The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Diplomatic Correspondence and Foreign Relations, 1862

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1862.

The correspondence of the Federal Governments with foreign governments daring 1862 was more voluminous than daring the preceding year, and embraces some interesting and important subjects arising out of the unusual state of affairs.

Great Britain. —As early as November, 1861, the action of the British Consul at Charleston, Mr. Bunch, became a subject of complaint by the Federal Government. This action consisted in communicating, under instructions from home, to the Confederate authorities the desire of her Majesty's Government that the second, third, and fourth articles of the declaration of Paris should be observed by the Confederate States in the prosecution of the hostilities in which they were engaged. The grounds alleged for complaint against this action of the Consul by the Federal Government were, that a statute of the United States forbids, under a heavy penalty, any person not specially appointed, or duly authorized or recognized by the President, whether citizen or denizen, privileged or unprivileged, from counselling or advising, aiding or assisting in any political correspondence with the Government of any foreign state whatever, with an intent to influence the measures of any foreign Government, or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of their Government. The conduct of Mr. Bunch was thus taken to be a wanton violation of the law of the United States, and its Government announced, as the result of the most calm and impartial deliberation, a necessity put upon it to revoke the exequatur of the Consul.

The reply of Earl Russell was, that the United States Government, by quoting this statute as the foundation on which to rest their complaint, seemed distinctly to admit that the Government of the Confederate States at Richmond was, as regards the United States, "the government of a foreign state "—an admission which goes further than any acknowledgment with regard to those states which her Majesty's Government had hitherto made. And if the Confederate States are, as regards the United States, a foreign state, which is implied by the grounds taken by the latter, then the President of the United States has no competence one way or the other, with respect to the functions of the Consuls of other Governments in that foreign state, and the exequaturs of such Consuls can be granted or withdrawn only by the government of such foreign state. The Confederate States cannot be at one and the same time "a foreign state," and part of the territory of the United States.

It had been further asserted by the United States Government that any communication to be addressed to the Government of the Confederate States respecting goods of a belligerent on board of neutral ships, &c, should have been made by diplomatic and not by consular agents, and the only authority in the United States to receive such a communication was the Government of the United States itself. To this assertion Earl Russell replies, that it is gravely telling her Majesty's Government that an application to the Confederate Government for redress ought to be made through the President of the United States. Her Majesty's Government may well ask whether such a position is seriously laid down, and whether the President of the United States can affirm that, in the present condition of things, he ha3the power to give effect to any such application which might be made to him. Could the President of the United States restore a British subject impressed into the Confederate service, or could he recover private debts due a British subject and confiscated under a Confederate or State law? It is then declared by Earl Russell to be a principle of international law, that when the persons or property of the citizens or subjects of a state are injured by a de facto government, the state so aggrieved has a right to claim from the de facto government redress and reparation. It may be necessary in future, for the protection of the interests of her Majesty's subjects, to have further communications both with the central authority at Richmond, and with the governors of the separate states, and in such cases communications will continue to be made, but such communications will not imply any acknowledgment of the Confederates as an independent state.

Mr. Adams, in reply, expressed astonishment that he should have given any justification of the view of the statute taken by Earl Russell through ambiguity in his previous communications, and proceeded to explain that the statute was designed to punish all persons, whether native or foreign, citizen or privileged, who knowingly made themselves instruments of foreign states to foment factious disturbances within the United States. In applying the law in a mitigated form to Mr. Bunch, he could not have made so great a mistake as to have assumed that he was dealing with "the government of a foreign state."

Respecting the other position taken by him, namely, that the Government was the only authority to which any diplomatic communication could be made, he urged that otherwise every proceeding was an attempt to undermine the authority to which an agent had been accredited, by his recognizing for any purpose the validity of a domestic antagonism within the limits of that authority. Other arguments were advanced by Mr. Adams, but the subject appears to have then been dropped. More than a year afterward, when an attack on Charleston was about to be made, the British war' steamer Cadmus entered that port and took away Mr. Bunch.

The next subject of discussion with her Majesty's Government arose from reports received by the Navy Department, that although the United States had a deposit of coal at Nassau, the Federal steamers were denied the right of taking it for use by the colonial authorities at that place. On the 24th of February, Mr. Adams Page 380  addressed a letter to Earl Russell stating the disbelief of the President that these proceedings had been sanctioned by her Majesty's Government, but if they had been, he requested such action in the proper quarter as might lead to a rectification of the error.

On the 25th of March, Earl Russell replied that coal had arrived at Nassau in the schooners Stetson and Perry, which could hardly he described as a deposit of coal existing at Nassau, although it was doubtless the coal referred to. On the arrival of the Stetson, the coal appeared by the vessel's papers to have been shipped by the Navy Department. The governor therefore gave directions that the coal should be admitted to an entry and landing, but that the United States Consul should be informed that it could not be permitted to be used in any manner which might involve a breach of the Queen's proclamation of the 13th of May, 1861, and particularly that the coaling at Nassau of vessels of war of either of the belligerent powers could not be allowed without the express sanction of her Majesty's Government laving been first obtained. Meantime the Perry arrived, laden with coal. On the 11th of December the U. S. war steamer Flambeau arrived, and on the next day the American Consul applied for permission to land the cargo of the Stetson, as she was leaking badly, or to discharge a part of it on board the Flambeau. Permission was given to him to land the coal, but not to transship it to the Flambeau. The coal was not however landed. The Consul then complained that the Confederate vessel Theodora had been supplied with coal by a merchant, to which the governor, in reply, said, that the Theodora was a merchant vessel trading to the port at Nassau, and that being propelled by steam, it was necessary, to enable her to pursue her occupation as a trader, that she should be supplied with coal. The furnishing this necessary article, therefore, for her use by a merchant in the way of trade, was perfectly lawful, and could not be construed into a breach of neutrality. On the other hand, the Flambeau was avowedly an armed vessel in the service of the Federal Government. To supply her with coal might facilitate her belligerent operations, and this would constitute an infraction of the neutrality prescribed by the Queen's proclamation. The object of the authorities at Nassau was to preserve a strict neutrality, and her Majesty's Government could not therefore withhold from the governor the approval to which he was entitled for the course which he had pursued. It was also pointed out that the cases of the James Adger and the Nashville at Southampton were not parallel cases. Those vessels were some thousands of miles distant from their respective homes, and to them, consequently, coal was an article of real necessity; whereas the Flambeau was within a very short distance of the ports of her own nation, Key West, for instance, where her necessities could readily be supplied. The application of-the United States Consul was not founded on the necessities of the Flambeau, but on the alleged necessities of the Stetson. The view taken of this decision is thus stated by Mr. Seward in a despatch to Mr. Adams, dated April 16: "The approval of the British Government of the proceedings of the governor of Nassau is regarded by the President as unfriendly toward a power that extends unrestricted hospitalities to the naval as well as the mercantile marine of Great Britain in its ports and harbors. The grievance is not sensibly alleviated by the fact that the Government of her Majesty are able to reconcile it with a proclamation issued by her Majesty in May last, conceding the rights of a belligerent to the insurgents in arms against the United States. The explanation obliges us to renew the declaration this Government has so often made, that it regards the proclamation itself as unnecessary, unfriendly, and injurious." The next subject of interest related to the preparation of the steam gunboat Oreto, which has subsequently appeared as a cruiser of the Confederate navy. On the 18th of February, Mr. Adams writes to Earl Russell that he had been informed of the preparation at Liverpool of an armed steamer, evidently intended for hostile operations on" the ocean. In reply, Earl Russell stated that the commissioners of the customs at Liverpool reported that she was built for certain parties in Liverpool, and intended for the use of Thomas, Brothers, of Palermo, one of whom had frequently visited the vessel during the process of building—that she had taken nothing on board but coal and ballast—that she was not fitted for the reception of guns; nor were the builders aware that she was to be supplied with guns whilst she remained in England, and the collector at Liverpool stated that he had every reason to believe that the vessel was for the Italian Government— also that special directions had been given to the officers at Liverpool to watch the movements of the vessel. Mr. Adams subsequently writes to Mr. Seward—"tho nominal destination of the Oreto to Sicily is the only advantage which appears to have been derived from my attempt to procure the interference of the Government to stop her departure."

 On the 25th of March, Mr. Adams writes again to Earl Russell, enclosing a letter from the American Consul at Liverpool, stating certain facts relative to the Oreto. Mr. Adams says: "It is with great reluctance that I am driven to the conviction that the representations made to your lordship of the purposes and destination of that vessel were delusive, and that though at first it may have been intended for service in Sicily, yet that such an intention has been long since abandoned in fact, and the pretence has been hold up only the better to conceal the true object of the parties engaged. That object is to make war on the United States. All the persons thus far known to be most connected with the undertaking are either Page 381 directly employed by the insurgents in the United States of America, or residents of Great Britain, notoriously in sympathy with, and giving aid and comfort to them on this side of the water."

On the 8th of April, Earl Russell replied to Mr. Adams, enclosing a report from the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's treasury, which states that the Oreto was registered on the 3d of March in the name of John Henry Thomas, of Liverpool, as solo owner, that she cleared on the following day for Palermo and Jamaica in ballast, but did not sail until the 22d, having a crew of fifty-two men, all British with the exception of three or four, one of whom was an American. She had no gunpowder, nor even a signal gun, and no colors save Marryatt's code of signals and a British ensign, nor any goods on board excepting the stores enumerated in an accompanying copy of her victualling bill.

On the 15th of April, a conference took place between Mr. Adams and Earl Russell. Its close is thus stated by the former:

In the case of the Oreto, upon which I had addressed a note to him, he had directed an investigation to be made, and the authorities at Liverpool had reported that there was no ground for doubting the legality of her voyage.

I replied that this was exactly what gave such unpleasant impressions to us in America. The Oreto, by the very paper furnished from the custom-house, was shown to be laden with a hundred and seventy tons of arms, and to have persons called troops on board, destined for Palermo and Jamaica. The very statement of the case was enough to show what was really intended. The fact of her true destination was notorious all over Liverpool. No commercial people were blind to it. And the course taken by her Majesty's officers in declaring ignorance only led to an inference most unfavorable to all idea of their neutrality in the struggle. It was just such action as this that was making the difficulties of our Government in the way of giving the facilities to the supply of cotton, which they hoped to furnish in a short time if the whole control of means to put an end to the contest was left to them.

His lordship concluded by a polite expression of regret at these circumstances, at the same time that he could not see how the Government could change its position.

The assertion of Mr. Adams relative to troops &c. is not sustained by the copy of the paper from the custom house contained in this volume of documents. The only part referring to troops and guns is as follows: —

"Men, 52; passengers or troops, ;guns, ; 178 tons."

Again, on the 26th of June, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Adams that a gunboat called the Oreto, built in England for the service of the insurgents, with ports and bolts for twenty guns, and other equipments, arrived at Nassau; and that the United States Consul, on the basis of the facts relative to her, made a protest upon the subject and she was seized by the authorities. She was, however, released soon after, on the arrival at Nassau of Captain Semmes, late of the Sumter, and was about to start on a privateering cruise. This release by the authorities of Nassau, Mr. Seward was instructed by the President to protest against, as it seemed to be particularly at variance with her Majesty's proclamation of neutrality—and to ask the consideration of her Majesty's Government upon the proceeding as one calculated to alarm the Government and people of the United States. The subject was duly brought to the notice of Earl Russell, who, on the 29th of August, replied that the Oreto had been seized at Nassau, and was to be tried before the admiralty court for a breach of the foreign enlistment act. This was accompanied by the statements of the collector, surveyor and inspector of the port of Liverpool, and the affidavit of the pilot, that the vessel, when she went to sea, had no munitions of war in her, that is guns, carriages, shot, shell, or powder.

No further reference is made to the Oreto in this correspondence, but the 280, or Alabama, is introduced as a more formidable object. On the 23d of June, Mr. Adams writes to Earl Russell, saying: —"I am now under the painful necessity of apprising your lordship that a new and still more powerful war steamer is nearly ready for departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand as the Oreto. This vessel has been built and launched from the dockyard of persons, one of whom is now sitting as a member of the House of Commons, and is fitting out for the especial and manifest object of carrying on hostilities by sea." Accompanying this was a letter from the United States Consul at Liverpool in confirmation of there and other statements.

The subject was immediately referred to the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's treasury, who, on the 1st of July, report that the fitting out of the vessel had not escaped the notice of the revenue officers, but that as yet nothing had transpired concerning her which had appeared to demand a special report. The vessel was intended for a ship of war, reported to be built for a foreign government, but as yet had neither guns nor carriages on board, and the builders did not appear disposed to reply to any questions respecting the destination of the vessel after she left Liverpool. Their solicitor, however, reported his opinion that there was not at that time sufficient ground to warrant the detention of the vessel, or any interference by the department. The Consul at Liverpool was then instructed by Mr. Adams to lay his evidence before the Commissioners. At the same time, he called Captain Craven, in command of the U. S. gunboat Tuscarora, to Southampton. To Captain Craven was given all the information respecting the objects and destination of the 290 in possession of Mr. Adams, who advised him to take such measures as might in his opinion be effective to intercept her on her way out.

Meanwhile evidence was procured of the character and objects of the vessel by the U. S. Consul at Liverpool, which, in the opinion of a Queen's solicitor, was sufficient to justify the collector of the port in seizing the vessel, and Page 382 laid before the commissioners. While the subject was under their consideration the 290 sailed from Liverpool, without register or clearance. The captain of the Tuscarora was immediately notified by Mr. Adams and he started in pursuit. Earl Russell, in a conference with Mr. Adams, stated that a delay in determining upon the case had most unexpectedly been caused by the sudden development of a malady of the Queen's advocate, Sir John D. Harding, totally incapacitating him for the transaction of business. This had made it necessary to call in other parties, whose opinion had been at last given for the detention of the gunboat, but before the order got down to Liverpool the vessel was gone. He should however send directions to live her seized if she went, as was probable, to Nassau. Instructions were also despatched to Ireland to detain the vessel, if she put into Queenstown.

On the 30th of September Mr. Adams wrote to Earl Russell, relating the injuries done by the 290 or Alabama, saying, "I have strong reasons to believe that still other enterprises of the same kind are in progress in the ports of Great Britain at this time. Indeed they have attained so much notoriety, as to be openly announced in the newspapers of Liverpool and London." Earl Russell, acknowledging the letter, in reply said: "I have to state to you that, much as her Majesty's Government desire to prevent such occurrences, they are unable to go beyond the law, municipal and international."

On the 9th of October Mr. Adams enclosed to Earl Russell the following intercepted letter, "as substantiating the allegations made of the infringement of the enlistment law by the insurgents of the United States in ports of Great Britain." He also added: "In the representations which I have had the honor lately to make, I beg to remind your lordship that I base them upon evidence which applies directly to infringements of municipal law itself, and not to anything beyond it."

                CONFEDFERATE STATES OF AMERICA,

    NAVY DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, July 12,1862.

Sir: Your letter of the 29th of March last reached me this morning.

The department notified you, on the 11th of January last, that you would receive orders to command the second vessel then being built in England, but for reasons satisfactory to the department, you were subsequently assigned to the command of the first vessel, the Florida (Oreto), now at Nassau, and any just ground for " the surprise and astonishment" in this respect at the department's action is not perceived.

A commission as commander for the war was sent you on the 5th of Mav, and your failure to follow the Oreto, which left England about the 21st of March, and to lake command of her, as was contemplated, and as you were apprised by Captain Bullock, on the 26th of March, is not understood, and has been productive of some embarrassment.

Captain Bullock was nominated by the executive for his position in the navy under existing law, and was duly confirmed by the Senate, and your protest to this department against the action of these coordinate branches of your government is out of place.

Upon the receipt of this letter you will turn over to Lieutenant Or. F. Sinclair the instructions which you may have received, together with any public funds in your hands, and return to the Confederate States in such manner as your judgment may direct.

Should you not be provided with funds for this purpose, Commander Bullock will, upon your application, supply them.

    I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

                       S. H. MALLORY, Secretary of the Navy.

   Commander Jas. H. North,

                          C. S. N., London, England.

On the 16th of October Mr. Adams writes home to Mr. Seward that, "It is very manifest that no disposition exists here to apply the powers of the Government to the investigation of the acts complained of, flagrant as they are, or to the prosecution of the offenders. The main object must now be to make a record which may be of use at some future day."

Among the papers laid before Earl Russell by Mr. Adams was an affidavit of a person who sailed from Liverpool in the 290, stating that arms were furnished to her in or near Augra Bay, part of the Azores. To which Earl Russell replies that the transaction does not appear to have taken place in any part of the United Kingdom, or of her Majesty's dominions, but in part of the Portuguese dominions. No offence, therefore, cognizable by the laws of the country, appears to have been committed by the parties engaged in the transaction. Respecting a statement in a letter of the American consul at Liverpool, that a bark was to take out a cargo of coals, either from Cardiff or Troon, near Greenock, for the 290, Earl Russell replies that "there would be great difficulty in ascertaining the intention of any parties making such a shipment; and we do not apprehend that our officers would have any power of interfering with it, were the coals cleared outward for some foreign port in compliance with the law." No further correspondence relative to the 290 and the Oreto took place. (See NAVY, CONFEDERATE.)

The discussions between the two Governments relating to these vessels were also extended to the subject of furnishing supplies to the Confederate States by means of vessels fitted out in English ports to run the blockade. On the 11th of March, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams that information had been received that insurance companies in England were insuring vessels engaged in running the blockade, and even vessels carrying contraband of war. This, he said, "was, in effect, a combination of British capitalists, under legal authority, to levy war against the United States. It is entirely inconsistent with the relations of friendship, which we, on our part, maintain toward Great Britain." Earl Russell, in reply to the representations of Mr. Adams, said: —" The matter shall have the due consideration of her Majesty's Government." On the 25th of March, Mr. Adams writes to Earl Russell as follows:

It is obvious that just in proportion to the success of the efforts made by the ill-intentioned people of foreign countries to violate the blockade must be the endeavors to enforce it with increased stringency. So, also, in proportion to the success of such persons in Page 383 supplying, by violation of law, the insurgents with the means or continuing their resistance, must be the delay in restoring to all honest people the customary facilities of trade and intercourse to which they are justly entitled. It has not been without great regret that the Government has been compelled to observe the extent to which her Majesty's flag has been abused to subserve the purposes of the disaffected, and thus to continue the present depressed condition of legitimate trade. A very great proportion of the vessels which attempted to violate the blockade appear to be fitted out directly from Great Britain, or some of her dependencies. The effect of permitting such violations of good faith to go unnoticed by Government is not merely to create an unfortunate degree of irritation in America, implicating many for beyond the sphere of the unworthy parties concerned in producing it, but to postpone proportionately the prospect of bringing about a better state of things. It is for this reason, as well as from a desire earnestly felt by the President to maintain unbroken all the customary relations of amity with Great Britain, that I have been directed to make the present representation. Any suggestion of the means best adapted to remedy the evils complained of is deemed a matter exclusively within the competency of those in whom the decision to act Is vested.

On the 27th, Earl Russell replied as follows:

The charge that nearly all the assistance now obtained from abroad by persons still in arms against the Government of the United States, and which enables them to continue the struggle, comes from Great Britain and its dependencies, is somewhat vague. I believe the greater part of the arms and ammunition sent from this country to America during the struggle has gone to the United States.

I agree with you in the statement that the duty of nations in amity with each other is not to suffer their good faith to be violated by ill-disposed persons within their borders, merely from the inefficiency of their prohibitory policy. But it is, at the same time, a duty not to punish persons on suspicion, without any proof of their evil intent. It is not the custom of this country to deprive any person of liberty or property without evidence of some offense. If such evidence can be obtained, the laws are sufficient to prevent the accomplishment of their evil designs against friendly nations.

You have not yourself hitherto furnished me with evidence that any vessel has received a hostile or warlike equipment in British waters, which has been afterward used against the United States. The care that was taken to prevent the warlike equipment of the Nashville in British waters must be familiar to your recollection.

With regard to cooperation with the policy of the United States in respect to the blockade, I must remind you that Great Britain has abstained, as far as possible, from complaints of the irregularity of the blockade which has been instituted.

Her Majesty's government have been mindful of the suddenness of the danger with which the United States were threatened; of the inadequacy of the naval force then at the disposal of the Government, and of the great difficulty of blockading a coast of three thousand miles. But beyond forbearance and a liberal interpretation of the law of nations in favor of the United States, her Majesty's Government cannot go. If by cooperation with the policy of the United States is meant either taking part in the civil war still raging, or imposing restraints on the Queen's subjects unknown to international law, I cannot undertake that her Majesty's Government will adopt either of those courses. It would be an unheard-of measure to prohibit merchants from sending ships to sea destined to the Southern ports. Should such ships attempt to violate the blockade, capture and condemnation are the proper penalty of such attempts. No authority can be found for any other.

On the 4th of April, Mr. Seward again requests Mr. Adams to bring the subject to the notice of Earl Russell, "in the hope that the time may have at last come when British subjects, deliberately and wickedly engaged as abettors in the existing warfare against the Government, may be subjected to some restraint, or, at least, be made to feel Her Majesty's severe displeasure." In reply to these views presented by Mr. Adams, on the 15th of April, Earl Russell expressed his belief that the parties engaged in these undertakings were not so much interested in the cause of the insurgents as in the profits to be expected by running the blockade. Such attempts always would be made in similar cases. For the rest, these adventurers were compelled to take their own risk. They had the dangers of capture to encounter, and the certainty of being deprived of their rights of reclamation. The Government had no disposition to give them protection. On the 25th of April, Mr. Adams writes to Mr. Seward: "Meantime outfits of vessels with supplies to run the blockade go on with increased vigor. Every account received of a successful voyage stimulates to enlarged contributions."

In a letter, on the 30th, to Earl Russell, Mr. Adams refers to the subject again, saying:

I deem it my duty to represent to your lordship the fact that the Government of the Unhid States finds itself involved in peculiar embarrassment in regard to its policy toward the vessels of Great Britain, from the difficulty, to which I have repeatedly called your lordship's attention, of distinguishing between the lawful and the unlawful trade carried on upon the coast of the United Stales in vessels bearing her Majesty's flag. It comes presented to me in so many forms of evidence, that I cannot avoid the painful conviction that a systematic plan, founded on the intent to annul her Majesty's proclamation by steady efforts to violate the blockade through vessels either actually British, or else sailing under British colors, has been in operation in this island for many months, and becomes more rather than less extensive with the progress of time.

To this letter Earl Russell emphatically replied on the 6th of May, in these words:

With regard to the "systematic plan" which you say has been pursued by "her Majesty's subjects "to violate the blockade by steady efforts, there are some reflections which I am surprised have not occurred to you.

The United States Government, on the allegation of a rebellion pervading from nine to eleven States of the Union, have now for more than twelve months endeavored to maintain a blockade of three thousand miles of coast. This blockade, kept np irregularly, but when enforced, enforced severely, has seriously injured the trade and manufactures of the United Kingdom. Thousands of persons are now obliged to resort to the poor rate for subsistence, owing to this blockade. Yet her Majesty's Government have never sought to take advantage of the obvious imperfections of this blockade, in order to declare it ineffective. They have, to the loss and detriment of the British nation, scrupulously observed the duties of Great Britain toward a friendly state. But when her Majesty's Government are asked to go beyond this, and to overstep the existing powers given them by municipal and international law for the purpose of imposing arbitrary restrictions on the trade of her Majesty's subjects, it is impossible to listen to such suggestions. The ingenuity of persons engaged in commerce will always, in some degree, defeat attempts to starve or debar from commercial Page 384 intercourse an extensive coast inhabited by a large and industrious population.

If, therefore, the Government of the United States consider it for their interest to inflict this great injury on other nations, the utmost they can expect is that European powers shall respect those acts of the United States which arc within the limits of the law. The United States Government cannot expect that Great Britain should frame new statutes to aid the Federal blockade, and to carry into effect the restrictions on commerce which the United States, for their own purposes, have thought fit to institute, and the application of which it is their duty to confine within the legitimate limits of international law.

Two days later Mr. Adams responded as follows:

In declaring that blockade the Government of the United States are believed to have done nothing which has not been repeatedly done heretofore, and the right to do which at any time hereafter, whenever the necessity shall appear to call for it, is not distinctly affirmed by the Government of Great Britain. Neither does the fact that this proceeding pressed with the greatest severity upon the interests of neutral nations appear formerly to have been regarded in any other light than as an incidental damage, which, however much regretted in itself, unavoidably follows from the gravity of the emergency which created it. For it can scarcely be supposed that so onerous a task as a veritable blockade will be undertaken by any nation for causes not deemed of paramount necessity, or will be persevered in one moment longer than those causes continue to operate. I am very sure that it is the desire of the Government of the United States to accelerate the period when the blockade now in operation may be safely raised. To that end it is bending all its efforts. And in this it claims to be mindful, not simply of the interests of its own citizens, but likewise of those of all friendly nations. Hence it is that it views with deep regret the strenuous efforts of evil disposed persons in foreign countries, by undertakings carried on in defiance of all recognized law, to impair, so far as they can, the efficacy of its measures, and in a corresponding degree to protract the severity of the struggle. Hence it is, likewise, that it has been profoundly concerned at the inefficacy of the laws of Great Britain, in which a large proportion of the undertakings originate, to apply any adequate policy of prevention. For I doubt not your lordship will see at a glance the embarrassment in which a country is necessarily involved by complaints raised of the continued severity of a blockade by a friendly nation, which at the same time confesses its inability to restrain its subjects from stimulating the resistance that necessitates a continuance of the very state of things of which they make complaint.

That a sense of the difficulties consequent upon the action of such persons prompted the enactment of the statute of his Majesty George the Third, of the 3d July, 1819, is made plain by the language of its preamble. It is therein stated that it was passed because the laws then in force were not sufficiently effectual to prevent the evil complained of. It now appears from the substance of the representations which I have heretofore had the honor to make to your lordship, that the provisions of that law are as little effectual in curing the evil as those of any of its predecessors. But I am pained to be obliged to gather from the concluding words of your lordship's note that the expression of an opinion that the United States, in the execution of a measure conceded to be correct, as well as justified by every precedent of international law as construed by the highest British authorities, cannot expect that Great Britain should frame new statutes to remedy the deficiency of its own laws to prevent what it acknowledges on the face of that statute to be evils created by its own refractory subjects. I must be permitted to say, in reply, that, in my belief, the Government of the United States would scarcely be disposed to make a similar reply to her Majesty's Government were the relative position of the two countries to be reversed.

Permit me, in conclusion, to assure your lordship that the grounds upon which the representations I have had the honor to make [were founded] have not been hastily considered. So far from it, the extent of the evil complained of has been under rather than overstated. I have now before me a list of eleven steamers and ten sailing vessels that have been equipped and despatched within thirty days, or are now preparing, freighted with supplies of all kinds for the insurgents from one port of Great Britain alone. These supplies, I have reason to believe, are to be conveyed to Nassau, which place is used as an entrepot for the convenience of vessels under British colors, employed for the sole purpose of breaking the blockade. I have reasons for supposing that the business is reduced to a system, emanating from a central authority situated at London; and further, that large sums of money have been contributed by British subjects to aid in carrying it on. If the United States have, in any of their relations with, with her Majesty's Government, committed some act not within the legitimate limits of international law which justifies the declaration of a disposition not to provide against such obvious violations of the neutrality proclaimed at the outset of this deplorable struggle, I trust I may be so clearly presented to their consideration by your lordship as to supply the means either of explanation or of remedy.

On the 10th of May, Mr. Adams, writing relative, to the case of the Emily St. Pierre, hereafter mentioned, argued the duty of the Government to suppress these attempts to send supplies to the Confederate States, from the intention of the queen's proclamation. (&c. Annual Cyclopedia, 1861; Public Documents.) Earl Russell immediately replied as follows:

                                        FOREIGN OFFICE, May 10,1862.

SIR: In the letter I had the honor to receive from you yesterday you appear to have confounded two things totally distinct:

The foreign enlistment act is intended to prevent the subjects of the crown from going to war when the sovereign is not at war. Thus private persons are prohibited from fitting out a ship-of-war in our ports or from enlisting in the service of a foreign state at war with another state, or in the service of insurgents against a foreign sovereign or state. In these cases the persons so acting would carry on war, and thus might engage the name of their sovereign and of their nation in belligerent operations. But owners and masters of merchant ships carrying warlike stores do nothing of the kind. If captured for breaking a blockade or carrying contraband of war to the enemy of the captor, they submit to capture, are tried, and condemned to lose their cargo. This is the penalty which the" law of nations has affixed to such an offence, and in calling upon her Majesty's Government to prohibit such adventures you in effect call upon her Majesty's Government to do that which it belongs to the cruisers and the courts of the United States to do for themselves.

There can be only one pica for asking Great Britain thus to interpose. That plea is, that the blockade is in reality ineffective, and that merchant ships can enter with impunity the blockaded ports. But this is a plea which I presume you will not urge. Her Majesty's Government have considered the blockade as an effective blockade, and have submitted to all its inconveniences as such.

They can only hope that, if resistance should prove to be hopeless, the Confederate States will not continue the struggle; but if, on the other hand, the restoration of the Union should appear to be impossible, the work of devastation now going on will cease.

Her Majesty's Government can only desire the prosperity of the' inhabitants of the United States, whatever may be the event of the present civil war.

Mr. Adams's answer was dated on the 12th, as follows:

                     LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, LONDON,

                                                       May 12, 1862.  

MY LORD: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of your note of the 10th instant. From the purport of it I am led to fear that I may have been unfortunate heretofore in my attempts to express my own meaning. If I have appeared to your lordship to confound two things so very dissimilar as the penalties of the enlistment act and the liabilities which follow from the attempt to break a blockade, I can only say that the fault must be laid to my want of ability to use words properly to express my thoughts.

The position which I did mean to take was this: that the intent of the enlistment act, as explained by the words of this preamble, was to prevent the unauthorized action of subjects of Great Britain, disposed to embark in the contests of foreign nations, from involving the country in the risk of a war with these countries. This view of the law does not seem to be materially varied by your lordship; when speaking of the same thing you say that the law applies to cases where "private persons so acting would carry on, and thus might engage the name of their sovereign and of their nation in belligerent operations." It is further shown by that preamble that that act was an additional act of prevention, made necessary by experience of the inefficiency of former acts passed to effect the same object.

But it is now made plain that whatever may have been the skill with which this latest act was drawn, it does not completely fulfil its intent, because it is very certain that many British subjects are now engaged in undertakings of a hostile character to a foreign state which, though not technically within the strict letter of the enlistment act, are as much contrary to its spirit as if they levied war directly. The measures embrace all of the operations preliminary to openly carrying on war—the supply of men, and ships, and arms, and money to one party in order that they may be the better enabled to overcome the other, which other is in this case a nation with which Great Britain is now under treaty obligations of the most solemn nature to maintain a lasting peace and friendship. The Government of the United States having, in the course of its hostile operations, bad occasion to experience the injurious effects of this virtual levying of war against itself from the ports of a friendly power, and seeing the obstacle in the way of the removal of them to be alleged to be the inefficiency of a statute intended to effect that object, does not regard it as asking anything unreasonable, or more than it would in lite case be willing itself to grant if it solicits some action to render effective the spirit as well of the law as of her Majesty's enunciation of the national will.

I perceive that your lordship appears to be of opinion that, in this proceeding, the Government of the United States is asking, more than is reasonable. It is, in your view, sufficient to declare that owners and masters of merchant ships, fitted out with intent to break a blockade or any contraband of war to one of two parties engaged in war, are subject to capture, trial, and condemnation, if caught by the offended party. And hence, in this case, that the Government of the United States, in calling upon her Majesty's Government to prohibit such adventures, is in effect calling upon it to do that which it ought to do for itself. The only valid plea, your lordship remarks, for asking 'interposition, is, that the blockade is in reality ineffective; and this, you very justly presume, I shall not be disposed to urge.

But I pray your lordship's pardon if I submit that you appear to have entirely overlooked another plea, which I am confident enough to imagine of no inconsiderable weight. That plea is that the kingdom of Great Britain endeavor in spirit as well as in letter to preserve the principle of neutrality, if not of friendship, toward a foreign power in amity with it to which it has pledged itself. The precise mode in which that shall be done, it does not presume to prescribe. That the toleration of such conduct in subjects of Great Britain, as I have had the pain heretofore to expose, is surely in violation of that neutrality, is justly to be inferred from the very language of her Majesty's proclamation. For it is therein declared that precisely such acts of theirs as I have been compelled to complain of are done "in derogation of their duty to her as a neutral sovereign, and incur her high displeasure." If such, then, be the true character of the proceedings to which I have heretofore called your lordship's attention, they surely merit something more of notice from her Majesty's ministers than an intimation that they will be suffered to pass unreproved unless the punishment shall be inflicted by the nation whom they are designed to injure. The object of the Government of the United States has not been to relieve itself of the duty of vigilance to capture offenders against the law. It has rather been to avoid the necessity of applying additional stringent measures for their own security against British subjects found to be engaged in such illicit enterprises, made imperative by the conviction that no preventive cooperation whatever can be expected from her Majesty’s Government. It has rather been to avoid the risk of confounding the innocent with the guilty, because all happen to be involved in a general suspicion. And, lastly, it has rather been to remove, at as early a day as may be, consistently with its own safety, the restrictions on the trade with foreign countries, which these evil-doers are laboring with so much industry to force it to protract. Your lordship's language leaves me little hope of any cooperation of her Majesty's Government to these ends. Nevertheless, I trust I may be permitted to indulge the belief that the time is not now far distant when the difficulties thus interposed in the way of its progress will have been so far removed by its own unassisted action as to relieve both countries from the painful necessity of further continuing the discussion.

The correspondence on this subject was closed by the following note from Earl Russell to Mr. Adams:

                                             FOREIGN OFFICE, May 17, 1862.

SIR: I do not wish to prolong this correspondence, and shall only make one remark in answer to your last letter.

If the British Government, by virtue of the prerogative of the crown or by authority of parliament, had prohibited and could have prevented the conveyance in British ships of arms and ammunition to the Confederate States, and had allowed the transport of such contraband of war to New York and to other Federal ports, her Majesty's Government would have departed from the neutral position they have assumed and maintained.

If, on the other hand, her Majesty's Government had prohibited and could have prevented the transport of arms and ammunition to both the contending parties, they would have deprived the United States of a great part of the means by which they have carried on the war. The arms and ammunition received from Great Britain, as well as from other neutral countries, have enabled the United States to fit out the formidable armies now engaged in carrying on the war against the Southern States, while by means of the blockade established by the Federal Government, the Southern States have been deprived of similar advantages.

The impartial observance of neutral obligations by her Majesty's Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more powerful of the two contending parties.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,                     

                                                                            RUSSELL.

           CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

The action of her Majesty's Government in according to the Confederate States belligerent rights, was a subject of constant correspondence. It was pressed by Mr. Seward as the most important Page 386 portant of all the questions arising between the two Governments. Nevertheless, her Majesty's Government remained inflexible in the position which it had taken. At one time, on August 22d, Mr. Adams writes to Mr. Seward that he had been told, but not by authority such as to place the matter altogether beyond a doubt, that his (Mr. Seward's) despatch in connection with preceding ones likewise communicated, and other considerations, had had so much effect on the Ministry as to incline them to leave open a way to the revisal of their former policy depending on the issue of the movement upon Richmond. Had that been successful, the recognition of belligerent rights was to have been withdrawn.

Representations were also made to her Majesty's Government, relative to the proceedings at Nassau, by parties engaged in running the blockade, but they were not successful in obtaining any interference of the Government. Representations were also made by British subjects at Liverpool, relative to a kind of blockade of the island by American cruisers. (See Blockade.) But the Government made no concessions to the petitioners.

The case of the ship Emily St. Pierre was one of considerable interest. On the 24th of April, Mr. Adams wrote to Earl Russell that this ship, being under a British register, and belonging to British subjects residing in Liverpool, was found on the 18th of March previous, attempting to run into the port of Charleston, in South Carolina, in violation of the blockade, there legitimately established. She was seized, and the crew, with the exception of the commander, the steward, and cook, taken out, and a prize crew of three officers and twelve men put on board, with directions to proceed to Philadelphia. The captain being left at liberty on board, concerted a scheme by which he surprised and took possession of the vessel, and compelled the seamen to navigate the ship to the port of Liverpool, where he sent them ashore, and took shelter for himself under the authority of the British Government. Mr. Adams asked for the restoration of the vessel, on the ground that it had been decided that such an act would work a total confiscation of vessel and cargo, and that the unlawful intent of the voyage was too strongly indicated to justify the extension to it of any protection by the Government.

Earl Russell replied, on the 7th of May, that her Majesty's Government were unable to comply with the request for the restoration of the ship, inasmuch as they had no jurisdiction or legal power whatever to take or to acquire possession of her, or interfere with her owners in relation to their property in her. Further, her Majesty's Government could not raise in an English court the question of the validity of the capture of this ship, or of the subsequent rescue and recapture, for such recapture is not an offence against the municipal law of England.

On the 9th of May, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Adams:—"Your proceeding, in asking from the British Government the restoration of the prize ship Emily St. Pierre, is approved, equally for its promptness and the grounds upon which it was adopted."

Mr. Adams replied to Earl Russell on th6 10th of May, by quoting the opinion of Lord Stowell, as the highest judicial authority of Great Britain, as follows:—" If a neutral master attempts a rescue, he violates a duty which is imposed upon him by the law of nations to submit to come in for inquiry as to the property of the ship or cargo; and if he violates that obligation by a recurrence to force, the consequence will undoubtedly reach the property of his owner ; and it would, I think, extend also to the confiscation of the whole cargo intrusted to his care, and thus fraudulently attempted to be withdrawn from the rights of war."

Mr. Adams then refers to the Queen's proclamation as warning her subjects, and all persons entitled to her protection, that if they shall presume, in contempt thereof, to do any act in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign, or in violation, or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf, they will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences, by statute or by the law of nations imposed. From the words of this proclamation he inferred a jurisdiction existing in Great Britain, capable of taking cognizance of cases arising under the law of nations, and beyond the range of the municipal law.

On the 12th of June Earl Russell replied by stating the principles involved in the case, and closed the correspondence on the subject as follows:

You speak of the rescue of the Emily St. Pierre ns being a fraud by the law of nations. But whether the act of rescue be viewed as one of fraud or of force, or as partaking of both characters, the act was done only against the rights accruing to a belligerent under the law of nations relating to war, and in violation of the law of war; which, whilst it permits the belligerent to exercise and enforce such rights against neutrals by the peculiar and exceptional right of capture, at the same time leaves to the belligerent alone the duty and confers upon him the power of vindicating such rights and of enforcing such law. The same law not only does not require, but does not even permit, neutral nations to carry out belligerent rights.

You allude to the conduct of the United States Government in the case of the Trent; but the flagrant wrong done in that case was done by a naval officer in the service of the United States; the prisoners whose release was demanded were in the direct custody and keeping of the executive Government, and the Government of the United States had actually the power to deliver them up, and did deliver them up, to the British Government But the Emily St. Pierre is not in the power of the Executive Government of this country; and the law of England, as well as the law of nations, forbids the Executive Government from taking away that ship from its legal owners.

I do not think it necessary to dwell, or even to remark, on the observations which you repent in your present letter as to the terms of her Majesty's proclamation, and as to the course which you suggest her Majesty's Government should adopt for giving effect to them.

I can only again assure you that her Majesty's Government have been most careful in observing strictly that impartial course which neutrality enjoins.

Mr. Adams, writing to Secretary Seward on the 18th of June, says:

It is not a little strange that this very question appears to have occupied the attention of the two Governments so far back as in the year 1800. My attention has been called to this fact by my under secretary, Mr. Moran, who happened to find the correspondence on the subject in the third volume of the collection of American State papers relating to foreign affairs. It was the British Government which then made the claim on almost the identical grounds taken by me, and the American declined acceding to it, substantially for the same reasons given by Lord Russell.

One of the most important subjects of negotiation during the year was a treaty for the suppression of the slave trade. (See Public Documents.) It admits, within certain limits, the search and seizure by British cruisers of vessels under the American flag supposed to be engaged in that traffic. Mr. Seward states, in his despatch to Mr. Perry at Madrid on August 2d: "It was freely offered by this Government to Great Britain, not bought, or solicited by that Government. It is in harmony with the sentiments of the American people. It was ratified by the Senate, unanimously, and afterward distinctly approved with not less unanimity by both Houses of Congress. Not a voice has been raised against it in the country." This treaty granted to Great Britain a privilege which had been inflexibly refused by the American Government since it was organized. Its exercise without permission had heretofore caused more irritated feelings in the United States against Great Britain than any other subject.

The correspondence between the two Governments during the year, amid all the embarrassing circumstances which existed, appears to have been conducted in a most friendly spirit. Her Majesty's Government seem by these papers to be actuated by no other purpose then to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality according to the law of nations between the two contending parties, and although the position assumed, to regard each as belligerents, has been considered by the Federal Government "as unnecessary and tending injuriously to prolong the war," yet her Majesty's Government have justly claimed the right to determine their own position, and have inflexibly maintained it. Apart from this point, each government has been prompt to listen to every complaint from the other, and treated it with the highest respect. Nothing appears in this correspondence to indicate that the Government of Great Britain entertains any other than the most friendly feelings toward the Government and people of the United States, and indulges the sincere desire that the bitter conflict, which is exhausting alike the North and the South, may be speedily so closed as to promote the welfare of the whole country. Still it might be asked, how the building of war steamers, and the shipment of the munitions and supplies from Liverpool to Nassau, and thence to the Confederate States, could be consistent with the existence of such friendly feeling? Such munitions and supplies have been shipped with equal freedom to the United States. These acts are not inconsistent with a position of neutrality, and the freedom of commerce of which the construction of the ship Great Admiral for Russia, and the Hudson and others for Greece, by the United States, are examples.

France.— The correspondence with France represents that country as determined not to interfere with the blockade of the Confederate ports, but as exceedingly anxious for the cessation of the domestic strife. Mr. Dayton writes on the 12th of February:

The Emperor, last night, in a brief conversation held with him while at a private ball at the Tuileries, again expressed his earnest wish that our domestic strife was brought to a close. When I told him that I had sanguine hopes of success at no distant day, he asked me specially about the condition of the roads, and the possibility of turning aside from them into the open country. He referred to the great difficulty of moving wagons, cannon, and the immense materiel essential to a great army over a single road, especially in a wooded country, illustrating it forcibly, as he did, by his own troubles and perplexities in his Italian campaign.

On the 18th of March, Mr. Dayton reports a conference with M. Thouvenel, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. "He asked again most anxiously when they should have cotton 1 I referred him to your despatch, and assured him of our earnest desire to afford the earliest facilities to foreign governments for the procurement of it. He said that petitions and memorials were being daily addressed to the Emperor on this subject: that the suffering and destitution in certain portions of France for want of it were constantly on the increase. Do not delay action, I beg of you, a day beyond the time that you can act on this subject with propriety."

On the 25th of March, Mr. Dayton had an interview with the Emperor. He writes, "I was most kindly received, and he said at once that he wished to have a talk with me about cotton, and the prospect of opening our ports. He spoke of the great inconvenience connected with the existing condition of things, and feared it would not speedily come to an end; that the war might yet be a long one." After explanations on these points, Mr. Dayton referred aa usual on every occasion to the granting of belligerent rights to the Confederate States, saying: "I told him we honestly believed that if a proclamation by France and England, withdrawing belligerent rights from the insurrectionists, should be made, the insurrection would collapse at once." During the conversation, the Emperor declared he must frankly say when the insurrection broke out, and this concession of belligerent rights was made, he did not suppose the North would succeed; that it was the general belief of statesmen in Europe that the two sections would never come Page 388 together again. This belief, he intimated, was a principal reason why this concession of belligerent rights was then granted. The close of this conference is thus reported by Mr. Dayton: "Without expressing any opinion upon these matters, he said he would think of them, but hoped in the meantime that something would be done by us to relieve the difficulties here growing out of the want of cotton."

Mr. Seward, writing to Mr. Dayton on the 26th, says, relative to a former inquiry of the Emperor whether cotton will come: "Upon this point you may safely assure him that all apprehensions are, in our view, groundless." Mr. Seward was mistaken. The cotton did not come to any amount of importance even with the port of New Orleans open. (See Commerce.) Mr. Dayton writes on March 31st, "That (cotton) is now the great and leading point of interest between them (the French Government) and us." "The French Government has come to the conclusion, I think, that we will get possession of the cotton ports, but they seem now to be troubled with grave doubts whether, in that event, even, cotton will be forthcoming." He then relates a conference with M. Thouvenel, at which he again called his attention to the propriety of his Government's retracing its steps in regard to its concession of belligerent rights to the Confederates.

On the 22d of April, Mr. Dayton writes that M. Thouvenel had returned from a visit to the manufacturing districts, and assured him that it was painful to see the immense establishments not at work and the population unemployed; the distress was great and the demand for cotton most urgent.

On the 16th of May, Mr. Dayton writes: "Without a still further change for the better in the condition of things at home, or some encouraging information from Mr. Adams, I hesitate to urge the point further (revoking the concession of belligerent rights). It might be considered as savoring of importunity, or, at all events, as wanting in that diplomatic forbearance which this Government would have a right to expect." He closes with a postscript, stating that a communication from Mr. Adams had just been received, which, he says, "informs me that the British Government had' no intention to vary the policy' adopted heretofore ; and he states further, 'the answer was that the great ports were not yet in our possession, and the issue appeared yet uncertain.'"

In a despatch dated August 18, Mr. Seward thus states the position of the United States, relative to the war between France and Mexico: "This Government, relying on the explanations which have been made by France, regards the conflict as a war involving claims by France which Mexico has failed to adjust to the satisfaction of her adversary, and it avoids intervention between the belligerents."

The quiet posture of affairs between the two Governments continued undisturbed, notwithstanding numerous rumors relative to mediation or intervention by France in American affairs. On the 6th of November, Mr. Dayton had a conference with M. Drouyn de I'Huys, who, on the 13th of October, succeeded M. Thouvenel, which he has thus related to Secretary Seward:

I have to-day had a conversation of some length with M. Drouyn de I'Huys in reference to our affairs. I told him that circumstances were such as to induce me to ask him distinctly whether any action was in contemplation by France, or by France conjointly with other powers, in reference to the condition of things in our country. he said no; that everything remained as it had done for some time past. That France, in common with the other powers of Europe, very much regretted the war and its continuance, but they had no purpose to intervene or interfere in any way. I then said to him I had seen it stated that France, England, and Russia were conferring upon the propriety of offering mediation. He said that the wish that the wit could be ended, or that something could be done, with the assent of the belligerent parties, had been spoken of, and it was yet spoken of, but nothing had been resolved upon. In further conversation he said that France reserved to herself the right to express this wish to the parties if it should be thought advisable to do so, or that good would grow out of it I told him that this at once brought us back to the starting point; that the expression of such wish would be, I presumed, but an Oder of mediation in another form. He said no; if there were any word which could express less than "mediation," that such word should be used in its place.

To test the character of this offer or suggestion, which he reserved to himself the right to make, I said: suppose your offer or suggestion, it made, shall be refused, what will be the consequences? He said: "nothing;" that we would be friends, as we had been before. I told him that I had just seen it stated in the English press, that some such offer of mediation was to be made by the three Powers, and, in the event of our refusal to accept it, the independence of the South was to be acknowledged. He said that was not so; that no such consequences would follow a refusal upon our part; that things would remain as before. 1 told him that we should look upon an acknowledgment of the South as but a form of intervention. To this he assented, and said they did not think of intruding into our affairs in any way, or intervening in any form; that their intent would be comprised in the expression of a wish to be useful, if it could be done with the assent of both parties. I told him that the Emperor, at an early day, hod expressed such wish, and that he had been willing to act the part of a friend between the two, if they should mutually request it. He said that such was yet his disposition, and nothing more, except that the calamities of this civil war and increased and strengthened the wish on his part. I may add that I said to M. Drouyn de I'Huys, unofficially, however, as I told him, that such an offer, if it should even be made, would come to nothing.

The correspondence with the Government of France contained in the volume published by the order of Congress, closes on the 6th of November. Subsequently, Congress called for the continuation of the correspondence, and it was published in a separate form. It embraces the action of the respective governments on the subject mentioned in the note of November 6th above.

On the 17th of November, Mr. Dayton writes to M. Drouyn de l'Huys, stating that the occasion of his letter is found in some questions asked by M. Drouyn de 1'Huys relative to the population of the Southern States, of the United States, Page 389 and to the position of the several divisions of the Federal army, and also in the following statement contained in a despatch from his Majesty's Government to its ministers at London and St. Petersburg. (See Public Documents.) In that despatch M. Drouyn de l'Huys said: "There has existed between the belligerents, from the very outset of the war, an equality of strength which has been almost constantly maintained ever since; and after so much bloodshed, they are now, in this respect, very nearly in the same position as at first. Nothing justifies the expectation of any more decided military operations at an early day." In his letter, Mr. Dayton proceeds to describe the result of the army operations, and the ground lost by the Confederate States, respecting which he thus concludes:

In a word, the insurgents do not now hold a foot of ground which they did not hold early in the war, while the flag of the Union has been constantly advanced, and now floats somewhere on the soil or over the fortifications of every slave State (save one). Their armies have in the mean time been driven from an area of country embracing in the aggregate not less than one hundred thousand square miles, and occupied by a population ranging from one million and a half to five millions of people.

He then examines the census returns for the population of the antagonist portions of the Union, and considers the money and other resources, thus intending to show the degree of inequality between the combatants, for the purpose of modifying the opinion of the French minister.

On the 23d, M. Drouyn de l'Huys replied as follows:

It is none the less true that, notwithstanding the inequality of numbers and of financial means, notwithstanding local advantages and partial conquests, the conditions of soil and of climate seem to oppose insuperable obstacles to the progress of the struggle, and that the equal energy of both sides tends to impress upon it a character of indomitable desperation. I am prepared to render homage with you to the courage which the Americans upon the one side and the other have shown thus far; hut this courage, even while it excites the admiration of the world, is only calculated to render more uncertain the result of the combats, and to retard the termination of the disasters of this bloody war.

You know, sir, what feelings this sad spectacle has given rise to in us; you know the step which a profound sympathy for America has inspired in the Government of the Emperor, in the hope of opening a way to a reconciliation. This step you know also ought and could take place in the opinion of the Emperor only with the consent and concurrence of the two belligerent parties. At present the reception given to our proposition by the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg prevents us from thinking of pursuing it further; but I can assure you, sir, that our friendly dispositions have not changed. If some day the Americans, tired of turning weir valor against themselves, should wish to have recourse to us in order to seek in concert the means of terminating this conflict, they would find us always ready (be it in associating ourselves with other Powers, or be it separately) to aid them with our cooperation, and to testily, by our good offices, feelings which hare not ceased to animate France in regard to them.

A despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton, dated November 30th, expresses the views of the Government on the unsuccessful proposition of France to Great Britain and Russia. He says: An inconclusive conference concerning the United States has been held between these Powers, all of whom avow themselves as friends of the United States, and yet the United States were carefully excluded from the conference. Neither party in the conference proposed any combination to coerce the will or control the policy of the United States.

Under these circumstances the United States arc not called upon to say what they would have done if the proposition of France, which was declined by Russia and Great Britain, had been adopted and carried into effect. Nor are we called upon to discuss the propriety of the positions and proceedings respectively of the several parties in the conference. Such a debate upon a subject which has already lost its practical character, or which, to speak more accurately, has not attained such a character, might produce irritations and jealousies which the President desires to avoid.

On the 15th of January, 1863, Mr. Dayton writes to Mr. Seward that a despatch will shortly be sent by M. Drouyn de l'Huys to M. Mercier, the French ambassador at Washington, requesting him to suggest to the Federal Government, the propriety of appointing commissioners to treat with the South for peace, and for union, if possible; if not possible, for such terms of separation as may be mutually agreed upon. The despatch proposed no interference of any kind by a foreign Power, nor required or asked any cessation of hostilities pending the negotiation, but like the negotiation for peace in 1788, between the United States and Great Britain, permitted everything to proceed as if no effort for a settlement were being made.

The despatch thus alluded to was addressed to M. Mercier by M. Drouyn de l'Huys on the 9th of January, and was as follows:

                                   DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

                            POLITICAL DIVISION, PARIS, January 9,1863.

SIR: If, in forming the purpose of assisting, by the proffer of our good offices, to shorten the period of those hostilities which are desolating the American continent, we had not been guided, beyond all, by the friendship which actuates the Government of the Emperor in regard to the United States, the little success of our overtures might chill the interest with which we follow the fluctuations of this contest. But the sentiment to which we have yielded is too sincere for indifference to find a place in our thoughts, and that we would cease to be painfully affected whilst the war continues to rage. We cannot regard without profound regret this war, worse than civil, comparable to the most terrible distractions of the ancient Republics, and whose disasters multiply in proportion to the resources and the valor which each of the belligerent parties develop.

The Government of his Majesty have, therefore, seriously examined the objections which have been made to us, where we have suggested the idea of a friendly mediation, and we have asked ourselves whether they are truly of a nature to set aside as premature every tentative to a reconciliation. On one part has been opposed to us the repugnance of the United States to admit the intervention of foreign influence in the dispute; on the other the hope, which the Federal Government has not abandoned, of attaining its solution by force of arms.

Assuredly, sir, recourse to the good offices of. one or more neutral Powers contains nothing incompatible with the pride so legitimate amidst a great nation, and wars purely international are not those alone which Page 390 furnish examples of the useful character of mediation. We flatter ourselves, besides, that in proffering to place ourselves at the disposal of the belligerent parties to facilitate between them negotiations, the basis of which we abstain from prejudging, we have manifested to the patriotism of the United States all the considerations to which it is entitled, now perhaps still more than ever, after such a new proof of moral force and energy. We are none the less ready, amid the wishes which we form in favor of peace, to take into account all susceptibilities of national feeling, and we do not at all question the right of the Federal Government to decline the cooperation (contourt) of the great maritime Powers of Europe.

But this cooperation, is it not the only means which offers itself to the Cabinet of Washington to hasten the close of the war? And if it believes that it ought to repel any foreign intervention, could it not honorably accept the idea of direct informal conferences (pour parler) with the authority which may represent the States of the South.

The Federal Government does not despair, we know, of giving a more active impulse to hostilities; its sacrifices have not exhausted its resources, still less its perseverance and its steadfastness. The protraction of the struggle, in a word, has not shaken its confidence in the definite success of its efforts. But the opening of informal conferences between the belligerent parties does not necessarily imply the immediate cessation of hostilities. Negotiations about peace are not always the consequence of a suspension of warfare; they precede, on the contrary, more often the establishment of a truce. How many times have we not seen plenipotentiaries meet, exchange communications, agree upon all the essential provisions of treaties, resolve, in fine, the question even of peace or war, whilst the leaders ot armies continued the strife and endeavored even to the latest moment to modify by force of arms the conditions of peace? To recall only one memory, drawn from the history of the United States—the negotiations which consecrated their independence were commenced long before hostilities had ceased in the New World, and the armistice was not established until the act of the 30th November, 1862, which under the name of provisional articles embraced in advance the principal clauses of the definitive treaty of 1783.

Nothing, therefore, would hinder the Government of the United States, without renouncing the advantage which it believes it can attain by the continuation of the war, from entering upon informal conferences with the Confederates of the South, in case they should show themselves disposed thereto. Representatives or commissioners of the two parties could assemble at such point as it should be deemed proper to designate, and which could, for this purpose, be declared neutral. Reciprocal complaints would be examined into at this meeting. In place of the accusations which North and South mutually cost upon each other at this time, would be substituted an argumentative discussion of the interests which divide them. They would seek out by means of well ordered and profound deliberations whether these interests are definitively irreconcilable —whether separation is an extreme which can no longer be avoided, or whether the memories of a common existence, whether the ties of any kind winch have made of the North and of the South one sole and whole Federative State, and have borne them on to so high a degree of prosperity, are not more powerful than the causes which have placed arms in the hands of the two populations. A negotiation, the object of which would be thus determinate, would not involve any of the objections raised against the diplomatic intervention ot Europe, and, without giving birth to the same hopes as the immediate conclusion of an armistice, would exercise a happy influence on the march of events.

Why, therefore, should not a combination which respects all the relations of the United States obtain the approbation of the Federal Government? Persuaded on our part that it is in conformity with their true interests, we do not hesitate to recommend it to their attention; and, not having sought in the project of a mediation of the maritime Powers of Europe any vain display of influence, we would applaud, with entilS freedom from all susceptibility of self-esteem, the opening of a negotiation which would invite the two populations to discuss, without the cooperation of Europe, the solution of their difference.

I request you, sir, to give this assurance to the Cabinet of Washington, while commending to its wisdom counsels dictated by most sincere interest in the prosperity of the United States. You are moreover authorized, if Mr. Seward expresses the wish, to leave with him a copy of this despatch.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

                          DROUYN DE L'HUYS.

   To M. Merciee, Minister of France at Washington.

On the 6th of February, 1863, Mr. Seward addressed a despatch to Mr. Dayton in reply to his note stating that mediation between the combatants was about to be proposed, and expressing the views under which such a proposition would be received by the Government of the United States. This important despatch was as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, February 6, 1863.

SIR: The intimation given in your despatch of January 15th (No. 255 that I might expect a special visit from M. Mercier has been realized. He called on the 3d instant, and gave me a copy of a despatch which he had just then received from M. Drouyn de l'Huys under the date of the 9th of January.

I have taken the President's instructions, and I now proceed to give you his views upon the subject in question.

It has been considered with seriousness, resulting from the reflection that the people of France are known to be faultless sharers with the American nation in the misfortunes and calamities of our unhappy civil war; nor do we on this, any more than on other occasions, forget the traditional friendship of the two countries, which we unhesitatingly believe has inspired the counsels that M. Drouyn dc l'Huys has imparted.

He says, "the Federal Government does not despair, we know, of giving more active impulse to hostilities f and again he remarks, " the protraction of the struggle, in a word, has not shaken the confidence (of the Federal Government) in the definitive success of its efforts."

These passages seem to me to do unintentional injustice to the language, whether confidential or public, in which this Government has constantly spoken on the subject of the war. It certainly has had and avowed only one purpose—a determination to preserve the integrity of the country. So far from admitting any laxity of effort, or betraying any despondency, the Government has, on the contrary, borne itself cheerfully in all vicissitudes, with unwavering confidence in en early and complete triumph of the national cause. Now, when we are, in a manner, invited by a friendly power to review the twenty-one months' history of the conflict, we find no occasion to abate that confidence. Through such an alternation of victories and defeats as is the appointed incident of every war, the land and naval forces of the United States have steadily advanced, reclaiming from the insurgents the ports, forts, and posts which they had treacherously seized before the strife actually began, and even before it was seriously apprehended. So many of the States and districts which the insurgents included in the field of their projected exclusive slaveholding dominions have already been reestablished under the flag of the Union, that they now retain only the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Texas, with half of Virginia, half of North Carolina, and two-thirds of South Carolina, half of Mississippi, and one third respectively of Arkansas and Page 391 Louisiana. The national forces hold even this small territory in close blockade and siege.

This Government, if required, does not hesitate to submit its achievements to the test of comparison; and it maintains that in no part of the world, and in no times, ancient or modern, has a nation, when rendered all unready for combat by the enjoyment of eighty years of almost unbroken peace, so quickly awakened at the alarm of sedition, put forth energies so vigorous, and achieved successes so signal and effective as those which have marked the progress of this contest on the part of the Union.

M. Drouyn de l'Huys, I fear, has taken other light than the correspondence of this Government for his guidance in ascertaining its temper and firmness. He has probably read of divisions of sentiment among those who hold themselves forth as organs of public opinion here, and has given to them an undue importance. It is to be remembered that this is a nation of thirty millions, civilly divided into forty-one States and territories, which cover an expanse hardly less than Europe; that the people are a pure democracy, exercising everywhere the utmost freedom of speech and suffrage; that a great crisis necessarily produces vehement as well as profound debate, with*sharp collisions of individual, local, and sectional interests, sentiments, and ambitions; and that this heat of controversy is increased by the intervention of speculations, interests, prejudices, and passions from every other part of the civilized world. It is, however, through such debates that the agreement of the nation upon any subject is habitually attained, its resolutions formed, and its policy established. While there has been much difference of popular opinion and favor concerning the agents who shall carry on the war, the principles on which it shall be waged, and the means with which it shall be prosecuted, M. Drouyn de l'Huys has only to refer to the statute book of Congress and the Executive ordinances to learn that the national activity has hitherto been and yet is, as efficient as that of any other nation, whatever its form of government, ever was, under circumstances of equally grave import to its peace, safety, and welfare. Not one voice has been raised anywhere, out of the immediate field of the insurrection, in favor of foreign intervention, of mediation, of arbitration, or of compromise, with the relinquishment of one acre of the national domain, or the surrender of even one constitutional franchise. At the same time, it is manifest to the world that our resources are yet abundant, and our credit adequate to the existing emergency. What M. Drouyn de l'Huys suggests is that this Government shall appoint commissioners to meet, on neutral ground, commissioners of the insurgents. He supposes that in the conferences to be thus held, reciprocal complaints could be discussed, and in place of the accusations which the North and South now mutually cast upon each other, the conferees would be engaged with discussions of the interests which divide them. He assumes, further, that the commissioners would seek, by means of well-ordered and profound deliberation, whether these interests are definitively irreconcilable, whether separation is an extreme that can no longer be avoided, or whether the memories of a common existence, the ties of every kind which have made the North and the South one whole Federative State, and have borne them on to so high a degree of prosperity, are not more powerful than the causes which have placed arms in the hands of the two populations. The suggestion is not an extraordinary one, and it may well have been thought by the Emperor of the French, in the earnestness of his benevolent desire for the restoration of peace, a feasible one. But when M. Drouyn de l'Huys shall come to review it in the light in which it must necessarily be examined in this country, I think he can hardly fail to perceive that it amounts to nothing less than a proposition that, while this Government is engaged in suppressing an armed insurrection, with the purpose of maintaining the constitutional National authority, and preserving the integrity of the country, it shall enter into diplomatic discussion with the insurgents upon the questions whether that authority shall not be renounced, and whether the country shall not be delivered over to disunion, to be quickly followed by ever increasing anarchy. If it were possible for the Government of the United States to compromise the national authority so far as to enter into such debates, it is not easy to perceive what good results could be obtained by them.

The commissioners must agree in recommending either that the Union shall stand or that it shall be voluntarily dissolved; or else they must leave the vital question unsettled, to abide at last the fortunes of the war. The Government has not shut out knowledge of the present temper, any more than of the past purposes of the insurgents. There is not the least ground to suppose that the controlling actors would be persuaded at this moment, by any arguments which national commissioners could offer, to forego the ambition that has impelled them to the disloyal position they are occupying. Any commissioners who should be appointed by these actors, or through their dictation or influence, must enter the conference imbued with the spirit and pledged to the personal fortunes of the insurgent chiefs. The loyal people in the insurrectionary States would be unheard, and any offer of peace by this Government, on the condition of the maintenance of the Union, must necessarily be rejected.

On the other hand, as I have already intimated, this Government has not the least thought of relinquishing the trust which has been confided to it by the nation under the most solemn of all political sanctions; and if it had any such thought, it would still have abundant reason to know that pence proposed at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a great mistake that European statesmen make, if they suppose this people are demoralized. Whatever, in the case of an insurrection, the people of France, or of Great Britain, or of Switzerland, or of the Netherlands would do to save their national existence, no matter how the strife might be regarded by or might affect foreign nations, just so much, and certainly no less, the people of the United States will do, if necessary to save for the common benefit the region which is bounded by the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts, and by the shores of the Gulfs of St Lawrence and Mexico, together with the free and common navigation of the Rio Grande, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, St. Lawrence, Hudson, Delaware, Potomac, and other natural highways by which this land, which to them is at once a land of inheritance and a land of promise, is opened and watered. Even if the agents of the American people now exercising their power should, through rear or faction, fall below this height of the national virtue, they would be speedily, yet constitutionally, replaced by others of sterner character and patriotism.

I must be allowed to say, also, that M. Drouyn dc l'Huys errs in his description of the parties to the present conflict. We have here, in the political sense, no North and South, no Northern and Southern States. We have au insurrectionary party, which is located chiefly upon and adjacent to the shore of the Gulf of Mexico; and we have, on the other hand, a loyal people, who constitute not only Northern States, but also Eastern, Middle, Western, and Southern States.

I have on many occasions heretofore submitted to the French Government the President's views of the interests, and the ideas more effective for the time than even interests, which he at the bottom of the determination of the American Government and people to maintain the Federal Union. The President has done the same thing in his Messages and other public declarations. I refrain, therefore, from reviewing that argument in connection with the existing question.

Drouyn de 1'Huvs draws to his aid the conferences which took place between the Colonies and Great Britain in our Revolutionary War. He will allow us to assume that action in the crisis of a nation Page 392 must accord with her necessities, and therefore can seldom be conformed to precedents. Great Britain, when entering on the negotiations, had manifestly come to entertain doubts of her ultimate success; and it is certain that the councils of the Colonies could not fail to take new courage, if not to gain other advantage when the parent State compromised so far as to treat of peace on the terms of conceding their independence.

It is true, indeed, that peace must come at some time, and that conferences must attend, if they are not allowed to precede the pacification. There is, however, a better form for such conferences than the one which M. Drouyn de l'Huys suggests. The latter would be palpably in derogation of the Constitution of the United States, and would carry no weight, because destitute of the sanction necessary to bind cither the disloyal or the loyal portions of the people. On the other band, the Congress of the United States furnishes a constitutional forum for debates between the alienated parties. Senators and representatives from the loyal portion of the people are there already, freely empowered to confer: and seats also are vacant, and inviting senators and representatives of this discontented party who may be constitutionally sent there from the States involved in the insurrection. Moreover, the conferences which can thus be held in Congress have this great advantage over any that could be organized upon the plan of M. Drouyn de l'Huys, namely—that the Congress, if it were thought wise, could call a national convention to adopt its recommendations, and give them all the solemnity and binding force of organic law. Such conferences between the alienated parties may be said to have already begun. Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri—States which are claimed by the insurgents—are already represented in Congress, and submitting with perfect freedom and in a proper spirit their advice upon the Course best calculated to bring about, in the shortest time, a firm, lasting, and honorable peace. Representatives have been sent also from Louisiana, and others are understood to be coming from Arkansas.

There is a preponderating argument in favor of the Congressional form of conference over that which is suggested by M. Drouyn de l'Huys, namely, that while an accession to the latter would bring this Government into a concurrence with the insurgents in disregarding and setting aside an important part of the Constitution of the United States, and so would be of pernicious example, the Congressional conference, on the contrary, preserves and gives new strength to that sacred writing which must continue through future ages the sheet anchor of the Republic.

You will be at liberty to read this despatch to Jr. Drouyn de l'Huys, and to give him a copy if he shall desire it.

To the end that you may be informed of flic whole case, I transmit a copy of M. Drouyn de l’Huys despatch.

     I am, sir, your obedient servant,

                                     WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The correspondence with France during the roar 1862 presents only a single instance of a complaint on the part of the United States Government. It is the case of an American citizen injured by some French soldiers at Vera Cruz. Throughout these pages her friendship appears steadfast and sincere. Not an instance of a departure from strict neutrality is found. No armed vessel left her ports, nor contraband articles were shipped by her citizens. Her minister expressly declares that if any suggestions looking to a peaceful close of this bloody American conflict should be made by his government, and refused by the American, nothing would follow. Mr. Dayton writes that he said to him, on October 13: "Suppose your offer, or suggestion, if made, shall be refused, what will be the consequences?" He replied: "Nothing; we would be friends as we had been before."

Russia.—The correspondence with Russia is unimportant, except so far as it indicates the friendly spirit of that government towards this country. In absence of Mr. Simon Cameron, who succeeded Mr. C. M. Clay, the secretary of legation, Mr. Bayard Taylor, reports a conference with Prince Gortchakoff on October 29. "Your situation," said he, "is getting worse and worse. The chances of preserving the Union are growing more and more desperate. Can nothing be done to stop this dreadful war? Can you find no basis of arrangement before your strength is so exhausted that you must lose for many years to come your position in the world?"

Spain.—Only one or two points of interest appear in the correspondence with the government of Spain, conducted, in the absence of General Schurz, through the secretary of legation, Mr. Horatio J. Perry. On the 22d of April, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Perry: "I think that you may be able to satisfy that eminent minister, Mr. Calderon Collantes, that the largest term which can readily be claimed for this civil war is a period of two years from its date."

Subsequently, General Schurz resigned the mission to Spain, and was succeeded by Mr. Gustavus Koerner, of Illinois.

A protest was made by the government of the United States upon the annexation of Dominica to Spain.

On the 11th of July, in a conversation with Mr. Perry, the Spanish minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Collantes, alluded to the treaty recently negotiated with Great Britain for the suppression of the slave trade. The conference is thus stated by Mr. Perry:

At a recent interview with Mr. Calderon Collantes, that minister inquired if I had received a copy of the treaty recently concluded between the United States and England, concerning the mutual right of search, for the suppression of the African slave trade. He was much surprised that, after combating that principle so long, the United States should have yielded now a right so exceedingly liable to be abused in practice, and he was very curious to know what provisions had been stipulated "to guard the exercise ot the right from such abuse.

I replied, regretting I could give no information other than what Mr. Calderon had himself seen in the newspapers. I understood, however, that the stoppage of the use of the American flag in the slave trade was an object which would naturally commend itself to the favor of the present government of the United States, and I inquired if Spain had not herself conceded the same right.

Mr. Calderon said that she had, at a period of her history which could not be recalled with pleasure, but that ever since he himself had held the portfolio of foreign affairs he had been desirous of an opportunity to revise that whole treaty in which the right of search was thus granted to Great Britain. The exercise of this right was vexatious, and, besides, the English were always talking in Parliament and out, of their having purchased this right of Spain for £40,000 sterling money, always putting their money forward, and Page 393 he (Mr. Calderon) would be exceedingly glad of an opportunity to give them their 40,000 and have the treaty back again.

Mr. Calderon asked me if I supposed the recent treaty would be ratified by the American Senate. I replied I had no reasonable doubt that it would be, and remarked that I supposed that England was now taking steps to obtain the same concession from the government of France.

Mr. Calderon said he had little doubt of it, but he wished to see the American treaty, as it might afford a basis for demanding a revision of the Spanish treaty as to the manner in which this right was to be exercised.

The remainder of this voluminous correspondence is occupied with subjects of less interest. The volume is a proof of the vast labors of the Department of State, which has been conducted during the year with great ability and success, in preserving the peaceful and most friendly relations with foreign nations. (The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1861, vol. 1. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868, pp. 379-393.)


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.