The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Diplomatic Correspondence and Foreign Relations, 1861

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN 1861. The diplomatic correspondence of the United States Government for the year 1861 properly commences at the Inauguration of the President on the 4th of March. A new President, a new party, a new Cabinet, composed of public men who had never before held such positions, came into power on that day. New and unusual scenes could be discerned rapidly rising to view in the future which would raise new questions and new aspects of old ones. Commencing about this date, the Secretary of State of the retiring Administration, Mr. Black, appears on the 28th of February addressing a circular "to all the ministers of the United States," in which he states that "the election of last November resulted in the choice of Mr. Abraham Lincoln; that he was the candidate of the republican or anti-slavery party; that the preceding discussion had been confined almost entirely to topics connected, directly or indirectly, with the subject of negro slavery; that every Northern State cast its whole electoral vote (except three in New Jersey) for Mr. Lincoln, while in the whole South the popular sentiment against him was almost absolutely universal. Some of the Southern States, immediately after the election, took measures for separating themselves from the Union, and others soon followed their example." The result of this was the assembling of a congress of Representatives from South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and the adoption of a provisional Constitution for what was styled the " Confederate States of America." He then proceeded to say:

It is not improbable that persons claiming to represent the States which have thus attempted to throw off their Federal obligations will seek a recognition of their independence by the European powers. In the event of such an effort being mode, you are expected by the President to use such means as may in your judgment be proper and necessary to prevent its success.

The reasons set forth in the President's Message at the opening of the present session of Congress, in support of his opinion that the States have no constitutional power to secede from the Union, are still unanswered, and are believed to be unanswerable. The grounds upon which they have attempted to justify the revolutionary act of severing the bonds which connect them with their sister States, are regarded as wholly insufficient. This Government has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of those States, and does not desire to do so.

On the 9th of March, Mr. Seward, the newly appointed Secretary of State, addressed a circular to "all the Ministers of the United States," in which he alluded to the instructions of his predecessor, and stated that the President, having assumed the administration of the Government, in pursuance of an unquestioned election, and of the directions of the Constitution, renewed the injunction above mentioned, and relied upon the exercise of the greatest possible diligence and fidelity on their part to counteract and prevent the designs of those who would invoke foreign intervention to embarrass or overthrow the Republic. They were instructed to urge upon the Governments to which they were commissioned, the consideration that " the present disturbances had their origin only in popular passions excited under novel circumstances of a very transient character, and that while not one person of well balanced mind, has attempted to show that dismemberment of the Union would be permanently conducive to the safety and welfare of even his own State or section, much less of all the States and sections of our country, the people themselves still retain and cherish a profound confidence in our happy Constitution, together with a veneration and affection for it such as no other form of government ever received at the hands of those for whom it was established."

Another circular was issued by the Secretary to the Ministers of the United States in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark, on the 24th of April, relative to the rights of neutrals in maritime war. It presents the whole case as it stood at that date. It states the position of the United States, our proposition to the Paris congress in 1856, the action of that congress, and the ground the Administration was ready to assume on the subject. The entire letter is too important to be abridged, as it contains propositions which were the subject of negotiation in all the courts above named for ensuing months:

                                                       DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

                                                    WASHINGTON, April 24, 1861. 

Sir: The advocates of benevolence and the believers in human progress, encouraged by the slow though marked meliorations of the barbarities of war which have obtained in modern times, have been, as you are well aware, recently engaged with much assiduity in endeavoring to effect some modifications of the law of nations in regard to the rights of neutrals in maritime war. In the spirit of these movements the President of the United States, in the year 1854, submitted to the several maritime nations two propositions, to which he solicited their assent as permanent-principles of international law, which were as follows:

1. Free ships make free goods; that is to say, that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a power or State at war are free from capture or confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles contraband of war.

2. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation unless the same be contraband of war.

Several of the Governments to which these propositions were submitted expressed their willingness to accept them, while some others, which were in a state of war, intimated a desire to defer acting thereon until the return of peace should present what they thought would be a more auspicious season for such interesting negotiations.

On the 16th of April, 1858, a congress was in session at Paris. It consisted of 6cvernf maritime powers, represented by their plenipotentiaries, namely, Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia, Prussia, Sardinia, and Turkey. That congress having taken up the general subject to which allusion has already been made in this letter, on the day before mentioned, came to an agreement, which they adopted in the form of a declaration, to the effect following, namely:

1. Privateering is and remains abolished.

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by forces sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

The agreement pledged the parties constituting the congress to bring the declaration thus made to the knowledge of the States which had not been represented in that body, and to invite them to accede to it The congress, however, at the same time insisted, in the first place, that the declaration should be binding only on the powers who were or should become parties to it as one whole and indivisible compact; and, secondiy, that the parties who hod agreed, and those who 'should afterwards accede to it, should, after the adoption of the same, enter into no arrangement on the application of maritime law in time of war without stipulating for a strict observance of the four points resolved by the declaration. The declaration, which I have thus substantially recited, of course prevented all the powers which became parties to it from accepting the two propositions which had been before submitted to the maritime nations by the President of the United States.

The declaration was, in due time, submitted by the Governments represented in the congress at Paris to the Government of the United States.

The President, about the 14th of July, 1856, made known to the States concerned his unwillingness to accede to the declaration. In making that announcement on behalf of this Government, my predecessor, Mr. Marcy, called the attention of those States to the following points, namely:

1st. That the second and third propositions, contained in the Paris declaration, are substantially the same with the two propositions which had before been submitted to the maritime States by the President

2d. That the Paris declaration, with the conditions annexed, was inadmissible by the United States in three respects, namely: 1st. That the Government of the United States could not give its assent to the first proposition contained in the declaration, namely, that "Privateering is and remains abolished," although it was willing to accept it with an amendment which should exempt the private property of individuals, though belonging to belligerent States, from seizure or confiscation by national vessels in maritime war. 2d. That for this reason the stipulation annexed to the declaration, viz.: that the propositions must be taken altogether or rejected altogether, without modification, could not be allowed. 3d. That the fourth condition annexed to the declaration, which provided that the parties acceding to it should enter into no negotiation for any modifications of the law of maritime war with nations which should not contain the four points contained in the Paris declaration, seemed inconsistent with a proper regard to the national sovereignty of the United States.

On the 29th of July, 1856, Mr. Mason, then minister of the United States at Paris, was instructed by the President to propose to the Government of France to enter into an arrangement for its adherence, with the United States, to the four principles of the declaration of the Congress of Paris, provided the first of them should be amended as specified in Mr. Marcy's note to the Count de Sartiges on the 28th of July, 1856. Mr. Mason accordingly brought the subject to the notice of the imperial Government of France, which was disposed to entertain the matter favorably, but which failed to communicate its decision on the subject to him. Similar instructions regarding the matter were addressed by this department to Mr. Dallas, our minister at London, on the 31 st day of January, 1857; but the proposition above referred to had not been directly presented to the British Government bv him when the administration of this Government by Franklin Pierce, during whose term these proceedings occurred, came to an end on the 8d of March, 1857, and was succeeded by that of James Buchanan, who directed the negotiations to be arrested for the purpose of enabling him to examine the questions involved, and they have ever since remained in that state of suspension.

The President of the United States has now taken the subject into consideration, and he is prepared to communicate his views upon it, with a disposition to bring the negotiation to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.

For that purpose you are hereby instructed to seek an early opportunity to call the attention of her Majesty's Government to the subject, and to ascertain whether it is disposed to enter into negotiations for the accession of the Government of the United States to the declaration of the Paris congress, with the conditions annexed by that body to the same; and if you shall find that Government so disposed, you will then enter into a convention to that effect, substantially in the form of a project for that purpose herewith transmitted to you; the convention to take effect from the time when the due ratifications of the same shall have been exchanged. It is presumed that you will need no special explanation of the sentiments of the President on this subject for the purpose of conducting the necessary conferences with the Government to which you are accredited. Its assent is expected on the ground that the proposition is accepted at its suggestion, and in the form it has preferred. For your own information it will be sufficient to say that the President adheres to the opinion expressed by my predecessor, Mr. Marcy, that it would be eminently desirable for the good of all nations that the property and effects of private individuals, not contraband, should be exempt from seizure and confiscation by national vessels in maritime war. If the time and circumstances were propitious to a prosecution of the negotiation with that object in view, he would direct that it should be assiduously pursued. But the right season seems to have passed, at least for the present. Europe seems once more on the verge of quite general wars. On the other hand, a portion of the American people have raised the standard of insurrection, and proclaimed a provisional government, and, through their organs, are taken the bad resolution to invite privateers to prey upon the peaceful commerce of the United States. Prudence and humanity combine in persuading the President, under the circumstances, that it is wise to secure the lesser good offered by the Paris congress, without waiting indefinitely in hope to obtain the greater one offered to the maritime nations by the President of the United States.

   I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant

                                               WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

   Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c, &c.

Convention upon the subject of the rights of belligerents and neutrals in time of war, between the United states of America and her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland.

The United States of America and her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, being equally animated by a desire to define with more precision the rights of belligerents and neutrals in time of war, have, for that purpose, conferred full powers, the President of the United States upon Charles F. Adams, accredited as their envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to her said Majesty, and her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, upon

And the said plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, have concluded the following articles:

Article I. 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of War. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

Article II. The present convention shall be ratified Page 260 by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and by her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, within the space of six months from the signature, or sooner if possible. In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention in duplicate, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at London, the day of , in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one (1861.)

Prussia.—These circulars are followed by extracts from the correspondence with each of the ministers of this country to foreign courts, in copious detail. Commencing with Prussia, the letter of instructions to Mr. Judd, the newly appointed minister, is under the date of March. Mr. Seward writes:

Sir: Contrary to what usually happens in giving instructions to a minister going abroad, I am directed by the President to ask you to fix your attention in the first instance, and to keep it constantly fixed, on the actual condition of affairs at home. I allude, of course, to the unlawful and unconstitutional attempt which is being made to detach several of the Suites from the Federal Union, and to organize them as an independent republic under the name of the "Confederate States of America."

You are well aware of what you will find Europeans unable to understand, namely, that owing to the very peculiar structure of our Federal Government, and the equally singular character and habits of the American people, this Government not only wisely but necessarily hesitates to resort to coercion and compulsion to secure a return of the disaffected portion of the people to their customary allegiance. The Union was formed upon popular consent, and must always practically stand on the same basis. The temporary causes of alienation must puss away; there must needs be disasters and disappointments resulting from the exercise of unlawful authority by the revolutionists, while happily it is certain that there is a general and profound sentiment of loyalty pervading the public mind throughout the United States. While it is the intention of the President to maintain the sovereignty and rightful authority of the Union everywhere with firmness as well as discretion, he at the same time relies with great confidence on the salutary working of the agencies I have mentioned, to restore the harmony and Union of the States. But to this end it is of the greatest importance that the disaffected States shall not succeed in obtaining favor or recognition from foreign nations.

It is understood that the so-called Confederate States of America have sent, or are about to send, agents to solicit such recognition in Europe, although there is no special reason for supposing Prussia to be one of the nations to which application will be made. An almost electric political connection, however, exists between the several capitals of western Europe, and therefore your mo3t efficient and unfailing efforts must be put forth directly, and even indirectly, to prevent the success of that ill-starred design.

Mr. Seward then calls the attention of Mr. Judd to his general circular to all our ministers, dated March 9th, and says: 

It may be well to call your attention to the fact that in that communication, as in this, I have forborne altogether from discussing the groundless complaints and pretexts which have been put forth by the organs of disunion to justify the rash and perilous revolution which they are attempting to inaugurate. I have practised this reticence not because the point is unimportant, but because the dispute is purely a domestic one, and the President would not willingly have the archives of our legations bear testimony to so unamerican a proceeding as an acknowledgment, even by indirection, that this Government ever consented in join issue upon a purely family matter of this kind with a portion of our own citizens before a foreign tribunal. Nevertheless, should you find that any weight is given to those complaints and pretexts in the court to which you are accredited, your perfect knowledge of all the transactions involved, will, I am sure, enable you to meet them conclusively and satisfactorily without precise instructions on that point.

Mr. Wright, who continued to represent the United States at the Court of Prussia until the arrival of Mr. Judd, writes to Mr. Seward under date of Berlin, May 8tli: "Baron Schleinitz, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave me the most positive assurance that this Government, from the principle of unrelenting opposition to all revolutionary movements, would be one of the last to recognize any de facto government of the disaffected States of the American Union."

Again, under date of May 15th, he writes: "Baron Schleinitz informed me that, in his opinion, no apprehension need be entertained as to Prussian subjects engaging under the authority of the so-called Confederate States in fitting out privateers, or in any manner interfering with our commerce."

Again, under date of May 26th, he writes to Mr. Seward: "Prussia will take efficient steps to sustain the Government of the United States in the protection of property and commerce, and will do all she can, consistently with her obligations to other Governments, to sustain the vigorous action of our Government in maintaining law and order."

On the 13th of June, Baron Schleinitz addressed a note to Baron Gerolt, the Prussian Minister at Washington, referring to doubts prevailing in Europe about the treatment to which neutral shipping might be subjected during the continuance of the disturbances in the United States, and requests him to obtain an explanation of the views of the Federal Government thereupon.

Mr. Seward, in reply, on the 16th of June, further adds:

Baron Schleinitz, in this communication, has remarked that it would certainly be most desirable for Prussia that this Government should embrace this occasion to announce its adhesion to the celebrated declaration of Paris. But that if this could not he attained, then, for the present, the Government of Prussia would urge that an exposition might be made, to be obligatory during the present intestine disturbances in the United States, in regard to the application generally of the second and third principles of the Paris declaration to neutral shipping.

The second principle of the Paris declaration is, that the neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, not contraband of war.

The third principle is, that the goods, not contraband of war, of a neutral found on board an enemy's vessel are exempt from confiscation.

The undersigned has the pleasure of informing Baron Gerolt, by authority of the President of the United States, that the Government cheerfully declares its assent to these principles in the present case, and to continue until the insurrection which now unhappily exists in the United States shall have come to an end, and they will be fully observed by this Government in its relations with Prussia. Page 261

At the same time he states that the newly-appointed Minister, Mr. Judd, was authorized to enter into a treaty with the kingdom of Prussia for the adhesion of the United States Government to the declaration of the Congress at Paris.

Similar instructions and powers were given to all the Milliliters appointed to conduct diplomatic intercourse with all existing maritime powers. This Government, in these instructions, declared its 'continued desire and preference lor the amendment of the Paris declaration proposed by this Government in 1856, to the effect that private or individual property of non-combatants, whether belonging to belligerent States or not, should be exempted from confiscation in maritime war. But recurring to the previous failure to secure the adoption of that amendment, this Government instructed tb ministers, if they should find it necessary, to waive it fur the present, and to negotiate our adhesion to the declaration pure and simple.

The right of the United States to close any of the national ports "which have already fallen, or which may fall into the hands of the insurgents, either directly or in the lenient and equitable form of the blockade," is understood as not qualified or modified.

The conclusion reached was an indirect intimation that a separate treaty with Prussia was not considered necessary by that court, but the simple adhesion of the Government of the United States to the articles of the Paris treaty would be sufficient.

Belgium.—On the 28th of March, Mr. Seward addressed instructions to Mr. Sanford, the United States Minister to Belgium. The policy of the Administration toward the seceded States at that date is thus stated:

Formidable as the conspiracy seemed nt the beginning, it is now confidently believed that the policy of the present Administration in regard to it will be supported by the people—a policy of conciliation, forbearance, and firmness—and that the conspiracy will thus fall for want of ultimate adoption by the States themselves which are expected to constitute the new Confederacy.

The most important duty of the diplomatic representatives of the United States in Europe, says the Secretary, will be to counteract, by all proper means, the efforts of the agents of that projected Confederacy at their respective courts. They are expected not to engage in any discussion which the agents of the disunionists may attempt to initiate on the merits of their proposed revolution. The President will not consent, directly or indirectly, to the interpellation of any foreign power in a controversy which is merely a domestic one. He then proceeds:

There is some reason to suppose that the agents of the disunionists will attempt to win favor for their scheme of recognition by affecting to sympathize with the manufacturing interests of the European nations in their discontent with the tariff laws of the United States, and by promising to receive the fabrics of such nations on more favorable terms. You will be able to reply to such seductions as these that the new tariff laws thus complained of are revenue laws deemed by the legislature of the United States necessary under new and peculiar circumstances; that all experience shows that such laws are not, and cannot be, permanent; that if, as is now pretended, they shall prove to be onerous to foreign commerce, they will, of course, prove also to be unfruitful of revenue, and that, in that case, they will necessarily be promptly modified. The inconvenience, if any shall result from them, will therefore be temporary and practically harmless. Nor will any statesman of a foreign country need to be informed that the consumption of the fabrics which it is proposed shall be favored by the so-called seceding States chiefly takes place, not within those States, but in a very large degree in the States which remain undisturbed by this unhappy attempt at revolution.

Under date of May 10th, Mr. Sanford wrote that he had been received by the King on the 8th, who spoke but generally of the insurrection in the Southern States, said he hoped some peaceful issue would be found, and that the spirit of conciliation would prevail, and then referred to the growing markets they had for manufactures in the United States.

Again, on the 26th of May, he writes to Mr. Seward that he had a conversation with M. de Vriere on the subject of the efforts of the commissioners of the Confederate States to obtain a recognition of the European powers. M. de Vriere replied that no application had been made to him in this view, "nor would it now be entertained if made. The revolution would receive no sanction by any act of Belgium." He also spoke of the new tariff with a great deal of feeling, and said it was highly prejudicial to their interests, instancing in point that forty furnaces for the manufacture of window-glass had been stopped in consequence.

On the 6th of May, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Sanford that the negotiation of a convention with the Government of Belgium, on the rights of belligerents and neutrals in time of war, was desirable; and he was instructed to endeavor to effect that object. Again, on the 21st of June, Mr. Seward writes:

You are aware that the declaration of Paris enjoins each of the parties that have signed it not to negotiate any other changes of the law of nations concerning the rights of neutrals in maritime war. We have supposed that this would operate to prevent Great Britain, and probably France, from receiving our accession to the declaration, if we should insist on the amendment proposed by Mr. Marcy, namely, the exemption of private property of non-belligerents from confiscation. But we should now, as the instructions heretofore given you have already informed you, vastly prefer to nave that amendment accepted. Nevertheless, if this cannot be done, let the convention be made for adherence to the declaration pure and simple.

No answer was received from the Belgian Government on this proposition, as they preferred to await the action of France and England; and on the 6th of August Mr. Seward again wrote to Mr. Sanford that "there is no especial urgency on our part for the consideration, by the Belgian Government, of our proposition to accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, before the similar propositions, submitted to the British and French Governments, shall have been acted upon by them; although we hold ourselves ready to carry overtures into effect when the Belgian Government shall desire."

Page 262

Mexico.—The instructions to Mr. Corwin, the American Minister to Mexico, are dated April 6th. Mr. Seward writes:

The President does not expect that you will allude to the origin or causes of our domestic difficulties in your intercourse with the Government of Mexico, although that Government will rightfully, as well as reasonably, ask what are his expectations of their course and their end. On the contrary, the President will not suffer the representatives of the United States to engage in any discussion of the merits of those difficulties in the presence of foreign powers, much less to invoke even their censure against those of our fellow-citizens who have arrayed themselves in opposition to its authority.

But you are instructed to assure the Government of Mexico that these difficulties having arisen out of no deep and permanent popular discontent, either in regard to our system of government itself, or to the exercise of its authority, and being attended by social evils which are as ruinous as they are unnecessary, while no organic change that is contemplated could possibly bring to any portion of the American people any advantages of security, peace, prosperity, or happiness, equal to those which the Federal Union so effectually guarantees, the President confidently believes and expects that the people of the United States, in the exercise of the wisdom that hitherto has never failed them, will speedily and in a constitutional way adopt all necessary remedies for the restoration of the public peace and the preservation of the Federal Union.

The success of this Government, in conducting affairs to that consummation, may depend in some small degree on the action of the Government and people of Mexico in this new emergency. The President could not fail to see that Mexico, instead of being benefited by the prostration or the obstruction of Federal authority in this country, would be exposed by it to new and fearful dangers. On the other hand, a condition of anarchy in Mexico must necessarily operate as a seduction to those who are conspiring against the integrity of the Union to seek strength and aggrandizement for themselves by conquests in Mexico and other parts of Spanish America. Thus, even the dullest observer is at last able to see what was long ago distinctly seen by those who are endowed with any considerable perspicacity, that peace, order, and constitutional authority in each and all of the several republics of this continent are not exclusively an interest of any one or more of them, but a common and indispensable interest of them all.

Again, Mr. Seward says:

You may possibly meet agents of this projected Confederacy busy in preparing some further revolution in Mexico. You will not fail to assure the Government of Mexico that the President never has, nor can ever have, any sympathy with such designs, in whatever quarter they may arise, or whatever character they may take on.

Mr. Corwin, on the 29th of May, writes in reply: "The present Government of Mexico is well affected towards us in our present difficulties, but, for obvious reasons, will be unwilling to enter into any engagement which might produce war with the South, unless protected by promise of aid from the United States."

On the 29th of June, Mr. Corwin again writes: "I am quite sure that whilst this Government will endeavor to preserve peaceful relations with all the European powers on fair terms, it regards the United States as its true and only reliable friend in any struggle which may involve the national existence."

Great Britain.—In a letter of instructions to Mr. Adams, dated April 10th, Mr. Seward first presents a dispassionate view of the disunion movement, and then proceeds to consider the manner in which that movement and its agents should be treated by Mr. Adams at the court ot Great Britain. He says:

Before considering the arguments you are to use, it is important to indicate those which you arc not to employ in executing that mission:

First. The President has noticed, as the whole American people have, with much emotion, the expressions of good-will and friendship toward the United States, and of concern for their present embarrassments, which have been made on apt occasions by her Majesty and her ministers. You will make due acknowledgment for these manifestations, but at the same time you will not rely on any mere sympathies or national kindness. You will make no admissions of weakness in our Constitution, or of apprehension on the part of the Government. You will rather prove, as you easily can, by comparing the history of our country with that of other States, that its Constitution and government arc really the strongest and surest which have ever been erected for the safety of any people. You will in no case listen to any suggestions of compromise by this Government, under foreign auspices, with its discontented citizens. If, as the President does not at all apprehend, you shall unhappily find her Majesty's Government tolerating the application of the so-called seceding States, or wavering about it, you will not leave them to suppose for a moment that they con grant that application and remain the friends of the United States. You may even assure them promptly, in that case, that if they determine to recognize, they may at the same time prepare to enter into alliance with the enemies of this republic. You alone will represent your country at London, and you will represent the whole of it there When you are asked to divide that duty with others, diplomatic relations between the Government of Great Britain and this Government will be suspended, and will remain so until it shall be seen which of the two is most strongly intrenched in the confidence of their respective nations and of mankind. "

You will not be allowed, however, even if you were disposed, as the President is sure you will not be, to rest your opposition to the application of the Confederate States on the ground of any favor this Administration, or the party which chiefly called it into existence, proposes to show to Great Britain, or claims that Great Britain ought to show them. You will not consent to draw into debate before the British Government any opposing moral principles which may be supposed to lie at the foundation of the controversy between those States and the Federal Union.

You will indulge in no expressions of harshness or disrespect, or even impatience, concerning the seceding States, their agents, or their people. But you will, on the contrary, all the while remember that those States are now, as they always heretofore have been, and, notwithstanding their temporary self-delusion, they must always continue to be, equal and honored members of this Federal Union, and that their citizens throughout all political misunderstandings and alienations still are and always must be our kindred and countrymen. In shortfall your arguments must belong to one of three classes, namely: First. Arguments drawn from the principles of public law and natural justice, which regulate the intercourse of equal States. Secondly. Arguments which concern equally the honor, welfare, and happiness of the discontented States, and the honor, welfare, and happiness of the whole Union. Thirdly. Arguments which are equally conservative of the rights and interests, and even sentiments of the United States, and just in their bearing upon the rights, interests, and sentiments of Great Britain and all other nations.

On the 9th of April, Mr. Dallas writes to Mr. Page 263 Seward that he had submitted to Lord John Russell the representations of his general circular, with the inaugural address of the President, lie says:

His lordship assured me with great earnestness that there was not the slightest disposition in the British Government to grasp at any advantage which might be supposed to arise from the unpleasant domestic differences in the United States; but, on the contrary, that they would be highly gratified if those differences were adjusted, and the Union restored to its former unbroken position.

I pressed upon him, in concluding, if that were the case—and I was quite convinced that it was—how important it must be that this country and France should abstain, at least for a considerable time, from doing what, by encouraging groundless hopes, would widen a breach still thought capable of being closed. He seemed to think the matter not ripe for decision one way or the other, and remarked that what lie had said was oil that at present it was in his power to say.

Mr. Seward, writing to Mr. Adams tinder date of April 27th, in reference to this communication of Mr. Dallas, says: "You will hardly need to be told that these last remarks of his lordship are by no means satisfactory to this Government."

On the 2d of May, Mr. Dallas writes to Mr. Seward that, at an interview with Lord John Russell, the latter stated that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were in London; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so unofficially; that there existed an understanding between his Government and that of France, which would lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be. He then referred to the rumor of a meditated blockade of Southern ports, and their discontinuance as ports of entry.

On the 21st of May, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Adams that "this Government considers that our relations in Europe have reached a crisis in which it is necessary for it to take a decided stand, on which not only its immediate measures, but its ultimate and permanent policy, can be determined and defined." He then informs Mr. Adams that the contents of this letter are not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of State, nor any of its positions prematurely, unnecessarily, or indiscreetly made known; but its spirit will be his guide.

A paper thus containing the private instructions of the Government, at such a time, to its representative at the principal court of Europe, is of more than ordinary interest to the American people. Mr. Seward then proceeds:

The President regrets that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British Government and the missionaries of the insurgents. It is due, however, to Mr. Dallas to say that our instructions had been given only to you and not to him, and that his loyalty and fidelity, too rare in these times, are appreciated.

Intercourse of any kind with the so-called commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed unofficial intercourse has yet actually begun. In our own antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped that you have not misunderstood them. You will, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official, with the British Government, so long as it shall continue intercourse of any kind with the domestic enemies of this country. When intercourse shall have been arrested for this cause, you will communicate with this department and receive .further directions.

Lord John Russell has informed us of an understanding between the British and French Governments that they will act together in regard to our affairs. This communication, however, loses something of its value from the circumstance that the communication was withheld until after knowledge of the fact had been acquired by us from other sources. We know also another fact that has not yet been officially communicated to us, namely: That other European States are apprised by France and England of their agreement, and are expected to concur with or follow them in whatever measures they adopt on the subject of recognition. The United States nave been impartial and just in all their conduct towards the several nations of Europe. They will not complain, however, of the combination now announced by the two leading powers, although they think they had a right to expect a more independent, if not a more friendly course, from each of them. You will take no notice of that or any other alliance. Whenever the European Governments shall see fit to communicate directly with us, we shall be, as heretofore, frank and explicit in our reply.

As to the blockade, you will say that by our own laws and the laws of nature, and the laws of nations, this Government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have been seized by insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is a proper means to that end. You will not insist that our blockade is to be respected, if it be not maintained by a competent force; but passing by that question as not now a practical or at least an urgent one, you will add that the blockade is now, and it will continue to be, so maintained, and therefore we expect it to be respected by Great Britain. You will add that we have already revoked the exequatur of a Russian consul who had enlisted in the military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss or demand the recall of every foreign agent, consular or diplomatic, who shall either disobey the Federal laws or disown the Federal authority.

As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy, it is not to be made a subject of technical definition. It is, of course, direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, ministers, agents, or commissioners, officially. A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings will pass unquestioned by the United States in this case.

Hitherto, recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the so-called Confederate States are de facto a self-sustaining power. Now, after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert the need of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States have been put in motion to repress insurrection. The true character of the pretended new State is at once revealed. It is seen to be a power existing in pronunciamento only. It has never won a field. It has obtained no forts "that were not virtually betrayed into its hands, or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port on the coast, nor any highway out from its pretended capital by land. Under these circumstances, Great Britain is. called upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition Page 264 would be British intervention, to create within our territory a hostile state by overthrowing this republic itself.   *    *    *    *    *     *    *

As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They arc our own citizens, or persons employed by our citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents, and give them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of nations afford an adequate and proper remedy.

Happily, however, her Britannic Majesty's Government can avoid all these difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of which body Great Britain was herself member, abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and forever. You already have our authority to propose to her our accession to that declaration. If she refuse it, it can only be because she is willing to become the patron of privateering when aimed at our devastation.

These positions are not elaborately defended now, because to vindicate them would imply a possibility of our waiving them.

We are not insensible of the grave importance of this occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a war may ensue between the United States and one, two, or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptionable from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the action of Great Britain, not our own; that Great Britain will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy, either without waiting to hear from yon our remonstrances and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in defence of national life is not immoral, and war in defence of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations.

The dispute will be between the European and the American branches of the British race. All who belong to that race will especially deprecate it, as they ought. It may well be believed that men of every race and kindred will deplore it. A war not unlike it, between the same parties, occurred at the close of the last century. Europe atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Great Britain committed in provoking that contest. If that nation shall now repeat the same great error, the social convulsions which will follow may not be so long, but they will be more general. When they shall have ceased, it will, we think, be seen, whatever may have been the fortunes of other nations, that it is not the United States that will have come out of them with its precious Constitution altered, or its honestly obtained dominions in any degree abridged. Great Britain has but to wait a few months, and all her present inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles. If she take a different course she will calculate for herself the ultimate, as well as the immediate consequences, and will consider what position she will hold when she shall have forever lost the sympathies and affections of the only nation on whoso sympathies and affections she has a natural claim. In making that calculation she will do well to remember that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall be actuated by neither pride, nor passion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall stand simply on the principle of self-preservation, and that our cause will involve the independence of nations and the rights of human nature.

Under date of May 21st, Mr. Adams writes to Mr. Seward, giving an account of his interview with Lord John Russell. The most important portion of their conversation, so far as regards its public interests, consists in the views of the English Government relative to regarding the Confederate States as a belligerent. On this point Mr. Adams thus writes:

I then alluded more especially to the brief report of the Lord Chancellor's speech on Thursday last, in which he had characterized the rebellious portion of my country as a belligerent State, and the war that was going on as justum bellum.

To this his lordship replied that he thought more stress was laid upon these events than they deserved. The fact was that a necessity seemed to exist to define the course of the Government in regard to the participation of the subjects of Great Britain in the impending conflict. To that end the legal questions involved bad been referred to those officers most conversant with them, and their advice had been taken in shaping the result. Their conclusion had been that, as a question merely of fact, a war existed. A considerable number of the States, at least seven, occupying a wide extent of country, were in open resistance, whilst one or more of the others were associating themselves in the same struggle, and as yet there were no indications of any other result than a contest of arms more or less severe. In many preceding cases, much less formidable demonstrations had been recognized. Under such circumstances it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this in the technical sense as justum bellum, that is, a war of two sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice, as well as to withhold an endeavor, so far as possible, to bring the management of it within the rules of modern civilized warfare. This was all that was contemplated by the Queen's proclamation. It was designed to show the purport of existing laws, and to explain to British subjects their liabilities in case they should engage in the war. And however strongly the people of the United States might feel against their enemies, it was hardly to be supposed that in practice they would now vary from their uniformly humane policy heretofore in endeavoring to assuage and mitigate the horrors of war.

On the 3d of June Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Adams stating the views of the President relative to foreign interference, thus:

Every instruction you have received from this department is full of evidence of the fact that the principal danger in the present insurrection which the President has apprehended was that of foreign intervention, aid, or sympathy; and especially of such intervention, aid, or sympathy on the part of the Government of Great Britain.

The justice of this apprehension has been vindicated by the following facts, namely:

1. A guarded of reserve on the part of the British Secretary of State, when Mr. Dallas presented to him our protest against the recognition of the insurgents, which seemed to imply that, in some conditions, not explained to us, such a recognition might be made.

2. The contracting of an engagement by the Government of Great Britain with that of France, without consulting us, to the effect that both Governments should adopt one and the same course of procedure in regard to the insurrection.

3. Lord John Russell's announcement to Mr. Dallas that he was not unwilling to receive the so-called commissioners of the insurgents unofficially.

4. The issue of the Queen's proclamation, remarkable, first, for the circumstances under which it was made, namely, on the very day of your arrival in London, which had been anticipated so far as to provide for your reception by the British secretary, but without affording you the interview promised before any decisive action should be adopted; secondly, the tenor of the proclamation itself, which seems to recognize, in a vague manner indeed, but does seem to recognize, the insurgents as a belligerent national power.

That proclamation, unmodified and unexplained, would leave us no alternative but to regard the Government of Great Britain as questioning our free exercise of all the rights of self-defence guaranteed to us by our Constitution and the laws of nature and of nations to suppress the insurrection.

I should have proceeded at once to direct you to Page 265 communicate to the British Government the definitive views of the President on the grave subject, if there were not especial reasons for some little delay.

These reasons Mr. Seward states to be, the information that England and France were preparing communications concerning the attitude to be assumed by them, and an interview which it was presumed Mr. Adams had with Lord John Russell.

The view taken by the Administration of their own position at this time, is described by Mr. Seward in a despatch dated June 8th:

This Government insists, as all the world might have known that it must and would, under all circumstances, insist, on the integrity of the Union, as the chief element of national life. Since, after trials of every form of forbearance and conciliation, it has been rendered certain and apparent that this paramount and vital object can be saved only by our acceptance of civil war as an indispensable condition, that condition, with all its hazards and deplorable evils, has not been declined. The acceptance, however, is attended with a strong desire and fixed purpose that the war shall be as short and accompanied by as little suffering as possible. Foreign intervention, aid, or sympathy in favor of the insurgents, especially on the "part of Great Britain, manifestly could only protract and aggravate the war. Accordingly, Mr. Dallas, under instructions from the President, in an interview conceded to him by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, presented our protest against any such intervention.

The views of the Administration towards England are thus expressed:

This Government has no disposition to lift questions of even national pride or sensibility up to the level of diplomatic controversy, because it earnestly and ardently desires to maintain peace, harmony, and cordial friendship with Great Britain.

Again, he says:

It is the purpose of this Government, if possible, consistently with the national welfare and honor, to Lave no serious controversy with Great Britain at all; and if this shall ultimately prove impossible, then to have both the defensive position and the clear right on our side.

On the 14th of June, Mr. Adams relates another interview had with Lord John Russell. After allusion to the proclamation of the Queen by Mr. Adams, as having been hastily issued, Lord John Russell's reply is thus given: He went over the ground once more which he occupied in the former interview—the necessity of doing something to relieve the officers of their ships from the responsibility of treating these persons as pirates if they met them on the seas. For his part, he could not believe the United States would persevere in the idea of hanging them, for it was not in consonance with their well-known character. But what would be their own situation if they should be found practising upon a harsher system than the Americans themselves?

Here was a very large territory—a number of States —and people counted by millions, who were in a state of actual war. The fact was undeniable, and the embarrassment unavoidable. Under such circumstances the law officers of the crown advised the policy which had been adopted. It was designed only as a preventive to immediate evils. The United States should not have thought hard of it They meant to be entirely neutral.

On the 15th of June the British and French Ministers had an interview with Mr. Seward, at which they proposed to read to him certain instructions from their Governments. Mr. Seward declined to hear them officially until he knew the nature of their contents. For this purpose they were left for his perusal.' He afterwards declined to hear them read, or to receive official notice of them. In a letter to Mr. Adams on the 19th, he thus states the contents of this paper:

That paper purports to contain a decision at which the British Government has arrived, to the effect that this country is divided into two belligerent parties, of which this Government represents one, and that Great Britain assumes the attitude of a neutral between them.

This Government could not, consistently with a just regard for the sovereignty of the United States, permit itself to debate these novel and extraordinary positions with the Government of her Britannic Majesty; much less can we consent that that Government shall announce to us a decision derogating from that sovereignty, at which it has arrived without previously conferring with us upon the question. The United States are still solely and exclusively sovereign within the territories they have lawfully acquired and long possessed, as they have always been. They are at peace with all the world, as, with unimportant exceptions, they have always been. They are living under the obligations of the law of nations, and of treaties with Great Britain, just the same now as heretofore; they are, of course, the friend of Great Britain, and they insist that Great Britain shall remain their friend now, just as she has hitherto been. Great Britain, by virtue of these relations, is a stranger to parties and sections in this country, whether they are loyal to the United States or not, and Great Britain can neither rightfully qualify the sovereignty of the United States, nor concede, nor recognize any rights, or interests, or power of any party, State, or section, in contravention to the unbroken sovereignty of the Federal Union. What is now seen in this country is the occurrence, by no means peculiar, but frequent in all countries, more frequent even in Great Britain than here, of an armed insurrection engaged in attempting to overthrow the regularly constituted and established Government. There is, of course, the employment of force by the Government to suppress the insurrection, as every other government necessarily employs force in such cases. But these incidents by no means constitute a state of war impairing the sovereignty of the Government, creating belligerent sections, and entitling foreign States to intervene or to act as neutrals between them, or in any other way to cast off their lawful obligations to the nation thus for the moment disturbed. Any other principle than this would be to resolve government every where into a thing of accident and caprice, and ultimately all human society into a state of perpetual war.

We do not go into any argument of fact or of law in support of the positions we nave thus assumed. They are simply the suggestions of the instinct of self-defence, the primary law of human action, not more the law of individual than of national life.

On the 21st of June Mr. Adams writes:

I am now earnestly assured on all sides that the sympathy with the Government of the United States is general; that the indignation felt in America is not founded in reason; that the British desire only to be perfectly neutral, giving no aid nor comfort to the insurgents. I believe that this sentiment is now growing to be universal. It inspires her Majesty's Ministers, and is not without its effect on the opposition.

The views of the Administration concerning the principle of the law of Congress which authorized the President to close the ports of the seceded States, were set forth with much eloquence by Mr. Seward, in a despatch to Mr. Adams, on July 21st. The occasion for the Page 266 despatch arose out of a debate in Parliament, and a statement by Lord John Russell, that the law officers were of opinion that the ports, of New Grenada for instance, could not be closed as against foreign nations, except by the regular form of blockade. After a general survey of the relations of the two countries subsequent to the outbreak in April, with a statement of the efforts of the United States to avoid all occasions for irritation, Mr. Seward proceeds:

The case then seemed to me to stand thus: The two nations had, indeed, failed to find a common ground or principle on which they could stand together; but they had succeeded in reaching a perfect understanding of the nature and extent of their disagreement, and in finding a line of mutual, practical forbearance. It was under this aspect of the positions of the two Governments that the President thought himself authorized to inform Congress on its coming together on the 4th of July instant, in extra session, that the sovereignty of the United States was practically respected by all nations.

Nothing has occurred to change this condition of affairs, unless it be the attitude which Lord John Russell has indicated for the British Government in regard to an apprehended closing of the insurrectionary ports, and the passage of the law of Congress which authorizes that measure in the discretion of the President.

It is my purpose not to anticipate or even indicate the decision which will be made, out simply to suggest to you what you may properly and advantageously say while the subject is under consideration. First. You will, of course, prevent misconception of the measure by stating that the law only authorizes the President to close the ports in his discretion, according as he shall regard exigencies now existing or hereafter to arise.

Secondly. The passage of the law, taken in connection with attendant circumstances, does not necessarily indicate a legislative conviction that the ports ought to be closed, but only shows the purpose of Congress that the closing of the ports, if it is now or shall become necessary, shall not fail for want of power explicitly conferred by law. When, on the 13th of April last, disloyal citizens defiantly inaugurated an armed insurrection by the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the President's constitutional obligation to suppress the insurrection became imperative.

But the case was new, and had not been adequately provided for by express law. The President called military and naval forces into activity, instituted a blockade, and incurred great expense, for all which no direct legal provisions existed. He convened Congress at the earliest possible day to confirm these measures, if they should see fit.

Congress, when it came together, confronted these facts. It has employed itself less in directing how and in what way the Union shall be maintained, than in confirming what the President had already done, and in putting into his hands more ample means and greater power than he has exercised or asked.

The law in question was passed in this generous and patriotic spirit. Whether it shall be put into execution to-day or to-morrow, or at what time, will depend on the condition of things at home and abroad, and a careful weighing of the advantages of so stringent a measure against those which are derived from the existing blockade.

Thirdly. You may assure the British Government that no change of policy now pursued, injuriously affecting foreign commerce, will be made from motives of aggression against nations which practically respect the sovereignty of the United States, or without due consideration of all the circumstances, foreign as well as domestic, bearing upon the question. The same spirit of forbearance towards foreign nations, arising from a desire to confine the calamities of the unhappy contest as much as possible, and to bring it to a close by the complete restoration of the authority of the Government as speedily as possible, that his hitherto regulated the action of the Government, will continue to control its counsels.

On the other hand, you will not leave it at all doubtful that the President fully adheres to the position that this Government so early adopted, and which I have so continually throughout this controversy maintained; consequently he fully agrees with Congress in the principle of the law which authorizes him to close the ports which have been seized by the insurgents, and he will put into execution and maintain it with all the means at his command, at the hazard of whatever consequences, whenever it shall appear that the safety of the nation requires it.

I cannot leave the subject without endeavoring once more, as I have so often done before, to induce the British Government to realize the conviction which I have more than once expressed in this correspondence, that the policy of the Government is one that is based on interests of the greatest importance, and sentiments of the highest virtue, and therefore is in no case likely to be changed, whatever may be the varying fortunes of the war at home or the action of foreign nations on this subject, while the policy of foreign States rests on ephemeral interests of commerce or of ambition merely. The policy of these United States is not a creature of the Government but an inspiration of the people, while the policies of foreign States are at the choice mainly of the governments presiding over them. If, through error, on whatever side this civil contention shall transcend the national bounds and involve foreign States, the energies of all commercial nations, including our own, will necessarily be turned to war, and a general carnival of the adventurous and the reckless of all countries, at the cost of the existing commerce of the world, must ensue. Beyond that painful scene upon the seas there lie, but dimly concealed from our vision, scenes of devastation and desolation which will leave no roots remaining out of which trade between the United States and Great Britain, as it has hitherto flourished, can ever again spring up.

The correspondence next enters upon the subject of the adhesion of the United States to the declaration of the Congress of Paris on neutral rights. The Government of the United States proposed to accede to this declaration if the proposition of Mr. Marcy could be added thereto. This soon appeared impracticable. It was then proposed by the American Government to accede to the declaration of the Paris Congress simply. This was to be accomplished by the negotiation of a separate convention with each nation represented in the congress. The secondary powers deferred to the action of Great Britain and France. On the 18th of July, Lord John Russell wrote to Mr. Adams that—

Her Majesty's Government would deem themselves authorized to advise the Queen to conclude a convention on this subject with the President of the United States so soon as they shall have been informed that a similar convention has been agreed upon, and is ready for signature, between the President of the United States and the Emperor of the French, so that the two conventions might be signed simultaneously and on the same day.

Mr. Adams corresponds with Mr. Dayton at Paris, who enters upon the negotiation at that city; and on the 29th of July writes to Lord John Russell, stating the progress of negotiations. To this Lord John Russell replies, and after recapitulating previous statements, says:

I shall be ready to carry on the negotiations as soon Page 267 as the necessary arrangements can be perfected in London and Paris, so that the conventions may be signed simultaneously at those two capitals. I need scarcely add that on the part of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not invalidate any thing already done.

Mr. Seward's opinion of this qualification of Lord John Russell appears in a letter addressed to Mr. Adams on the 17th of August, in which be writes thus:

Your letter to Lord John Russell is judicious, and is approved. Lord John Russell's answer is satisfactory, with the exception of a single passage, upon which it is mv duty to instruct you to ask the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs for an explanation. That passage is as follows:

"I need scarcely add that on the part of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not invalidate any thing already done.

A brief statement of the objects of the proposed negotiation will bring the necessity for an explanation of this passage into a strong light. We have heretofore proposed to other maritime States certain meliorations of the laws of maritime war affecting the rights of neutrals. These meliorations are: 1st. That the neutral flag shall protect enemy's goods not contraband of war. 2d. That the goods of neutrals, not contraband, though found under an enemy’s flag, shall not be confiscated! 3d. That blockades, to be respected, must be effective.

The Congress at Paris adopted these three principles, adding a fourth, namely, that privateering shall be abolished. The powers which constituted that congress invited the adhesion of the United States to that declaration. The United States answered that they would accede on condition that the other powers would accept a fifth proposition, namely, that the goods of private persons, non-combatants, should be exempt from confiscation in maritime war.

"When this answer was given by the United States, the British Government declined to accept the proposed amendment, or fifth proposition, thus offered by the United States, and the negotiation was then suspended. We have now proposed to resume the negotiation, offering our adhesion to the declaration of Paris, as before, with the amendment which would exempt private property from confiscation in maritime war.

The British Government now, as before, declares this amendment or fifth proposition inadmissible. It results that, if the United States can at all become a party to the declaration of the Congress of Paris by the necessary consent of the parties already committed to it, this can be done only by their accepting that declaration without any amendment whatever—in other words, "pure and simple." Under these circumstances you nave proposed in your letter to Lord John Russell to negotiate our adhesion to the declaration in that form. It is at this stage of the affair that Lord John Russell interposes, by way of caution, the remark, that "on the part of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not invalidate any thine already done."

I need dwell on this remark only one moment to show that, although expressed in a very simple form and in a quite casual manner, it contains what amounts to a preliminary condition, which must be conceded by the United States to Great Britain, and either be inserted in the convention, and so modify our adhesion to the declaration of Paris, or else must be in some confidential manner implied and reserved, with the same effect.

The letter then enlarges upon the possible meaning and object of the British Government without arriving at a satisfactory impression, and concludes with instructions to Mr. Adams to request respectfully, and with reasonable promptness, an explanation. This had been previously done, and Lord John Russell's explanation was given on the 19th of August, in a letter to Mr. Adams:

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a declaration which I propose to make upon signing the convention of which you gave me a draft embodying the articles of the declaration of Paris.

I propose to make the declaration in question in a written form, and to furnish you with a copy of it.

You will observe that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of the engagement to be taken by her Majesty.

If you have no objection to name a day in the course of this week for the signature of the convention, Mr. Dayton can on that day, and at the same time, sign with M. Thouvenel a convention identical with that which you propose to sign with me.

Draft of Declaration.—In affixing his signature to the convention of this day between her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order of her Majesty, that her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States.

Mr. Adams writes to Mr. Seward in August 23d, that this proceeding was " of so grave and novel a character as to render further action unadvisable until he obtained further instructions." The reply of Mr. Seward to this declaration, and the course decided upon by the Government, are stated by Mr. Seward in a letter to Mr. Adams dated September 7th:

I am instructed by the President to say that the proposed declaration is inadmissible.

It would be virtually a new and distinct article incorporated into the projected convention. To admit such a new article would, for the first time in the history of the United States, be to permit a foreign power to take cognizance of and adjust its relations upon assumed internal and purely domestic differences existing within our own country.

This broad consideration supersedes any necessity for considering in what manner or in what degree the projected convention, if completed either subject to the explanation proposed or not, would bear directly or indirectly on the internal differences which the British Government assume to be prevailing in the United States.

I do not enlarge upon this branch of the subject. It is enough to say that the view thus adopted by the President seems to be in harmony equally with a prudent regard to the safety of the Republic and a just sense of its honor and dignity.

The proposed declaration is inadmissible, among other reasons, because it is not mutual. It proposes a special rule by which her Majesty's obligations shall be meliorated in their bearing upon internal difficulties now prevailing in the United States, while the obligations to be assumed by the United States shall not be similarly meliorated or at all affected in their bearing on internal differences that may now be prevailing, or may hereafter arise and prevail, in Great Britain.

It is inadmissible, because it would be a substantial and even a radical departure from the declaration of the Congress at Pans. That declaration makes no exception in favor of any of the parties to it in regard to the bearing of their obligations upon internal differences which may prevail in the territories or dominions of other parties.

The declaration of the Congress of Paris is the joint act of forty-six great and enlightened powers, designing to alleviate the evils of maritime war, and promote the first interest of humanity, which is peace. The Government of Great Britain will not, I am sure, expect Page 268 us to accede to this noble act otherwise than upon the same equal footing upon which all the other parties to it are standing. We could not consent to accede to the declaration with a modification of its terms unless all the present parties to it should stipulate that the modification should be adopted as one of universal application. The British Government cannot but know that there would be little prospect of an entire reformation of the declaration of Paris at the present time, and it has not even told us that it would accept the modification as a general one if it were proposed.

It results that the United States must accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris on the same terms with all the other parties to it, or that they do not accede to it at all.

Thus ended this negotiation, and the question arises, says Mr. Seward—

What, then, are to be the views and policy of the United States in regard to the rights of neutrals in maritime war in the present case? My previous despatches leave no uncertainty on this point We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag, according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods not contraband of war. Goods of her Majesty's subjects, not contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation though found under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective, must be respected.

The unfortunate failure of our negotiations to amend the law of nations in regard to maritime war does not make us enemies, although, if they had been successful, we should have perhaps been more assured friends.

The reasons for inserting the declaration proposed by Lord John Russell in the convention contemplated with the United States, are stated by him in a letter to Mr. Adams dated August 28th:

The undersigned has notified Mr. Adams his intention to accompany his signature of the proposed convention with a declaration to the effect that her Majesty "does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."

The reasons for this course can be easily explained. On some recent occasions, as on the fulfilment of the treaty of 1846, respecting the boundary, and with respect to the treaty called by the name of the " Clayton-Bulwer treaty," serious differences have arisen with regard to the precise meaning of words, and the intention of those who framed them.

It was most desirable in framing a new agreement not to give rise to a fresh dispute.

But the different attitude of Great Britain and of the United States in regard to the internal dissensions now unhappily prevailing in the United States, gave warning that such a dispute might arise out of the proposed convention.

Her Majesty's Government, upon receiving intelligence that the President had declared by proclamation His intention to blockade the ports of nine of the States of the Union, and that Mr. Davis, speaking in the name of those nine States, had declared his intention to issue letters of marque and reprisals; and having also received certain information of the design of both Bides to arm, had come to the conclusion that civil war existed in America, and her Majesty had thereupon proclaimed her neutrality in the approaching contest.

The Government of the United States, on the other hand, spoke only of unlawful combinations, and designated those concerned in them as rebels and pirates. It would follow logically and consistently, from the attitude taken by her Majesty's Government, that the so-called Confederate States, being acknowledged as a belligerent, might, by the law of nations, arm privateers, and that their privateers must be regarded as the armed vessels of a belligerent.

With equal logic and consistency it would follow, from the position taken by the United States, that the privateers of the Southern States might be decreed to be pirates, and it might be further argued by the Government of the United States that a European power signing a convention with the United States, declaring that privateering was and remains abolished, would be bound to treat the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates.

Hence, instead of an agreement, charges of bad faith and violation of a convention might be brought in the United States against the power signing such a convention, and treating the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as those of a belligerent power.

The undersigned had at first intended to make verbally the declaration proposed. But he considered it would be more clear, more open, more fair to Mr. Adams to put the declaration in writing, and give notice of it to Mr. Adams before signing the convention.

The remainder of this extensive correspondence with the British Government is devoted to the cases of individuals and of vessels supposed to have infringed upon the strict laws of neutrality; and although many interesting topics were discussed, no important principle was disputed. For correspondence on the capture of Mason and Slidell from the steamer Trent, see page 276.

France.—The correspondence with the French Government is no less interesting than that with the Government of Great Britain. The letter of instructions to Mr. Dayton, Minister to France, commences with a simple statement of the origin, nature, and purposes of the contest in which the United States was involved. Secretary Seward says: " I have thus written only for the purpose of deducing from it the arguments you will find it necessary to employ in opposing the application of the so-called Confederate Slates to the Goverment of his Majesty the Emperor, for a recognition of its independence and sovereignty." He then proceeds to deduce these arguments:

The President neither expects nor desires any intervention, or even any favor, from the Government of France, or any other, in this emergency. Whatever else he may consent to do, he will never invoke nor even admit foreign interference or influence in this or any other controversy in which the Government of the United States may be engaged with any portion of the American people. It has been simply his aim to show that the present controversy furnishes no one ground on which a great and friendly power, like France, can justly lend aid or sympathy to the party engaged in insurrection, and therefore he instructs you to insist on the practice of neutrality by the Government of the Emperor, as all our representatives are instructed to insist on the neutrality of the several powers to which they are accredited.

Not entertaining the least apprehension of the departure from that course by his Majesty's Government, it is not without some reluctance that the President consents to the suggestion of some considerations affecting France herself, which you may urge in support of it. France is an agricultural and manufacturing country. Her industry depends very largely on a consumption of her productions and fabrics within the United States, and on the receipt, in exchange, of cotton, or other staples, or their equivalent in money, from the United States. The ability of the United States to thus consume and furnish depends on their ability to maintain and preserve peace. War here will Page 269 in any case be less flagrant, and peace, when broken, will be restored all the more quickly and all the more perfectly if foreign nations shall have the sagacity, not to say the magnanimity, to practise the neutrality we demand.

Foreign intervention would oblige us to treat those who should yield it as allies of the insurrectionary party, and to carry on the war against them as enemies. The case would not be relieved, but, on the contrary, would only be aggravated, if several European States should combine in that intervention. The President and the people of the United States deem the Union, which would then be at stake, worth all the cost and all the sacrifices of a contest with the world in arms, if such a contest should prove inevitable.

However other European powers may mistake, his Majesty is the last one of those sovereigns to misapprehend the nature of this controversy. He knows that the revolution of 1775 in this country was a successful contest of the great American idea of free popular government against resisting prejudices and errors. He knows that the conflict awakened the sympathies of mankind, and that ultimately the triumph of that idea has been hailed by all European nations. He knows at what cost European nations resisted for a time the progress of that idea, and perhaps is not unwilling to confess how much France, especially, has profited by it. He will not fail to recognize the presence of that one great idea in the present conflict, nor will he mistake the side on which it will be found. It is, in short, the very principle of universal suffrage, with its claim to obedience to its decrees, on which the Government of France is built, that is put in issue by the insurrection here, and is in this emergency to be vindicated, and, more effectually than ever, established by the Government of the United States.

I forbear from treating of questions arising out of the revenue laws of the United States, which lately have been supposed to have some bearing on the subject. They have already passed away before the proclamation of the blockade of ports in the hands of the revolutionary party. Nor could considerations so merely mercenary and ephemeral in any case enter into the counsels of the Emperor of France.

You will, naturally enough, be asked what is the President's expectation concerning the progress of the contest and the prospect of its termination. It is, of course, impossible to speculate, with any confidence, upon the course of a revolution, and to fix times and seasons for the occurrence of political events affected by the excitement of popular passions; but there are two things which may be assumed as certain: First, That the union of these States is an object of supreme and undying devotion on the part of the American people, and, therefore, it will be vindicated and maintained. Secondly, The American people, notwithstanding any temporary disturbance of their equanimity, are yet a sagacious and practical people, and less experience of evils than any other nation would require will bring them back to their customary and habitual exercise of reason and reflection, and, through that process, to the settlement of the controversy without further devastation and demoralization by needless continuance in a state of civil war.

The President recognizes, to a certain extent, the European idea of the balance of power. If the principle has any foundation at all, the independence and the stability of these United States just in their present form, properties, and character, are essential to the preservation of the balance between the nations of the earth as it now exists. It is not easy to see how France, Great Britain, Russia, or even reviving Spain, could hope to suppress wars of ambition which must inevitably break out if this continent of North America, now, after the exclusion of foreign interests for three-quarters of a century, is again to become a theatre for the ambition and cupidity of European nations.

It stands forth now to the glory of Franco that she contributed to the emancipation of this continent from the control of European States—an emancipation which has rendered only less benefit to those nations than to America itself. The present enlightened monarch of France is too ambitious, in the generous sense of the word, to signalize his reign by an attempt to reverse that great and magnanimous transaction. He is, moreover, too wise not to understand that the safety and advancement of the United States are guaranteed by the necessities, and, therefore, by the sympathies of mankind.

On the 19th of March Mr. Faulkner replies to the letter of Mr. Black, dated February 28th. In this answer he then describes the views and intentions of the French Government:

I have no hesitation in expressing it as my opinion, founded upon frequent general interviews with the Emperor, although in no instance touching this particular point, that France will act upon this delicate question when it shall be presented to her consideration in the spirit of a most friendly power; that she will be the last of the great States of Europe to give a hasty encouragement to the dismemberment or the Union, or to afford to the Government of the United States, in the contingency to which you refer, any just cause of complaint. The unhappy divisions which have afflicted our country have attracted the Emperor's earnest attention since the first of January last, and he has never, but upon one occasion of our meeting since, failed1 to make them the subject of friendly inquiry, and often of comment. He looks upon the dismemberment of the American Confederacy with no pleasure, but as a calamity to be deplored by every enlightened friend of human progress. And he would act, not only in conflict with sentiments often expressed, but in opposition to the well-understood feelings of the French people, if he should precipitately adopt any step whatever tending to give force and efficacy to those movements of separation, so long as a reasonable hope remains that the Federal authority can or should be maintained over the seceding States.

The Emperor Napoleon has no selfish purpose to accomplish by the dismemberment of the American Union. As he has upon more than one occasion said to me, "There are no points of collision between France and the United States; their interests are harmonious, and' they point to one policy, the closest friendship, and the freest commercial intercourse." He knows full well that the greatness of our republic cannot endanger the stability of his throne, or cast a shadow over the glory of France. He would rather see us united and powerful than dissevered and weak. He is too enlightened to misapprehend the spirit of conciliation which now actuates the conduct of the Federal authorities. He knows that appeals to the public judgment perform that function in our republic which is elsewhere only accomplished by brute force. And if armies have not been marshalled, as they would have been ere this in Europe, to give effect to the Federal authority, he is aware that it is not because the General Government disclaims authority over the seceding States, or is destitute of the means and resources of war, but from an enlightened conviction on its part that time and reflection will be more efficacious than arms in reestablishing the Federal authority, and restoring that sentiment of loyalty to the Union which was once the pride of every American heart.

I have not, so far, heard that any commissioners have been sent by the seceding States to France. Should they, as you anticipate, arrive shortly, I think I am not mistaken in saying that they will find that the Imperial Government is not yet prepared to look favorably upon the object of this mission.

Again, on the 15th of April, Mr. Faulkner describes to Mr. Seward his interview with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Thouvenel. In reply to the request of Mr. Faulkner that no proposition recognizing the permanent Page 270 dismemberment of the American Union should be considered by the French Government until after the arrival and reception of the new Minister accredited by the United States, M. Thouvenel said:

That no application had yet been made to him by the Confederated States, in any form, for the recognition of their independence; that the French Government was not in true habit of acting hastily upon such questions, as might be seen by its tardiness in recognizing the new kingdom of Italy; that be believed the maintenance of the Federal Union, in its integrity, was to be desired for the benefit of the people North and South, as well as for the interests of France, and the Government of the United States might rest well assured that no hasty or precipitate action would be taken on that subject by the Emperor. But whilst he gave utterance of these views, he was equally bound to say that the practice and usage of the present century had fully established the right of de facto Governments to recognition when a proper case was made out for the decision of foreign powers. Here the official interview ended.

The conversation was then further protracted by an inquiry from M. Thouvenel when the new tariff would go into operation, and whether it was to be regarded as the settled policy of the Government. I told him that the first day of the present month had been prescribed as the period when the new duties would take effect; that I had not yet examined its provisions with such care as would justify me in pronouncing an opinion upon its merits; that it was condemned by the commercial classes of the country, and that I had no doubt, from the discontent manifested in several quarters, that the subject would engage the attention of Congress at its next meeting, and probably some important modifications would be made in it. The finances of the Government were at this time temporarily embarrassed, and I had no doubt the provisions of the new tariff were adopted with a view, although probably a mistaken one, of sustaining the credit of the treasury as much as of reviving the protective policy, lie then asked me my opinion as to the course of policy that would be adopted towards the seceding States, and whether I thought force would be employed to coerce them into submission to the Federal authority. I told him that I could only give him my individual opinion, and that I thought force would not be employed ; that ours was a Government of public opinion, and although the Union unquestionably possessed all the ordinary powers necessary for its preservation, as had been shown in several partial insurrections which had occurred in our history, yet that the extreme powers of Government could only be used in accordance with public opinion, and that I was satisfied that the sentiment of the people was opposed to the employment of force against the seceding States. So sincere was the deference felt in that country for the great principles of self-government, and so great the respect for the action of the people, when adopted under the imposing forms of State organization and State sovereignty, that I did not think the employment of force would be tolerated for a moment, and I thought the only solution of our difficulties would be found in such modifications of our constitutional compact as would invite the seceding States back into the Union or a peaceable acquiescence in the assertion of their claims to a separate sovereignty.

On the 4th of May Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dayton that the question had been asked of Mr. Faulkner by M. Thouvenel, whether there was not some diversity of opinion in the cabinet of the President as to the proper mode of meeting the difficulties which disturbed the relations of the States and the General Government. He instructs Mr. Dayton to recall that conversation and to assure M. Thouvenel explicitly that there was no difference of opinion whatever between the President and his constitutional advisers, or among those advisers themselves, concerning the policy that had been pursued, and which was prosecuted by the Administration in regard to the unhappy disturbances existing in the country. The path of executive duty has thus far been too plainly marked out by stern necessities to be mistaken, while the solemnity of the great emergency and the responsibilities it devolves have extinguished in the public councils every emotion but those of loyalty and patriotism. It is not in the hands of this Administration that this Government is to come to an end at all—much less for want of harmony and devotion to the country. He further adds:

You cannot be too decided or too explicit in making known to the French Government that there is not now, and has there been, nor will there be, any the least idea existing in this Government of suffering a dissolution of this Union to take place in any way whatever.

There will be here only one nation and one Government, and there will be the same republic, and the same constitutional Union that have already survived a dozen national changes, and changes of government in almost every other country. These will stand hereafter, as they are now, objects of human wonder and human affection.

You have seen, on the eve of your departure, the elasticity of the national spirit, the vigor of the national Government, and the lavish devotion of the national treasures to this great cause. Tell M. Thouvenel, then, with the highest consideration and good feeling, that the thought of a dissolution of this Union, peaceably or by force, has never entered into the mind of any candid statesman here, and it is high time that it be dismissed by statesmen in Europe.

Again, on the 22d of May Mr. Dayton reports his arrival at Paris, and his first interview with the French Minister on the 16th. He thus relates the conversation:

M. Thouvenel, in the course of the conversation, took occasion to say that he deeply regretted the condign of things in the United States, and that in this expression of feeling he represented the views and feelings of the Emperor; that so deeply concerned was the Emperor that he had felt disposed to offer his good offices, but had been deterred from the fear that his offer might not be well received; but should occasion for this arise, he would always be ready and happy to be of use. He made special inquiry as to the policy of our Government in regard to neutral rights, particularly in reference to neutral property found in Southern ships. He went into considerable detail to show that historical precedents were in favor of treating Southern vessels as those of a regular belligerent, and applying the same doctrine to them as had always been upheld by the United States. He dwelt particularly upon the fact that Great Britain, during our revolutionary war, had not considered our privateers as pirates. I understood him to say that, as respects an effective blockade, it would be fully recognized and respected; but he seemed much impressed with the importance of understanding clearly the intentions of our Government in reference to these matters as respects the foreign world.

The recognition of the Southern Confederates as possessing belligerent rights he did not consider at all as recognizing them as independent States.

On the next day he was received by the Emperor, who said in substance: "That he felt great interest in the condition of things in the United States; that he was very anxious the Page 271 difficulties should be settled amicably; that he had been and yet was ready to offer his kind offices, if such offer would be mutually agreeable to the contending parties; that whatever tended to affect injuriously American interests was detrimental to the interests of France, and that he desired a perpetuation of the Union of the States," with some additional remarks of like tenor and character.

On the 20th of May another interview with the French Minister was had, in which the conversation turned on "neutral rights" and "belligerent rights." Mr. Dayton thus describes it:

He said, in substance, that they held that the flag covers the cargo; and that if a Southern ship carrying neutral property was captured, the property would not be condemned, &c. He hoped our Government would recognize principles for which it had always contended. I tola him it would certainly do so, but the question here was, whether there was a flag; that our Government insisted that the Confederates, being merely in rebellion, had no flag, and I could not exactly understand how a foreign Government which had not recognized them as an independent power could recognize them as having a flag. He said, furthermore, that the French Government had given no warning to their citizens, &c, (as the English Government had,) by proclamation, because it was unnecessary; that the statute law of France (of 1825, April 10, I think) declared that any French citizen taking service under a foreign power lost all claim to protection as a citizen; that if a subject of France should take service on board of a letter of marque licensed by the Confederate States, it would be, as I understood him, piratical on the part of such subject. He said, furthermore, that no letters of marque could be fitted out in their ports, or even, sheltered there, unless they came in from necessity, (as stress of weather, Ac.,) and then could remain, I think, but twenty-four hours; that consequently there could be no bringing of prizes into French ports, and while there a condemnation of them in the courts of the Southern States.

On the 30th of May, Mr. Seward, writing to Mr. Dayton, alludes to the conversation between Mr. Faulkner and M. Thouvenel, in which it was said by the latter, "that in view of the great commercial interests involved in the domestic controversy agitating the United States, the French Government had felt itself constrained to take measures in conjunction with the Government of Great Britain to meet a condition of things which imperilled those interests. Communications of a similar tenor would be addressed by both Governments to the Government of the United States," &c. The occasion is thus taken to state more explicitly the position of the United States. Mr. Seward writes:

First, I desire that M. Thouvenel may be informed that this Government cannot but regard any communications held by the French Government, even though unofficial, with the agents of the insurrectionary movement in this country as exceptionable and injurious to the dignity and honor of the United States. They protest against this intercourse, however, not so much on that ground as on another. They desire to maintain the most cordial relations with the Government of France, and would therefore, if possible, refrain from complaint. But it is manifest that even an unofficial reception of the emissaries of disunion has a certain though measured tendency to give them a prestige which would encourage their efforts to prosecute civil war destructive to the prosperity of this country and aimed at the overthrow of the Government itself. It is earnestly hoped that this protest may be sufficient to relieve this Government from the necessity of any action on the unpleasant subject to which it relates.

Secondly, The United States cannot for a moment allow the French Government to rest under the delusive belief that they will be content to have the Confederate States recognized as a belligerent power by States with which this nation is in amity. No concert of action among foreign States so recognizing the insurgents can reconcile the United States to such a proceeding, whatever may be the consequences of resistance.

The measures we have adopted, and arc now vigorously pursuing, will terminate the unhappy contest at an early day, and be followed by benefits to ourselves and to all nations greater and better assured than those which have hitherto attended our national progress. Nothing is wanting to that success except that foreign nations shall leave us, as is our right, to manage our own affairs in our own way. They, as well as we, can only suffer by their intervention. No one, we are sure, can judge better than the Emperor of France how dangerous and deplorable would be the emergency that should intrude Europeans into the political contests of the American people.

On the 30th of May Mr. Dayton writes to Mr. Seward:

I am happy to say that there is no disposition manifested here, so far as I have observed, to favor the rebellion in our Southern States, or to recognize them as an independent power. All recognition of rights on their part is for commercial purposes only. But the Government of France cannot, it says, look at this rebellion as a small matter. That, embracing as it does a large section and many Stales, they cannot apply to it the same reasoning as if it were an unimportant matter or confined to a small locality.

M. Thouvenel says he has had no application from Southern Commissioners for any purpose of recognition, and he docs not know even that such persons arc or have been in Paris.

Again, in June, he writes:

I think I may say with some confidence that all the efforts of the agents of the Confederates on this side of the channel have thus far been abortive. They have no encouragement to their hopes of recognition. They have met with no success in their attempts to negotiate a loan. I do not believe they have got any considerable supply of arms, and I think that we know substantially what they have done and are attempting to do. My only fear is of a possible, not probable, reverse to our arms in Virginia, and a rush, under the excitement of a first victory, upon the city of Washington. Should they get possession, by any possibility, of that point, the prestige it would give them (aside from any strategic advantage) might be productive of most unhappy results. God grant that no such future may hang over us.

On the 31st of May Mr. Dayton addressed to M. Thouvenel the proposition for the accession of the United States to the Declaration of the Paris Conference with the amendment proposed by Secretary Marcy.

On the 17th of June Mr. Seward informs Mr. Dayton of the visit of the British and French Ministers to lay before him conjointly certain views of their respective Governments, and that he declined to receive the same officially, and his reasons for adopting this course. The entire despatch is one of the ablest in the correspondence with the French Government, and explains very fully the views entertained by Page 272 the Government relative to the Confederate States:

Every instruction which this Government has given to its representatives abroad, since the recent change of Administration took place, has expressed our profound anxiety lest the disloyal citizens who are engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Union should obtain aid and assistance from foreign nations, either in the form of a recognition of their pretended sovereignty, or in some other and more qualified or guarded manner. Every instruction has expressed our full belief that, without such aid or assistance, the insurrection would speedily come to an end, while any advantage that it could derive from such aid or assistance could serve no other purpose than to protract the existing struggle and aggravate the evils it is inflicting on our own country and on foreign and friendly nations. Every instruction bears evidence of an earnest solicitude to avoid even an appearance of menace or of want of comity towards foreign powers; but at the same time it has emphatically announced, as is now seen to have been necessary, our purpose not to allow any one of them to expect to remain in friendship with us if it should, with whatever motive, practically render such aid or assistance to the insurgents. We have intended not to leave it doubtful that a concession of sovereignty to the insurgents, though it should be indirect or unofficial, or though it should be qualified so as to concede only belligerent or other partial rights, would be regarded as inconsistent with the relations due to us by friendly nations. Nor has it been left at all uncertain that we shall, in every event, insist that these United States must be considered and dealt with now, as heretofore, by such nations as exclusively sovereign for all purposes whatsoever within the territories over which this Constitution has been extended. On the other hand we have not, at any time, been unmindful of the peculiar circumstances which might excite apprehensions on the part of commercial nations for the safety of their subjects and their property in the conflicts which might occur upon sea as well as on land between the forces of the United States and those of the insurgents.

The United States have never disclaimed the employment of letters of marque as a means of maritime war. The insurgents early announced their intention to commission privateers. We knew that friendly nations would be anxious for guarantees of safety from injury by that form of depredation upon the national commerce. We knew also that such nations would desire to be informed whether their flags should be regarded as protecting goods, not contraband of war, of disloyal citizens, found under them, and whether the goods, not contraband, of subjects of such nations would be safe from confiscation when found in vessels of disloyal citizens of the United States. This Administration, free from some of the complications of those which had preceded it, promptly took up the negotiations relating to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, just at the point where they had been suspended by President Buchanan. We found it just and humane iii itself so far as it goes, and that it had only failed to be accepted by the United States because foreign nations had refused to accept an additional principle proposed by this Government, yet more just and humane than any which it does contain, namely, that the property of private citizens, not contraband, should be exempted from confiscation in maritime war. While still willing and desirous to have that further principle incorporated in the law of nations, we nevertheless instructed you, and all our representatives in foreign countries, to waive it, if necessary, and to stipulate, subject to the concurrence of the Senate of the United States, our adhesion to the declaration of the Congress of Paris as a whole and unmodified. This was done so early as the 25th day of April last, long before the date of the instructions which Mr. Mercier proposed to submit to us. We have ever since that time been waiting for the responses of foreign powers to this high and liberal demonstration on our part. We have, however, received no decisive answers on the subject from those powers.

It was under these circumstances that, on the 15th day of June instant, the Minister from France and the Minister from Great Britain, having previously requested an interview, were received oy me. Each of them announced that he was charged by his Government to read a despatch to me and to give me a copy if I should desire it.

I answered that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the times, I could not consent to an official reading or delivery of these papers without first knowing their characters and objects. They confidentially and with entire frankness put the despatches into my hands for an informal preliminary examination. Having thus become possessed of their characters, I replied to those Ministers that I could not allow them to be officially communicated to this Government. They will doubtless mention this answer to their respective States.

I give you now the reasons of this Government for pursuing this course in regard to the despatch from France, that you may communicate them to the French Government, if you shall find it necessary or expedient.

Some time ago we learned, through our legation at St. Petersburg, that an understanding has been effected between the Governments of Great Britain and France that they should take one and the same course on the subject of the political disturbances in this country, including the possible recognition of the insurgents. At a later period this understanding was distinctly avowed by M. Thouvenel to Mr. Sanford, who had been informally introduced by me to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Lord John Russell to Mr. Dallas, our late Minister "in London. The avowal in each case preceded the arrival of our newly appointed Ministers in Europe, with their instructions for the discharge of their respective missions.

On receiving their avowals I immediately instructed yourself and Mr. Adams " that although we might have expected a different course on the part of these two great powers, yet, as the fact that an understanding existed between them did not certainly imply an unfriendly spirit, we should not complain of it, But that it must be understood by the French and British Governments that we shall deal hereafter, as heretofore, in this case, as in all others, with each power separately, and that the agreement for concerted action between them would not at all influence the course we should pursue." The concert thus avowed has been carried out. The Ministers came to me together; the instructions they proposed to me differ in form, but are counterparts in effect.

Adhering to our previous decision, which before this time has doubtless been made known to the Government of France, we do not make this concert, under the circumstances, a reason for declining to hear the instruction with which Mr. Mercier is charged.

That paper does not expressly deny the sovereignty of the United States of America, but it does assume, inconsistently with that sovereignty, that the United States are not altogether and for all purposes one sovereign power, but that this nation consists of two parties, of which this Government is one. France proposes to take cognizance of both parties as belligerents, and for some purposes to hold communication with each. The instruction would advise us indeed that we must not be surprised if France shall address herself to a Government which she says is to be installed at Montgomery for certain explanations. This intimation is conclusive in determining this Government not to allow the instruction to be read to it. The

United States, rightly jealous, as we think, of their sovereignty, cannot suffer themselves to debate any abridgment of that sovereignty with France or with any other nation. Much less can they consent that France shall announce to them a conclusion of her own against that sovereignty, which conclusion France has opted without any previous conference with the Page 273 United States on the subject. This Government insists that the United States are one whole undivided nation, especially so far as foreign nations are concerned, and that France is, by the law of nations and bv treaties, not a neutral power between two imaginary parties here, but a friend of the United States.

In the spirit of this understanding of the case, we are not only not wishing to seek or to give offence to France, but, on the contrary, we desire to preserve peace and friendship with that great power, as with all other nations. We do not feel at liberty to think, and do not think, that France intended any want of consideration towards the United States in directing that the instruction in question should be read to us. Outside of that paper we have abundant evidence of the good feeling and good wishes of the Emperor, and even his anxious solicitude for the same consummation which is the supreme object of our own desires and labors, namely, the preservation of the American Union in its full and absolute integrity.

Doubtless the proceeding has been the result of inadvertence. We feel ourselves at liberty to think that it would not have occurred if we had been so fortunate as to have been heard through you in the consultations of the French Government. We think we can easily see how the inadvertence has occurred. France seems to have mistaken a mere casual and ephemeral insurrection here, such as is incidental in the experience of all nations, because all nations are merely human societies, such as have sometimes happened in the history of France herself, for a war which has flagrantly separated this nation into two coexisting political powers which are contending in arms against each other after the separation.

It is erroneous, so far as foreign nations are concerned, to suppose that any war exists in the United States. Certainly there cannot be two belligerent powers where there is no war. There is here, as there has always been, one political power, namely, the United States of America, competent to make war and peace, and conduct commerce and alliances with all foreign nations. There is none other, either in fact, or recognized by foreign nations. There is, indeed, an armed sedition seeking to overthrow the Government, and the Government is employing military and naval forces to repress it. But these facts do not constitute a war presenting two belligerent powers, and modifying the national character, rights, and responsibilities, or the characters, rights, and responsibilities of foreign nations. It is true that insurrection may ripen into revolution, and that revolution thus ripened may extinguish a previously existing State, or divide it into one or more independent States, and that if such States continue their strife affect such division, then there exists a state of war affecting the characters, rights, and duties of all parties concerned. But this only happens when the revolution has run its successful course.

The French Government says, in the instruction which has been tendered to us, that certain facts which it assumes confer upon the insurgents of this country, in the eyes of foreign powers, all the appearances of a government de facto; wherefore, whatever may be its regrets, the French Government must consider the two contending parties as employing the forces at their disposal in conformity with the laws of war.

This statement assumes not only that the law of nations entitles any insurrectionary faction, when it establishes a de facto government, to be treated as a belligerent, but also that the fact of the attainment of this status is to be determined bv the appearance of it in the eyes of foreign nations. If we should concede both of these positions, we should still insist that the existence of a de facto government, entitled to belligerent rights, is not established in the present case. We have already heard from most of the foreign nations. There are only two which seem so to construe appearances, and France is one of them. Are the judgments of these two to outweigh those of all other nations? Doubtless each nation may judge and act for itself, but it certainly cannot expect the United States to accept its decision upon a question vital to their national existence. The United States will not refine upon the question when and how new nations are born out of existing nations. They are well aware that the rights of the States involve their duties and their destinies, and they hold those rights to be absolute as against all foreign nations. These rights do not at all depend on the appearances which their condition may assume in the eyes of foreign nations, whether strangers, neutrals, friends, or even allies. The United States will maintain and defend their sovereignty throughout the bounds of the republic, and they deem all other nations bound to respect that sovereignty until, if ever, Providence shall consent that it shall be successfully overthrown. Any system of public law or national morality that conflicts with this would resolve society, first in this hemisphere and then in the other, into anarchy and chaos.

This Government is sensible of the importance of the step it takes in declining to hear the communication the tender of which has drawn out these explanations. It believes, however, that it need not disturb the good relations which have so long and so happily subsisted between the United States and France.

The paper, as understood, while implying a disposition on the part of France to accord belligerant rights to the insurgents, docs not name, specify, or even indicate one such belligerent right. On the other hand, the rights which it asserts that Franco expects, as u neutral, from the United States, as a belligerent, are even less than this Government, on the 25th of April, instructed you to concede and guarantee to her by treaty, as a friend. On that day we offered to her our adhesion to the declaration of Paris, which contains four propositions, namely: 1st. That privateering shall be abolished. 2d. That a neutral flag covers enemy's goods not contraband of war. 3d. That goods of a neutral, not contraband, shall not be confiscated though found in an enemy's vessel. 4th. That blockades, in order to be lawful, must be maintained by competent force. We have always, when at war, conceded the three last of these rights to neutrals; a fortiori, we could not when at peace deny them to friendly nations. The first-named concession was proposed on the grounds already mentioned. We are still ready to guarantee these rights, by convention with France, whenever she shall authorize either von or her Minister hero to enter into convention. There is no reservation or difficulty about their application in the present case. We hold all the citizens of the United States, loyal or disloyal, alike included by the law of nations and treaties; and we hold ourselves bound by the same obligations to see, so far as may be in our power, that all our citizens, whether maintaining this Government or engaged in overthrowing it, respect those rights in favor of France and of every other friendly nation. In any case, not only shall we allow no privateer or national vessel to violate the rights of friendly nations as I have thus described them, but we shall also employ all our naval force to prevent the insurgents from violating them just as much as we do to prevent them from violating the laws of our own country.

What, then, does France claim of us that we do not accord to her? Nothing. What do we refuse to France by declining to receive the communication sent to us through the bauds of Mr. Mercier? Nothing but the privilege of telling us that we are at war, when we maintain we are at peace, and that she is a neutral, when we prefer to recognize her ns a friend.

Of course, it is understood that on this occasion we reserve, as on all others, our right to suppress the insurrection by naval as well as by military power, and for that purpose to close such of our ports as have fallen or may fall into the hands of the insurgents, either directly or in the more lenient and equitable form of a blockade, which for the present we have adopted. It is thus seen that there is no practical subject of difference between the two Governments. The United States will hope that France will not think Page 274 it necessary to adhere to and practise upon the speculation concerning the condition of our internal affairs which she has proposed to communicate to us. But however this may be, the United States will not anticipate any occasion for a change of the relations which, with scarcely any interruption, have existed between the two nations for three-quarters of a century, and have been very instrumental in promoting, not merely the prosperity and greatness of each State, but the cause of civil and religious liberty and free institutions throughout the world.

This Government understands equally the interest of friendly nations and its own in the present emergency. If they shall not interfere, the attempt at revolution here will cease without inflicting serious evils upon foreign nations. All that they can do by any interference, with a view to modify our action, will only serve to prolong the present unpleasant condition of things, and possibly to produce results that would be as universally calamitous' as they would be irretrievable.

The case, as it now stands, is the simple, ordinary one that has happened at all times and in all countries. A discontented domestic faction seeks foreign intervention to overthrow the Constitution and the liberties of its own country. Such intervention, if yielded, is ultimately disastrous to the cause it is designed to aid. Every uncorrupted nation, in its deliberate moments, prefers its own integrity, even with unbearable evils, to division through the power or influence of any foreign State. This is so in France. It is not less so in this country. Down deep in the heart of the American people—deeper than the love of trade, or of freedom— deeper than the attachment to any local or sectional interest, or partisan pride or individual ambition— deeper than any other sentiment—is that one out of which the Constitution of this Union arose, namely, American independence—independence of all foreign control, alliance, or influence. Next above it lies the conviction that neither peace, nor safety, nor public liberty, nor prosperity, nor greatness, nor empire, can be attained here with the sacrifice of the unity of the people of North America. Those who, in a frenzy of passion, arc building expectations on other principles, do not know what they are doing. Whenever one part of this Union shall be found assuming bonds of dependence or of fraternity towards any foreign people, to the exclusion of the sympathies of their native land, then, even if not before, that spirit will be reawakened which brought the States of this republic into existence, and which will preserve them united until the common destiny which it opened to them shall be fully and completely realized.

On the 6th of July, writing to Mr. Dayton, Mr. Seward gives the reasons why a speedy adhesion to the declaration of the Paris Congress had been desired. This letter presents also the aspect of the question of neutral rights as viewed by our Government, and was intended when written to be regarded as a private communication between himself and Mr. Dayton.

The reason why we wished it done immediately was, that we supposed the French Government would naturally feel a deep anxiety about the safety of their commerce, threatened distinctly with privateering by the insurgents, while at the same time, as this Government had heretofore persistently declined to relinquish the right of issuing letters of marque, it would be apprehended by France that we too should take up that form of maritime warfare in the present domestic controversy. We apprehended that the danger of such a case or depredation upon commerce equally by the Government itself, and by its enemies, would operate as a provocation to France and other commercial nations to recognize the insurrectionary party in violation of our national rights and sovereignty. On the contrary, we did not desire to depredate on friendly commerce ourselves, and we thought it our duty to prevent such depredations bv the insurgents by executing our own laws, which make privateering by disloyal citizens piracy, and punish its pursuit as such. We thought it wise, just, and prudent to give, unasked, guarantees to France and other friendly nations for the security of their commerce from exposure to such depredations on either side, at the very moment when we were delivering to them our protest against the recognition of the insurgents. The accession to the declaration of Paris would be the form in which these guarantees could be given—that for obvious reasons must be more unobjectionable to France .and to other commercial nations than any other. It was safe on our part, because we tendered it, of course, as the act of this Federal Government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal citizens.

The instructions waived the Marcy amendment, (which proposed to exempt private property from confiscation in maritime war,) and required you to propose our accession to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, pure and simple. These were the reasons for this course, namely: First, It was as well understood by this Government then, as it is now Ly yourself, that ail article of that celebrated declaration prohibits every one of the parties to it from negotiating upon the subject of neutral rights in maritime warfare with any nation not a party to it, except for the adhesion of such outstanding party to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, pure and simple. An attempt to obtain an acceptance of Mr. Marcy's amendment would require negotiation not merely with France alone, but with nil the other original parties of the Congress of Paris, and every Government that has since acceded to the declaration. Nay, more: we must obtain their unanimous consent to the amendment before being able to commit ourselves or to engage any other nation, however well disposed, to commit itself to us on the propositions actually contained in the declaration. On the other hand, each nation which is a party to the declaration of Paris is at liberty to stipulate singly with us for acceptance of (hat declaration for the government of our neutral relations. If, therefore, we should waive the Marcy proposition, or leave it for ultimate consideration, we could establish a complete agreement between ourselves and France on a subject which, if it should be left open, might produce consequences very much to be deprecated. It is almost unnecessary to say that what we proposed to France was equally and simultaneously proposed to every other maritime power. In this way we expected to remove every cause that any foreign power could have for the recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent power.

The matter stood in this plain and intelligible way until certain declarations or expressions of the French Government induced you to believe that they would recognize and treat the" insurgents as a distinct national power for belligerent purposes. It was not altogether unreasonable that you, being at Paris, should suppose that this Government would think itself obliged to acquiesce in such a course by the Government of France. So assuming, you thought that we would not adhere to our proposition to accede to the declaration, pure and simple, since such a course would, as you thought, be effective to bind this Government without binding the insurgents, and would leave France at liberty to hold us bound, and the insurgents free from the obligations created by our adhesion. Moreover, if we correctly understand your despatch on that subject, you supposed that you might propose our adhesion to the treaty of Paris, "not pure and simple, but with the addition of the Marcy proposition in the first instance, and might afterwards, in case of its being declined in that form, withdraw the addition, and then propose our accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple.

While you were acting on these views on your side of the Atlantic, we on this side, not less confident in our strength than in our rights, as you are now aware, were acting on another view, which is altogether different, namely, that we shall not acquiesce in any declaration of the Government of Franco that assumes that this Government is not now, as it always has been, Page 275 exclusive sovereign, for war as well as for peace, within the States and Territories of the Federal Union, and over all citizens, the disloyal and loyal all alike. We treat in that character, which is our legal character, or we do not treat at all, and we in no way consent to compromise that character in the least degree; we do not even suffer this character to become the subject of discussion. Good faith and honor, as well as the same expediency which prompted the proffer of our accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple, in the first instance, now require us to adhere to that proposition and abide by it; and we do adhere to it, not, however, as a divided, but as an undivided nation. The proposition is tendered to France not as a neutral but as a friend, and the agreement is to be obligatory upon the United States and France and all their legal dependencies just alike.

The case was peculiar, and in the aspect in which it presented itself to you portentous. We were content that you might risk the experiment, so, however, that you should not bring any responsibility for delay upon this Government. But you now see that by incorporating the Marcy amendment in your proposition, you have encountered the very difficulty which was at first foreseen by us. The following nations are parties to the declaration of Paris, namely: Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Bremen, Brazils, Duchy of Brunswick, Chili, the Argentine Confederation, the Germanic Confederation, Denmark, the two Sicilies, the Republic of the Equator, the Roman States, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, Hamburgh, Hanover, the two Hesses, Lubeck, Mecklenburgh Strelitz, Mecklenburgh Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburgh, Parma. Holland, Peru, Portugal, Saxony, Saxe Altenburgh, Saxe Coburg Gotha, Saxe Meiningen, Saxe Weimar, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, Würtemberg, Anhalt-Dessau, Modena, New Granada, and Uruguay.

The great exigency in our affairs will have passed away—for the preservation or destruction of the American Union—before we could bring all these nations to unanimity on the subject, as you have submitted it to M. Thouvenel. It is a time not for propagandism, but for energetic acting to arrest the worst of all national calamities. We therefore expect you now to renew the proposition in the form originally prescribed. But in doing this you will neither unnecessarily raise a question about the character in which this Government acta, (being exclusive sovereign,) nor, on the other hand, in any way compromise that character in any degree. Whenever such a question occurs to hinder you, let it come up from the other party in the negotiation. It will be time then to stop and wait for such further instructions as the new exigency may require.

One word more. You will, in any case, avow our preference for the proposition with the Marcy amendment incorporated, and will assure the Government of France that whenever there shall be any hope for the adoption of that beneficent feature by the necessary parties, as a principle of the law of nations, we shall be ready not only to agree to it, but even to propose it, and to lead in the necessary negotiations. On the 2d of August Mr. Dayton proposed to open negotiations with M. Thouvenel relative to the accession of his Government to the declaration of the Paris Congress.

On the 2d of August these negotiations had reached a crisis which Mr. Dayton thus reports to Secretary Seward:

My anticipations expressed in despatch No. 10 are fully realized. Both Lord John Russell and M. Thouvenel refuse to negotiate for an accession by the United States to the treaty of Paris of 1856, except on the distinct understanding that it is to have no bearing, directly or indirectly, on the question of our Southern or domestic difficulty, and to render the matter certain they each propose to make a written declaration simultaneous with the execution of the convention, of which I herewith send you a copy and a translation. I likewise send you a copy of M. Thouvenel's note to me, with its translation.

I had an interview on Tuesday, the 20th instant, with M. Thouvenel by appointment in reference to the subject-matter of the convention, and then he gave me the first notice of the purpose of the French Government to execute this outside declaration, predicated as it was, beyond all doubt, upon a note he had just received from Lord John Russell, dated only the day preceding. He said that both France and Great Britain had already announced that they would take no part in our domestic controversy, and they thought that a frank and open declaration in advance of the execution of this convention might save difficulty and misconception hereafter. He further said, in the way of specification, that the provisions of the treaty standing alone might bind England and France to pursue and punish the privateers of the South as pirates. That they were unwilling to do this, and had already so declared. He said that we could deal with these people as we chose, and they could only express their regrets on the score of humanity if we should deal with them as pirates, but they could not participate in such a course. He said, further, that, although both England and France were anxious to have the adhesion of the United States to the declaration of Paris, they would rather dispense with it altogether than be drawn into our domestic controversy. He insisted somewhat pointedly that I could take no just exception to this outside declaration, simultaneous with the execution of the convention, unless we intended they should be made parties to our controversy; and that the very fact of my hesitation was an additional reason why they should insist upon making such contemporaneous declaration. These are the general views expressed by him.

In answer I assented at once to the propriety of such declaration being made in advance if France and England did not mean to abide by the terms of the treaty. I stated that I had no reason to suppose that the United States desired to embroil these countries in our domestic difficulties—that in point of fact our great desire had been that they should keep out of them; but they proposed now to make a declaration to accompany the execution of the convention which they admitted would vary its obligations. That my instructions were to negotiate that convention, and that I had no authority to do any thing or listen to any thing which would waive any rights or relieve from any obligation which might fairly arise from a just construction of its terms. He said they did not mean to alter its terms, that it was not like an addition of other provisions to the terms of the treaty itself. To this I replied, that for the purpose intended, it was precisely the same as if this declaration they proposed to make were to be incorporated into the treaty itself. In the course of our conversation I told him that any declaration or action which looked to or recognized a difference or distinction between the North and South was a matter upon which our Government was, under the circumstances, peculiarly sensitive; that we treated with foreign Governments for our whole country, North and South, and for all its citizens, whether true men or rebels, and when we could not so treat, we would cease to treat at all. He answered that they did not mean to contest our right to treat for the whole country, and that was not the purpose of the outside declaration they proposed to make; but having heretofore adopted a course of strict neutrality, the declaration in question was right and proper to prevent misconception and controversy in the future.

The reservation which the French Minister proposed to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, was inadmissible. The negotiation on this subject failed. The remainder of the correspondence with the French Government possesses less importance.

The diplomatic correspondence with Russia, although brief, was marked by a very friendly Page 276 letter from Prince Gortchakoff to the Russian Minister at Washington, expressive of the views of the Emperor. (See PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.)

The diplomatic correspondence with Spain contains a decree relative to the position of the Spanish Government on American affairs. (See PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.) The King of Portugal issued a similar decree. (See PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.)

The Trent Affair.—Near the close of the year a supplement was added to the correspondence with Great Britain, by the occurrence of the "Trent affair," as it is called. (See TRENT.)

On the 30th of November, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Adams that Captain Wilkes, in the steamer San Jacinto, had boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to England on an errand of treason against their own country. He then proceeds:

We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we Cave not furnished you with any explanations. "We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British Government should be first

 made known to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. It is proper, however, that you should know one fact in the case, without indicating that we attach much importance to it, namely, that, in the capture of Messrs. Mason and glided on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the Government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us.

Earl Russell on the same day writes to Lord Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, relating the facts of the case as he had received them from the commander of the colonial steamer Trent, and thus states the demands of his Government in relation to the matter:

Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from bis Government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized he greatly misunderstood the instructions which he had received. For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.

Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward you will propose them to him.

Later, on the same day. Lord John Russell addressed another note to Lord Lyons, of a private nature, as follows:

In my previous despatch of this date I have instructed you, by command of her Majesty, to make certain demands of the Government ot the United States.

Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her Majesty’s Government, your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London.

If, however, you should be of opinion that the requirements of her Majesty's Government are substantially complied with, you may report the facts to her Majesty's Government for their consideration, and remain at your post till you receive further orders.

A copy of the first despatch was sent to Mr. Seward by Lord Lyons, who gave him a reply on the 26th of December. After stating the facts in the case, Mr. Seward proceeds thus:

Your lordship will now perceive that the case before us, instead of presenting a merely flagrant act of violence on the part of Captain Wilkes, as might well be inferred from the incomplete statement of it that went up to the British Government, was undertaken as a simple legal and customary belligerent proceeding by Captain Wilkes to arrest and capture a neutral vessel engaged in carrying contraband of war for the use and benefit of the insurgents.

The question before us is, whether this proceeding was authorized by, and conducted according to the law of nations. It involves the following inquiries:

1st. Were the persons named and their supposed despatches contraband of war?

2d. Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and search the Trent for these contraband persons and despatches? 

3d. Did he exercise that right in a lawful and proper manner?

4th. Having found the contraband persons on board and in presumed possession of the contraband despatches, had he a right to capture the persons?

5th. Did he exercise that right of capture in the manner allowed and recognized by the law of nations?

If all these inquiries shall be resolved in the affirmative, the British Government will have no claim fur reparation.

The first four questions are briefly answered by himself in the affirmative, and only the fifth remained for consideration. This he examines at some length, and thus draws to a conclusion the most important paper that has emanated from his department:

I trust that I have shown to the satisfaction of the British Government, by a very simple and natural statement of the facts, and analysis of the law applicable to them, that this Government has neither meditated, nor practised, nor approved any deliberate wrong in the transaction to which they have called its attention; and, on the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertency, consisting in a departure, by the naval officer, free from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British Government "has a right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent State, should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly nation in a similar case.

I have not been unaware that, in examining this question, I have fallen into an argument for what seems to be the British side of it against my own country. But I am relieved from all embarrassment on that subject. I had hardly fallen into that line of argument when 1 discovered that I was really defending and maintaining, Page 277 not an exclusively British interest, but an old, honored, and cherished American cause, not upon British authorities, but upon principles that constitute a lame portion of the distinctive policy by which the United States have developed the resources of a continent, and thus becoming a considerable maritime power, have won the respect and confidence of many nations. These principles were laid down for us in 1804, by James Madison, when Secretary of State in the administration of Thomas Jefferson, in instructions given 10 James Monroe, our Minister to England. Although the case before him concerned a description of persons different from those who are incidentally the subjects of the present discussion, the ground he assumed then was the same I now occupy, and the arguments by which he sustained himself upon it, have been an inspiration to mc in preparing this reply.

Whenever," he says, " property found in a neutral vessel is supposed to be liable on any ground to capture and condemnation, the rule in all cases is, that the question shall not be decided bv the captor, but be carried before a legal tribunal, where a regular trial may be had, and where the captor himself is liable to damages fur an abuse of his power. Can it be reasonable then, or just, that a belligerent commander who is thus restricted, and thus responsible in n case of mere property of trivial amount, should be permitted, without recurring to any tribunal whatever, to examine the crew of a neutral vessel, to decide the important question of their respective allegiances, and to carry that decision into execution bv forcing every individual he may choose into a service abhorrent to his feelings, cutting him off from his most tender connections, exposing his mind and his person to the most humiliating discipline, and his life itself to the greatest danger. Reason, justice, and humanity unite in protesting against so extravagant a proceeding."

If I decide this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this Government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect upon its merits. Wo are asked to do to the British nation must what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us.

The claim of the British Government is not made in a discourteous manner. This Government, since its first organization, has never used more guarded language in a similar case.

In coming to my conclusion I have not forgotten that, if the safety of this Union required the detention of the captured persons, it would be the right and duty of this Government to detain them. But the effectual check and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as well as the comparative unimportance of the captured persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily forbid me from resorting to that defence.

Nor am I unaware that American citizens are not in any case to be unnecessarily surrendered for any purpose into the keeping of a foreign State. Only the captured persons, however, or others who are interested in them, could justly raise a question on that ground. Nor nave I been tempted at all by suggestions that cases might be found in history where Great Britain refused to yield to other nations, and even to ourselves, claims like that, which is now before us. Those cases occurred when Great Britain, as well as the United States, was the home of generations, which, with all their peculiar interests and passions, have passed away. She could in no other way so effectually disavow any such injury’s as we think she does by assuming now as her own the ground upon which we then stood. It would tell little for our own claims to the character of a just and magnanimous people if we should so far consent to be guided by the law of retaliation as to lift up buried injuries from their graves to oppose against what national consistency and the national conscience compel us to regard as a claim intrinsically right. Putting behind me all suggestions of this kind, I prefer to express my satisfaction that, by the adjustment of the present case upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly settled between them, which, heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two countries from each other, and perplexed with fears and apprehensions all other nations. The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated. Your lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving them.

Other nations besides Great Britain took a lively interest in this seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. On the10th of December, the Minister of France for Foreign Affairs writes to the representative of that court at "Washington that "the arrest had produced in France, if not the some emotion as in England, at least extreme astonishment and sensation. Public sentiment was at once engrossed with the unlawfulness and the consequences of such an act." Again he says:

The desire to contribute to prevent a conflict, perhaps imminent, between two powers for which the French Government is animated by sentiments equally friendly, and the duty to uphold, for the purpose of placing the right of its own flag under shelter from any attack, certain principles, essential to the security of neutrals, have, after mature reflection, convinced il that it could not, under the circumstances, remain entirely silent.

After examining the reasons which might be urged to justify the arrest of Mason and Slidell, if the United States approved of the act, lie proceeds to show the disastrous effects which their detention would have on the principles governing neutral rights. 

There remains, therefore, to invoke, in explanation of their capture, only the pretext that they were the bearers of official despatches from the enemy; but this is the moment to recall a circumstance which governs all this affair, and which renders the conduct of the American cruiser unjustifiable.

The Trent was not destined to a point belonging to one of the belligerents. She was carrying to a neutral country her cargo and her passengers; and, moreover, it was in a neutral port that they were taken.

The Cabinet of  Washington could not, without striking a blow at the principles which all neutral nations are alike interested in holding in respect, nor without taking the attitude of contradiction of its own course up to this time, give its approbation to the proceedings of the commander of the San Jacinto. In this state of things it evidently should not, according to our views, hesitate about the determination to be taken.

The result of this occurrence was highly favorable to the United States. It caused the courts of Great Britain and France to manifest a degree of respect for her which had been in a great measure withheld so far during the troubles of the country. The recognition of the Confederate States was emphatically declined, and all hope of encouragement on their part from those powers, was destroyed. (The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1861, vol. 1. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868, pp. 258-278.)


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.