History of the United States, v.4, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 23, Part 3: Grant’s Disappointment through The War Must Go On

There is little or no evidence, so far as I know, exhibiting the dejection of Grant at the failure of the high hopes and expectations which filled his soul when he crossed the Rapidan. His sturdy disposition and strong will, the determination that he must succeed, prevented probably the admission to himself of failure, and even if they had not, his stolid countenance would have concealed it. Yet two circumstances seem to indicate that the bitterness of disappointment was his share. It was commonly believed in the army that his misfortunes had driven him again to drink,2 and on this account and others, Butler, with crafty method, acquired a hold on him which prevented him from acting for the best interests of the service. It is not a grateful task to relate the story of Butler using Grant as a tool to accomplish his own ends. The picture of such a relation between the two is repulsive, but it may be fraught with instruction, as men of the type of Butler are never absent from our political life.
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2 W. F. Smith, From Chattanooga to Petersburg, pp. 52, 174, 178, 193. There is considerable tradition which points the same way.

"Butler," wrote Dana to Stanton, July 1, "is pretty deep in controversial correspondence with' Baldy Smith,' in which Grant says Butler is clearly in the wrong."1 On the same day Grant wrote Halleck, "I have feared that it might become necessary to separate General Butler and General Smith. The latter is really one of the most efficient officers in service, readiest in expedients and most skilful in the management of troops in action."2 He went on to say that "the good of the service would be subserved" if the command of a department "could be cut out" for Butler, "where there are no great battles to be fought," and that he "would feel strengthened" if Smith, Franklin, or J. J. Reynolds had Butler's position.3 July 6 Grant asked, by telegraph, for an order assigning Smith to Butler's active command.4 Having previously received a letter from Halleck which recognized Butler's "total unfitness to command in the field," but implied the absolute necessity of retaining him in a military position, and suggested that he be left in the local command of his department,5 Grant, in this despatch of July 6, asked that such a disposition be made of him. The President, Stanton, and Halleck had a conference, the result of which was the issuance, July 7, of an order complying exactly with Grant's request.6 Butler, learning of this order, paid a visit, July 9, to Grant at his headquarters,7 the outcome of which was seen the next day, when Grant telegraphed Halleck that he had suspended the order depriving Butler of his active command,8 thus leaving him in the same position which he had held from the commencement of the campaign; or, rather, as Butler stated the case, in a despatch to his chief-of-staff: "Do not trouble yourself about the order. It is all right now, and better
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l O.R., vol. xl. part i. p. 28. "Baldy" is W. F. Smith. The matter of this controversy does not concern my narrative. It is explained fully in Smith's and Butler's books.
2 Ibid., part ii. p. 559.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., part iii. p. 31.
5 Halleck to Grant, July 3, ibid., part ii. p. 598.
6 Ibid., part iii. pp. 59, 69.
7 Ibid., p. 114.
8 Ibid., p. 122.

than if it had not been disturbed."1 In the mean time Smith, on account of ill health, had gone away on a leave of absence for ten days, and on his return was relieved from the command of his corps and ordered to New York City.2

There can be but one explanation of this sudden reverse of action of Grant. Butler had some hold on the commander of the armies of the United States, and in that interview of July 9 showed his hand. Perhaps he joined together, in a Mephistophelian manner, the failure of the campaign, the popular horror at the waste of blood, seemingly to no purpose, and the general's relapse from his rule of total abstinence;3 perhaps he told Grant that as a Confederate corps under Early was now threatening Washington, to the exasperation of the people of the North, the commander of the Union armies needed a friend who had a powerful control of public sentiment, and that he was not so secure of his position that he could afford to refuse the proffered aid of Butler, which was his for an
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1 O. R., vol. xl. part iii. p. 114.
2 Ibid., pp. 334, 577. The history of this transaction is told in an orderly manner by Smith in his "From Chattanooga to Petersburg;" but while he suppresses nothing which might tell against himself, he does not, it seems to me, appreciate fully one circumstance which may have contributed to his having been relieved. July 10, "in a confidential conversation with General Grant, I tried to show him," he writes, "the blunders of the late campaign of the Army of the Potomac, and the terrible waste of life that had resulted from what I had considered a want of generalship in its present commander. Among other instances I referred to the fearful slaughter at Cold Harbor on the 3d of June. General Grant went into the discussion, defending General Meade stoutly, but finally acknowledged, to use his own words, 'that there had been a butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he had said nothing about it because it could do no good.'" — From Chattanooga to Petersburg, p. 176. Hardly any one now, I think, would speak of this campaign and its blunders as Meade's; they were Grant's. Neither is it clear why Smith, July 10, 1864, should have imputed the responsibility for them to Meade, unless he were hitting Grant over his subordinate's shoulders. Of course, this criticism must have been very distasteful to Grant, who would have needed the magnanimity of Lincoln to continue Smith under him in command afterwards. This, however, does not affect the main point of the case, — the retention of Butler in active command. Franklin, a very efficient officer, was available for the position. Contrariwise, see Butler's Book, p. 685 et seq.
3 See review of Smith's book by J. D. Cox, the Nation, May 25, 1893.

equivalent. Indeed, in Grant's despatches to the President and Halleck at this time, we seem to detect a more deprecatory, a less confident and resolute tone than during the first part of his campaign, and this prepares us for the explanation that he was swayed by Butler's threats, exhibiting in this affair less nerve than the President. Disaffection to the administration was growing. Lincoln needed the support of Butler's following, and unquestionably disliked to give the order to shelve the Massachusetts general,1 but he had the moral courage to say the word and run a personal risk for the good of the country.

I shall now proceed to give a brief account of Early's invasion into Maryland, which had a profound influence on the sentiment of the army and the people who were sustaining the government. Affairs in the Shenandoah valley had gone unfavorably for the Union cause. Sigel at first had been in command, but, proving incompetent, was succeeded by Hunter, who in the beginning had some success,2 and, emboldened
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1 See the curious change in the wording of the order, O. R., vol. xl part iii. pp. 59, 69; Smith, p. 33.
2 Long thus writes: "From Staunton Hunter advanced by way of Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely witnessed in the course of civilized warfare. . . . The beautiful valley of Virginia everywhere gave evidence of the ravages of war. Throughout the march down the valley the unsparing hand of Hunter was proclaimed by the charred ruins of its once beautiful and happy homes. At Lexington were seen the cracked and tottering walls of the Virginia Military Institute, the pride of Virginia, and the alma mater of many of the distinguished sons of the South, and near them appeared the blackened remains of the private residence of Governor Letcher." — Long's Lee, pp. 355, 357. Hunter in his report (O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 97) says: "On the 12th I also burned the Virginia Military Institute and all the buildings connected with it. I found here a violent and inflammatory proclamation from John Letcher, lately Governor of Virginia, inciting the population of the country to rise and wage a guerilla warfare on my troops, and ascertaining that after having advised his fellow-citizens to this course the ex-governor had himself ignominiously taken to flight, I ordered his property to be burned under my order, published May 24, against persons practising or abetting such unlawful and uncivilized warfare."

by it, advanced on Lynchburg, hoping to capture this important strategic point. Lee, greatly encouraged by his victories over Grant, and feeling confident that with a diminished force he could hold his ground against the crippled Army of the Potomac, detached Early and his corps to operate against Hunter.1 The Confederates forced the Union troops out of the Shenandoah valley, which was left open to their march, affording them an easy route to Maryland and the rear of Washington. July 2 Early reached Winchester, drove Sigel, who had been retained in a subordinate command, to Maryland Heights, crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown (July 6), levied $20,000 from Hagerstown, entered on the morning of the 9th Frederick City, which he laid under contribution for $200,000, and on the same day fought and defeated Lew. Wallace at Monocacy Bridge. Wallace had a heterogeneous force, composed of regiments of the Potomac Home Brigade, of Ohio and Maryland hundred-days men, reinforced by Rickett's division of the Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. He made a determined resistance, and his defeat was more serviceable than many victories, as he delayed Early, and thereby, in all probability, saved Washington from capture.2

The defeat of Wallace, however, caused much alarm in Washington and all over the North. "Baltimore is in great peril," telegraphed a committee of its citizens to the President. ..." Can we rely upon the prompt aid of the government in sending reinforcements?"3 Lincoln's reply furnished cold comfort, and from its lack of assurance showed to what straits the government was reduced. "I have not a single soldier but who is being disposed by the military for the best protection of all," he said. "By latest accounts, the enemy is moving on Washington. They cannot fly to either
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1 This was previous to the assaults on Petersburg, June 16-18.
2 Rickett's division bore the brunt of the battle with "coolness and steadiness," and he himself deserved credit "for his skill and courage." — Wallace's report, O. R, vol xxxvii. part i. p. 191.
3 July 9, ibid., part ii. p. 140. 

place. Let us be vigilant, but keep cool. I hope neither Baltimore nor Washington will be taken."1 The President had put the best face upon the situation, and he could not truthfully express a confidence he did not feel. He displayed, however, not the slightest abatement of his physical and moral courage, although he might well be appalled at the conditions confronting him. About 20,000 veterans,2 under Early and Breckinridge, flushed with victory and spoils,3 were advancing rapidly towards Washington,4 which, so much had this city and its fortifications been denuded of troops to send reinforcements to Grant, was defended only by invalids, hundred-days men,5 and District of Columbia volunteers, a total of 20,400, of whom nearly all were perfectly raw troops, and a considerable portion unavailable. Sigel's force was at Harper's Ferry; Hunter was approaching that place slowly from the West (his adjutant taking care to direct that he be received with ceremony and honor as he passed along the railroad),6 and Wallace and Ricketts had been beaten so badly that the most expected of them was an essay at the defence of Baltimore.7 Stanton had called on several of the governors
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1 July 10, 9.20 A. m., ibid., p. 173.
2 This number is variously given, but 20,000 is, I think, within bounds. It is of interest, as bearing on the alarm in Baltimore and Washington, that at the time this was a moderate estimate of the enemy.
3 Early to Breckinridge, July 5, also General Order, same date, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 592.
4 "On the morning of the 10th I moved toward Washington, taking the route by Rockville and then turning to the left to get on the Seventh Street pike. The day was very hot, and the roads exceedingly dusty, but we marched thirty miles." — Early's report, ibid., part i. p. 348.
5 The hundred-days men were furnished by the Western States, being the result of afar-sighted offer, April 23, by Governors Brough (Ohio), Morton (Ind.), Yates (111.), Stone (Iowa), and Lewis (Wis.). The number offered was: Ohio (whose governor seems to have taken the lead in this transaction) 30,000, Indiana 20,000, Illinois 20,000, Iowa 10,000, Wisconsin 5,000.— Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. pp. 514, 575, 583.
6 Order of July 2. "General Hunter will probably pass Cumberland on Monday. Please instruct the guards along the railroad to turn out. In case he should stop anywhere, have a salute fired."—O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 13.
7 Lincoln to Grant, July 10, 2.30 p. m., Halleck to Grant, same day, 3.30 p. m., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 155,157 ; Barnard's report cited by Humphreys, p. 245, note; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 163.

for assistance, making this record worthy of note, "Governor Seymour answers the President's call handsomely;"1 but the notice to them being sudden, no efficient aid could be rendered from these quarters.

Early's plan, which had been suggested or approved by Lee, comprised the release of the 17,000 prisoners at Point Lookout,2 arming them, and marching them immediately on the route to Washington, where they might be of assistance in its capture.3 For this object a detachment of cavalry was now on its way to Point Lookout, while Early himself, with his infantry and artillery, marched forward, and on the morning of July 11 appeared on the Seventh Street road north of Washington, before the fortifications of the city, in sight of the dome of the Capitol. Communication from Washington to the Northern cities was cut off; the excitement and alarm were great. The President, who, unmindful of personal danger, had, as usual, the night previous, ridden out to his summer residence, the Soldiers' Home, directly in the line of the advance of the enemy, was brought back to the city by the earnest insistence of the Secretary of ________________________
1 July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 91.
2 This point is where the Potomac empties into Chesapeake Bay. For the number of prisoners, see ibid., vol. xl. part iii. p. 143.
3 Lee wrote Davis, June 26: "Great benefit might be drawn from the release of our prisoners at Point Lookout. ... I have understood that most of the garrison at Point Lookout was composed of negroes. I should suppose that the commander of such troops would be poor and feeble. A stubborn resistance therefore may not reasonably be expected. By taking a company of the Maryland artillery, armed as infantry, the dismounted cavalry, and their infantry organization, as many men would be supplied as transportation could be procured for. By throwing them suddenly on the beach with some concert of action among the prisoners, I think the guard might be overpowered, the prisoners liberated and organized, and marched immediately on the route to Washington." —ibid., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 767, see p. 769 ; also, letter of John Tyler, July 9, ibid., vol. zL part iii. p. 759. The reports of Lee and Early of July 14, 19 (ibid., vol. xxxvii. part i. pp. 346, 347), must be read in the light of the earlier correspondence, and allowance must be made for the tendency of the most truthful commanders to make the best of great opportunities missed.

War; and Captain Fox, of the Navy Department, had, without Lincoln's knowledge, a vessel ready to transport him from the capital, should its fall become absolutely certain.1 If Early had profited by the moment of consternation, he could have gone into Washington early on July 11, seized the money in the Treasury, the large stores of clothing, arms, and ammunition, destroyed a large amount of government property, and, while he might not have been able to hold the place, he could have escaped without harm from the veterans who were on the way to the rescue, having struck the prestige of the Union an incalculable blow.

The veterans of the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac and of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans saved the country from the disaster of the capture of its capital. It was, however, little to the credit of Grant that Washington should be in so imminent danger, while Richmond was in none, and that the measures for its safety should have been so tardily taken. During these days the commander seemed to be stunned. Although his despatches are frequent, and evidence good attention to business, he did not realize the danger. He was not the man of prompt decision and ready purpose who commanded at Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga; rather was he the lethargic general of Shiloh. He refused to believe, while Early was marching down the Shenandoah valley, that the self-same Confederate corps had left Petersburg.2 It was not until July 5 that he became certain of it,3 and even then he did not show himself complete master of the situation.

Lee had in some measure reckoned on Grant's aversion to diminish his own army. "It is so repugnant to Grant's principles and practice to send troops from him," he had written Davis, "that I had hoped, before resorting to it, he would have preferred attacking me."4 But, as we have seen, Grant
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 167.
2 O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii pp. 3, 15, 16.
2 Ibid., p. 60.
4 July 7, ibid., p. 593; see, also, p. 595.

was now too weak to assault the Confederates in their intrenchments, and he did not fall into the trap which had been laid for him. July 6 he sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, about 5000 strong, an account of whose service has already been given, and 3000 of the cavalry corps, of whom, however, 2496 were sick, to Baltimore, deeming this reinforcement to the troops already in the field sufficient to guard against the threatened danger; indeed, he even cherished the hope that these veterans from his army, together with Hunter, might "succeed in nearly annihilating Early and Breckinridge."1 In response to Halleck's alarming telegram the night of the 8th,2 Grant ordered, the next day, before he had heard of Wallace's defeat, the remainder of the Sixth Corps to Washington, and suggested that part of the Nineteenth Corps, then on its way from New Orleans to Fortress Monroe, should also be sent as succors to lend aid in capturing or destroying the Confederates who had invaded the North.3 As a later thought, he sent this word: "If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person, I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive."4 Lincoln replied: "What I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are, certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if
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1 July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 80.
2 Of 10.30 p. m. "Sigel and Couch say that scouts, prisoners, and country people confirm previous reports of the enemy's force — that is, some 20,000 or 30,000. Until more forces arrive, we have nothing to meet that number in the field, and the militia is not reliable even to hold the fortifications of Washington and Baltimore. ... If you propose to cut off this raid and not merely to secure our depots, we must have more forces here. Indeed, if the enemy's strength is as great as represented, it is doubtful if the militia can hold all of our defences. I do not think that we can expect much from Hunter. He is too far off and moves too slowly. I think, therefore, that very considerable reinforcements should be sent directly to this place." — Ibid., pp. 119, 120.
3 Ibid., pp. 133, 134.
4 July 9, 6 p.m., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 134

the movement is prompt. This is what I think upon your suggestion, and is not an order."1 The President was wiser than the general. Grant, as the sequel proved, made a mistake in not proceeding immediately to Washington, and he failed to furnish satisfying reasons for not acting upon this suggestion of his own, which was so promptly accepted by the President. "Before more troops can be sent from here," he telegraphed, "Hunter will be able to join Wright [commander 6th Corps] in rear of the enemy, with at least 10,000 men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights. I think, on reflection, it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with General Ord at Baltimore, and Hunter and Wright with the forces following the enemy up, could do no good. I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force."2

Yet Grant had acted with sufficient promptness to save the capital, as Early, by delay, had missed a great opportunity. The Confederate commander suspected, probably, that the veterans had already arrived, for he did not seize Fort Stevens, which guarded the entrance to Washington by the Seventh Street road, and which he might have had by simply saying the word.3 At noon of this day (July 11), two divisions
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1 July 10, 2.30 p. m., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part 11. p. 155.
2 Ibid., p. 156 ; H. Porter, Century Magazine, May, 1897, p. 99. It may be urged that it was not safe for Grant to leave City Point on even a temporary errand, for the reason that Butler, being the senior officer in rank, would then be in supreme command of the operations against Petersburg. That was indeed an additional reason for the displacement of Butler, but the Army of the Potomac being engaged in siege operations was safe certainly under the command of Meade, assisted by his accomplished chief-of-staff Humphreys and the corps commanders Hancock and Warren.
3 John N. Frazee, Lieut.-Col. 150th Reg. Ohio N. G. (100-days men) Com'd'g Fort Stevens, reported, July 16: "The troops garrisoning the fort were composed of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard, 78 men, Capt. Safford; Thirteenth Michigan Battery, 79 men, Capt. Charles Dupont; 52 convalescents, commanded by Lieutenant Turner, of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard." —O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 247. To support the statement in the text, see the rest of his report; also Hayward's, p. 245, and A. D. McCook's, p. 230. I have been helped in this account by the recollections of my brother, Robert R. Rhodes, then a corporal in Company B, 160th Ohio N. G., stationed at this time at Fort Bunker Hill.

of the Sixth Corps, from City Point, with General Wright in command, arrived at the wharf in Washington, and soon after four o'clock in the afternoon were in the neighborhood of Fort Stevens.1 The capital was saved. The next day a severe skirmish took place, which was watched from the fort by the President, who was apparently oblivious of the flying bullets of the sharpshooters, until the fall of a wounded officer near him caused General Wright to ask him peremptorily to retire to a safer spot.2 The night of July 12 the Confederates withdrew, burning, as they departed, the house of Postmaster-General Blair at Silver Spring. A pursuit was attempted which accomplished nothing. Dana,8 who had gone to Washington, saw accurately the situation, and with prophetic insight foretold the result. "Nothing can possibly be done here toward pursuing or cutting off the enemy, for want of a commander," he telegraphed Grant. "There is no head to the whole, and it seems indispensable that you should at once appoint one. Hunter will be the ranking officer if he ever gets up, but he will not do. Indeed, the Secretary of War directs me to tell you, in his judgment Hunter ought instantly to be relieved, having proven himself far more incompetent than even Sigel. He also directs me to say that advice or suggestions from you will not be sufficient. General Halleck will not give orders except as he receives them; the President will give none, and until you direct positively and explicitly what is to be done, everything will go on in the deplorable and fatal way in which it has gone on for the past week." 4 There was a mass of contradictory
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1 Despatch of Wright, July 11, 4.10 p. m., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 265; see also the reports which follow, p. 265. The advance of the Nineteenth Corps arrived the same day.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 173; Chittenden, p. 415.
3 Charles A.
4 O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 223. Grant's flippant words were a poor answer to this weighty communication: "If the enemy has left Maryland," he said, "as I suppose he has, he should have upon his heels veterans, militiamen, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them." — O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 300,301. Grant's support of Hunter is incomprehensible unless it was due to his kindness of heart. See ibid., pp. 332, 365.

orders, a playing at cross purposes, the out generalling of the Federal commanders by Early, and a demoralization of the Union forces. Despatches were a long while in transmission between Washington and Grant's headquarters, and everything operated badly, for the reason that there was no efficient head. As long as he had no competent coadjutor in the Shenandoah valley, the commander of the armies should have been in Washington, or for a time even with the troops in pursuit of the Confederates. Toward the end of July Early turned upon his pursuers, drove them across the Potomac, and sent McCausland, with his cavalry, on a raid into Pennsylvania. McCausland occupied Chambersburg (July 30), and "in retaliation of the depredations committed by Major-General Hunter . . . during his recent raid," demanded from the citizens of the town "$100,000 in gold, or, in lieu thereof, $500,000 in greenbacks or national currency."1 Compliance therewith being impossible, the Confederate general carried out his threat, and laid the best part of the town in ashes.2
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1 McCausland's order, ibid., part i. p. 334.
2 Couch's report, ibid., p. 331; see, also, p. 334, and part ii. pp. 515, 525, 542; Pond, The Shenandoah Valley, p. 102; McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, pp. 239, 387.
Lincoln telegraphed Grant, August 14: "The Secretary of War and I concur that you had better confer with General Lee, and stipulate for a mutual discontinuance of house-burning and other destruction of private property." — Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 561. In this connection I add a citation from Grant's celebrated despatch to Sheridan of August 26: "Give the enemy no rest. ... Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah valley to remain a barren waste." — O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 917. Pursuit of McCausland was ordered, and resulted in the crippling of his force. "This affair [the final skirmish of the pursuit]," writes Early, "had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign." — Pond, The Shenandoah Valley, p. 107.

An aberration or negligence of Grant was certain to be followed by a gleam of his military genius, and such a gleam it now falls to me to record. August 1 he ordered General Philip H. Sheridan to the Shenandoah valley on temporary duty, this order furnishing the text for a despatch from Lincoln, which is sickening in its despair. "I have seen your despatch," the President wrote to Grant, "in which you say, 'I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.' This, I think, is exactly right as to how our forces should move; but please look over the despatches you may have received from here even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of ' putting our army south of the enemy,' or of 'following him to the death' in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it."1 Grant now paid a visit to the army of Hunter, and as that general in conversation expressed his willingness to be relieved, Sheridan was placed in permanent command.2 A different chapter on the Shenandoah valley from that of 1862, 1863, or 1864 until August 1 is henceforward to be written.3

I may not leave this part of my subject without mentioning the tradition that, on account of the failure and great loss of life of Grant's campaign, over which the feeling of the country was intensified by the Confederate invasion of the North and the imminent danger of Washington, the question of his removal from command was mooted; or, to present another phase of the story, that he was warned that a further cam
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1 August 3, O. R. vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 682.
2 Ibid., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 30; vol. xliii. part i. p. 719.
3 On Early's invasion, see reports of Lee, Early, Wallace, Hunter, and the despatches of Sigel, ibid., vol. xxxvii. part i.; the correspondence, ibid., part ii. and vol. xl. part iii.; Rec. of Lincoln, Chittenden; Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. ii.; Life of Lee, Long; Early's article, Century War Book, vol. iv.

campaign of attrition must be avoided. There are two despatches which may be considered to support, moderately, the less extreme version of the matter. July 17 the President thus telegraphed Grant: "In your despatch of yesterday to General Sherman, I find the following, to wit: 'I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men.' Pressed as we are, by lapse of time, I am glad to hear you say this; and yet I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of great loss of life."1 The next day Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 500,000 volunteers, by virtue of the Act of Congress of July 4, 1864,2 the passage of which had been largely influenced by the great losses in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, and ordered a draft to take place immediately after September 5 for any unfilled quotas.3 July 19 Halleck wrote Grant: "We are now not receiving one-half as many as we are discharging. Volunteering has virtually ceased, and I do not anticipate much from the President's new call, which has the disadvantage of again postponing the draft for fifty days. Unless our government and people will come square up to the adoption of an efficient and thorough draft, we cannot supply the waste of our army."4

Whatever implied warning there may have been in these despatches of Lincoln and Halleck,61 have found no evidence indicating the shadow of an intention of the supersedure of Grant, nor do I believe that such a thought even occurred to the President. Indeed, there was no one to take his place. Extenuating none of his faults, there can be no doubt that so far as any military ability had been developed, Grant was the
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1 Complete Works, vol. II. p. 549.
2 This act repealed the $300 exemption clause which had been a large factor in the incitement of the New York draft riots; if one were drafted now, he must go into the service or furnish a substitute.
3 Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 551.
4 O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 385.
5 Halleck, be it remembered, was the President's chief-of-staff.

fittest of all the generals to command the armies of the United States. That the President had confidence in him is plainly manifest. Before Grant knew of the proclamation calling for 500,000 volunteers, he suggested that there ought to be an immediate call for 300,000. Lincoln, in reply, informing him of what he had already done, said, "Always glad to have your suggestions."1 During July and August there obtained the usual pressure which came in time of disaster, for the restoration of McClellan to command;2 but I have written in vain if the reader can suppose that Lincoln entertained the idea of displacing Grant by McClellan, or that such a change would have redounded to the benefit of the Union cause.3

Despondency and discouragement are words which portray the state of feeling at the North during the month of July,
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1 July 19, 20, O. R. vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 384, 400.
2 This is well illustrated by Francis P. Blair's self-imposed mission to McClellan about July 20. — Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 790. The Cincinnati Commercial (Rep.) of August 2 thought that McClellan should be placed in command of the defences of Washington. The New York World of August 5, in citing the Cincinnati Commercial article, said that several Republican newspapers had expressed the same view. A pedler told a guest at a New York City hotel that he now sold more of McClellan's portraits than he did of Grant's (New York Tribune, August 12), an exhibition of surface public sentiment different from that of the previous April, when at the Metropolitan Sanitary Fair in New York City the sword-voting contest (each vote costing one dollar) terminated amid great excitement and some turbulence in 30,291 votes for Grant and 14,509 for McClellan. — New York Tribune, April 23, 25, World, April 25.
3 I believe that the following citation from Wilkeson, Record of a Private, represents the sentiment which preponderated in the army: "The enlisted men spent much time in comparing Grant with McClellan. The latter had many warm friends among the soldiers. He only of all the men who had commanded the Army of the Potomac was personally liked and admired by his troops. Soldiers' eyes would brighten when they talked of him. Their hard, lean, browned faces would soften and light up with affection when they spoke of him, — and still it was affection only; they did not, as a rule, concede to him military talent. And the general opinion among them was, given Grant in command of the army in 1862, and the rebellion would have been crushed that year. Asked how McClellan would have done with the army of 1864 under his command, they shrugged their shoulders and said dryly, 'Well, he would have ended the war in the Wilderness — by establishing the Confederacy.' " — P. 192.

and the closer one's knowledge of affairs the gloomier was his view; but the salient facts put into every one's mind the pertinent question, "Who shall revive the withered hopes that bloomed on the opening of Grant's campaign?"1

A resolution of Congress adopted July 2 was worthy of the Hebrews of the Old Testament or the Puritans of the English Civil War. It requested the President "to appoint a day for humiliation and prayer," and to ask the people "to convene at their usual places of worship" in order that they may "confess and repent of their manifold sins, implore the compassion and forgiveness of the Almighty, that, if consistent with his will, the existing rebellion may be speedily suppressed," and "implore him as the supreme ruler of the world not to destroy us as a people." The President, "cordially concurring ... in the penitential and pious sentiments expressed" in that resolution, appointed the first Thursday of August to be "observed by the people of the United States as a day of national humiliation and prayer." 2

Two despatches during Early's invasion of Maryland are worthy of note. Brigadier-General West having asked Halleck by telegraph from the Continental Hotel, Philadelphia, whether he could be of service in that vicinity,3 Halleck made this grim reply: "We have five times as many generals here as we want, but are greatly in need of privates. Any one volunteering in that capacity will be thankfully received." 4 Thomas A. Scott, who was always ready to help efficiently the government in a time of trouble, and who now offered the services of himself and his railroad,5 telegraphed from Philadelphia to Stanton, "The apathy in the public mind
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1 New York World, July 12. Yet this journal was fair in its treatment of Grant, see July 1, 12, 20, August 4.
2 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 544.
3 O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 81.
4 July 11, ibid., p. 196. Halleck may have thought of Artemus Ward's proposal to raise a "company composed excloosively of offissers, everybody to rank as Brigadier-General."
5 The Pennsylvania Railroad.

is fearful."1 It might well be doubted whether men in sufficient number and money in a sufficient amount would be forthcoming to complete the work of conquering the South. The financial condition of the country was deplorable, and may be measured by the fluctuations of the price of gold. January 2 gold sold in New York at 152, and when in April it reached 175 the Secretary of the Treasury endeavored to depress the price by the sale of about eleven millions; but the effect was only temporary. It continued to advance, and by June 17 had passed 197. On this day the President approved an act of Congress which aimed to prevent speculative sales of gold, and which calls to mind futile human efforts to stay a flood. After this enactment the speculation became wilder than before, and owing to the military failures and the resignation of Chase, gold touched, on the last day of June, 250. July 2 "An Act to prohibit certain sales of gold" was repealed. July 11, when Early was before Washington and communication with that city was cut off, gold fetched 285, its highest price during the war; the next day, the day of the skirmish in the vicinity of Fort Stevens and of the rumor in Philadelphia that the capital had fallen, it sold at 282. Such prices meant that the paper money in circulation was worth less than forty cents on the dollar. As the government bonds were sold for this money, the United States were paying, with gold at 250 (at which price or higher it sold during the greater part of July and August), fifteen per cent. on their loans.2 Nevertheless, money could be had. The continued issue of legal-tender notes had inflated the currency. Business, though feverish, was good; and many fortunes of our day had their origin in the excited business years of 1863 and 1864, when sales were easily made, most transactions were for cash, and nearly every one engaged in trade or manufactures seemed
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1 O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 255. On the apathy in New York City, see a startling article in the New York Round Table of July 16.
2 Schuckers's Life of Chase, chap. xxxvi., also p. 633; New York Tribune, July 11,13; New York World, July 13; New York Round Table, July 23; Boston Advertiser, August 10.

to be getting rich.1 There must have been still considerable financial strength in reserve, and as the value of property depended largely on a stable government, ample funds would have been furnished in the supreme crisis for its maintenance. Even now it was an element of confidence that the Germans were making large and constant purchases of our bonds.2

But the question of men was of far greater seriousness. In spite of the large immigration, labor was scarce, and in spite of the high prices of the staples of living, seemingly well paid. The class of men who enlisted in 1861 and 1862 no longer came forward; the ranks, as the conditions of the narrative have frequently obliged me to state, were filled by mercenaries, part of whom were obtained from the steady influx of European immigrants and from robust sons of Canada who contracted their service for a stipulated sum. Notwithstanding these sources of supply, able-bodied men in sufficient number were difficult to obtain. Many of the veterans, especially those in Sherman's army, the officers generally, the hundred-days men from the Western States, who had originally organized themselves as home guards, were from the best class of the community; and sorrow, now hanging over nearly every household from the casualties of war, augmented the discouragement and gloom. In the early days of July there was cheer at the news of the spirited duel between the Alabama and the Kearsarge off the French coast in the English Channel, which resulted in the defeat and sinking of the Confederate cruiser, while the Kearsarge suffered little, its casualties being only three wounded men; but it was the gladness over a heroic exploit and the gratification of revenge that this formidable destroyer of our commerce had at last been driven to her rain.3 That
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1 George Ticknor wrote Pickard, May 10, 1864: "Luxury reigns as it never did before in Boston, New York, and through the North generally." — Life and Letters of Ticknor, vol. ii. p. 456.
2 City article London Times, August 15, cited by Boston Advertiser, September 1.
3 The fight took place June 19. — Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 143; Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 600. Motley wrote, June 27: "The sinking of the Alabama by the plucky little Kearsarge will occasion great glee everywhere at home, and I can almost hear the shouts of delight at this distance." — Letters, vol. ii. p. 164. Farragut wrote: "I would sooner have fought that fight than any ever fought on the ocean." — Mahan's Farragut, p. 252.

the destruction of the Alabama had no effect in lightening the general gloom, since it was universally regarded as of no moment towards terminating the war, demonstrates how little, if anything, the ravages of the Confederate cruiser had to do directly with the prolongation of the civil conflict.1

Nor did the operations of Sherman dispel the gloom. Successful though they were, they lacked a striking character, and while steadily making for the destruction of Johnston's army and the capture of Atlanta, neither of these objects had yet been accomplished. July 17 Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee River, and began his movement directly against Atlanta. Jefferson Davis on the same day assisted him greatly by the removal of Johnston from the command, for the reason, in the words of the order, that "you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta . . . and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him."2 So masterly had been the strategy of Johnston in retreat that the intelligence of his displacement was glad tidings to the Union general, and to all the officers and men in the Union army. J. B. Hood, who superseded him, had been personally known at West Point by McPherson, Schofield, and Howard, and they with Sherman proceeded to measure the new commander: the result is summed up in Sherman's words, "the change . . . meant fight."3 In truth, the removal of Johnston implied that the Confederates must take the offensive, and Hood lost no time in carrying out the design of Jefferson Davis, which confirmed the judgment of Sherman. Thrice he attacked and brought on a battle; thrice
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1Grant shows no joy when he refers to the intelligence. — O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 60. Mr. Pierce prints no letter in which Sumner rejoices at it. I use the word " directly," in the text, as the escape and destructive work of the Alabama might have caused war between Great Britain and the United States.
2 Johnston's Narrative, p. 349.
3 Sherman Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 72.

he was repulsed with severe loss: these are the battles of Peach Tree creek, July 20, Atlanta, the 22d, and Ezra Church, the 28th. The chief feature of the battle of Atlanta, which was fought within two and one-half miles of the city, was a vigorous and skilful attack by Hardee, which struck a portion of the Union line in the rear, and would have caused a panic among any but sturdy veterans; but the soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee leaped over their breastworks and fought from the reverse side. McPherson, however, their commander, was killed. He had just left Sherman to investigate the unexplained firing in his rear, and to make the necessary dispositions to meet it; he had already given several orders, when he rode into the woods and ran into a Confederate skirmish line. The Confederates called upon him to surrender; he wheeled his horse in the attempt to ride away; there was a volley of musketry, and one of the noblest soldiers of the war fell dead. His sudden loss, telegraphed Sherman, "was a heavy blow to me." 1 This misfortune, together with the Confederate claims of victory,2 contributed partially, without doubt, to the lack of comprehension of what had really been gained during the month of July in this campaign, for the general notion seemed to be that the whole story was told in the statement, "Sherman is checked before Atlanta." 3 But in fact Hood's army had been crippled, and
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1 July 24, O. R., vol. xxxviii. part v. p. 240. He wrote the same day: "General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant knight and gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had called into existence to vindicate its honor and integrity. History tells us of but few who so blended the grace and gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith, and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, ne'er spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect; those whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth." — Ibid., p. 241.
2 See ibid., pp. 903, 908, 909.
3 Chicago Tribune, August 4; Boston Advertiser, August 2.

after the battle of Ezra Church he did not attack Sherman again for more than a month. The casualties of the Confederates during July were about 10,841, of the Union army 9719.1

The apathy and discouragement throughout the country took the shape of a yearning for peace,2 and this found an emphatic expression in much of the public and private writing of Horace Greeley, who in the month of July made an attempt to initiate negotiations which should bring the war to an end. On questionable authority he had received information that "two ambassadors of Davis & Co." were in Canada, "with full and complete powers for a peace." Placing this intelligence before the President, and writing that "our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country longs for peace, shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood," he urged Lincoln to make "a frank offer ... to the insurgents of terms which the impartial will say ought to be accepted," and to invite "those now at Niagara [Canada] to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum." 3 Lincoln replied: "If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you."4 Such a mode of prosecuting the business was not in accordance with Greeley's idea; therefore it was not until after further correspondence and some
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1 Sherman Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 93. This is one of my principal authorities on this campaign. See also Sherman's report, O. R., vol. xxxviii. part i. p. 71; the correspondence, ibid., part v.; J. D. Cox, Atlanta; Johnston's Narrative; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix.; J. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii.; Howard's article, Century War Book, Tol. iv.
2 Lowell wrote Motley, July 28: "The mercantile classes are longing for peace, but I believe the people are more firm than ever." — Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 168. 8 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 185 et seq.
4 Ibid., pp. 187, 188.

pressure from the President1 that he with reluctance accepted the mission and proceeded to Niagara Falls, where, on the American side of the river, he began negotiations with the Confederates in Canada. He exceeded his mandate, but ascertained that the Confederates were without authority from the Richmond government. This compelled him to ask for fresh instructions, upon which the President sent to him his private secretary, John Hay, with the famous paper of July 18: "To Whom it may Concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. Abraham Lincoln." 2 This was transmitted to the Confederates, and stopped all further negotiations, prompting from them an indignant manifesto, and from Greeley a sad, discouraged, reproachful letter.3

It was the idea of Greeley that for political as well as other reasons the President should have invited the Confederates to Washington, and asked them to submit their terms, without pronouncing at the outset an ultimatum, "however inherently reasonable," 4 which precluded any negotiation whatever; and indeed the President's ultimatum had for the moment an unfortunate effect on public opinion. Its form was deemed infelicitous; its substance gave a shock to those people who would willingly see the strife of arms cease on the simple
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1 Lincoln made the following effective statement: "I not only intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made." — Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 189.
2 Ibid., p. 192.
3 Ibid., chap, viii.; Greeley's Amer. Conflict, vol. ii. p. 664; Appleton's Ann. Cyc., 1864, p. 780; Raymond's Life of Lincoln, p571; J. Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 611; N. Y. Tribune, July 22, 25; Benjamin to Mason, August 25, Richmond Dispatch, August 26
4 American Conflict, vol. ii. p. 665.

condition of the restoration of the Union, and who believed that the exaction from the South of the abandonment of slavery stood in the way of peace. The course of after events, however, has amply justified the conduct of the President.

In truth, a conference occurring at the very time made it evident how well Lincoln grasped the situation, how he comprehended that any sure and satisfactory peace could come only from the destruction or surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaquess and J. R. Gilmore went, with the knowledge and consent of the President, on an irregular mission to Richmond, and obtained on the evening of July 17 an interview with Jefferson Davis. The burden of their conversation was, Could any means be tried that might lead to peace? "I desire peace as much as you do," said Davis, but the war "must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for Independence, and that or extermination we will have." As Jaquess and Gilmore took their departure, Davis said: "Say to Mr. Lincoln from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our Independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."

Taking into account the actual military situation, a different attitude on the part of the Richmond government could not have been expected. Davis also stated with clearness the understanding of present conditions by the aggressive people of the South. "We are not exactly shut up in Richmond," he said. "If your papers tell the truth, it is your capital that is in danger, not ours. Some weeks ago, Grant crossed the Rapidan to whip Lee and take Richmond. Lee drove him in the first battle, and then Grant executed what your people call a 'brilliant flank movement,' and fought Lee again. Lee drove him a second time, and then Grant made another 'flank movement;' and so they kept on, — Lee whipping, and Grant flanking, — until Grant got where he is now.

And what is the net result? Grant has lost seventy-five or eighty thousand men — more than Lee had at the outset — and is no nearer taking Richmond than at first; and Lee, whose front has never been broken, holds him completely in check, and has men enough to spare to invade Maryland and threaten Washington! Sherman, to be sure, is before Atlanta; but suppose he is and suppose he takes it? You know that the farther he goes from his base of supplies the weaker he grows, and the more disastrous defeat will be to him. And defeat may come. So, in a military view, I should certainly say our position was better than yours. As to money, we are richer than you are. You smile; but admit that our paper is worth nothing, — it answers as a circulating medium, and we hold it all ourselves. If every dollar of it were lost, we should, as we have no foreign debt, be none the poorer. But it is worth something; it has the solid basis of a large cotton crop, while yours rests on nothing, and you owe all the world. As to resources, we do not lack for arms or ammunition, and we have still a wide territory from which to gather supplies."1

Bad as was the military situation, the North had not yet come to the end of its misfortunes. A promising attempt to capture Petersburg by blowing up a portion of the Confederate works through the agency of a huge mine charged with powder failed on account of the inefficiency of the corps commander and the incompetence and cowardice of the general of a division, who were unequal to their opportunity after the mine had properly done its work. The casualties were great, the blundering was indisputable.2 This affair intensified the
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1 Down in Tennessee, Kirke (Gilmore), pp. 272, 273, 280; letter of J. R. Gilmore in Boston Evening Transcript, July 22 ; Atlantic Monthly, September 1864; Benjamin's circular from the State Department, August 25, Richmond Dispatch, August 26; comments of Richmond Dispatch and Whig, August 26, of Richmond Enquirer, August 27; letter of J. R. Gilmore, September 3, to New York Tribune; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. chap, ix.; Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 610; J. R. Gilmore, Personal Recollections of A. Lincoln, chap. xvii.
2 This was July 30, O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 27; ibid. vol. xi part i. p 163 et seq., p. 556; Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 315; Humphreys, p! 254; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 420; Century War Book, vol. iv. pp. 543, 561.

depression in the Army of the Potomac and in the country at large.

"I shall say nothing about politics, my dear Charles," wrote Lowell to Norton, August 1, " for I feel rather down in the mouth, and moreover I have not had an idea for so long that I shouldn't know one if I saw it. The war and its constant expectation and anxiety oppress me. I cannot think." 1

The intense gloom displayed itself in two forms, — in eagerness for peace and in dissatisfaction with Lincoln. "I know," wrote Greeley to Lincoln, August 9, "that nine-tenths of the whole American people, North and South, are anxious for peace — peace on almost any terms — and utterly sick of human slaughter and devastation. I know that, to the general eye, it now seems that the rebels are anxious to negotiate and that we repulse their advances. I know that if this impression be not removed we shall be beaten out of sight next November. I firmly believe that, were the election to take place to-morrow, the Democratic majority in this State and Pennsylvania would amount to 100,000, and that we should lose Connecticut also. Now, if the Rebellion can be crushed before November, it will do to go on; if not, we are rushing on certain ruin. . . . Now I do not know that a tolerable peace could be had, but I believe it might have been last month; and at all events, I know that an honest, sincere effort for it would have done us immense good. And I think no government fighting a rebellion should ever close its ears to any proposition the rebels may make. I beg you, implore you, to inaugurate or invite proposals for peace forthwith. And in case peace cannot now be made, consent to an armistice for one year, each party to retain, unmolested, all it now holds, but the rebel ports to be opened. Meantime, let a
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1 Lowell Letters, vol. i. p. 339.

national convention be held, and there will surely be no more war at all events." 1 The dissatisfaction with Lincoln found expression in New York City in a private call which had the support of many influential men for a convention to be held in Cincinnati, September 28, to nominate, if necessary, a new candidate for president. "Mr. Lincoln is already beaten," wrote Greeley, August 18. "He cannot be elected. And we must have another ticket to save us from utter overthrow. If we had such a ticket as could be made by naming Grant, Butler, or Sherman for President, and Farragut for Vice, we could make a fight yet. And such a ticket we ought to have anyhow, with or without a convention."2 Chase, in a letter to George Opdyke, showed partial sympathy with this movement. Henry Winter Davis wrote in hearty advocacy of a new candidate, and vouched for the support of Wade.3 Daniel S. Dickinson gave countenance to the enterprise,4 which had also the backing of Governor Andrew.5 Other prominent men, not willing to go to the length of Greeley, Davis, Wade, and Andrew, would have looked with supreme satisfaction on the
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. pp. 196, 197.
2 New York Sun, June 30,1889. The call for the convention is also therein printed.
3 August 19, 25, ibid.
4 Dickinson wrote, August 26: "I cannot believe that Mr. Lincoln, if fully advised of the public mind, would desire to enter upon a canvass. If the necessities of the shoddy contractors and longing office-holders had been less, the Union convention would have been postponed to September, and the true popular sentiment might be consulted and obeyed. . . . The war has been protracted beyond popular expectation. Men and money have been given freely. The helm has not been held with a firm and steady grasp, and there is a cry of change, which, no matter whether wise or ill-founded, should be both heard and heeded." — Ibid. See, also, Dickinson's Letters and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 650.
5 Memoir of J. A. Andrew, Chandler, p. 111. It is a tradition that Andrew's objection to Lincoln, growing out of his own radical views and associations, was heightened by an incident during a visit of his to the White House. While the governor was setting forth a matter he had at heart, the President, by way of putting him off, told him in illustration a smutty story, which turned the manner of his presentation into ridicule and caused him disgust.

withdrawal of Lincoln that a stronger candidate might be named.1 In Boston a number of radicals asked Fremont if he would withdraw from the canvass provided that Lincoln would do the same. He did not answer this question categorically, but suggested a new "popular convention upon a broad and liberal basis," and by implication a new candidate.2 The proposition that both Lincoln and Fremont should retire from the field received the support of Richard Smith, the editor of the Cincinnati Gazette. "The people regard Mr. Lincoln's candidacy as a misfortune," he wrote. "His apparent strength when nominated was fictitious, and now the fiction has disappeared, and instead of confidence there is distrust. I do not know a Lincoln man, and in all our correspondence, which is large and varied, I have seen few letters from Lincoln men. . . . The withdrawal of Lincoln and Fremont, and the nomination of a man that would inspire confidence and infuse a life into our ranks would be hailed with general delight." 3

Acutely conscious of public sentiment, did Lincoln, in view of the yearning for peace,4 change his ground from his "To Whom it may Concern" manifesto of July? He certainly did not in any published missive, but he revealed his mind in words written down in the form of a letter which probably was never sent. "If Jefferson Davis," he wrote, "wishes for himself, or for the benefit of his friends at the North, to know what I would do if he were to offer peace and reunion, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me." 5

1 E. g. Charles Sumner, Amasa Walker, L. Robinson, John Jay, Whitelaw Reid. See their letters August 29-September 2, New York Sun, June 30, 1889; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 197; see, also, Lieber's letter to Halleck, September 1, Life and Letters, p. 350.
2 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 791.
3 New York Sun, June 30, 1889.
4 Many peace meetings were held in Ohio, a notable one at Peoria, III. Vallandigham addressed a large peace meeting at Syracuse. He had returned to Ohio in June, 1864, and went about unnoticed and unmolested by the President. — Columbus Crisis, August 10, 24; Life of Vallandigham, p. 351 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 359.
5 August 17, ibid., vol. ix. p. 217; see, also, draft of instructions to Raymond, ibid., p. 220.

On the face of things this may seem a change of ground. In July he made two conditions for peace, Union and the abandonment of slavery, now only one, reunion, "saying nothing about slavery;" but if the conversation of Jefferson Davis with Jaquess and Gilmore had sunk deeply into his soul, the change was one of words and naught in essence. "You have already emancipated nearly two millions of our slaves," Davis said, "and if you will take care of them you may emancipate the rest. I had a few when the war began. I was of some use to them; they never were of any to me. Against their will you 'emancipated' them; and you may 'emancipate' every negro in the Confederacy, but we will be free! We will govern ourselves! We will do it, if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in flames!"1

Lincoln's eager desire for military success was expressed, on the day of his seeming change of ground, in a despatch to Grant, wherein is the quaint phraseology which brings a smile when read at the present day, although undoubtedly used with no attempt at humor, but, on the contrary, with a sad and heavy heart. "I have seen your despatch," he said, "expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible."2

The Democrats, who were to meet in convention at Chicago on August 29, were sure to nominate McClellan, who was the most popular man they could name. As he would receive the support of the Democrats and of a certain conservative element in the Union party, and since Fremont would draw off the radicals from their ordinary party allegiance in some of the doubtful States, the election of Lincoln was endangered, and the jubilation of the Democrats at their prospect of success was, in the existing state of the public mind, well
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1 Down in Tennessee, Kirke (Gilmore), p. 279. See Seward's speech, September 3, Works, vol. v. p. 502. For an allusion of Lincoln to a declaration of Davis to Jaquess and Gilmore, see Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 653.
2 August 17, ibid., p. 563.

founded. The friends of Lincoln became alarmed. August 22 Thurlow Weed wrote to Seward: "When, ten days since, I told Mr. Lincoln that his re-election was an impossibility, I also told him that the information would soon come to him through other channels. It has doubtless ere this reached him. At any rate, nobody here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from other States who authorizes the slightest hope of success. Mr. Raymond, who has just left me, says that unless some prompt and bold step be now taken all is lost. The people are wild for peace. They are told that the President will only listen to terms of peace on condition [that] slavery be abandoned."1 The Republican National Executive Committee met in New York City for consultation: this was the report given, August 22, to the President of its deliberations by Henry J. Raymond, its chairman, the editor of the New York Times, the representative of a wing of the Republican party which had steadfastly supported the administration and was antagonistic to the faction headed by Greeley. "I feel compelled," Raymond wrote, "to drop you a line concerning the political condition of the country as it strikes me. I am in active correspondence with your stanchest friends in every State, and from them all I hear but one report. The tide is setting strongly against us. Hon. E. B. Washburne writes that, 'were an election to be held now in Illinois, we should be beaten.' Mr. Cameron writes that Pennsylvania is against us. Governor Morton writes that nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry Indiana. This State, according to the best information I can get, would go 50,000 against us to-morrow. And so of the rest. Nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the Government and its friends can save the country from falling into hostile hands. Two special causes are assigned for this great reaction in public sentiment, — the want of military successes, and the impression in some minds, the fear and suspicion in others, that we are not to have peace in any event under this Administration
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 250.

until slavery is abandoned. In some way or other the suspicion is widely diffused that we can have peace with Union if we would. It is idle to reason with this belief — still more idle to denounce it. It can only be expelled by some authoritative act at once bold enough to fix attention and distinct enough to defy incredulity and challenge respect." 1

The reading of the sentiment of the country by Lincoln affords us a glimpse into his soul which discloses judgment of affairs, patriotism, and magnanimity. August 23, the day probably on which he received Raymond's letter, he wrote this memorandum to be seen at that time of no one: "This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards." 2

August 29 the Democratic National Convention met in Chicago. Governor Seymour was its permanent chairman, but in its proceedings Vallandigham 3 seemed equally influential. Seymour and his following dictated the candidate, McClellan being nominated for President on the first ballot; but Vallandigham drew up the important resolution, carried it through the committee, and got it adopted by the
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 218. Raymond went on to suggest a peace commission to make proffers of peace to Davis, which he had little doubt would be rejected, and the rejection of them would "unite the North as nothing since the firing on Fort Sumter has hitherto done." For the sequel of this, ibid., pp. 220, 221.
2 Ibid., p. 251. In my study of this subject I have consulted the files of the New York Tribune, World, Times, Independent, Round Table, Boston Advertiser, Springfield Republican, and Chicago Tribune. See especially the Tribune, July 25, August 4, 12, 17, World, July 21, August 11, 17, 20, Times, August 10, 24, September 8, Round Table, July 23 ; Springfield Republican, August 2, Cincinnati Gazette, August 27, cited by the Tribune; Forney's Chronicle cited by the World, August 18; see Seward's private letters, Life, vol. iii. pp. 238, 239, 240, 241.
3 See note 4, p. 519.

convention,1 which thus resolved: "That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States."2

At first the nominations at Chicago8 were received with enthusiasm by the Democrats and with solicitude by some Republicans. "The Chicago men seem to take well," wrote Henry Winter Davis, "and I hear daily of defections to them in quarters least expected from us." 4 "We think McClellan and Pendleton a very strong ticket," wrote Whitelaw Reid from Cincinnati, "and fear the result." 5 But this was simply an instant outburst of sentiment. A marked revulsion was at hand. While the people were pondering the resolution of the Democratic convention which, with epigrammatic brevity, they had reduced to the words, Resolved that the war is a failure, they read in their newspapers of September 3, "General Sherman has taken Atlanta," and they made up their minds that the declaration of the Democrats was untrue. Two days later the modest words of Sherman were printed: "Atlanta is ours and fairly won." 6 This was the culmination
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1 Vallandigham wrote, October 22, to the New York Daily News: "Mr. Vallandigham wrote the second, the material resolution, of the Chicago Platform, and carried it through the Sub-Committee and the General Committee, in spite of the most desperate and persistent opposition on the part of Cassidy and his friends."— Tribune, October 26.
2 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 793. See Nicolay and Hay, vol. Ix. p. 254 et seq.; Stan wood, History of the Pres., p. 304; Chicago Tribune, August 30, 31; New York Tribune, September 1, Independent, September 1; Springfield Republican, September 1.
3 George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, was nominated for Vice-President.
4 From Wilmington, Del. The letter is undated, but was written about September 1. —New York Sun, June 30, 1889.
5 September 2, ibid.
6 New York Times, September ; O. R.. vol. xxxviii. part v. p. 777. Hood abandoned Atlanta the night of September 1.

of his striving and of that of his able lieutenants and their devoted armies. The campaign was all the more glorious in that "a victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers."1 The army which entered Atlanta was substantially the same as the army which Sherman led out of Chattanooga.2

In August Farragut had fought the great battle of Mobile Bay, defeated the Confederate fleet, and had become master of the bay, compelling the surrender of Forts Gaines and Morgan. "In the lofty courage and stern determination which plucked victory out of the very jaws of defeat, the battle of Mobile Bay was to the career of Farragut what the battle of Copenhagen was to that of Nelson."8 Mobile, now the most important port in the Gulf of Mexico remaining to the Confederates, was no longer available for blockade-running. Another door to the outside world was shut. The persistent work of the navy by the blockade and the capture of ports was reducing the South to complete isolation.4

In August the demonstrations of joy over this naval exploit were perfunctory, but the capture of Atlanta by Sherman seemed to give Farragut's victory a cumulative force. The President, on September 3, issued a proclamation asking the people, when they assembled in their churches on the next Sunday, to make a "devout acknowledgment to the Supreme Being" for the success of the fleet in the harbor of Mobile, and the glorious achievements of the army in the State of Georgia; he issued orders of thanks to Farragut and Sherman; and he ordered salutes of rejoicing to be fired from the navy-yards and arsenals of the country.5 On the Sunday appointed by the President, the people, with one accord, thanked God and took courage.6
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1 Much Ado about Nothing, act i. scene
2. 8 J. C. Ropes, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Mass., vol. x. p. 267.
3 Mahan's Farragut, p. 239.
4 Ibid., p. 240 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 230. Fort Gaines was surrendered August 7, Morgan, August 23.
5 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 571.
6 New York Times, September 12; see, also, Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 244.

McClellan accepted the nomination of the Democrats, but repudiated the pivotal resolution of their platform.1 Grant furnished a strong campaign document, in a private letter to E. B. Washburne, written August 16, but not published until twenty-four days later. "I state to all citizens who visit me," he wrote, "that all we want now to insure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment North. The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons for entrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing, from desertions and other causes, at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is not far distant, if we will only be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them reinforcements from Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, while it would weaken us. With the draft quickly enforced, the enemy would become despondent, and would make but little resistance. I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter-revolution; they hope the election of the Peace candidate. In fact, like ' Micawber,' they hope for something to ' turn up.' Our Peace friends, if they expect peace from separation, are much mistaken. It would but be the beginning of war with thousands of Northern men joining the South because of our disgrace in allowing separation. To have ' peace on any terms,' the South would demand the restoration of their slaves already freed; they would demand indemnity for losses sustained, and they would demand a treaty which would make the North slave-hunters for
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1 Letter of September 8, Appleton's Ann. Cyc., 1864, p. 794; Stanwood, Hist of the Pres., p. 306.

the South. They would demand pay for the restoration of every slave escaping to the North."1

The State elections in Vermont and Maine, during the first half of September, showed that the disaffection with the administration was small, and indicated a favorable result for Lincoln in November.2

During the month of August, Sheridan, who, it will be remembered, had been placed in command of the army in the Shenandoah valley, accomplished no positive results, but in his marches and countermarches, in his advance and retreat, he was learning the ground and studying his adversary. Grant, watching all the movements, and alive to the importance of the valley, paid his lieutenant a visit, September 15, and gave him an order in the two words, "Go in! "3 Four days later Sheridan gained a brilliant victory over Early at Winchester, announcing it in these words to Grant: "I attacked the forces of General Early . . . and after a most stubborn and sanguinary engagement, which lasted from early in the morning until five o'clock in the evening, completely defeated him, and, driving him through Winchester, captured about 2500 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, 9 army flags, and most of their wounded."4 September 20 Lincoln sent this hearty message to Sheridan: "Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men."5 The Confederates "rallied and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill,"6 where Sheridan again attacked them and put them to rout. "I achieved a most signal victory over the army of General Early at Fisher's Hill to-day," he telegraphed to Grant, September 22; ". . . only darkness has saved the whole of Early's army from total destruction. My attack could not be made until four o'clock in the evening, which
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1 New York Times, September 9; Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 134.
2 Greeley's American Conflict, vol. ii. p. 670.
3 O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 30.
4 New York Times, September 21; September 19, 7.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 24
5 Ibid., part ii. p. 117.
6 Ibid., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 31.

left but little daylight to operate in. . . . The victory was very complete."1

These victories of Sheridan appealed to the popular imagination, as had those of Stonewall Jackson in 1862; but now it was the North which rejoiced that the commander who united dash and prudence was on their side, giving them long wished-for but unexpected victories in the Shenandoah valley, which had been the death of so many hopes, and the open door to the invasions of the North. What campaign speeches were Sheridan's despatches, telling the stories of Winchester and Fisher's Hill 1 How they contrasted with the declaration of the Chicago platform that there had been "four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war," and with its demand that there should be "a cessation of hostilities "! While such victories are gained, said one citizen to another as they shook hands and rejoiced, the war is not a failure; and victors in such battles do not ask for an armistice.

The political campaign was now prosecuted with vigor. Secretary Seward, in a brief speech at Washington, said, "Sherman and Farragut have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations." 2 Chase, who during July and August had been sulky and wavering, and had sneered at the President, now announced his support of Lincoln, went on the stump, and made effective speeches for the Union candidate.3
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1 New York Times, September 24; O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 26. September 23 Sheridan telegraphed: "General Crook struck the left flank of the enemy, doubled it up, advancing down along their line. Ricketts's division, of Sixth Army Corps, swung in and joined Crook, Getty's and Wheaton's divisions taking up the same movement, followed by the whole line, and attacking beautifully, carried the works of the enemy. The rebels threw down their arms, and fled in the greatest confusion, abandoning most of their artillery. . . . I do not think that there ever was an army so badly routed." —Ibid., p. 27.
2 September 14, before Sheridan's victories. — Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 794.
3 Judge E. R. Hoar once told me that he met Chase at a dinner in Boston during the summer, and that the ex-Secretary spoke with no attempt at concealment in offensively contemptuous terms of Lincoln. Lowell wrote Norton, August 18: "To-day I am going to help dine Mr. Chase. I shall come home sorry that I went, I know. . . . Would n't I like to dine old Farragut, though! By Jove 1 the sea-service has n't lost its romance, in spite of iron turtles." — Letters, vol. i. pp. 340, 341. In August, when Chase was at the White Mountains with his devoted friend Edward L. Pierce, who urged that all must sink private griefs and support the Union nominations, he exclaimed, "Well, anyway, McClellan is a gentleman." Bowles wrote, September 4: "Chase is going around, peddling his griefs in private ears, and sowing dissatisfaction about Lincoln." — Merriam, Life of Bowles, vol. i. p. 413. On the change of feeling of Chase, see letter of September 20, New York Sun, June 30,1889; also, Schuckers, p. 510; letter to John Sherman, October 2, Sherman's Recollections, vol. i. p. 340.

Dickinson wrote: "I make no doubt of Lincoln's triumphant election."1 Whitelaw Reid, in a newspaper despatch from Washington, said that the radicals had returned to their old allegiance, and would fight in the van.2 Governor Andrew, in a private letter, wrote that the plain duty for them as practical men was to give to Lincoln their energetic support.3 The tide having turned, the President helped the movement with the art of the politician. The sixth resolution of the Union National Convention virtually called for the removal of Montgomery Blair from the cabinet. During the gloomy summer, when everything seemed going wrong, when a smaller man would have complied with this demand, Lincoln did nothing, knowing that such an effort would be compared to the drowning man clutching at straws. But when the
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1 New York Sun, June 30, 1889.
2 To the St. Louis Democrat, September 21: "A private letter received here to-day from one of the prominent leaders in the radical movement now abandoned for another convention in Cincinnati, says: 'The conditions under which that call was issued were the general apathy and discontent, and the apparent certainty of Mr. Lincoln's defeat. All this is changed. The outrage on the nation perpetrated at Chicago, the fall of Atlanta, the success of the cause in Vermont and Maine, render that impossible and unreasonable which then seemed our only safety. We must now place ourselves in the van of the fight; we shall not enjoy its honors, but we will do what we may to save the country; it shall not be said of us that we have played in this contest the part of Fitz John Porter at the Second Battle of Bull Run.' This statement, I have reason to know, fairly represents the views of the entire body of earnest Unionists with and for whom he has been acting, from Ben Wade and Winter Davis down. Whoever among our foes counts on disaffection or lukewarmness in our ranks in the coming contest reckons without his host." — New York Sun, June 30, 1889.
3 Ibid.

current began to run in his favor, he was willing to make assurance doubly sure by lending himself to a bargain which should win the support of the still disaffected radicals who had placed Fremont in nomination, and of Wade and Davis, the authors of the manifesto and the most bitter of his opponents, who had influence and a considerable following. Fremont was to withdraw from the field, and the President was to request the resignation of Blair. The bargain was faithfully carried out. Fremont's letter of withdrawal to do his "part toward preventing the election of the Democratic candidate " was published in the evening journals of September 22, and the next day the President requested the resignation of Blair.1

To seal such a bargain was not a dignified proceeding on the part of the President of the United States, but it was a politic move. When we take into account the history of the candidacies of third parties, the earnest following of Fremont, and the estimated closeness of the vote in certain important States, the political shrewdness of Lincoln will be apparent. To consolidate the Republican party against its old-time opponent, to secure the energetic service of Wade on the stump, and the silence of Henry Winter Davis by a concession which had in it nothing of dishonor, and involved no injury to the public service, was a course to be adopted, without hesitation, by a master politician. Blair, with generosity and patriotism, made the sacrifice, and began at once to speak publicly and labor earnestly for the re-election of Lincoln.2 The Union and Republican party, being now united, made an aggressive fight. Their epigrammatic interpretation
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1 New York Tribune, evening ed., September 22; New York Times, September 23; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 579; Life of Z. Chandler, Detroit Post and Tribune, p. 273 et seq.; Julian's Political Record, p. 248; New York Nation, July 4, 1889. The despatches of the President to Blair, September 1 and 3, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 571, would seem to indicate that he began to prepare for this change in his cabinet directly after the Chicago convention. There is not in Nicolay and Hay any intimation of this bargain, but in the light of the other evidence, pp. 335, 339 et seq., vol. ix., are an indirect confirmation of it.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 341; Life of Chandler, p. 277. 

of the Democratic platform, Resolved that the war is a failure, was put forth on all occasions with the taunt that Farragut, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant had made this declaration forever and completely false; for Grant, the general of all the armies, shone in the reflected glory of his two lieutenants. Nothing could be more effective with the mass of the people than the contrast of these words of despair, written out carefully by Vallandigham, the most unpopular man of eminence in the country, with the victories on sea and land won by the ability and persistence of the admiral and generals who had been sustained by the hopefulness of the President and the people. In vain did Robert C. Winthrop urge, "If anybody is disposed to cavil with you about your platform, tell him that General McClellan has made his own platform, and that it is broad enough and comprehensive enough for every patriot in the land to stand upon." His supporters for the presidency, Winthrop continued, are not "scared from their position by any paper pellets of the brain, wise or otherwise, which ever came from the midnight sessions of a resolution committee in the hurly-burly of a National Convention."1 But the record could not be blotted out. The salient resolution of the Democratic platform, or the epitome of it uttered every day by every Union newspaper and stump-speaker in all the villages, towns, and cities, was a damning argument which could not be overthrown. By way of parrying it, the Democrats glorified the generalship of McClellan, and made much of the alleged ill treatment of him by Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck, when he was in command of the Army of the Potomac. During July and August, when military
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1 Speech in New York City, September 17, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 598. Winthrop wrote in a private letter, September 1: "It really seems to me as if the best hope of restoring the Union was in a change of administration, and I feel irresistibly compelled to support McClellan." — Memoir by Robert C. Winthrop, Jr., p. 234. Again he wrote, September 10: "I admit that the Chicago platform does not suit my fancy . . . but, on the whole, I do not see my way clear to prefer Lincoln and Johnson to McClellan and Pendleton. McClellan's letter of acceptance is admirable, and I can say Amen to it."—Ibid., p. 235.

reverses1 were the food of reflection, there was a point to these arguments;2 but the glory of Antietam paled when compared with the Atlanta campaign and the victories of Sheridan in the Shenandoah. The desperate character of the canvass for McClellan led the New York World, the ablest and most influential Democratic journal of the country, into an unworthy line of argument. Not content with the general charges of the "ignorance, incompetency, and corruption of Mr. Lincoln's administration," it cast imputations upon the personal honesty of the President. It asked these questions: "Mr. Lincoln, has he or has he not an interest in the profits of public contracts?" "Is Mr. Lincoln honest?" and gave these answers: "That Lincoln has succumbed to the . . . opportunities and temptations of his present place is capable of the easiest proof," and "This claim of honesty will not bear examination." Again it made this assertion, "' Honest Old Abe' has few honest men to defend his honesty."3 If anything in history be true, not only was there no just ground at this time for the slightest suspicions of the personal integrity of Lincoln, but it is, furthermore, certain that no more honest man than he ever lived.

From such campaign slanders it is agreeable to turn to the speeches of Horatio Seymour and Robert C. Winthrop, who advocated the election of a gentleman of honor in manner and words befitting their own high characters. At the end of the campaign, Winthrop quoted the injunction of an English orator and statesman, that "we should so be patriots as not to forget that we are gentlemen;"4 and while there may have been a tinge of sarcasm 5 in this allusion, he him
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1 I have given no account of the unfortunate Red River expedition of April and May. See Mahan's Farragut, pp. 245, 253; Nicolay and Hay, vol. viii. p. 289 et seq. If Grant had achieved signal success in Virginia, the effect of it would have been obscured, but, as matters were in the summer, the memory of it reappears continually.
2 The nomination of McClellan being a foregone conclusion.
3 New York World, September 22, 23, October 1.
4 Speech in Boston, November 2, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 637.
5 Winthrop wrote, in a private letter from Boston, October 23: "A very insolent tone prevails here towards all who cannot find it in their conscience to support Lincoln." — Memoir, p. 257; see, also, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 600.

self did not depart from the rule by a hair. Paying tribute to the strongest sentiment in the country at that time, love for the Union, both Seymour and Winthrop tried to impress it upon their hearers that the restoration of the Union would be more surely and quickly accomplished under the Democrats than by a continuance of the administration of Lincoln; and both gave their adherence to the party cry, "The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was." "Good Heavens I" exclaimed Winthrop, "what else are we fighting for?"1 Both urged with force that Lincoln's "To Whom it may Concern" letter, in insisting upon the abandonment of slavery made an unnecessary and insuperable condition to the re-establishment of the Union, and both expressed their sincere belief that the Republican policy of emancipation and subjugation was an effectual hindrance to the pacification of the South. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the historian whose faith is in the anti-slavery cause can have no sympathy with the main line of Seymour's and Winthrop's arguments, but he will be recreant to his duty should he leave the impression that he approves the doctrine that in the stress of the nation criticism of the faults of the administration should be silent. Believing, as he must, from the political literature of the day and the sequence of events, that the good of the country and the good of mankind demanded the re-election of Lincoln, and that Seymour and Winthrop had chosen the wrong part, he may rejoice that on collateral points they spoke words of warning and of wisdom on which lovers of our country will do well to ponder. Seymour mentioned "the frauds and failures that in an unusual degree have marked the conduct of affairs during the last three and a half years. I do not mean to say," he continued, "that the administration is to be condemned because, under circumstances so unusual as those which have existed during this war, bad men have taken
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1 September 17, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 594.

advantage of the confusion in affairs to do acts of wrong. But I do complain that when these wrongs are done, the government deliberately passes laws that protect the doer, and thus makes wrongdoing its own act. Moreover, in an election like this, when the government is spending such an enormous amount of money, and the liability to peculation is so great, the administration that will say to contractors, as has been openly said in circulars: 4 You have had a good contract, out of which you have made money, and we expect you to use a part of that money to assist to replace us in power, '. renders itself a partner in fraud and corruption. The contractor will say to this government: 'You shall not make a peace that shall put an end to all my profits.' "1 "The Republican party," declared Winthrop, "have so thriven and fattened on this rebellion, and it has brought them such an overflowing harvest of power, patronage, offices, contracts, and spoils, and they have become so enamoured of the vast and overshadowing influence which belongs to an existing administration at such an hour, that they are in danger of forgetting that their country is bleeding and dying on their hands."2

Worthy of note, too, is what both Seymour and Winthrop said, respecting the suppression of newspapers and arbitrary arrests. "In Great Britain," asserted Seymour, "the humblest hut in the kingdom, although it may be open to the winds and rains of heaven, is to the occupant a castle impregnable even to the monarch, while in our country the meanest and most unworthy underling of power is licensed to break within the sacred precincts of our homes." 3 "When martial law," said Winthrop, "is deliberately and permanently substituted for almost every other kind of law; when it is promulgated and enforced in places and under circumstances where it has no relation whatever to military affairs;
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1 Speech in Philadelphia, October 5, Public Record of H. Seymour, p. 257.
2 Speech at New London, Conn., October 18, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii p. 615.
3 Speech in Philadelphia, October 5, Public Record, p. 254.

when this extreme medicine of government is adopted and administered as its daily bread; when we see persons arrested and imprisoned . . . without examination or trial; . . . when we see newspapers silenced and suppressed at the tinkling of an Executive bell, a thousand miles away from the scene of hostilities; . . . when we hear those who have solemnly sworn to support the Constitution, proclaiming a prospective and permanent policy in utter disregard and defiance of that great charter of free government, and deriding and denouncing all who are for holding fast to it as it is, — who can help being alarmed for the future ?"1

The speeches of Winthrop and Seymour, however logical in appearance and finished in expression, were answered in the common mind by the bulletins of Sherman and Sheridan, the decline in gold and in the necessaries of life, and the
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1 Speech in Boston November 2, Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. pp. 633, 634; Seymour's speeches at Milwaukee September 1, in New York City September 8, in Philadelphia October 5, are printed in Public Record of H. Seymour. The speech in Philadelphia is especially dignified, high-toned, and patriotic. Winthrop's speeches in New York City September 17, at New London October 18, in Boston November 2, are printed in vol. ii. of Addresses and Speeches. The New London speech was the chef-d'oeuvre. It was printed in many Democratic newspapers. See New York World, October 20, Boston Advertiser, October 21. Winthrop wrote in a private letter, October 23: "The McClellan managers think so well of my New London speech that they have had it stereotyped, and besides my own edition, 200,000 copies are being circulated as campaign documents. My nomination at the head of the Democratic electoral ticket in this State was without my knowledge, but, feeling as I did, I could not refuse it, though I was sorry to be placed in a sort of antagonistic position to Everett" (who was at the head of the Union ticket). — Memoir, p. 258. He wrote, December 10: "I dined yesterday with William Amory — the Friday Club — all of whom, as it turned out, had voted McClellan except Agassiz and Chief Justice Bigelow. Caleb Cushing was there as a guest, but his politics I doubt if any one can accurately define except himself. He and I walked home together about midnight, when he volunteered the remark that my New London speech was the most effective one on that side, and that if McClellan's cause had been uniformly advocated in the same spirit, and the campaign run on those lines, he might have been triumphantly elected. I had already learned, on good authority, that both Lincoln and Seward had expressed a substantially similar opinion, which I consider one of the greatest compliments ever paid me, there being no better judges of the ability of campaign speeches than these three men." — Ibid., p. 261.

advance in price and continued large purchase of our bonds in Germany.1 But persons given to reflection, who liked to see argument met by argument, found matter to their satisfaction in the campaign speeches of Carl Schurz, which, though not seemingly purposed as a direct answer to Winthrop and Seymour, shook their positions, demonstrating clearly and cogently the necessity for the re-election of Lincoln. Schurz maintained that the evidence was abundant and clear that the Confederates would not come back on the basis of reunion; that "the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy was a condition sine qu& non for all peace negotiations;" and that the Democratic argument, "while the rebel government is for war the Southern people are for peace," although specious, was in reality destitute of foundation. The sentiment which pervaded Winthrop's and Seymour's speeches he showed to be merely a "vague impression . . . that the union and universal good feeling may be restored by a policy of conciliation and compromise." But nothing could be clearer than that the only course to be pursued was to fight the war out. "We went into the war," he declared, "for the purpose of maintaining the Union and preserving our nationality. . . . Gradually it became clear to every candid mind that slavery untouched constituted the strength of the rebellion, but that slavery touched would constitute its weakness. ... It became a question of life or death — the death of the nation or the death of slavery. Then the government chose. It chose the life of the nation by the death of slavery. ... As soon as a man throws his whole heart into the struggle for the Union, he throws, at the
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1 Boston Advertiser, September 24, October 2, Chicago Tribune, September 17, 28; city article London Times, cited in Boston Advertiser, September 22. Carl Schurz said, in a speech in Philadelphia, September 16: "You have heard of the people of Germany pouring their gold lavishly into the treasury of the United States [applause]. You have heard of a loan of a thousand millions having been offered and being now in progress of negotiation. Would those people who are standing by us so generously in our embarrassments, would they have done so if they did not trust in our ability and determination to carry through the war ?" — Speeches, p. 289.

same time, his whole heart into the struggle against slavery." It is useless to talk of restoring the Union as it was. "Thank God, it is impossible " to revive slavery.1

"There is not, now, the slightest uncertainty about the reelection of Mr. Lincoln," wrote Chase to John Sherman, October 2. "The only question is, by what popular and what electoral majority. God grant that both may be so decisive as to turn every hope of rebellion to despair! "2 October 11 State and congressional elections took place in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. Ohio went Union by a majority of 54,751;8 Indiana gave Morton, for governor, 20,883 more votes than were received by his Democratic opponent, and all three States made material gains in Union members of Congress. These elections manifested a tendency of public opinion which gave an almost unerring indication of the election of Lincoln in November. Sheridan conveyed an augmented force to the movement, and infused enthusiasm into the last weeks of the canvass. In a despatch to Grant, at ten in the evening of October 19, he thus tells the story: "My army at Cedar Creek was attacked this morning before daylight, and my left was turned and driven in confusion; in fact, most of the line was driven in confusion with the loss of twenty pieces of artillery. I hastened from Winchester, where I was on my return from Washington, and found the armies between Middletown and Newtown, having been driven back about four miles. I here took the affair in hand, and quickly united the corps, formed a compact line of battle just in time to repulse an attack of the enemy, which was handsomely done at about 1 p. M. At 3 p. m., after some changes of the cavalry from the left to the right flank, I attacked, with great vigor, driving and routing the enemy, capturing, according to the last report, forty-three pieces of artillery and very many prisoners. . . . Affairs at
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1 Speeches of Schurz in Philadelphia, September 16, in Brooklyn, Oct 7. — Speeches, pp. 277, 278, 284, 290, 291, 338, 339, 340, 348, 356. 2 Recollections of John Sherman, vol. i. p. 341.
3 28,152 of this was contributed by the soldiers.

times looked badly, but by the gallantry of our brave officers and men disaster has been converted into a splendid victory."1

"With great pleasure," telegraphed Lincoln to Sheridan, "I tender to you and your brave army the thanks of the nation, and my own personal admiration and gratitude for the month's operations in the Shenandoah valley; and especially for the splendid work of October 19, 1864."2 "The nation rings with praises of Phil Sheridan," said the Chicago Tribune.3 In New York City his exploit was "recited in prose and chanted in verse."4 The most famous poem called forth by the battle was "Sheridan's Ride," written on the impulse of the moment by Thomas Buchanan Read, and delivered immediately after it was written to a large audience in Cincinnati by James E. Murdoch, a retired actor and celebrated reader, whose declamation in the dramatic style eight days before the election stirred the crowd and served as effective last words of the political campaign.5
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1 New York Times, October 21; O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 32; see Sheridan's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 68. In this connection the glimpses we get of Sheridan in Busch's Bismarck are interesting. Speaking of the battle of Gravelotte, Sheridan said, " Your infantry is the best in the world ; but it was wrong of your generals to advance your cavalry as they did." —Vol. i. p. 74; see, also, pp. 97, 99, 107, 128. 2 October 22, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 589.
2 October 22.
3 New York Times, October 22. 6 Cincinnati Commercial, November 1, 1864. A different account of the circumstances under which the poem was composed is given by David L. James, cited in the Boston Evening Transcript, October 31, 1898. The poem is printed in a volume, "A Summer Story, Sheridan's Ride and other Poems" (Phila., 1865); the great effect which it had must have been due largely to the exciting time when it appeared and the impressive delivery of Murdoch. It is a laudation of the horse (see Sheridan's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 177) which bore Sheridan from Winchester to the battle-field; its keynote is

"Hurrah! hurrah for Sheridan!
Hurrah! hurrah for horse and man!"

The best stanza historically is

"The first that the general saw were the groups
Of stragglers, and then the retreating troops.
What was done? what to do? A glance told him both,
Then striking his spurs with a terrible oath,
He dashed down the line, mid a storm of huzzas,
And the wave of retreat checked its course there, because
The sight of the master compelled it to pause.
With foam and with dust the black charger was gray;
By the flash of his eye, and the red nostrils' play,
He seemed to the whole great army to say,
'I have brought you Sheridan all the way
From Winchester, down to save the day.' " — P. 77.

November 8 the presidential election took place. Lincoln carried States sufficient to give him 212 electoral votes, while McClellan would receive only 21, — those of New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky. In but one large State, New York, was there a close contest; Lincoln had a majority of the popular vote, in the whole country, of 494,567.1 Another result of the elections of the year was that enough Republican and Unionist members of the House of Representatives had been elected to insure the requisite majority of two-thirds for the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.

"I give you joy of the election," wrote Emerson to a friend. "Seldom in history was so much staked on a popular vote. I suppose never in history."2 "I thought that I should have much to say about the result of the election," wrote Motley from Vienna to his daughter. "But I am, as it were, struck dumb. The more than realization of my highest hopes leaves me with no power of expression except to repeat over and over again, —

'O Grosser Gott in Staube danke ich dir.' " 3

Even with the wealth of experience which his country's history has since furnished him, the historian can add nothing to the fervor of these expressions of men who lived in the spirit. In the first election of Lincoln, the people of the North had spoken, had declared their antagonism to slavery; did they remain true to their highest aspirations, they could
_______________
1 Stanwood, History of the Pres., pp. 307, 308.
2 Cabot, p. 609.
3 Motley's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 191.

not turn back, but must go forward. In spite of burdensome taxation, weariness of the war, and mourning in every household, they decided on this election day of 1864 to finish the work they had begun.1
__________________
1 My authorities for this account of the campaign other than already mentioned are the files of the New York Times, Tribune, World, Independent, Boston Advertiser, Chicago Tribune, Springfield Republican, Columbus Crisis, Belmont's speeches, August 29, September 17; Life of Vallandigham by his brother; Life of Chase, Schuckers; Julian's Political Recollections; Sherman Letters; Life of Bowles, Merriam; Life of Garrison, vol. iv.; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix.; Greeley's Amererican Conflict, vol. ii.; Reminiscences of Lincoln, Rice.
All writers on the Civil War owe their foremost and greatest obligations to the United States government for the publication of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. No such compilation was ever before possible (nor has it been since); and the government in seizing the opportunity has rendered a unique service to history. In this connection I am glad to acknowledge courtesies received from Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War.
The many references which I have made to Nicolay and Hay's history are by no means the full measure of my obligations to these authors, whose knowledge and industry have lightened very considerably the task of those who follow after them. During many years I had the opportunity of listening in the freedom of private conversation to Colonel John Hay's comments on public men and affairs, and my recollection of his brilliant talk has been a good annotation to his published work. I have also been helped by John T. Morse's Lincoln more than the references to it would seem to indicate.
My frequent conversations with General J. D. Cox, Francis A. Walker, John C. Ropes, Charles F. Adams, Thornton K. Lothrop, and George H. Monroe have been of assistance to me in the use of my material, and in arriving at proper judgments of many of the men whose deeds I have attempted to recount.
I am under great obligations to my friend Professor Edward G. Bourne of Yale University for reading carefully this volume in manuscript, and for giving me the benefit of his historical knowledge and literary criticism. I am indebted to Miss Wyman for her efficient work as my secretary, to Miss Wildman of the Boston Athenaeum for intelligent aid, to Mrs. M. S. Beall for care in the copy of material in the government archives at Washington, and to my son, Daniel P. Rhodes, for a valuable literary revision of this volume.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.4. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].