History of the United States, v.4, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 18: A Picture of Lee through Confidence in Lincoln

CHAPTER XVIII

Let us take a look at Lee, as Longstreet has drawn his picture. Instead of the well-formed, dignified soldier, mounted at the head of his troops, and exhibiting in every movement the alertness and vigor of rich manhood, we have now before us the closet student, poring over his maps and papers, with an application so intense as sometimes to cause his thoughts to run no longer straight. Often on these occasions he would send for Longstreet and say that his ideas were working in a circle and that he needed help to find a tangent. He was now at Chantilly, in the midst of one of these perplexities. He had no intention of attacking the enemy in his fortifications about Washington, for he could not invest them and could not properly supply his army. He must either fall back to a more convenient base or invade Maryland. In that State, so allied in sympathy with his own, he even hoped for a rising in his favor, but at all events deemed it likely that he could "annoy and harass the enemy." He would strike alarm to Washington and Baltimore, and would enter Pennsylvania. Perhaps in the chances of war he might win a decisive battle and conquer a peace. His soldiers were ragged, and many of them were destitute of shoes. The army lacked "much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation." "Still," Lee wrote, "we cannot afford to be idle;" we shall encounter without fear the troops of McClellan and Pope, both of which we have beaten and both of which "are much weakened and demoralized." He decided to cross the Potomac. Nothing occasioned him uneasiness but "supplies of ammunition and subsistence." With this project in contemplation, he talked with Longstreet.

Perhaps the friendly collision with another mind would strengthen his determination. His lieutenant related how Worth's division had marched "around the city of Monterey on two days' rations of roasting-ears and green oranges," and that we could as safely trust ourselves to "the fields of Maryland laden with ripening corn and fruit."1

September 3 Lee had put his troops in motion, and had reached Dranesville when he wrote Davis that he entertained the idea of invading Maryland. September 4, still marching on and now at Leesburg, his despatch to his President said, "I shall proceed to make the movement at once, unless you should signify your disapprobation;" but before this word could have reached Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac, its soldiers singing "Maryland, my Maryland," and had continued their rollicking march to Frederick City, which was reached on the sixth by the van led by Jackson. His riding through the streets gave an occasion to forge the story of Barbara Frietchie which Whittier wove into inspiring war verse. This poem was read in the home, in the school, and from the platform, and stirred Northern blood at the "barbarity of rebel warfare." It is a token of the intense emotion which clouds our judgment of the enemy in arms. Although Stonewall Jackson not long before was eager to raise the black flag, he was incapable of giving the order to fire at the window of a private house for the sole reason that there "the old flag met his sight;" and it is equally impossible that a remark of old Dame Barbara, "Spare your country's flag," could have brought "a blush of shame" over his face. Jackson was not of the cavalier order, but he had a religious and chivalrous respect for women. It is related, on seemingly good authority, that in this Frederick City, which was Union to the core, a woman, not Barbara Frietchie, waved a Union flag as Jackson's
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1 See Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 158, 199; Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 663 ; Lee to Davis, September 3, 4, 5, O. K., vol. xix. part ii. p. 590 et seq.

soldiers" passed and that he paid no attention to it. One of his colonels tells the story that on their march to Harper's Ferry, as they went through Middletown, two pretty girls, ribbons of red, white, and blue streaming from their hair, waved with a merry defiance their small Union flags in the face of the general. "He bowed and raised his hat, and turning with his quiet smile to his staff, said: 'We evidently have no friends in this town.'" 1

In conformity with his intention in crossing the Potomac to give the people of Maryland "an opportunity of liberating themselves," 2 Lee issued an address to them declaring that the South had "watched with deepest sympathy" their wrongs, and had "seen with profound indignation their sister State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province." "To aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke" is the object of our invasion.3 He was soon convinced that if the people of Maryland were oppressed they kissed the rod of the oppressor. They gave no signs of rising.4 Jackson's experience was the epitome of the real feeling, which if it had formulated itself would have issued in an earnest prayer for the departure from their borders of the Confederate host. The most serious effect of their cold welcome was the difficulty in procuring subsistence. Lee proposed to pay for their supplies, but all that he had to pay with was Confederate currency, or certificates of indebtedness of the Confederate States, and these the farmers, millers, and drovers would not take for their wheat, their flour, and their cattle. The army which had defeated McClellan and Pope could not make the farmers thresh their wheat and the millers grind it, nor prevent the owners of cattle from driving them into Pennsylvania. The citizens of Frederick, caring not for the
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1 Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 618, 622; Boston Herald, September 6, 1896 j Life of Jackson, by his wife, p. 346 ; Whittier's Poetical Works (1888), vol. iii. p. 245.
2 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 593.
3 September 8, ibid., p. 601.
4 Ibid., p. 596.

custom offered them by the officers and soldiers, closed their shops.1

It was Lee's intention, and in this Davis agreed with him, to have the Confederate States propose peace to the Northern government and people on the condition of the recognition of their independence. Lincoln in declining this proposal would help the Democratic party in the coming fall elections, when a new House of Representatives was to be chosen; and if the invading army could maintain its position in the territory of the North, a clamor might arise against a further attempt to conquer the South.2 He purposed to attack neither Washington nor Baltimore. His objective point was probably Harrisburg, and his purpose the destruction of the long bridge of the Pennsylvania Railroad across the Susquehanna River. Since he had already severed the communication by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the success of this undertaking would leave no land connection between the eastern and western States except the railroad line along the lakes. He would draw the Union forces away from the capital, so that, if he fought and overcame them, they would not have the intrenchments of Washington to fall back upon.3

At no time during the war were Confederate prospects so bright. Kirby Smith had defeated a Union force in Kentucky, had occupied Lexington, and was now threatening Louisville and Cincinnati, having pushed a detachment of his army within a few miles of Covington, one of the Kentucky suburbs of Cincinnati. Bragg with a large army had eluded Buell, and was marching northward toward Louisville in the hope that Kentucky would give her adhesion to the Confederacy. Cincinnati and Louisville were excited and alarmed.4 So impressed was Davis by the importance at this juncture of a union of statecraft with military strategy that he had started
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1 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 596 et seq.
2 Davis to Lee, September 7, Lee to Davis, September 8, ibid., pp. 598, 600.
3 Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 605; Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia, p. 331.
4 Cist, The Army of the Cumberland ; Cincinnati Commercial, September 1-11.

from Richmond to join Lee, expecting to sign his manifesto, offering peace from the head of the victorious army j but the general, unwilling to have him undergo the hardships of the journey and the risk of capture by the enemy, sent his aide-de-camp to warn him against continuing his progress.1

Lee had now found out that he could not live upon the country, and decided that he must open a line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley so that he could procure sufficient supplies of flour. But Harper's Ferry commanded the valley, and was held by a Federal garrison, although, according to the principles laid down in the military books, this post should have been abandoned when the Confederate army crossed the Potomac. Lee had expected to see it abandoned, and McClellan had advised it,2 but Halleck would not give it up. It was a lucky blunder, for Lee was forced on September 10 to divide his army, sending Jackson back into Virginia to capture Harper's Ferry, while he proceeded with Longstreet toward Hagerstown.

The feeling in the North approached consternation. That Lee should threaten Washington and Baltimore, then Harrisburg and Philadelphia, while Bragg threatened Louisville and Cincinnati, was a piling up of menace that shook the nerves of the coolest men. Those who were in a position to receive the fullest information seemed the most gravely anxious, for the inner councils of the nation were even more disturbed than the people. The number of the Confederates was grossly exaggerated, but their mobility and their leaders were compensation so great that their power as an invading army was still rated none too high. Taking into account that over 60,000 3 veteran soldiers, led by Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, marched out of Frederick with spirits high and with confidence of victory, it may not at this day be affirmed that the alarm
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1 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 602 ; Taylor, Four Years with General Lee, p. 66. See Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 204, 284. Davis returned to Richmond.
2 O. R., vol. xix. part 1. pp. 43, 145.
3 But see Ropes, Story of the Civil War, part 11. p. 337.

which spread over the North was greater than men in such peril ought to feel. In Washington the anxiety was not so much for the safety of the capital, which was well fortified and garrisoned, as for the danger to the cause. Stanton's uneasiness showed itself in the fear that communication with the North might be cut off. "The President said he had felt badly all day" (September 8).1 Seward, an optimist by nature and by conviction, wrote to his wife: "It would seem as if a crisis in our affairs were at hand. It would be easy to predict a favorable result, but the old armies are fearfully reduced. The new regiments come in very slowly, and of course they will be quite unreliable at first." 2 When Lee left Frederick and made directly for Pennsylvania, the farmers on the border sent away their women and children, then their cattle, and armed themselves for the protection of their homes against cavalry raids.3 The despatches from Governor Curtin at Harrisburg manifest concern for that capital: he called out 50,000 militia for the defence of the State. The words which came from Philadelphia were such as utter the citizens of a wealthy city in time of panic.4 All sorts of suggestions of little or no value were telegraphed to Halleck, to Stanton, and to the President, who had already done all they could. The peril in which Maryland and Pennsylvania lay could for the moment be averted only by McClellan and his army.

McClellan started his troops from Washington September 5, he himself following two days later. The necessity of reorganizing his depleted army and of covering Baltimore and Washington, together with his own habitual caution and his uncertainty as to the enemy's movements, caused him to
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1 Warden's Chase, pp. 464, 466.
2 September 10, Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 128.
3 National Intelligencer, September 11. Old residents of Keedysville, Md., on the edge of the battlefield of Antietam, have related to me like occurrences in their section, which was strongly Union.
4 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. pp. 230, 250, 268, 279. S. H. Gay wrote from New York City: "There Is the deepest anxiety here, and a most ominous state of affairs." — A. S. Hill papers, MS.

proceed slowly. September 10 he ordered a general advance, and began to ask for reinforcements; the next day he repeated this request, specified what troops in particular he wanted, and argued that it would be well even to weaken the defences about Washington for the purpose of strengthening his army: he estimated the Confederate force at 120,000.1 The President ordered Porter's corps to join him.2 September 12 a portion of the Union right wing entered Frederick City amidst the joyful acclaim of its inhabitants. McClellan arrived a day later, and wrote of his "enthusiastic reception ": "I was nearly overwhelmed and pulled to pieces. ... As to flowers, — they came in crowds!" 3 Fortune turned his way. There was brought to him an order of Lee,4 disclosing the division of the Confederate army and the exact scheme of their march — the whole plan of the able strategist opposed to him was revealed. The order, addressed to D. H. Hill and wrapped around three cigars, was found by Private Mitchell of the 27th Indiana on the ground which had been occupied by Hill's troops. When General John G. Walker received his copy of this order, it occurred to him that disaster might result from its loss, and he "pinned it securely in an inside pocket." Longstreet, with the same thought, took a more certain precaution; "he memorized the order and then chewed it up." The finder and his superior officers made no doubt of its importance: it was taken at once to the headquarters of the army, where the signature to it of Lee's adjutant was verified.5 McClellan's joy is shown in his despatch to the President written at noon of September 13: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost ... I think Lee has made a gross mistake,
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1 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. pp. 234, 253, 254.
2 Porter had been relieved from duty by direction of the President, but this order was suspended at the request of McClellan. — Ibid., pp. 188, 189. The general court-martial which tried Porter did not convene until November 27. — Ibid., vol. xii. part ii. p. 507.
3 Own Story, p. 571.
4 Printed, O. R., vol. six. part ii. p. 603.
5 Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 603, 607. 

and that he will be severely punished for it. The army is in motion as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged. ... I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. I now feel that I can count on them as of old. . . . My respects to Mrs. Lincoln Received most enthusiastically by the ladies."1 McClellan acted with energy, but not with the energy of the great Frederick or of Napoleon.2 He marched his army forward, and the next day (September 14) won the battle of South Mountain. Jacob Dolson Cox, who seized an unexpected opportunity, made a brave assault in the morning, with his Kanawha division and carried the crest of Fox's Gap. In the afternoon Reno's corps, to which Cox belonged, and Hooker's corps forced Turner's Gap, securing a passage for the Union army over the South Mountain range to the field of Antietam. This victory restored the morale of the Union army, and gave heart to the President and the people of the North.

Meanwhile Franklin, on his way to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry, had forced Crampton's Gap. But it had been put beyond the power of generals of no more enterprise than McClellan and Franklin to save this post.3 The military blunder of Halleck in refusing to abandon Harper's Ferry would have been an astonishing piece of good fortune had he thrown off for the occasion his habitual vacillation. As early as September 5 he suggested to Wool, who was stationed at Baltimore and had command of a department which embraced Harper's Ferry, "the propriety of withdrawing all our forces in that vicinity to Maryland Heights,"4 on the Maryland side of the Potomac River; but Wool did
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1 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 281. In his despatch to Halleck, 11 p. m., September 13, McClellan wrote that Lee's order came into his hands that evening, but it is unquestionable that he must have had it when he sent the telegram to the President cited in the text.
2 See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 341 et seq.
3 Ibid., p. 346.
4 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 189.

not see fit to put this suggestion in shape of an order. Why Halleck himself did not issue such a command is not entirely clear. McClellan advised it as the next best thing to having the garrison reinforce his own army, and had it been done it is difficult to imagine how Lee with all his fertility of resource could have saved himself, for Franklin and the Harper's Ferry garrison would have fought Jackson while McClellan overwhelmed the other wing of the Confederate army. Perhaps the military jealousy of which Halleck had spoken in warning to Pope1 had risen in his own breast, and as McClellan's star was now in the ascendant and his was declining, he would not order it because the suggestion came from his rival. Nothing could have been more unwise than this division of authority. The whole campaign should have been from the first in McClellan's hands.2 Yet, as haggling between Halleck and McClellan seemed to be the necessary concomitant of their endeavors to co-operate, Halleck ought to have had the courage of his conviction. Wool was a man seventy-eight years old, who had been given a place on account of meritorious service in Mexico, but who seems to have been no better than a clog in these operations; and for the general-in-chief to have suggested to him a strategic move was a piece of misplaced responsibility hardly to be expected in military affairs. D. S. Miles, the commander at Harper's Ferry, placed the strange construction on his orders that they did not permit him to mass his whole force on Maryland Heights, but required him in his exigency to coop it up in the village. Jackson and other detachments of the Confederates encompassed Harper's Ferry by occupying all the hills around it, and the garrison fell without a struggle, the surrender including 12,500 men and much material of war.3

The despatches of Halleck, even after he became aware of
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1 See last note to chap. xvii.
2 The Harper's Ferry garrison was not placed under McClellan's command until September 12.
3 See O. R., vol. xix. parts i. and ii.; Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 612 et seq.; McClellan's Own Story, p. 549.

the finding of Lee's lost order, conveyed to McClellan poor and superfluous counsel. His fears for the safety of Washington, his anxious suggestions of caution showed blindness to McClellan's great fault, and no proper comprehension of the strategy needed in this campaign.1 Compare this division of authority among Halleck, McClellan, and Wool, accompanied undoubtedly by pressure from the President and the Secretary of War, with the management on the other side, where a single head directed all movements. Lee was supreme. Longstreet objected to the division of the army when he was asked to command the detachment for the capture of Harper's Ferry. Lee simply ordered Jackson to make the move at first intended for Longstreet, but the arrangement was made in such manner that Longstreet did not feel aggrieved.2 It may have been that aversion to having his movements hampered by his superior was a reason why Lee objected to Jefferson Davis joining his army.

A citizen friendly to the Confederate cause had been present when Lee's lost order was brought to McClellan; he got an inkling of its importance to the Union army, made his way through the lines, and gave the information to Stuart, who at once transmitted it to Lee.3 Having this knowledge before daylight of September 14, Lee, who was disappointed and concerned at the rapid advance of McClellan, left Hagerstown, retraced his steps, disputed without success, as we have seen, the passes of South Mountain,4 and took up a strong position behind Antietam Creek, around the village of Sharpsburg. In the lost order Jackson and the commanders of the different detachments acting with him for the capture of Harper's Ferry were asked to join the main body of the army after accomplishing their object. Lee awaited them with his
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1 O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 41, part ii. p. 289; C. W., part i. p. 451.
2 Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 663; From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 201.
3 Allan, Army of Northern Virginia, p. 345.
4 It was not Lee's main army that Franklin fought at Crampton's Gap, but some of the troops who had been sent to capture Harper's Ferry.

small force. His Maryland campaign so far was a failure. Circumstances had beaten him, and only a decisive victory could bring back that prestige which was his when he marched out of Frederick. It was no longer Philadelphia and Harrisburg that were in danger; it was the very army which had menaced them. McClellan, say military judges, should have pressed forward vigorously, fought Lee the afternoon of September 15 before Jackson came up, since with his superior force he ought to have crushed the Confederate army. Whether indeed he could have been ready may be questioned, but it seems clear that he ought to have attacked early in the morning of the 16th, when Jackson was still three miles away on the other side of the Potomac,1 when John G. Walker's division was even farther off, and when McLaws, R. H. Anderson, and A. P. Hill, who had also assisted in the capture of Harper's Ferry, were in a position not to come up until the next day. Walker arrived during the morning of the 16th,2 and reporting to Lee found him "calm, dignified, and even cheerful," as composed as if he had had a "well-equipped army of a hundred thousand veterans at his back," confident that he could hold his own until he was joined by the other three divisions.3

McClellan and the main part of his army had left South Mountain September 15, and advanced to the field of Antietam, taking up their position on the opposite side of Antietam Creek from Lee. One is pleased with the glimpses he obtains of the Union general in these days. Cox tells about a reconnaissance made by McClellan, Burnside, and himself in the afternoon of the 15th, when, standing on a hill in the midst of a large group of officers, they attracted the fire of the enemy's artillery. "I noted," adds Cox, "the cool and
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1 The exact hour of Jackson's arrival is not stated, but at sunrise he was at Shepherdstown, between three and four miles from Sharpsburg, with the Potomac Elver to ford. — O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 1007.
2 Ibid., p. 914.
3 John G. Walker, article Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 675.

business-like air with which McClellan made his examination under fire."1

He had certainly purposed to give battle on the 16th. At 7 A. M. he telegraphed to Halleck, "will attack as soon as situation of enemy is developed." 2 Our general was a busy man that day, scheming, reconnoitring, changing the position of his troops. But in his desire to have everything in perfect readiness he was letting slip an advantage which fortune and his own ability had secured. He experienced apparently no trepidation at the thought of meeting face to face the antagonist who had out-manoeuvred and defeated him on the Peninsula and had driven Pope from the plains of Manassas; but he had not Lee's faculty of grasping a situation, nor would he ever combine his many perceptions in a single judgment that would gain for him the end desired.

In the afternoon of the 16th McClellan commenced operations on his right by sending Hooker, who now commanded a corps, across Antietam creek. A skirmish resulted which lasted until dark, and that night Hooker's men lay so close to the Confederate left wing that the opposing pickets could hear each other's tread.

This advance of the Union troops had shown Lee where the battle would begin on the morrow. At daylight, September 17, Hooker made a vigorous onset. He encountered stern resistance, and there was stiff wrestling and awful carnage in that historic cornfield. Knowing that he was hard pressed, Joseph K. F. Mansfield's corps, who had crossed the creek the night before, on orders to support him, was hastening to his assistance. Mansfield soon met his death, and Hooker was wounded and borne from the field. "Had you not been wounded when you were," wrote McClellan to him three days afterwards, "I believe the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the rebel army, for I know that, with you at its head, your corps would have kept on
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1 Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 631.
2 O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 307.

until it gained the main road."1 Hooker's corps, badly cut up, slowly retreated from the cornfield. Mansfield's corps pressed on, drove the Confederates before them, and part of one division effected a lodgment in the woods north of the Dunker church, which was situated on the high ground that was the key to the position of the enemy's left wing; but the greater part of the corps was finally brought to a stand. These corps had fought separate battles which by nine o'clock were practically over.

Now Sumner came forward. With "ill-regulated ardor" he put in the division of Sedgwick, who advanced "in column with his flank absolutely unprotected." 2 But Jackson, who had the advantage of numbers, hurled Early and Walker together with McLaws, who had just arrived from Harper's Ferry, upon Sedgwick.3 "My God," exclaims Sumner, "we must get out of this." 4 He attempts to avert the disaster, is unsuccessful, and gives the word to retreat. It is now perhaps ten o'clock. Hooker's and Mansfield's corps and Sedgwick's division have been hurt, and are unable to resume the offensive, but reinforced by part of Franklin's corps, which has just arrived from Crampton's pass, are still strong for defence. Sedgwick himself has been wounded. These successful blows have cost the Confederates dear.

After Sedgwick had been repulsed, French's division, afterwards assisted by Richardson's division, both of Sumner's corps, made an attack on Lee's line to the right of his extreme left where the previous fighting had been done. This was a desperate encounter, especially the struggle in the sunken road which has since been known as Bloody Lane. Richardson fell, mortally wounded; but the enemy was driven before them and would have suffered a still greater defeat but for the opportune arrival from Harper's Ferry of R. H. Anderson's division. The fighting on this part of the field ended at about one.
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1 O. R., vol. six. part i. p. 219.
2 Francis A. Walker, Second Army Corps, p. 106.
3 Allan, Army of Northern Virginia, p. 405.
3 Walker, Second Army Corps, p. 106,

Burnside commanded the left of McClellan's line, which was formed by his old corps, the Ninth, under Cox, the successor of Reno, who had been killed at the battle of South Mountain. At about ten o'clock1 Burnside received the order to carry the bridge across the Antietam, thereafter known as Burnside's bridge. Cox took charge of the operation, which was a difficult one in that he must fight his way across the creek. The creek ran in a deep and narrow valley, and the slope on the Confederate side, which was steep, was commanded by the enemy from rifle-pits and "breastworks made of rails and stones."2 Rodman's division and Scammon's brigade were ordered to cross by a ford one third of a mile below the bridge. Cox at the bridge met with a stubborn resistance, but his work was stiff and persistent, for the Union right had fared badly, and orders came constantly from McClellan to push the assault. Finally, the troops made a last successful charge, carried the bridge, and at one o'clock planted the banner on the opposite bank. Rodman had crossed at the ford, and at the same time had approached the rear of the enemy's position. The heights had been won and were held. Ammunition and fresh troops were now needed, and it was three o'clock before all was again made ready. Then Cox advanced and drove the Confederates before him.3 Sharpsburg, the centre of Lee's position, was almost in his grasp, when up came A. P. Hill's division, which had marched that day from Harper's Ferry. These men were dressed in the blue uniforms which were part of their captured spoil, and until they began to fire, Cox's soldiers thought they were a Union force. If only Couch's division, which had been left at Maryland Heights to watch Jackson, had arrived at the
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1 McClellan's report of October 15, 1862, and Burnside's of September 30. This was a controverted point until cleared up by the publication of a supplemental volume of O. R. The order is dated 9.10 a. m. It then had to be transmitted two miles as the crow flies. —Amer. Historical Review, April, 1898, p. 675; O. R., vol. li. part i. p. 844 ; see Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 372, n. 2.
2 Cox's report of September 23.
3 "It was a brilliant success." — Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 374.

same time, as perhaps they might have done had everything been ordered with care, how different had been the result! As it was, the advance of Cox was checked. He withdrew his troops in good order, but still held much of the ground he had gained by forcing the passage of the creek.

The battle of Antietam was over. Lee had had 55,0001 available troops, McClellan 87,000.2 McClellan used only about 60,000 in the battle;3 Lee employed every man who reached the field of action,4 but since the concentration of his troops at Sharpsburg had required swift marches from more than one half of his army, the men whom he took into battle fell short of the number which the field returns gave as present for duty. The Union loss was 12,410; the Confederate, 11,172.5 While McClellan outnumbered Lee in the ratio of about three to two,6 the work of attack was his, and the position of the Confederates was strong for defence. Besides the breastworks spoken of there were "occasional ridges of limestone cropping out in such shape as to give partial cover
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1 I have arrived at this number from the fair and accurate collation and analysis of the Confederate field returns by General J. D. Cox in his reviews of Allan's Nor. Va. and Fitzhugh Lee's Lee, his replies to Fitzhugh Lee and D. H. Hill, Jr. The Nation, February 2, 1893, pp. 85, 86; November 15, December 20, 1894, pp. 369, 462; January 24, 1895, p. 71. From General Cox's total I have deducted an estimate of the casualties at South Mountain.
General Lee's statement in his report of August 19, 1863, "This great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side "(O.R., vol. xix. part i. p. 151), implies a loss of 20,000 men by straggling and by casualties from Frederick City to Antietam. See Ropes's estimate of the two forces, Civil War, part ii. pp. 376, 377, 382; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 266.
2 McClellan's report of August 4, 1863. — O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 67.
3 Lincoln's statement in cabinet meeting after his visit to the army, October 1-5. — Warden's Chase, p. 500; Palfrey, pp. 69, 71; Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 603.
4 Taylor, Four Years with General Lee, pp. 69, 73.
5 Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 603.
6 General Palfrey, after a careful and candid discussion, arrives at the conclusion that, counting the men actually engaged, the Federals did not outnumber the Confederates as much as in the proportion of 3 to 2. — The Ant. and Fred., p. 71. That indeed would be an inference from my statements in the text.

to infantry lying under them." The Confederates had, moreover, the full benefit of interior lines.1

Much controversy obtains whether Antietam was a Union or Confederate victory, and the result is variously characterized in technical terms. After an analysis of the evidence and the criticisms, it will, I think, appear to the non-professional student that McClellan was justified when on the morning of the next day he wrote to his wife that he had gained a success.2 We read much, however, about his defective tactics. "It was," asserts General Francis A. Walker, "a day of isolated attacks and wasted efforts."3 In this opinion there is so general a consensus that to traverse it will be impossible. Perhaps McClellan would have severely defeated Lee had not his overestimate of the Confederate force 4 forbade his using Franklin's corps to the best advantage and making any use whatever of Porter's corps, which he held rigidly as his reserve. But to one who is biassed by the feeling that Lee had by this time shown himself almost invincible, it will be natural to speak well of the general who overcame him in any way and on any terms. While Lee's strategy and in some measure his tactics have been censured by Longstreet,6 the layman will be prone to agree with Allan
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1 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 235, 267.
2 Own Story, p. 612.
3 Second Army Corps, p. 109. J. D. Cox speaks of the "series of partial reverses which resulted from the piecemeal and disjointed way in which McClellan's morning attacks had been made." — Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 658. Palfrey writes: "Of McClellan's conduct of this battle there is little to be said in the way of praise beyond the fact that he did fight it voluntarily without having it forced upon him."—The Ant. and Fred., p. 119. Longstreet says "General McClellan's plan of the battle was not strong, the handling and execution were less so." — From Man. to App., p. 267. Allan's criticism is, McClellan's "execution was unequal and without coherence. . . . His divisions were separated and fought in a disjointed and desultory way, accomplishing nothing." —A. N. V., p. 382; see Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 369.
4 He thought he was fighting 97,000. — Report of August 4, 1863, O. R., vol. xix. part i. p. 67.
5 From Man. to App., pp. 220, 237, chap xx.; Century War Book, vol. ii p. 666.

that the conduct of the battle of Antietam itself "by Lee and his principal subordinates seems absolutely above criticism."1

McClellan's first impulse was to renew the battle the next day,2 but after "a careful and anxious survey of the condition" of his command he decided to rest his army and get the reinforcements which were arriving into position for an attack on the morrow.3 He has been blamed by military critics for not falling upon the Confederates at once, but as Lee "awaited without apprehension the renewal of the attack," 4 we may conclude that McClellan's caution redounded to the benefit of the Union cause.5 September 19 Lee withdrew from the field and crossed the Potomac into Virginia.6 The pursuit was neither vigorous nor effectual.

Military judges criticise McClellan's lack of celerity after he found Lee's lost order; he acted with energy, they say, but not with the utmost possible energy. The situation demanded uncommon diligence, the straining of every nerve, inasmuch as the destruction or capture of Lee's army in detachments was in sight. Lincoln and Seward, believing that more might have been accomplished, were not satisfied.7 In these judgments, however, there is, consciously or unconsciously, a reflection of what Frederick the Great or Napoleon in like case would have done. But against a Frederick, a Napoleon, or the Grant or Sherman of 1864, Lee's strategy would have been different: he would not have invaded Maryland nor divided his army. Instead therefore of emphasizing these criticisms, let us rather contrast the conquering
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1 P. 441. "Of General Lee's management of the battle there is nothing but praise to be said." — Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 377.
2 September 18. To Halleck, 8 A. m., O. R, vol. xix. part ii. p. 322.
3 Report of October 15, ibid., part i. p. 32.
4 Lee's report, ibid., p. 151; Allan, p. 443.
5 Contrariwise, see Life of Lee, White, p. 224; Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 378.
6 "The prestige of victory remained naturally with McClellan."  Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 379. 'Warden, p. 481; Life of Seward, vol. iii. pp. 132,136.

1862 host of the South as they marched through the streets of Frederick, full of pride and hope, and singing "The Girl I left behind me,"1 with the "horde of disordered fugitives" fleeing before an army they had a fortnight earlier driven "to cover under its homeward ramparts;" 2 let us note the change of feeling at the North from depression before South Mountain to buoyancy after Antietam; 8 let us reflect that a signal Confederate victory in Maryland might have caused the Northern voters at the approaching fall elections to declare for the peace that Jefferson Davis would offer them from the head of Lee's victorious army, and that without McClellan's victory the Emancipation Proclamation would have been postponed and might never have been issued!

Antietam "was the bloodiest single day of fighting of the war," writes Longstreet, and supports the statement with an array of figures.4 Such fighting in a border State like Maryland makes us realize the horror of civil conflict. On this battlefield friend fought friend, and even brother fought brother. At the ford near Burnside bridge a Northern colonel leading a charge of his regiment was killed by the Confederates under the command of his brother, the general of a division.5 We may say with King Henry VI., whom Shakespeare represents in a battle of the Wars of the Roses as standing by when a son, who has killed his father unawares, recognizes the face of the slain and bursts into grief,

"0 piteous spectacle! 0 bloody times!
Whiles lions roar and battle for their dens,
Poor harmless lambs abide their enmity.
Weep, wretched man, I '11 aid thee tear for tear;
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1 Longstreet, From Man. to App., p. 205.
2 Longstreet's expressions, ibid., p. 283.
3The whole literature of the period may be referred to. See especially files of the New York Tribune, Times, World, Herald; Chicago Tribune; Washington National Intelligencer
4 Longstreet, From Man. to App., p. 239.
5 Ibid., p. 262; see also D. H. Hill, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 580.

And let our hearts and eyes, like civil war,
Be blind with tears, and break o'ercharged with grief."1

The great historical significance of the battle of Antietam is that it furnished Lincoln the victory he was waiting for to issue his proclamation of emancipation. This, as we have seen, he had laid aside on July 22, until some military success should give support to the policy.2 The working of his mind in the two months following that day is open to us. While he had come to a resolve, he showed the true executive quality, as well as the fair mind, in not regarding the policy of striking directly at slavery as absolutely and finally determined until it had been officially promulgated. From the cabinet meeting of July 22, when he announced tentatively his purpose, to that of September 22, when he told his advisers that he should issue an irrevocable decree, he endeavored, in his correspondence and formal interviews and private conversation, to get all the light possible to aid him in deciding when the proper moment had come to proclaim freedom to the slaves. To Conservatives he argued the radical side of the question. "I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed," he wrote Reverdy Johnson.3 "This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all and
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1 "A heavy case
When force to force is knit, and sword and glaive
In civil broils make kin and countrymen
Slaughter themselves in others, and their sides
With their own weapons gore!"
Marlowe, Edward II., act iv. sc. 4.

Illustrating this phase of the civil war, see the story of " An Unfinished Fight" in "Southern Soldier Stories," by George Gary Eggleston; "Tales of the Home Folks in Peace and War," J. C. Harris, p. 172; also, "A Horseman in the Sky," by Ambrose Bierce in "In the Midst of Life." Francis Lieber had one son in the Confederate army, another in the Union. — Life and Letters, p. 318.
One gets a good idea of the aftermath of battle in an article of O. W. Holmes in the Atlantic of December 1862, " My Hunt after 'the Captain,' " being an account of his search for his son who was wounded at Antietam.
2 Ante.
3 July 28, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 215.

its enemies stake nothing," he said in a letter to August Belmont. "Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the government and if they fail still come back into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever have the Union as it was . . . now is the time."1 To Radicals he put forth the conservative view or laid stress on the necessity of proceeding with caution. "My paramount object ... is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery," he wrote to Horace Greeley.2 To the committee of clergymen from the public meeting in Chicago of Christians of all denominations who presented a memorial in favor of national emancipation, he said: "I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there ?" 3

There was pressure on the President to issue a proclamation of emancipation, and there was pressure against it. He talked with conservatives and radicals, listened to their arguments, reasoned with them, and left different impressions on different minds. Much of his talk was after his manner of thinking aloud where the stimulation of contact with sympathetic or captious men afforded him the opportunity to revolve his thoughts, and see the question on all sides. There was, indeed, much to be considered. His warrant was the war powers of the Constitution. There ought to be a reasonable probability that a proclamation would help the operations of our army in spite of the strong opposition among many officers of high rank to a war for the negro,4 that it would damage the Confederates by stirring up in the slaves their
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1 July 81, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 217.
2 August 22, ante.
3 September 13, Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 234; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 154; Chicago Tribune, September 23.
4 See Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 83; Warden's Chase, p. 485.

inherent desire for freedom, causing every one of them to be in secret a friend of the North, and that it might lead to the employment of the blacks as soldiers. Granted these considerations, Lincoln must satisfy himself that public opinion at the North would sustain him in the action. He could not doubt that the cavilling support of the radicals would for the moment turn to enthusiasm, and the zeal of these positive anti-slavery Republicans directed in the channel of raising men and money was an influence worth having. But was the sentiment of the plain people, the mass of steady Republicans and war Democrats, ripe for an edict of freedom?

Again, the possibility that the policy might alienate the border slave States which had clung to the Union was in Lincoln's mind a serious objection, "but the difficulty was as great not to act as to act."1 On the other hand, emancipation would help us in Europe. England and France could not recognize the Southern Confederacy when the real issue between the sections was thus unmasked. Yet there was reason to anticipate that an avowed war against slavery would revive the opposition of the Democrats and give them a "club" to use against the administration; but the President did not regard this an objection of great moment, since party opposition at the North must in any event be expected.2

Turning the question over and over in his mind, he finally settled his doubts. He believed that a proclamation of freedom was a military necessity, and that the plain people of the North would see it as he did. As the days went on, he was confirmed in the conclusion which he had come to in July, and felt that public sentiment was growing in that direction.3
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l Welles, The Galaxy, December, 1872, p. 847.
2 Ibid.
3 Lincoln's almost unerring judgment of popular opinion did not fail him. Grimes wrote Chase from Iowa, July 29: "The people are far in advance of the administration and of Congress in their desire for a vigorous prosecution of the war. . . . The popular sentiment ... is far more ardent and extreme than even / ever supposed. . . . We have too much at stake ... to justify us in neglecting any methods to put the rebellion down known to civilized warfare." —Salter, p. 215. Chase wrote Butler, July 31: "The truth Is, there has been a great change in the public mind within a few weeks. The people are resolved not to give up the struggle for territorial integrity. . . . Whatever stands in the way of this determination must get out of the way. If State organizations, they must fall; if negro slavery, it must be abolished."—Schuckers, p. 378. John Sherman wrote General Sherman from Ohio, August 24: "I am prepared for one to meet the broad issue of universal emancipation." — Sherman Letters, p. 157. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote Motley, August 29: "I feel no doubt in my own mind that the spirit of hostility to slavery as the cause of this war is speedily and certainly increasing. ... I think a miscellaneous Boston audience would be more like to cheer any denunciation of slavery now than almost any other sentiment." — Motley's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 86. The Republican State Convention of Massachusetts, meeting September 9, adopted with enthusiasm resolutions which nominated Sumner as senator to succeed himself and which called for the extermination of slavery. — Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 100; Sumner's Works, vol. vii. p. 240.

Even in the dark hours following the second defeat of Bull Run and Lee's invasion of Maryland, he did not falter. "When the rebel army was at Frederick " [September 6-10], he afterwards said, "I determined as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of emancipation. . . . I said nothing to any one, but I made the promise to myself and to my Maker."1 Antietam was won. Lee had recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. Then was held that cabinet meeting of September 22, which is a point in the history of
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1 Chase's Diary, Warden, p. 481. The growth of Lincoln's religious feeling under the stress of perturbation and trouble is an interesting by-study. His religion was devoid of cant. When he made the remark to his cabinet cited in the text, he hesitated a little before he spoke of his promise to his Maker. When the Chicago clergymen told him, September 13, that they and those whom they spoke for believed "these disasters to be tokens of Divine displeasure, calling for new and advanced action by the President in behalf of the country, such as would indicate national repentance for the sin of oppression," he replied with a tinge of sarcasm: "I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right." — Chicago Tribune, September 23; Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 234.

civilization. After some general talk, the President took the word and read from Artemus Ward's book a chapter, "High-Handed Outrage at Utica." He thought it very funny and enjoyed the reading of it greatly, while the members of the cabinet except Stanton laughed with him. Was ever so sublime a thing ushered in by the ridiculous? Lincoln fell into a grave tone and told of the working of his thoughts on the slavery question since the July meeting. "The rebel army is now driven out" of Maryland, he said, and I am going to fulfil the promise I made to myself and my God. "I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter; for that I have determined for myself."1 He read then his proclamation of freedom: "On the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free." In the case of the loyal slave States he declared again for his policy of compensated emancipation, and colonization of the freed negroes,2 and said that he should in due time recommend compensation also for the loss of their slaves to loyal citizens of the States in rebellion. All the members of the cabinet except Blair approved substantially the proclamation, and Blair's objection was on the ground of expediency, not of principle.3 On the morrow, September 23, this edict, which heralded a new epoch in the world's progress, was given to the country.4
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1 Chase's Diary, Warden, p. 481.
2 How much Lincoln had this at heart is shown by his address on Colonization to a deputation of colored men, August 14. —Works, vol. ii. p. 222.
3 Chase's Diary; Welles's Diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 160; Welles, The Galaxy, December, 1872, pp. 846, 847.
4 Besides authorities already cited, I will refer to Carpenter, Six Months at the White House, passim; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 66; Schurz, A. Lincoln, p. 78; McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, p. 96 et seq.; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i. p. 439; Julian, Bout well, Welling, Reminiscences, N. A. Review, pp. 61, 124, 519; Julian, Political Recollections, p. 222; Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 135; Letter of Joseph Medill to Colfax, Life of Colfax, Hollister, p. 186.

The next evening the President made a short speech to a party who serenaded him, in which he said: "What I did, I did after a very full deliberation and under a very heavy and solemn sense of responsibility. I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. ... It is now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it."1 The immediate response of the country was apparently favorable.2 "God bless Abraham Lincoln," the New York Tribune said, and it spoke for the radical and fervent Republicans.3 Many conservatives endorsed it because it came from the mind and pen of the President. But Lincoln himself, with his delicate touch on the pulse of public opinion, detected that there was a lack of heartiness in the response of the Northern people. In his "strictly private " letter to Hamlin, the Vice-President, he manifested his keen disappointment. "While I hope something from the proclamation," he wrote, "my expectations are not as sanguine as are those of some friends. The time for its effect southward has not come; but northward the effect should be instantaneous. It is six days old, and while commendation in newspapers and by distinguished
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1 Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 240.
2 See, for example, New York Times, September 23; N.Y. Tribune, Chicago Tribune, September 23, 24; New York Herald, September 24. When the North was threatened with invasion, a conference of governors of the loyal States was called at Altoona, Pa., but before they met, the emergency had passed away. They however took counsel together. Twelve of them went from Altoona to Washington, called on the President (September 26), presented him an address which then or afterwards was signed by seventeen governors; in this, after assurances and one recommendation, they said, "We hail with heartfelt gratitude and encouraged hope the proclamation." The governors of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri dissented from the portion of the address that approved of the emancipation policy. — Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 165; McPherson, History of the Great Rebellion, p. 232 ; Washington Star, cited by National Intelligencer, September 27 ; Washington despatch to New York Times, September 27.
3 "' God bless Abraham Lincoln,' as Horace Greeley did n't say. It is curious how much a phrase will do. The town [New York] rung with that the other day. The Proclamation stunned the secesh here at first, but they are coming to." — S. H. Gay to Hill, September 25, A. S. Hill papers, MS.

individuals is all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have declined and troops come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory. . . . The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath; but breath alone kills no rebels." 1 Lincoln's despondency is revealed also in his reply to an address by a pious Quaker woman, and in his "Meditation on the Divine Will," in which his belief in a divine Providence mingled with his present disappointment to produce the doubt whether indeed God were on our side.2

The President's policy, his administration of affairs, clouded by defeats in the field, were submitted to the judgment of the people at the ballot-box. In October and November, elections took place in the principal States, with the result that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, all of which except New Jersey 8 had cast their electoral votes for Lincoln, declared against the party in power. A new House of Representatives was chosen, the Democrats making conspicuous gains in the States mentioned. The same ratio of gain extended to the other States would have given them the control of the next House, — a disaster from which the administration was saved by New England, Michigan, Iowa, California, and the border slave States.4
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1 September 28, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 242 ; see, also, Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 135. The President would have been more exact had he said that government stocks were not active and had not advanced. The New York Times reported for the week ending September 27, "a somewhat tame market for U. S. securities which have not responded to the extreme speculation in railway shares and bonds." One factor in the advance of these was the large traffic returns. On the other hand, there was an impression In Wall Street that the Proclamation would have an adverse effect on Governments.
2 September 28, 30, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 243 ; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 342.
3 New Jersey cast 4 out of her 7 electoral votes for Lincoln.
4 Minnesota with two representatives, Kansas and Oregon each with one, also contributed to this result. Maine voted in September, Iowa in October, Massachusetts and Michigan in November.

Some of these States, however, did not elect their Congressmen until the following year, when the conservative reaction had spent itself. The elections came near being what the steadfast Republican journal, the New York Times, declared them to be: a "vote of want of confidence " in the President.1 Since the elections followed so closely upon the Proclamation of Emancipation, it is little wonder the Democrats declared that the people protested against Lincoln's surrender to the radicals, which was their construction of the change of policy from a war for the Union to a war for the negro. Many writers have since agreed with them in this interpretation of the result. No one can doubt that it was a contributing force operating with these other influences: the corruption in the War Department before Stanton became Secretary, the suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, arbitrary arrests which had continued to be made by military orders under the authority of the Secretary of War, and the suspension, by the same power, of the writ of habeas corpus. But the dominant cause was the failure of our armies to accomplish decisive results in the field. Had McClellan captured or destroyed Lee's army after Antietam, had Buell cut up Bragg's army at Perryville when the tide of invasion into Kentucky turned,2 the President would have received at the ballot-box a triumphant approval of his whole policy. While at first the victory at Antietam brought relief and satisfaction, further reflection on the part of the people as well as of those high in office made it evident that merely to stem an invasion into the North was making little progress towards crushing the Confederacy. The defeat of the administration party in these important States, which was occasioned by its former friends staying away from the polls, was a symptom of weariness of the war, a protest against the waste of so much life and money with so little result accomplished. This feeling showed itself in an extreme form in the open dissatisfaction,
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1 November 7.
2 Bragg was beaten at Perryville, October 8, and retreated from Kentucky, infra.

which in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin broke out into positive violence, over the draft necessary under the August call for 300,000 militia.

The result in Ohio was affected by the arrest of Dr. Edson B. Olds for a speech in which it was alleged that he had used treasonable language and discouraged enlistments. To drag a man of seventy from his house at night without legal warrant, and take him summarily to Fort Lafayette, was a procedure likely to set to thinking voters who were bred to liberty, especially as in this case the victim was an intelligent man of high character, who had served his constituents three terms in the legislature and six years in Congress. A vacancy occurring while Olds suffered in prison, his neighbors and fellow citizens promptly chose him to represent them again in the legislature. The normal Democratic majority in New Jersey was made larger through the feeling aroused by the arrest, the year previous, and incarceration in Fort Lafayette of James W. Wall, a lawyer and writer of culture, who was prosecuted probably on account of his severe criticism of the administration which appeared in the editorial columns of the New York Daily News. The newly elected legislature sent him to the United States Senate to fill an unexpired term. The arrests made in 1862, under the authority of Stanton, amounted to a considerable number, and were futile for good; attended as they frequently were by the insolence of subordinate officers, they were pregnant with mischief in that they increased the majorities against the administration. Frequently they were suggested by local animosity or mistaken zeal, and the Secretary of War in putting these motives in the shape of formal orders displayed short-sighted judgment as well as the capriciousness of power. It must be reckoned as one of the results of the elections that he issued, November 22, an order which, after no more than a formal delay, effectuated the discharge from military custody of practically all of the political prisoners.

Allusion must be made to an explanation, then current to some extent among Republicans, which ascribed their defeat to the fact that the Republicans were fighting the Confederates in the field while the Democrats stayed at home to vote.1 It was not alleged as necessarily true that the Republican volunteers exceeded greatly the Democratic, but that the natural tendency of the soldiers was to vote as they fought and to sustain the administration in its conduct of the war. A comparison, however, of the returns of 1862 with those of 1860 and 1863 will make it plain that this had little to do with the result.2

Senator Grimes thought that the anti-slavery declaration of the President enabled the Republicans to win in Iowa. "We took the bull by the horns and made the proclamation an issue," he wrote to Chase. "I traversed the State for four weeks, speaking every day, and the more radical I was the more acceptable I was. The fact is, we carried the State by bringing up the radical element to the polls. The politicians are a vast distance behind the people in sentiment." 3 Sumner, in making the canvass of Massachusetts, planted himself squarely on the President's edict of freedom, which he maintained to be a military necessity. A legislature was chosen which sent him back to the Senate by a vote of nearly five to one, and Andrew, the most outspoken of all the war governors in his anti-slavery views, was re-elected.4
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1 In 1862 only a few of the States authorized their soldiers to vote in camp.
2 An example of the high character of candidates for political office is seen in Ohio, where the Union men nominated Backus, one of the counsel for the Oberlin-Wellington rescuers (see vol. ii. p. 363), for supreme judge (no governor being chosen this year, the candidate for this office stood at the head of the ticket), while the Democrats drew forth from a grateful retirement Rufus P. Ranney (ibid., p. 380), and nominated and elected him against his will. Either of these men would have adorned the highest judicial bench of the country ; either would make a heavy pecuniary sacrifice in becoming a member of the Supreme Court of his own State.
3 Life of Grimes, Salter, p. 218.
4 In his reply, May 19, to the Secretary of War on a demand for troops, Andrew had intimated that it would be difficult to furnish them on account of the manner in which the war was prosecuted, but let the President sustain General Hunter in his order freeing the slaves, and let the blacks be employed as soldiers, and "the roads will swarm, if need be, with multitudes whom New England would pour out to obey your call." — Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 333. "Who was it that demanded, before troops should be sent to defend the flag of the government, that that government should form a policy that pleased him?" asked Horatio Seymour, October 22. "Who was it but the extreme radical Governor of the State of Massachusetts?" The intimation of Andrew was severely condemned by a resolution of the Democratic convention of Ohio.

This result was remarkable in that the opposition contained elements of a high character, the moving force coming from the Bell-Everett supporters of 1860, and from conservative Republicans who took the name of the People's party, called for a vigorous prosecution of the war, and nominated for governor Charles Devens, a gallant general in active service.

The Democratic conventions of the great States which voted against the administration had been held before the issue of the proclamation, but the policy of emancipation was in the air and they denounced it in advance. A favorite catchword of the time, "the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was," incorporated into many platforms of the Democrats, expressed exactly the principle for which they demanded the support of the country. By the Constitution as it is, they meant that there ought to be no more violation of it in time of war than in time of peace, and that it ought not to be stretched to cover an arbitrary use of power. By the Union as it was they signified that after the suppression of the rebellion the States should be as they had been before, slavery should remain unimpaired, and the country should adhere to the policy solemnly declared by Congress in its resolution of July, 1861.1 In most of the States the Republicans took the name of Union men. In New York and Illinois their conventions were held late enough to allow their cordial approval to be given to the proclamation. In New York this approval was emphasized by the nomination for governor of General Wadsworth, a radical on the slavery question and one of the military advisers of the President. The Democrats had named for governor Horatio Seymour, a gentleman of public experience,
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1 See vol. iii. p. 464.

culture, sterling character, and moral purpose. He repelled indignantly an electioneering statement of the other side, that every vote for Wadsworth was one of loyalty, every vote for Seymour one of treason. "God knows I love my country," he said; "I would count my life as nothing, if I could but save the nation's life." In the speeches which gave the key-note to his campaign, he made but one allusion, a brief one, to the proclamation of emancipation, and did not impart to his words a tone of bitterness. Recognizing "that at this moment the destinies, the honor, and the glory of our country hang poised upon the conflict in the battle-field . . . we tender to this government no conditional support" to put down "this wicked and mighty rebellion." Speaking always in a respectful manner of the President, he condemned the course of the radical Republicans, the infractions of the Constitution, the mismanagement of affairs, but he was most severe when he denounced corruption in the departments, dishonesty in the award of government contracts. Read the Congressional investigations, he said, and "learn for yourselves if fraud does not reek at the National Capital." We have a right to require that the National affairs "be conducted not only by efficiency, but with honesty, economy, and integrity." Our aim is to preserve the Constitution as it is, to restore the Union as it was.1

Seymour, who was the ablest Democrat to enter the political arena during the civil war, represented the best quality of the opposition, even as Lincoln stood for the highest purpose and most expedient methods in the prosecution of the war. Granted the necessity in a constitutional government of an opposition party even when the life of the nation is at stake, the leadership of it could not in this case have fallen into better hands. At the same time with his fearlessness in criticism Seymour's speeches were marked by patriotism, good temper, reverence for the constitution and the laws, and
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1 Speeches at Cooper Institute, New York, October 13, Brooklyn Acad. of Music, October 22, Public Record of H. Seymour (New York 1868).

respect for the constituted authorities. What was still more noteworthy was the moderation he displayed in his victory.1 Sturdy and thoughtful Democrats had been irritated indeed by a proclamation of the President two days after the edict of emancipation (September 24), which gave the authority of an executive decree to Stanton's arbitrary orders, created the new offences2 of "discouraging enlistments" and "any disloyal practice," ordered that such offenders and those who afforded "aid and comfort to the rebels" should be "subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or military commissions," and for persons arrested on these charges suspended the writ of habeas corpus? This proclamation applied to the whole country, and supplemented with the machinery instituted by the Secretary of War for its enforcement, was the assumption of authority exercised by an absolute monarch.4 On the part of the President of the United States it was a usurpation of power, for which the military necessity was not as cogent as for the edict of emancipation: indeed it is not surprising that it gave currency to an opinion that he intended "to suppress free discussion of political subjects." 5 As it was not promulgated until after the Democrats had held their conventions, it is difficult to trace the effect it had on the elections, but it was probably not so potent a factor in the success of the opposition as the edict of freedom.6
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1 See his speech of November 6. He was elected governor by a majority of 10,752.
2 In this remark I have followed Benjamin R. Curtis in his pamphlet on Executive Power.
3 This was undoubtedly to set at rest questions which had been raised In different courts whether the Secretary of War had by delegated authority the right to suspend the writ. This proclamation is printed in Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 239.
4 Joel Parker, Professor in the Harvard Law School, asked the people of Massachusetts, "Do you not perceive that the President is not only a monarch, but that his is an absolute, irresponsible, uncontrollable government; a perfect military despotism ?" —Boston Courier, November 1.
5 Curtis's pamphlet.
6 My authorities for this account other than those already mentioned are Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862; Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv.; War Department Archives, MS.; Report of Secretary of War, December 2; Debate in Senate and House, 3d sess., 37th Congress, 1862-63; Tribune Almanac; O. R., vol. xix. part ii. pp. 473, 489; Columbus (Ohio) Crisis, July 9, August 20, September 24, October 22, 29, November 12, 19; Boston Advertiser of November 6, 7; Boston Courier, November 6; New York World, October 17, November 5,6,24, 25, 29; New York Times, November 7, Tribune, November 6, 7, Evening Post, November 5, Herald, October 16, November 6; Chicago Tribune, November 6; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i.; S. S. Cox, Three Decades; Marshall, American Bastile; Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, vols" i., ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. chap. i. Sumner to Bright, October 28: "The old Democracy are rallying against the proclamation." — Pierce, vol. iv. p. 106. John Sherman to General Sherman, November 16: "The people were dissatisfied at the conduct and results of the war. . . . No doubt the wanton and unnecessary use of power to arrest without trial and the ill-timed proclamation contributed to the general result." — Sherman Letters, p. 167. On the arrest of Olds, see Columbus despatch to Cincinnati Commercial, August 13, Lancaster (Ohio) Eagle, cited in Columbus Crisis, August 20.

Benjamin R. Curtis as Supreme Judge had answered with common sense and justice the reasoning of Taney in the Dred Scott decision, which was a juridical manifestation of the arrogance of slavery's advocates.1 He now published a pamphlet entitled "Executive Power,"2 part of which was a strong argument to show that the President had no constitutional right to issue the edict of freedom. Of the later proclamation (that of September 24) he said in substance: The President has made himself a legislator, he has enacted penal laws governing the citizens of the United States, has erected tribunals and created offices to enforce his penal edicts upon citizens, he has superadded to his rights as commander the powers of a usurper: "and that is military despotism." He can use the authority, which he has assumed, to make himself the absolute master of our lives, our liberties, and our property, with power to delegate his mastership to such satraps as he may select or as may be imposed on his credulity or his fears.3 This pamphlet, owing to the high standing
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1 See vol. ii. p. 257.
2 It appeared October 18. Little, Brown & Co. were the publishers.
3 Pp. 23, 30. See, also, p. 16. This pamphlet is printed in the Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, vol. ii. p. 306.

of its author, attracted the attention of the President, the Secretary of War, of jurists from Massachusetts to Wisconsin, and of thinking men in this country and England,1 but it did not apparently have a profound and enduring effect on public opinion. That the country finally sustained the antislavery policy of the President, when enforced by military success, is a fact in accord with the natural development of Northern sentiment. That the protests against the arbitrary arrests lacked energy and persistence, that the infringements upon the bill of rights of the Constitution were not actively resisted, is explicable only by the confidence the people had in Abraham Lincoln; for, while there was at this time much distrust of his ability and firmness, his honesty was unquestioned. That he had assumed unwarranted powers might be true; but that he had done this with regret, that he was no Caesar or Napoleon and sought no self-aggrandizement, that he had in his own loyal and unselfish nature a check to the excessive use of absolute power, was then almost as clear to his friends and opponents as it is now to the student of his character and acts. The Democrats might protest that we were no longer a free people, that we could not with safety criticise the acts of the President, yet criticism went on; and while some of the arrests were undoubted outrages, Democratic citizens submitted, not so much because they were overawed by force as because they knew that the ruler whom they called a despot was really "Honest old Abe." Indeed, there was a real majority of the people who were impatient too of the law's delay, and gave the President in the exercise of these extraordinary powers their faithful and earnest though unexpressed support. Men may have held the faith that the tyrant desired by Plato had appeared, — a tyrant who was
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1 Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, vol. i. p. 350 et seq.; Theophilus Parsons, Professor in Harvard Law School, in Boston Advertiser, October 24; Chief Justice Dixon in giving the unanimous opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 514.

temperate, quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; like the Athenian, they may have said, if some happy chance brings to our President a great general, God has done all that he can ever do for our State.1
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1 If "some happy chance brings them [the tyrant and a great legislator] together . . . God has done all," etc.—Laws, book iv.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.4. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].