History of the United States, v.4, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 17, Part 3: English Opinion through Pope’s Virginia Campaign

That ship-builders and ship-owners of Liverpool and other ports exulted in the escape of the Alabama, is doubtless true; that the prospect that she would destroy the shipping of England's greatest rival on the sea at the outbreak of the war occurred to them and gave them joy, is more than probable; that there were members of the House of Commons who shared these feelings, cannot be gainsaid; and that the same ideas may have entered the minds of some members of the cabinet, it would be impossible to deny: but I should be loath to believe, since indeed there is no evidence of it, that they affected the official action of any minister. Lord Palmerston's hand is not apparent in any part of the proceedings, although as First Lord of the Treasury he probably ought to have been acquainted with the progress of the case. His spirit seems to have run through every department of the government, but affected the department of Foreign Affairs less perhaps than any other, since Earl Russell was a rival leader of the Liberal party and had been talked of for Prime Minister at the time the Queen sent for Palmerston. Many other things go to show that Russell considered himself supreme as Foreign Secretary. Perhaps the main duty of an English Prime Minister, next to upholding the honor of his country, is to retain his majority in the House of Commons. Palmerston had alienated the radicals, chief of whom were Cobden and Bright, and as a set-off had won golden opinions from the conservatives, who displayed little anxiety to turn him out of office.1 The radicals were on the side of the North through thick and thin, while many of the conservatives sympathized with the South. Lending countenance to the Southern cause was therefore the better method of keeping his majority,2 and to do this Palmerston would, in John Bright's opinion, stick at nothing, not even war.3 He deemed the feeling of the North towards England unreasonable,4 and such was his real or affected indignation at General Butler's notorious woman order6 that he wrote Adams a private and
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1 Life of Palmerston, Ashley, vol. ii. p. 205.
2 Adams wrote Seward August 8: "Lord Palmerston has been steadily laboring to counterbalance the loss experienced on the liberal side by corresponding gains from the opposition. . . . That the American difficulties have materially contributed to this result, cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the leading liberals are the declared friends of the United States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate subdivision of America into many separate States which will neutralize each other. This is most visible among the conservative class of the aristocracy, who dread the growth of liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the nursery of them. The practical effect upon our interests is rather disadvantageous, as it renders our enemies frank and bold, whilst it makes our friends conscious of the labor of working against the stream and therefore hesitating and timid in our defence. The indications of this are constantly visible in Parliament." — State Dept. Archives, MS.
3 Adams's Diary, entry July 4.
4 Letter to Gladstone, April 29, Ashley's Palmerston, vol. ii. p. 224.
5 When New Orleans was taken Butler was made commanding general. The women of the city continually insulted the Union officers and soldiers. For example : one woman deliberately spat in the face of an officer in full uniform as he was on his way to church ; a woman emptied from a balcony a vessel of dirty water on Admiral Farragut and Colonel Deming in full uniform as they were walking along one of the principal streets. Butler gives other instances: these were the most pronounced insults. He thereupon issued an order, May 15, that if any female should insult in any manner a Union officer or soldier, "she should be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation." This order caused a cry of rage in the English press and House of Commons. The strongest expression that I have found is from the Saturday Review of June 14, "Unless the author of this infamous proclamation is promptly recalled, let us hear no more of 'the ties which bind us to our transatlantic kinsmen.' No Englishmen ought to own as kinsmen men who attempt to protect themselves from a handful of women by official and authoritative threats of rape. The bloodiest savages could do nothing crueler —the most loathsome Yahoo of fiction could do nothing filthier." The English did not understand American soldiers. All evidence which I have found sustains Butler's statement that there was no case of abuse of the order by a Northern soldier. The insults ceased. See Butler's Book, p. 414 et seq.
It is probable that this order was the main cause of Butler's removal from the command of New Orleans. It grievously incensed the ladies of this city, many of whom were of French extraction. Their bitterness made itself felt in the remonstrances of Mercier, the French Minister at Washington. The removal of Butler emanated from Seward. A partial support for this statement will be found in Butler's Book, p. 533; Life of Seward, vol. iii. p. 139.

confidential note which the minister considered offensive and insolent in tone and an insult to his country.1 It must be remembered that while Adams was trying to stop the Alabama the English public and officials were pondering the news of the Union reverses before Richmond. The reports, which were indeed gloomy enough, were exaggerated, until one day in July there was exultation in London and Liverpool over a telegram which said that McClellan's army had surrendered, or at all events was on the point of capitulation.2 Confidence in the Confederates' ultimate success was general, and undoubtedly contributed to the laxity of the English officials in their performance of the duties imposed on them by neutrality. We may be sure that if McClellan had taken
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1 Adams's Diary, entry June 10; see letter from Louis Blanc, London, June 19, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 68.
2 Times and Daily News, July 19; letter from Louis Blanc, London, July 21, Letters on England, vol. ii. p. 100.

Richmond in June, the Alabama would not have escaped in July.

The Alabama left Liverpool without guns or munitions of war of any kind; these as well as coal were brought to her at the Azores by two British vessels which sailed from England about the middle of August.1

However unfriendly the action of England was in the case of the Alabama, it must be borne in mind that the fault was one of omission. The British government, unlike the Emperor of the French, was during the whole war innocent of any overt acts of unkindness. The Queen's speech at the prorogation of Parliament, August 7, declared that her Majesty had still determined to take no part in the contest on the American continent.2

Again, though the dominant sentiment of England toward the North is to be deplored and the want of due diligence in the performance of her duties as a neutral is unquestioned, her atonement has been ample. English books, magazines, and newspapers are full of sincere admissions that the public opinion of the country took a wrong direction. In the treaty of Washington3 the regret which Great Britain expresses at the escape of the Confederate cruisers is all that can be asked in the way of moral reparation from a high-spirited people conscious of their strength. As far as pecuniary damages4
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1 Part i. p. 38; part ii. p. 191.
2 Hansard, 1209; see the correspondence between James M. Mason, the Confederate envoy, and Earl Russell from July 17 to August 2, Life of J. Davis by his wife, vol. ii. p. 332 et seq. Lord Ranelagh, who had had a talk with the Emperor Louis Napoleon, thus wrote the Earl of Malmesbury, August 30: "I was very much struck by a conversation about America, for in the most open manner after dinner he said he was quite ready to recognize the South, but Palmerston would not do so, and he could not unless Palmerston did. The result of this (pretended ?) frankness is that Slidell in Paris tells every one that England is the cause of the South not being recognized. He abuses England, and says we are their enemy; in fact, we are in the happy position of being hated by both North and South." — Memoirs of an ex-Minister, vol. ii. p. 277.
3 Made in 1871 and provided for the Arbitration of Geneva.
4 The award of the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration for damages done by the Florida, Alabama, their tenders, and the Shenandoah was a gross sum of $15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States.

were concerned, the terms submitting the dispute to arbitration made absolutely sure our case, which was already very strong. That the score has been wiped out should be recognized at the bar of history and in the court of honor.

We must now return to McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, whom we left, after their masterly retreat, in camp at Harrison's Landing on the James River. "I need 50,000 more men," he telegraphed July 1, "and with them I will retrieve our fortunes."1 Already this request had been in some measure anticipated by the President; 5000 of McDowell's corps had been sent to him, Burnside at New Berne, N. C, was directed to send all reinforcements possible, and Halleck was asked for a detachment of 25,000 troops from the Western army.2 Halleck protested that so material a reduction of his force would necessitate the surrender of territory already acquired, and the postponement of the projected expedition to Chattanooga.3 The President, who was earnest for the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee, replied that he need not send a man if it would weaken or delay this expedition or endanger any important point now held.4 Within two days Lincoln informed McClellan that Halleck could spare no troops, and that it would be impossible to send him promptly 50,000 or any considerable force. "Save the army, material and personal," he added, "and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept." 5 The events of the "Seven Days" had not diminished his confidence in his general. "I am satisfied,"
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 281.
2 Ibid., pp. 271, 281. These orders and this request are of June 28, the day of the receipt of the demoralized despatch of McClellan from Savage's Station, and of Lincoln's benignant reply, ante.
3 July 1, ibid., p. 285.
4 July 2, ibid., p. 286.
5 Ibid., pp. 286, 291.

he said in a despatch, "that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."1 In the mean time McClellan had raised his demand for reinforcements to 100,000, to insure the capture of Richmond and the bringing of the war to an end. This new demand did not affect the kindly feeling of the President and the Secretary of War, who ordered reinforcements to him from Burnside, from Hunter, and from Washington, while the President begged Halleck for 10,000 infantry.2 Nothing could have been warmer than Stanton's expression of confidence and assurance of support.3 But something occurred about this time (what it was I have not been able to ascertain) which shook the unreserved trust of Lincoln and Stanton in McClellan. "The private and very confidential letter" of Seward to Weed, of July 7, reflects some change of feeling on the part of the administration, and is all the more remarkable inasmuch as Seward was the constant friend of McClellan. "Notwithstanding," he wrote, "the light thrown upon the position of our army on the James River, most painful doubts come up from there now, upon the question whether it can, in any case, however reinforced, make a successful or hopeful attack upon Richmond. If that is impossible, reinforcements sent there will only aggravate the impotence of its position. Meantime the suggestion comes up, of course, that the insurgents, holding McClellan in his present position with a small force, will immediately organize a new and vigorous campaign against Washington." 4
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1 July 3, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 291.
2 Ibid., pp. 291, 294, 298.
3 "Be assured that you shall have the support of this department and the government as cordially and faithfully as was ever rendered by man to man." — Stanton to McClellan, July 5, ibid., p. 298. "Also there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own base and selfish purposes. No man had ever a truer friend than I have been to you and shall continue to be." — McClellan's Own Story, p. 476. See McClellan's reply, ibid., p. 477.
3 Seward's Life, vol. iii. p. 114.

July 8 Lincoln made a visit to the army, and, seeking information which should lead him to a decision, asked McClellan and his corps commanders if the army could be safely removed. McClellan thought that it would be a "very difficult matter; " Sumner and Heintzelman deemed it possible, though entailing the abandonment of our cause; Porter said it was impossible, and would ruin the country; while Franklin and Keyes were sure that the removal might be effected, and that it was the proper course to pursue. McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Porter expressed the opinion that the health of the army was good, but Franklin and Keyes maintained the contrary. All agreed that the army was secure in its present position.1 The President could come to no decision, and in his perplexity of mind felt the need of better military advisers than there were in Washington. The armies of the West, as contrasted with the Army of the Potomac, had accomplished positive results, and to the ability there developed he looked for aid. A fortnight previously he had placed General John Pope, who had achieved fame by the capture of Island No. 10, and had enjoyed a popular reputation for greater military capacity and energy than McClellan, in command of the newly christened Army of Virginia, composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont. His eyes now turned to Halleck, the commander in the West, who was versed in the theory of military art, had written books on tactics and international law, and was generally regarded with favor. July 2 Lincoln asked him, "Could you make me a flying visit for consultation?" July 11 he ordered "that Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as General-in-Chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department under his charge."2 It is probable that this appointment
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1 Lincoln's memorandum from McClellan's headquarters, July 9. Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 201. See also letter of Keyes to the President, July 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 313.
2 Ibid., pp. 286, 314.

was suggested by General Scott, when the President saw him at West Point in the last days of June, and that it was favored by Stanton and by Pope.1 Halleck came to Washington unwillingly. The mixture of politics with military affairs, the disposition of an influential part of the press to cry down a general who would not carry out the policy of the radical Republicans, had instilled in him a strong distaste for the capital, which was augmented by his poor opinion of the negro. He had already declined invitations from the President, but the order of July 11 left him no option.2

In the interim, before Halleck's arrival in Washington, the opposition to McClellan grew in virulence. It may have been increased by his so-called political letter which he had handed to the President at Harrison's Landing,3 although Chase, who seems at this time to have been the head of the opposition, makes no reference to it in his diary, notes, or private letters. The Secretary of the Treasury and the radicals who sympathized with him, and represented an active sentiment in the Northern States, were disposed to rate high the talent of a general who would seize every opportunity to strike at slavery. McClellan's conservatism increased their bitterness against him, whereas they found in Pope a commander whose ideas of a vigorous prosecution of the war agreed with their own, and whose ability gave them reason to expect results in the field from an army under his command which they had hoped for in vain from Butler and Fremont. Pope had gone to work with energy, concentrating his troops in front of Washington in a position where they could protect the capital or undertake active operations. The exposition of his plans and the frank expression of his very positive opinions before the Committee on the Conduct of the War must have won the hearts of the radical senators and
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 2; Welles, Lincoln and Seward, p. 192. 2 Halleck to McClellan, July 30, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 343; Warden's Chase, p. 448.
3 Dated July 7. Printed in O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 73; Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 447. Vide ante.

representatives who heard his testimony, although the freedom of his confidences was not in accordance with the best military tradition.1 Dining with Chase, he made no secret of his opinion of McClellan's incompetency and indisposition to active movements, and said that he had urged the President to displace McClellan before the arrival of Halleck; confident that slavery must perish, he favored the use of any instrument that would weaken the enemy.2 Yet Pope had at the outset made an honest attempt to work in harmony with McClellan. The two generals in their correspondence show equal sincerity and a like desire to overcome the enemy, but their plans were irreconcilable. McClellan proposed after receiving heavy reinforcements to resume the offensive from his present position, while Pope plainly implied that the wide separation of the two armies was dangerous.3 Believing, as he did, that a move upon Richmond from the James River as a base was too hazardous an operation, and that the two armies ought to be united and advance upon the Confederate capital from the north,4 he gave his meaning to McClellan with a delicacy that was noteworthy in a man whose expression was ordinarily blunt. Of his bluntness he gave signal proof in another way. In an address issued to his army for the purpose, he afterwards said, of creating in it "a feeling of confidence and a cheerful spirit which were sadly wanting," 5 he announced: "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found. ... I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. . . . I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which
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1 This was July 8, C. W.. part i. p. 276.
2 This was July 21, Warden's Chase, p. 438; Schuckers's Chase, p. 448.
3 Pope's letter of July 4, McClellan's reply of July 7, O. R., vol. xi. part iii pp. 295, 306.
4 Testimony before the Committee, C. W-, part i. p. 280.
5 C. W., Supp. part ii. p. 105.

I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of 'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear."1

This address lacked wisdom and tact. To the officers and soldiers of the three corps which made up his Army of Virginia, it was unjust and almost insulting. Their ill success had come from the imperfect strategy devised at Washington and from incompetent leadership rather than from the want of bravery. Regarded also as a slur upon the Army of the Potomac, it made almost every officer in it his enemy. Pope followed up his address with four orders which caused commotion at the time, and have since given rise to much discussion in the Confederate and the Union books on the war. Orders No. 5 and 6 and the greater part of Order No. 7 were at least unnecessary, although Ropes maintains, after an impartial discussion of them, that they were justified by the laws of war.2 A penalty threatened in Order No. 7 calls for mention. Non-combatants who fired upon Union soldiers from houses should, if detected, "be shot without awaiting civil process." Order No. 11 provides for the arrest of all disloyal male citizens within the lines of the Union army. Those who took the oath of allegiance should be permitted to remain at their homes; those who refused to take it should be sent farther South, and if found again within our lines, "be considered as spies and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law;" those who violated their oath of allegiance should be
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1 Date of this is July 14, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 474.
2 The Army under Pope, p. 9. Order No. 5 gave occasion for acts of pillage and outrage, and Pope issued an order, August 14, rebuking those who had misinterpreted and abused it, and threatening them with punishment. — O. K., vol. xii; part iii. p. 573.

shot.1 For Order No. 11 there is, in the opinion of Ropes, "absolutely no justification." It was, moreover, impossible of execution. I have found no instance of the enforcement of the extreme penalty or even of attempt at its enforcement.2 Even Chase wrote Pope mildly disapproving it.3 From Winchester, a town constantly bandied between the Union and Confederate armies, a lady whose sympathy was entirely with the South wrote to the wife of Stonewall Jackson seventeen days after the issue of the order, "That threatened oath of allegiance has been so long delayed that we hope it may not be carried out."1 Nor have I found a case of summary punishment that substantiated the menace of Order No. 7. In truth, any serious intention of carrying out these orders would have been abandoned after Jefferson Davis had threatened to retaliate, and after Pope and his army had entered upon their active campaign, which from the start was a series of reverses. The address and the orders are such as were hardly to be expected from a trained and experienced soldier; they bear the stamp of a pugnacious civilian. General Pope in after years affirmed they were issued on the direct prompting of Stanton.5 Certain it is that the orders were shown to the President before they were published, and the most obnoxious one, Order No. 11, was in his hands twenty-four hours without receiving a manifestation of disapproval.6 The radical Republicans were convinced that the Army of the Potomac under McClellan had been coddled. The Secretary of War undoubtedly shared this conviction,
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1 These orders are printed in O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 50 et seq. The date of Order No. 7 should probably be July 20 (see Ropes), that of Order No. 11 is July 23.
2 Some references to these orders and proceedings under them in the Confederate Correspondence may be found in O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 669; vol. xii. part iii. pp. 919, 923.
3 August 1, Schuckers, p. 378.
4 Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 369.
5 In conversation with General J. D. Cox four or five years before Pope's death.
6 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 359; vol. xii. part iii. p. 500.

which suggested the advisability of giving the troops in Virginia to understand that rough work lay before them. Moreover, "the barbarity of rebel warfare" was a common tenet at the North, where it was believed that undue leniency in many respects had been shown by our generals to the Confederates.1 The orders of Pope were looked upon as the announcement of a change of policy, and when Chase set down in his notes, "General Pope seemed to me an earnest, active, intelligent man, and inspired me with the best hopes,"2 he unquestionably spoke for the radical Republicans in Washington and in the country at large. Perhaps we shall gain a better understanding of these orders if we attribute to them the ulterior purpose of affecting public sentiment at a time when fresh enlistments in the army were earnestly desired.

Jefferson Davis ordered that notification be sent to the general-in-chief of the armies of the United States that the Confederacy would not consider any of the commissioned officers captured from Pope's army as prisoners of war.3 Halleck probably made no reply to this communication; indeed he regarded some of the orders as "very injudicious," and advised Pope, on the authority of the Secretary of War, to modify Order No. 11 in the direction of leniency.4 Some of the officers of the Army of Virginia who were taken prisoners were sent into close confinement as felons;6 but with the end of Pope's brief career in Virginia, this wrangle ceases, having gone no great way beyond fulminations.

Those who made a hero of Pope continued their strife against McClellan. "My dear Mac," wrote Burnside, July 15, after his visit to Washington, "you have lots of enemies."6 The radicals so far prevailed with the President that after
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1 See, for example, letters of John Sherman to his brother, May 19, August 24, September 23, Sherman Letters, pp. 151, 157, 164.
2 Schuckers, p. 448.
3 July 31, Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 315.
4 August 6, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 359; vol. xii. part iii. p. 540.
5 A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. ii. p. 148.
6 McClellan's Own Story, p. 472.

sending 9000 or 10,000 troops to Harrison's Landing, he withheld further reinforcements, detaining Burnside with his force at Fort Monroe.1 Rumors of McClellan's disloyalty were in the air, and the subject must have been alluded to in cabinet meeting, for Chase records in his diary: "I said that I did not regard General McClellan as loyal to the administration, although I did not question his general loyalty to the country."2 It was about this time that he and Stanton advised the President to remove McClellan and send Pope to the army on the James.3 This, Lincoln would not do, but, owing to the representations of Pope that cordial co-operation from McClellan could not be expected, or perhaps for other reasons, he offered the command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside, who peremptorily declined it.4 This was known only to a few. The President's perplexity was painful, but he would decide nothing further until he should have a chance to consult Halleck, whose arrival was awaited by all with the hope that he would prove the long-sought-for leader. He reached Washington July 23, and the next day went to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on the James River. McClellan told his chief that his plan was to cross the James River, attack Petersburg, an important railroad centre, and cut the communication between Richmond and the States farther South. Halleck maintained this project to be impracticable and full of risk, and nearly if not quite talked him out of it. He further laid down as a military necessity the concentration of the Army of the Potomac with Pope's army unless a reinforcement of 20,000 would enable McClellan to attack Richmond with a strong probability of success. McClellan thought he should require 30,000 additional troops,
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1 Letters of July 15, 17, McClellan's Own Story, pp. 449, 472.
2 July 22, Warden, p. 440.
3 Schuckers, p. 447.
4 Burnside's testimony, C. W., part i. p. 650; McClellan's Own Story, p. 458. This offer was made between July 18 and 30, and probably before Halleck's arrival in Washington on the 23d. — General J. D. Cox's Reminiscences, MS.; also, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 326, 330.

but after reflection said in a second interview that there was "a chance," and he "was willing to try it" with the number promised by the President. He also expressed the opinion that while the junction between his and Pope's forces might be made without exposing Washington, the withdrawal of his army would have a demoralizing influence on the soldiers, and that it would be better to maintain his present position until reinforcements should be furnished him adequate to an aggressive movement.1 His despatches to Washington which followed Halleck's visit are an enforcement of this view. There also ensued between him and his chief an exchange of friendly and sympathetic letters.2 July 30 an order to send away his sick was despatched from Washington, the reason given for it being "to enable you to move in any direction." 3 August 3 Halleck telegraphed him: "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this." 4 Burnside's letter of the day before throws some light on a council which led to this determination. "My dear Mac," he wrote, "I am much worried at the decision they have chosen to make in regard to your army. From the moment I reached Washington I feared it would be so, and I am of the opinion that your engineers had much to do with bringing about the determination. When the conclusion was arrived at, I was the only one who advocated your forward movement." 5

The decision was a choice of evils made on the side of safety, a natural result of the balancing of chances in which the poor promise for the future of McClellan's failures in the past outweighed the many disadvantages of his withdrawal from the Peninsula. The hesitating manner in which he agreed to resume the offensive with a reinforcement of 20,000 indicated that when that number reached him he would cry
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1 Memorandum of Halleck, July 27, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 337.
2 July 30 and August 1, ibid., pp. 343, 345.
3 Ibid., part i. p. 76.
4 Ibid., p. 80. 6 McClellan's Own Story, p. 472.

for more. Indeed, the promise was drawn from him by his anxiety to retain the army in its present position. The withdrawal of it to the neighborhood of Washington would be notice to the country that the plan of his Peninsular campaign was a failure. He suspected, moreover, that a part of the design was to supersede him in the command of the Army of the Potomac.1 Halleck, in a friendly letter to him, explains clearly the grounds of the decision. McClellan and his officers estimated the enemy's forces in and about Richmond at 200,000, and he had raised his demand for reinforcements to 35,000, a number which it was impossible to send promptly. To keep his army in camp on the James during the sickly months of August and September, a probable necessity according to his plan, would weaken it sadly by disease. The delay would not only be dangerous to the health of his soldiers, but might expose Pope to the attack of the larger part of the Confederate army, while McClellan was in a position where he could render no assistance.2

Although the estimate of Lee's force was greatly in excess of the actual number, it was one generally credited. Meigs, who was, I believe, the only officer in high position to record any doubt of it, had, by a careful collation of the reports in the Richmond and Wilmington, N. C, newspapers, and by intelligent deductions therefrom, arrived at the opinion that it did not exceed 105,000.3 As a matter of fact, it numbered about 80,000,4 with reinforcements slowly arriving. While therefore the decision was based upon incorrect information, the judgment of the authorities in Washington, of McClellan and of Keyes,6 that the Army of the Potomac would need to be largely reinforced before it could safely take the offensive,
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1 See his letters to his wife during July.
2 August 6, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 82.
3 Ibid., part iii. p. 340. Keyes held the prevalent opinion. See letter to Meigs, July 27, ibid., p. 338.
4 Ibid., p. 645; Allan, Army of N. Va., p. 149, note iii.
5 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 332. Keyes wrote letters to Lincoln and Meigs, undermining his commander.

is a case of a sound conclusion from a false premise. McClellan had an effective force of 90,000.' Considering that there were intrenchments around Richmond and that Lee was the abler general of the two, McClellan ought to have had double the force of the enemy before venturing on an attack. The question must then have arisen, Can he handle so large an army? Criticism is silent on those who at that time gave a negative answer.2

Nevertheless, in his despatch replying to Halleck's order, McClellan made out a strong case. "Your telegram," he said, "has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. . . . This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. . . . With the assistance of the gunboats I consider our communications as now secure." I urge "that this order may be rescinded," that this army " may be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive." Pointing out reinforcements that were available, he continued: "Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defence of Washington. It is here on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union should be decided. ... I entreat that this order may be rescinded." 3 The events of the next two years added a tremendous force to the logic of this despatch, making evident, as they did, that McClellan's plan was better than that of Halleck; and the conclusion may be drawn, that it would
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1 Halleck's memorandum, O. R, vol. xi. part iii. p. 338.
2 See Der Feldzug in Nord-Virginia in August, 1862 (Hannover, 1881), Major F. Mangold, p. 45.
3 August 4, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 81.

probably have been better to reinforce the Army of the Potomac for the purpose of offensive operations in the autumn from its base on the James River.1 The necessary troops could have been furnished, for Halleck had promised 20,000, and if Lincoln had reverted to his first impulse and drawn 25,000 from the West, leaving their places to be filled from the new levy, he would still have been in the region of safety; indeed, these 45,000 joined to the Army of the Potomac and a victory near Richmond were more favorable to the military situation in the West than the Western army intact and severe reverses in Virginia. The remaining troops needed could have been sent from the Army of Virginia, if an active campaign for Pope were given up, and it were deemed safe to intrust the defence of Washington largely to the new recruits which were now fast coming forward.2 Forasmuch as Washington was more valuable to the Confederates than Richmond to the North, the possibility could not be ignored, that Lee should leave his capital with a slight defence, and with the main part of his army make a vigorous attack on Washington.3
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1 See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 242. General J. D. Cox thus reports a conversation had with McClellan near Alexandria, August 31: "McClellan discussed his campaign in the Peninsula with apparent unreserve. He condemned the decision to recall him from Harrison's Landing, arguing that the one thing to do in that emergency was to reinforce his army there and make it strong enough to go on with its work and capture Richmond. He said that if the government had lost confidence in his ability to conduct the campaign to a successful end, still it was unwise to think of anything else, except to strengthen that army and give it to some one they could trust. He added explicitly: 'If Pope was the man they had faith in, then Pope should have been sent to Harrison's Landing to take command, and however bitter it would have been, I should have had no just reason to complain.' He predicted that they would be put to the cost of much life and treasure, to get back to the position left by him." — Cox's Reminiscences, MS. Cf. Napoleon to Carnot, May, 1796, Lanfrey, tome i. p. 107.
2 In addition to the call for 300,000 three-years men, of which mention has been made, a call for 300,000 nine-months militia was issued August 4.
3 See Keyes's opinion given to Lincoln July 9. Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 202; his letters to Lincoln and Meigs, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 313, 338. In reckoning the available supply of troops, some thought must be given to the large number absent from the army. This had attracted the attention of Lincoln, causing him to admonish McClellan, who was taking measures to bring back the absent officers and soldiers, and correct the evil. — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 319, 321, 323.

All these considerations must have occurred to Lincoln and to Seward, who, in the many civil and military councils that took place before a decision was reached, were apparently the only men, except Burnside and possibly Halleck, to speak a good word for McClellan. The President was capable of resisting the unanimous opinion of his advisers, but he himself had lost confidence in the ability of his general to make an effective forward movement, no matter how large his resources and how favorable the opportunity. If, as Ropes points out, the government had reposed the same trust in McClellan that they did in Grant two years later, they would without doubt have furnished him what he asked for and permitted him to execute his plan.1 That he had forfeited their confidence was a natural result of his career as commander, yet in truth he was now more worthy of trust than when he first took command of the Army of the Potomac. His private correspondence is used by historical writers to show his conceit and lack of a proper spirit of subordination, even contempt of the government in Washington;2 but from the day on which he handed his Harrison's Landing political letter to the President3 a different spirit is manifest. His self-importance is still conspicuous, his complacency and puerile vanity; also the usual complaints, the expressed lack of faith in the administration, boasts that he will take Richmond, uncompromising condemnation of those who do not agree with him, detraction of Stanton, disdain of Pope, and early suspicions of Halleck.4 There is still somewhat of the feeling that he is necessary to the salvation of the country, and that in his political letter he has shown himself a master
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1 The Army under Pope, p. 11.
2 See vol. iii. of this work, p. 496 et seq.
3 July 8.
4 August 4, "Halleck has begun to show the cloven foot already." August 10, "Halleck is turning out just like the rest of the herd." —Own Story, pp. 462, 465.

spirit, his policy shining with Christian feeling and humanity in contrast with that of Congress and of Pope.1 But notwithstanding the persistence of the old failings, reflection and his reverses are making a better man. "There never was such an army, but there have been plenty of better generals;" "I have tried to do my best honestly and faithfully for my country. That I have to a certain extent failed I do not believe to be my fault, though my self-conceit probably blinds me to many errors that others see." 2 These and similar expressions draw us to the writer with sympathy, and when we take into account that no man can go unscathed if his acts are interpreted by his inmost thoughts, a careful reading of these affectionate and confidential letters of McClellan to his wife cannot fail to force upon us the conviction that he had been improved by adversity, and to make us regret that the President could not see him as clearly as it is now given us to do. The acerbity which he displayed in his official letters must have incensed even a man with Lincoln's poise of temper and judgment; indeed this fault, if allowed to sway us too far, will lead us to do injustice to McClellan, for his geniality and sincerity in private intercourse show another and better side to the man, who too frequently dipped his pen in gall.

In answer to McClellan's able and warm protest against the removal of his army from the James River, Halleck replied at once: "The order of the withdrawal . . . will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness."3 If McClellan had been a great general with the high spirit that such greatness ordinarily carries, he would not have submitted tamely to the thwarting of his plans,4 a sequence to his supersession by Halleck, whom he considered his inferior and whose appointment he
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1 Own Story, pp. 461, 463.
2 Ibid., pp. 447, 453.
3 August 5, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 82.
4 See Allan, Army of N. Va., p. 153.

deemed a blow to his self-respect:1 he would have resigned his commission. Here, though, must be taken into account the problem of the working man,—how in that event was he to get a living for himself, his wife, and child. He had already written his friend William H. Aspinwall, a man of large business connections in New York City, that if he lost the command of the Army of the Potomac he should give up the service; anticipating this contingency, he adds, "Be kind enough to cast your eyes about you to see whether there is anything I can do in New York to earn a respectable sup. port for my family." 2 This was July 19. Three weeks later his feeling is thus expressed: "Their [the government's] game is to force me to resign; mine will be to force them to place me on leave of absence."3 The natural and comprehensible desire to continue receiving the pay of a Major-General was one reason, if not the main reason, why he did not resent by a signal act the humiliation of supersedure and the overruling of his plan.

Meanwhile a reconnaissance made towards Richmond at the suggestion of Halleck,4 had resulted in a skirmish in which Hooker drove the Confederates from Malvern Hill. It is from this place that McClellan dates his telegraphic report of it to Halleck, adding: "This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only 14| miles distant, and I feel confident that with reinforcements I could march this army there in five days." "I have no reinforcements to send you," was Halleck's prompt reply.5 General Sumner had supported McClellan by sending at the same time a telegram to Washington with the words, "I am convinced that if we had a reinforcement of 20,000 men we
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1 "I am tired of serving fools. God help my country! He alone can save it. It is grating to have to serve under the orders of a man whom I know by experience to be my inferior." — Own Story, p. 453, also p. 455.
2 Ibid., p. 451.
3 Ibid., p. 464.
4 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 76.
5 August 5 and 6, ibid., p. 78.

could walk straight into Richmond." 1 McClellan's private correspondence and Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War indicate that he entertained the project of a forward movement with the purpose of fighting Lee. This plan was recommended by Hooker, who was so confident of success that he told his commander he would willingly take the advance.2 But McClellan was not made of the stuff which ventures disobedience of orders where final ruin or lasting glory is the issue of the move, and the thought was not translated into action. So loath, however, was he to leave his present position, so impelled by a union of military judgment, patriotism, and self-interest, that, after receiving Halleck's despatches which informed him that the enemy was fighting Pope and that the most urgent necessity existed for getting additional troops in front of Washington, he went to Fort Monroe and across Chesapeake Bay, travelling sixteen hours in order to have a conversation with his general-in-chief by wire, to learn fully about Pope's movements, and probably to urge with earnestness and force what he had already advised in two despatches of August 12: that he could help Pope with greater certainty and more surely relieve Washington from all danger by a movement on Richmond than by embarking his troops for Aquia Creek. He proposed to make an advance within forty-eight hours, fight a detachment of the enemy between him and the Confederate capital, and if he defeated and captured this estimated force of 18,000, he saw "but little difficulty in pushing rapidly forward into Richmond." He would need no reinforcements unless he were successful, but would then require them to maintain his communications. At 1.40 in the morning of August 14 Halleck said to him over the wires, "There is no change of plans; you will send up your troops as rapidly as possible," and then worn out by fatigue and anxiety left the telegraph office for his bed, to the
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 356.
2 Letter of Sunday, August 10, Own Story, p. 465; C. W., part i. p. 579.

great disappointment and annoyance of McClellan, who had waited at the other end of the telegraph in hope of a frank interchange of views.1

All this while the removal of the sick by steamers and transports was going on, but not with sufficient promptness to satisfy Halleck. From the commencement he had urged rapid progress. Expecting impossibilities, tortured with the anxiety and responsibility of his office and with the fear that Pope, who was at Culpeper Court House, and Burnside, who was at Falmouth, were in danger of being crushed, whereupon the enemy would move forward to the Potomac, his telegrams assumed, in McClellan's opinion, an "unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone." "There must be no further delay in your movements," he said. "That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained" 2

It is possible but not entirely clear from the correspondence and reports that there was a slight delay at the inception of the movement, caused by McClellan's desire to know what would be done with the army; for this knowledge, he maintained, would enable him to send off the sick to the greatest advantage. But after August 4, the day on which he received the order to withdraw his troops to Aquia Creek, his operations were marked by promptness, order, and zeal. In bis despatches he reiterated that there had been no unnecessary delay. From the 8th to the 12th the artillery and cavalry ordered to Burnside were embarked. August 14, the day on which he had hoped to make a final appeal to Halleck for permission to take the offensive, two of his corps began their march towards Yorktown. On the 16th the last of the sick were sent off by water,3 and by August 19 all of the corps
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 86 et seq.; part iii. pp. 372, 379; McClellan's Own Story, p. 467; conversation between Hooker and Chase, September 25, Warden's Chase, p. 488.
2 August 10, O. R. vol. xi. part i. p. 86.
3 Ibid., pp. 76-90, also part iii. pp. 378, 379. Halleck was not convinced that up to this time the movement had been made with proper celerity. He wrote Stanton, August 30: "The order was not obeyed with the promptness I expected and the national safety, in my opinion, required." — O. R, vol. xii. part iii. p. 739.

had reached their different points of embarkation. Porter's sailed from Newport News the 19th and 20th, Heintzelman's from Yorktown the 21st, Franklin's from Fort Monroe the 23d. Sumner had to wait for transports, but on August 27 reached Aquia Creek, which had also been the destination of the others. Meanwhile McClellan had given Keyes directions to garrison Yorktown temporarily; he himself reported for orders at Aquia August 24, and three days later in response to a request from Halleck reached Alexandria.1

Our attention is now claimed by Pope's campaign in Virginia, which is from the beginning a story of cross purposes and of energy counteracted by unskilful management and the lack of hearty co-operation. Burnside having refused the command of the Army of the Potomac, in the belief that no one in the service was as well fitted for it as its actual general, and Chase, Stanton, and Pope having failed to induce the President to supersede McClellan with any one else, Halleck finally decided the matter by saying that" McClellan would do very well under orders from himself."2 Pope, however, was still troubled "with grave forebodings of the result," and expressed to the President, the Secretary of War, and to Halleck his "desire to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia and to be returned to the Western country."8 At first the plan seems to have been that Halleck should take command in the field of the combined armies of McClellan and Pope when their concentration had been effected,4 but this was abandoned, owing doubtless to his
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1 Ibid., vol. xi. part i. p. 90 et seq. Referring to McClellan's movement after August 14, Halleck wrote Stanton that "it was rapidly carried out." — Ibid., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739; see, also, pp. 578,580, 590,599, 605 et seq., noting especially McClellan's confidential letter to Burnside.
2 Schuckers's Chase, p. 448.
3 Pope's report of January 27, 1863, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 22.
4 Report of Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, Senate Document, 1st Session 46th Congress No. 37, part iii. p. 1697.

unwillingness to assume so great a responsibility. Afterwards Halleck writing to McClellan at Harrison's Landing informed him that when the armies were joined, he should be given the command of all the troops, Pope and Burnside coming immediately under his control.1 Although the language of this letter is plain, McClellan doubted the sincerity of it.2 Burnside, the common loyal friend of all, went to the Chickahominy to assure him that the purpose thus announced would certainly be executed,3 but three days later McClellan wrote: "My dear Burn. . . . Yesterday and to-day I have received intelligence from confidential sources leading me to think it probable that Halleck either will not or cannot carry out his intentions in regard to my position as expressed to you."4 He may have obtained an inkling of a later scheme that some other general than himself or Halleck was to have the supreme command in the field.5 Pope was not allowed to return to the West. By July 29 he had pretty well concentrated his army, which consisted of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel,6 and numbered 43,000. Having threatened Gordonsville, an important railroad centre, he forced Lee to send Jackson from Richmond to oppose his advance, and on the 29th left Washington to take command of the operations in the field. From the nature of the case, public sentiment demanded that the rival of McClellan should assume at once a vigorous offensive, and Pope had given proof by his address to his army that to find the Confederates and defeat them was his own purpose and desire. Varro had taken the place of Fabius, and had
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1 August 7, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 360.
2 Own Story, p. 466.
8 August 17, ibid., p. 468; see, also, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 590.
4 August 20, ibid., p. 605.
5 Senate Document, 1st Session 46th Congress No. 37, part iii. p. 1697. It is possible that this was the time when the command was offered to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who declined it. See Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 24.
6 Fremont had declined to serve under his junior in rank, and at his request had been relieved from command.

vaunted that whenever he should get sight of the enemy he would discomfit him.

Halleck was general-in-chief of all the forces, and, sitting at his office desk in Washington, formed the strategical combinations, and directed by telegraph the movements of his different generals. As happened generally on the advent of the new man, faith in him was unlimited. "If he fails," wrote Chase in his diary, "all fails."1 Halleck pushed Pope forward to the Rapidan River, in order that by the diversion McClellan might remove his troops safely from the Peninsula, and take a position somewhere in the rear of the Rappahannock.2 At Cedar Mountain, Banks, with 8000, attacked Stonewall Jackson, who had 24,000, and of course was beaten.3 This battle swelled the list of controversies with a dispute between Banks and Pope, whether an order had actually been given to attack. Halleck called it a "hard-earned but brilliant success against vastly superior numbers," 4 but the truth was in Jackson's stereotyped despatch, "God blessed our arms with another victory." 6 Two days afterwards, hearing that the Union army had been reinforced, Jackson retired to the vicinity of Gordonsville; somewhat later Pope advanced to the Rapidan, taking a position along the line of that river. In Richmond Lee was pondering how best he might strike at either Pope or McClellan. From the Northern newspapers and from other sources he knew that discord had arisen between the federal government and the commander of the Army of the Potomac;6 but from his understanding of his opponent, he had no idea, even after Hooker's attack at Malvern Hill, that McClellan would advance on Richmond.7 He
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1 Warden, p. 451.
2 Halleck to Stanton, August 30, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739 ; Halleck's report, ibid., part ii. p. 6.
3 August 9.
4 August 14, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 135.
5 Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 327.
6 Life of Lee, Long, p. 183.
7 Lee to Jackson, August 7, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 925.

now took to studying Pope. Frederick the Great, writes Carlyle, "always got to know his man, after fighting him a month or two; and took liberties with him or did not take accordingly." 1 This task of learning to comprehend one's adversary was made somewhat easy in our civil war, for the reason that most of the opposing commanders had become acquainted at West Point or during their service in Mexico. Longstreet was graduated in the same class with Pope, and undoubtedly conveyed to Lee his judgment of Academy days, that Pope "was a handsome dashing fellow and a splendid cavalryman," who "did not apply himself to his books very closely." Lee accepted the popular opinion of the new commander, as a boastful ambitious man and not a hard student or a close thinker. When he heard of Pope's address to the army, his estimate was lowered: the Federal general had shown contempt for the military maxim of centuries, "Do not despise your enemy." 2

As early as August 3 the rumor was current in Richmond that McClellan was stealing away from his base on the James.3 The confederate commander kept a careful watch on his every movement, and by August 13 made up his mind that the Army of the Potomac was "being withdrawn and sent to reinforce Pope." Deciding at once not to pursue McClellan, but to concentrate his forces upon Pope, he ordered Longstreet with his command and Hood with two brigades to Gordonsville, he himself following at four o'clock in the morning of the 15th.4

Attention has been so frequently directed to McClellan's failures to seize the supreme opportunity that it is a matter of ordinary fairness to observe that the plan proposed by him was the most promising strategy of this whole campaign, both for security to Washington and for positive results.5
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1 Vol. vii. p. 108, Chapman and Hall's 10 vol. ed.
2 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 513, 514, 524.
3 A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. ii. p. 147.
4 O. R, vol. xi. part iii. p. 674 et seq.; ibid., vol. xii. part ill. p. 928 et seq.
5 Ante. p. 111.

On the 14th of August there were in Richmond and the neighborhood 30,000 troops at the outside: the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia was in Gordonsville and vicinity. It was on this very day that McClellan tried to have a telegraphic conversation with Halleck when he intended to beg for permission to throw his 81,0001 soldiers upon Richmond. Himself thirsting to retrieve his failing fortunes by a plan of his own, his men and most of his officers devoted to him, Sumner and Hooker full of the purpose and eager to fight, Franklin and Porter bound to him by hoops of steel, it is not improbable that he would have taken Richmond and held it, the gun-boats maintaining his communications, until the whole energy of the government had been turned to his support.2 Yet in this speculation on what might have been, must be taken into account McClellan's lack of promptness, the greater ability and celerity of Lee, who could have been back in Richmond in a few hours, while a day would have sufficed to transport there by rail the troops of Longstreet and Hood. Moreover G. W. Smith had been left in command with instructions "to hold Richmond to the last extremity should an attack be made on it." 3 But, as we have seen, Halleck would consent to no alteration of his plan.

When Lee became certain that the Army of the Potomac was marching away from Harrison's Landing, he ordered two more divisions from Richmond to join him, and now outnumbering Pope, determined to make an attack. Pope discovered his plan from a letter of Lee to Stuart in possession of a captured cavalry officer, and knowing that the enemy had the larger force, was wiser in action than he had been in word, and withdrew with all speed behind the Rappahannock River.4 From Clarke's mountain Lee watched the movement, and with a sigh of disappointment said to his companion, Longstreet,
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1 Return of August 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 367.
2 In this connection, see Porter to Halleck, August 16, ibid., vol. xii. part iii. p. 579.
3 Ibid., vol. xi. part iii. p. 677.
4 August 18 and 19.

"General, we little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us thus early in the campaign." 1 He crossed the Rapidan and endeavored to pass the Rappahannock, seeking a favorable opportunity to fall upon Pope; but his attempts were defeated, at times by the vigilance of his adversary and the strength of the Federal artillery, and again by heavy rains and a swollen river.

The story has now reached August 25. Lee had been outmanoeuvred and balked in his design of suppressing Pope.2 With the exception of the battle of Cedar Mountain, Pope, since he took the field, had done well, and that defeat had not been followed by grave results. His retreat to the line of the Rappahannock had been approved by Halleck, who had telegraphed him to "dispute every inch of ground," and on August 21 promised him adequate reinforcements within forty-eight hours.3 Although of a sanguine temperament, Pope took in his despatches no rose-colored view of his situation. "McDowell's is the only corps that is at all reliable that I have," he telegraphed to his chief. "Sigel, as you know is perfectly unreliable, and I suggest that some officer of superior rank be sent to command his army corps. His conduct to-day has occasioned me great dissatisfaction. Banks's corps is very weak, not amounting to more than 5000 men, and is much demoralized. Kearny's division [of Heintzelman's corps, Army of the Potomac] is the only one that has yet reached me from Alexandria. . . . Banks's corps must be left somewhere in the rear, to be set up again. Sigel's corps, although composed of some of the best fighting material we have, will never do much service under that officer."4 Pope,
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1 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 162.
2 Lee's own word, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 919.
3 Ibid., part ii. pp. 56, 57.
4 August 25, ibid., part iii. p. 653. The contemporary evidence and comments of military critics substantiate these statements, taking into account that in the first part of his despatch Pope referred only to his original army and did not include the two divisions of Reno of Burnside's corps and the division of Reynolds of the Army of the Potomac which had already come to him from Aquia Creek.

whose influence had been materially lessened by his indiscreet address, had in intercourse with his subordinate officers lost still further their confidence by the roughness of his manner and the vacillation of his spirit. Nor had he the trust of his soldiers; the campaign, at best a difficult one, had been made needlessly hard, and the men were now tired out, and suffering from hunger.1 That in spite of these disadvantages he has won praise for his boldness and strategy thus far in the campaign,2 is due to the energy and persistence with which he overcame obstacles.

The indecision of Halleck was amazing, although the President was perhaps responsible for this in some degree. Matters were awry in Alexandria, whither a part of the Army of the Potomac had gone on the way to reinforce Pope, and McClellan had been ordered there to straighten them out. He himself was begging Halleck to let him know if he should have command of the combined armies, as had been promised, but received no reply; 3 this may not have been the fault entirely of the general-in-chief. With the desire " to help him loyally" and "render all the assistance in my power," McClellan went two days later to see him, and found him "well disposed," having " had much to contend against."4 Porter, now marching from Falmouth to join Pope, was left under the impression that after he had made his junction the operations were to be defensive until all the forces were united and a commander for them designated by the President.5 Search was perhaps being made for a general equal to the task, but until he was found, or until it had been decided whether Halleck, McClellan, or Pope should have command in the field, or until the junction of the two armies had actually been made,
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1 As to the last statement, see Col. Franklin Haven's article, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. ii. p. 266.
2 Col. Thos. L. Livermore, ibid., p. 321.
3 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 93.
4 Own Story, pp. 529, 530.
5 Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter. Senate Documents, No. 37, part i. p. 319, part iii. p. 1697.

the known untrustiness of the Army of Virginia, the disaffection to Pope of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, should have prompted Halleck to charge caution and again caution to him whose distinguishing trait was impetuosity. Instead of this he intimates in his despatches that aggressive action is looked for without explaining clearly how and when.1 August 25 he telegraphed, "You may expect orders to recross the Rappahannock and resume the offensive in a few days."8 Pope's reply, taken in connection with his other despatch of the same day already quoted, is pathetic in that, like McClellan, he begs for necessary knowledge. "Of course, I shall be ready to recross the Rappahannock at a moment's notice," he said. . . . "You wished forty-eight hours to assemble the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock, and four days have passed without the enemy yet being permitted to cross. ... I had clearly understood that you wished to unite our whole forces before a forward movement was begun. ... I am not acquainted with your views as you seem to suppose, and would be glad to know them as far as my position and operations are concerned. I understood you clearly that at all hazards I was to prevent the enemy from passing the Rappahannock. This I have done and shall do. I don't like to be on the defensive if I can help it, but must be so as long as I am tied to Burnside's forces, not yet wholly arrived at Fredericksburg. Please let me know, if it can be done, what is to be my own command, and if I am to act independently against the enemy. I certainly understood that as soon as the whole of our forces were concentrated you designed to take command in person, and that when everything was ready we were to move forward in concert."8 In his answer Halleck evades the important questions, but makes the statement, "The main object has been accomplished in getting up troops from the Peninsula:"
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1 Caution, however, is suggested, August 22 and 23, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. pp. 625, 630.
2 Ibid., p. 642.
3 Despatch of August 25, ibid., part ii. p. 65.

this should have inclined both Halleck and Pope to circumspection until an effective junction were made and both armies were well in hand. What follows: "Just think of the immense amount of telegraphing I have to do, and then say whether I can be expected to give you any details as to the movements of others even when I know them,"1 shows the irritation of a bureaucrat full of business; it also demonstrates the folly of directing a vital campaign from an office in Washington, and emphasizes the incapacity of the man attempting it, who failed utterly to comprehend the brilliant move, now being made by Lee and Jackson, which resulted in the discomfiture of the Union army.

Turn we now to the Confederate camp. From intercepted letters, Lee felt certain that McClellan's army was on its way to join Pope, and suspected that Cox was coming from western Virginia as an additional reinforcement.2 If he were to crush Pope he must therefore do it at once. While the Federal General begged Halleck for detailed instructions and even submitted an order for the disposition of his troops before putting it into force,8 Lee directed all the soldiers in and about Richmond, except two brigades, to be sent to him, but said to Davis, "Should you not agree with me in the propriety of this step, please countermand the order and let me know."4 The reply of Davis6 makes evident that on the Confederate side there was one able head, who contended against the Federal division of authority, the confusion of generals, the interference of the President and his cabinet. This difference alone weighed heavily in the scales which turned to Southern success. Lee consulted no one.6 He devised a plan contrary,
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1 Halleck's despatch is August 26, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 668.
2 Ibid., p. 940 et seq.; Cox's Reminiscences, MS.
3 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 641.
4 August 24, ibid., p. 942.
5 "Confidence in you overcomes the view which would otherwise be taken of the exposed condition of Richmond, and the troops retained for the defence of the capital are surrendered to you on a renewed request." —Aug, 26, ibid., p. 945.
6 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 522.

the military critics say, "to the recognized principles of strategy," but some risk must be run, and, while he did not know all of the facts, he knew something of his enemy's inefficiency that was co-operating with his own great ability. In pursuance of this bold project, Jackson, on the morning of August 25, was despatched with 25,000 men on a forced march, his aim being to cross the Rappahannock above the position of the Union army, to move through Thoroughfare Gap, strike the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Pope's rear and sever his communications with Washington. He took no transportation but ambulances and ammunition wagons; all baggage was left behind. A few days' cooked rations in the haversacks, some live cattle, some salt for the ears of corn which the men expected to pluck in the fields and roast, were to be the food supply until they could reach the rich stores of the Northern army. Twenty-five miles were covered that day, and Jackson's troops slept at Salem. Commencing the day before, Lee continued for some days to threaten vigorously Pope's front for the purpose of misleading him.

From the officers of his Signal Corps Station, Pope learned, probably as early as noon of the 25th, of the movement of a large body of the enemy,1 and without suspecting the real aim of the movement, made up his mind by nightfall that their whole force had "marched for the Shenandoah valley by way of Luray and Front Royal." 2 Ropes, who is friendly to him, maintains that in the afternoon of the 25th, while he was in doubt of the Confederates' design, or even though he believed that they were going into the Shenandoah valley, he should have abandoned his position in the neighborhood of Warrenton, and occupied Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville for the purpose of preserving his lines of communication.3 This move would have frustrated Lee's plan at the outset. Pope was perhaps so plagued by the recollection of his injudicious
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1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 654.
2 Despatch of 9.30 p. m., ibid., part ii. p. 67 ; see, also, part iii. p. 665. 3 The Army under Pope, p. 45; Civil War, part ii. p. 265.

address to the Army of Virginia, that he would not entertain the idea of further retreat, or perhaps he thought it would be contrary to the orders he had received from Washington, although in this event he had time and opportunity to communicate with the general-in-chief and gain his consent. Halleck, on the other hand, who probably had all the facts by the morning of the 26th, ought perhaps to have taken into account the possibility of Jackson's destination, and suggested a falling back, especially as the movement of the different corps of the Army of the Potomac had not been as rapid as he had expected.

August 26 Jackson marched swiftly on. He went through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville, unopposed and unobserved. By evening he had reached Bristoe Station, torn up the railroad track, cut the telegraph wires, severing Pope's line of supplies and his direct telegraphic communication with Washington. He sent a detachment to Manassas Junction which captured rich quartermaster and commissary stores, so that the Confederates obtained the clothes and shoes of which they stood in need, and feasted on Northern bread and meat while Pope's troops went hungry. There was bustle in the Army of Virginia that day, but in the wrong direction. Pope certainly was to blame, affirms Colonel Thomas Livermore, that he did not discover that 25,000 troops were marching twenty miles in his rear, and close to his position. He might have fallen upon Jackson with his superior force, and crushed that wing of the Confederate army;1 but ignorant of the enemy's movements, he thought that his fight, which he hoped to postpone for two days, should be made at Warrenton, and ordered the disposition of his troops to that end.2 About eight o'clock that evening, immediately after writing a despatch to McDowell outlining his plan, he learned that his communications had been severed at Manassas Junction, and taking this news in connection with other information pre
_________________
1 Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. ii. p. 323.
2 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 69; part iii. p. 675.

previously received, he suspected that a large force of the Confederates was in that vicinity. Full of confidence and eager to meet them, he decided, in the early morning of August 27, to abandon his front on the Rappahannock and march with his main body to Gainesville, — a wise determination, say both Ropes and Allan.1 This day was spent largely in marching, and was productive of a skirmish between Hooker and Ewell in which Hooker got the better of his opponent. Jackson at Manassas Junction rested and fed his tired and hungry troops. In the evening Pope arrived in person at Bristoe, and learning of the whereabouts of Jackson, and deciding to concentrate his army on Manassas, issued orders at nine o'clock to McDowell, who was at Gainesville, and to his other lieutenants, to march thither at dawn. "If you will march promptly and rapidly," he said to McDowell, "we shall bag the whole crowd," meaning Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill.2

An ordinary general might have been satisfied with the capture of stores and the alarm created in Washington, but Lee's strategy went further. He thought Jackson's move would disconcert and delay the reinforcements which were coming from Alexandria, and cause Pope to retire from the Rappahannock in the effort to preserve his communications. He himself with Longstreet's wing proposed to join Jackson, and seize a favorable opportunity, which would probably offer, to give battle.3 Late in the afternoon of August 26, leaving one division in position on the Rappahannock, he started with Longstreet to march by the same route over which Jackson
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1 The Army under Pope, p. 53; Civil War, part ii. p. 266; The Army of Northern Virginia, p. 218. William Allan was an officer in the Confederate army, almost constantly at Jackson's headquarters and with him during this campaign. He is a clear and candid writer, and "his abilities as a military critic," in the opinion of Ropes, "were of a high order." — Introduction to Army of N. Va.
2 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 72. "All that talk of bagging Jackson, &c. was bosh." — Porter to Burnside, August 28, ibid., part iii. p. 732. This despatch was transmitted to Halleck and seen by the President.
3 Allan, p. 200.

had so successfully passed. The night of the 27th they spent at White Plains.

As battles are near at hand, it will be well to contrast the opposing forces as they stood on the morning of August 28. Lee had, in the two wings of Jackson and Longstreet, at least 49,000 men. Pope, with the reinforcement of Heintzelman's and Porter's corps of the Army of the Potomac, had no more than 70,000;1 but the correspondence shows so much straggling from Pope's army on account of hunger, fatigue, and discouragement, that it may be questioned whether any estimate made from the returns would not exceed the number actually under his command. Moreover, it must be said that in the various reports and accounts of these operations discrepancies exist as to the size of both armies. Accepting, however, the figures that Southern authority gives, 49,000 and 70,000, the odds were in favor of the Confederates. In Pope's original army there was but one efficient corps commander. McDowell was a capable man, and served his general loyally; his corps alone was trustworthy.2 The corps of Heintzelman and Porter and the men who came to him from Burnside were good soldiers; but a collection of parts of three armies is not, in Ropes's judgment, an army, but merely " an aggregation of troops." 3 In this case many of the men lacked confidence in their commander, and if the officers and privates of the Fifth Corps took their cue from Porter, their commander, the defection was still more serious.4
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1 Figures agreed on by Allan and Ropes. — Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. ii. p. 197.
2 Ante, p. 118.
3 Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. ii. p. 218.
4 Porter himself felt disdain for Pope. I presume that we shall "get behind Bull Run in a few days if strategy don't use us up," are his words of sarcasm to Burnside. "The strategy is magnificent and tactics in the inverse proportion. ... I believe the enemy have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions." — Despatch from Warrenton, August 27, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 700. This and other despatches of Porter were transmitted by Burnside to Halleck, and made known to the President, for the reason that they contained almost the sole information of Pope's position and movements. — See Burnside's testimony before the Fitz John Porter Court-martial.

To oppose this conglomeration, Lee had a compact, well-disciplined army, that worked like a machine. His two corps commanders, Jackson and Longstreet, men of eminent military ability, confided in him and loved him. The three wrought together like devoted brothers. Lee gave his orders in general terms, leaving the details to be worked out by his lieutenants according to circumstances. This spirit ran through the whole army. A. P. Hill having better and later information did not hesitate a moment to go contrary to an order he had received from Jackson, his superior.1 Lee's cavalry officer Stuart kept him thoroughly posted up,2 and until the night of August 28 he had regular reports from Jackson, and likewise knew pretty well what his enemy was doing.3 If furthermore we take into account that Lee was a much abler general than his antagonist, that his troops had gained a succession of victories since May, while most of the men under Pope had seen little else than defeat, the story of the next three days will cause no surprise.

Pope with the van of his army reached Manassas at midday, August 28, but Jackson had flown. Burning all the stores that he could not transport, he had left the night before, and when Pope arrived at Manassas expecting to strike him, he was some miles away, placing his army in position near the old battle-field of Bull Run, to await the arrival of Longstreet, who, he knew, was fast approaching. Pope was puzzled, but as usual came to a prompt decision, and countermanding orders set on again in pursuit of Jackson. Towards sunset King's division of McDowell's corps came into collision with some of Jackson's troops and fought the battle of Gainesville. The loss was heavy on both sides, and although it was a drawn battle,4 King deemed his position
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1 See A. P. Hill's report, O. R., vol. xii. part ii.
2 Lee's and Stuart's reports, ibid.
3 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 517.
4 Ropes, The Army under Pope, p. 77; Civil War, part ii. p. 272.

critical and retreated to Manassas. Pope was so intent on the capture of Jackson that he took no heed of Longstreet's rapid march, and did nothing to hold Thoroughfare Gap. McDowell had better information and used better judgment. He had proposed to have Sigel's corps, which was temporarily under his command, and one of his own divisions dispute the passage of Longstreet through the Gap, while he himself with two divisions joined in the chase after Jackson; but late in the night of August 27 he received the order from Pope directing him to march with his whole force to Manassas. Impressed with the vital importance of preventing the union of the two Confederate corps, he varied from this unfortunate order to the extent of detaching Ricketts's division and some cavalry to hold Longstreet in check. Meanwhile the Confederate general had reached the Gap, and finding his passage disputed thought himself in a " desperate strait;"1 but on the morning of the 29th he experienced great relief on ascertaining that Ricketts had withdrawn2 and that he could get through the Gap unopposed. At dawn he was in motion, and hearing the noise of cannon before he reached Gainesville, quickened his march and had his troops deployed on the battle-field of Bull Run by noon of that day. The battle of Groveton had already begun. The Union right wing was contending with Jackson.

Pope did not know of the arrival of Longstreet's corps, and expected that McDowell and Porter in pursuance of a joint order sent them in the morning would assail Jackson in flank and rear. These two met about noon, and agreed that the order could not be fulfilled to the letter; but in the
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1 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 517.
2 The McDowell Court of Inquiry, February 14, 1863, speak of this retirement of Ricketts and the retreat of King after the battle of Gainesville as grave errors, and find fault that McDowell was not present with his command when these movements were made. He had gone to Manassas to see Pope, and had "separated himself from his command at a critical time without any order of his superior officer and without any imperative necessity." — O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 330; Ropes, The Army under Pope, p. 82 ; Civil War, part ii. p. 275.

endeavor to carry out the spirit of it they had a misunderstanding. From this time dates the alleged most serious neglect and disobedience of Porter, which constitute the gravest charge against him in the interminable controversy known as the Fitz John Porter case.

At midday there was a lull in the battle, but in the afternoon Pope attacked again with vigor. Although his troops lacked food and were fatigued from the fruitless marching and countermarching of the previous day, they had a stomach for fighting and fought well. It was on both sides a desperate struggle to prevail. At half-past four, observing that neither McDowell nor Porter had appeared on the field, Pope wrote an order to Porter saying, "I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank and if possible on his rear."1 Porter in his court-martial declared that he did not receive this order until "at or nearly 6.30 ": that this is the truth of the matter is the conclusion of the Board of Army Officers of 1878, at whose head sat General Schofield.2 Porter made preparations for attack, but before they could be completed darkness came on, and "it was evidently impossible to accomplish any good that night." 3 Even had he received the order sooner and assailed the force in his front, it would have availed Pope nothing, for instead of striking at Jackson's flank he would have rushed with his 9000 men against Longstreet's corps of four divisions.4 Of Porter's conduct this day it may be said that he rendered to his commander a measure of technical military obedience but not a zealous support.

In spite of his disappointment at Porter's inaction Pope fought on until dark and thought that he had gained a great victory.5 The truth, it seems to me, is better conveyed in
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1 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 18.
2 Senate Documents No. 37, 1st Session 46th Congress, part i. p. 251; part lii. p. 1707.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., part Hi. p. 1709.
5 Despatch to Halleck, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.

Lee's letter to Davis, in which he says that the attack of the Union troops was repulsed.1 The medical director of Jackson's corps, "recounting the many casualties which he had witnessed," said to Jackson: "General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting." "No," was the reply, "it has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence."2

The next day, Saturday, August 30, the Second Battle of Bull Run3 was fought on the already historic field. Pope, full of the illusion that he had inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, readily gave credence to the intelligence that they were retreating.4 His reconnaissances this morning and the reports of McDowell, Heintzelman, and Sigel6 confirmed him in this view, from which he could not be shaken by the strong representations of Porter,6 towards whom, indeed, he felt harshly7 for the supposed disobedience of orders the previous day. He was afraid that the Confederates would get away from him, and undoubtedly reasoned that since he must attack them at once he could not afford to wait for Franklin and Sumner with their 20,000 fresh and veteran soldiers, who he knew were on the way from Alexandria.8 At noon he
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1 September 3, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 559. Carl Schurz, who commanded a division of Sigel's corps, and who did the principal part of the fighting in the first half of this day's battle, said in his report of the events of the afternoon: "If all these forces instead of being frittered away in isolated efforts had co-operated with each other at any one movement after a common plan, the result of the day would have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the ground we had already taken and occupied in the morning, and which in the afternoon was, for a short time at least, lost again."—Ibid., p. 299.
2 Dabney, p. 531.
3 Called by the Confederates the Second Battle of Manassas.
4 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.
5 Ibid., part ii. pp. 340, 413.
8 The Army under Pope, Ropes, p. 129.
7 See order of 8.50 p. m., August 29, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 509.
8 If it had been urged to Pope

"The quality and hair of our attempt
Brooks no division :"

he might have replied with Hotspur that their absence

"Lends a lustre and more great opinion,
A larger dare to our great enterprise."

ordered McDowell's, Porter's, and Heintzelman's corps "forward in pursuit of the enemy," and added, "press him vigorously during the whole day."1

When the morning broke, writes Longstreet, "we were a little apprehensive that Pope was going to get away from us;" but Lee, though eager for a battle, had made up his mind that he would not attack the Union army in its strong position.2 Watching intently and waiting patiently, he saw Pope do exactly what he could have wished, and, backed by his trusting and enthusiastic officers and men, felt that his adversary had delivered himself into his hands. The onset was made. The dejected Northern soldiers, though feeling probably that they were sent to slaughter, fought gallantly, but met with repulse. At the proper moment Lee ordered a counter-attack, which had been anticipated by Longstreet, so close was the harmony between the two. The Union defeat became a rout,3 and at dusk Pope gave the order for a general retreat. At six o'clock Franklin with his corps reached the ground, and found the Warrenton turnpike 4 "filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field in a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion," he added, "and I immediately formed line of battle across the road [the Warrenton turnpike between Cub and Bull Runs] and attempted to stop and form the stragglers. It was impossible to succeed in this, the number becoming over 7000 in less than half an hour."5 The loss of the Union army since it left the Rappahannock had been enormous, and much greater than that of the Confederates.6 Stragglers exceeded the usual
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1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 741.
2 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 520. Lee had. however, been reinforced during the night by R. H. Anderson's division which he had left on the Rappahannock.
3 It is with some hesitation that I have written this clause. As presenting a contrary view with force, see Ropes, The Army under Pope, p. 141; Civil War, part ii. p. 299 et seq.
4 See Map, vol. iii. p. 448.
5 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 536.
6 Century War Book, vol. ii. pp. 499, 500; Allan, Army of N. Virginia, p. 306.

number. The loss, too, in materiel at the Second Battle of Bull Run was large.1

Commanding generals rarely own to discomfiture, and Pope was no exception to the common rule. In his despatch to Halleck of 9.45 p. m., before, indeed, he had realized the seriousness of his reverse, he told in euphemistic phrase that he had been forced back from the field, . . . and had withdrawn to Centreville. "The troops are in good heart," he said, "and marched off the field without the least hurry or confusion. . . . The enemy is badly crippled. ... Be easy; everything will go well." 2 It is little wonder that Halleck, who was disposed to construe everything in Pope's favor, thus replied: "My dear General, you have done nobly. Don't yield another inch if you can avoid it. With Franklin and Sumner, who must now be with you, can't you renew the attack?" 3 Porter, who had been in the thick of the fight and had come in contact with his men, comprehended the situation better than Pope, and wrote McClellan the night after the battle: "I was whipped, as was the whole army, badly. . . . The men are without heart, but will fight when cornered. ... I have had no dinner or supper to-day, and no chance of any to-morrow."4

During these active operations Halleck in Washington and McClellan at Alexandria were making exertions to forward reinforcements to the contending army. The news that a force of the enemy had come between Pope and Washington and severed his communications,6 caused them astonishment and anxiety, and perhaps delayed the departure from Alexandria of Franklin and Cox, for the reason that McClellan took into account the contingency of an attack on the capital
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1 O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 558.
2 Ibid., p. 79.
3 August 31, ibid., part iii. p. 769.
4 Ibid., p. 768.
5 Pope could still communicate with Halleck by telegraph via Falmouth (ibid., p. 684), but his line of supplies was the railroad running from Alexandria to Manassas Junction.

by Lee's whole army.1 The division of authority between Halleck and McClellan worked badly and occasioned misunderstandings. McClellan begged in vain to have his position defined. "I do not wish to act in the dark," he said.2 Halleck was mutable in purpose: at one time his opinions and acts took their color from the importunity of McClellan;3 at another from the pressure of Chase and Stanton. The dissatisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War had grown in intensity. They had "long believed that General McClellan ought not to be trusted with the command of any army of the Union." They now thought that he had not been prompt in the withdrawal of his troops from the James River and in the movement of Franklin's corps to the aid of Pope.4 August 30 Stanton received a report from Halleck in response to his request for information, which gave them a body of proof to substantiate this opinion;6 and on the same day an order was published by direction of the Secretary of War, stating that "General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command." 6 Since all of this army except 100 soldiers in Alexandria and part of a corps near Fort Monroe had been despatched to Pope, the effect of the order was to deprive McClellan of all actual command, and transfer his troops to the authority of his rival.7 Chase exulted over this humiliation, and wrote to
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 96, 97; J. D. Cox, Reminiscences, MS. General Cox gives a lively account of affairs in and about Alexandria. Lee expected that Jackson's move would have the effect of delaying these reinforcements.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 97.
3 Own Story, p. 530.
4 Warden, p. 456; O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 706.
5 Ibid., p. 739.
6 Ibid., vol. xi. part i. p. 103. 7 See Own Story, p. 532. "McClellan was at this time a little depressed in manner, feeling keenly his loss of power and command, but maintaining a quiet dignity that became him better than any show of carelessness would have done. He used no bitter or harsh language in criticising others. Pope and McDowell he plainly disliked, and rated them low as to capacity for command, but he spoke of them without discourtesy or vilification." — Cox's Reminiscences, MS.

Thaddeus Stevens: "McClellan at last is reduced to the command of the residue of the Army of the Potomac not sent to Pope. This is late, but well, though not well enough." 1 Whether Halleck knew of this order is not clear, 2 nor is there a record of the President's approval, although it must be presumed that he gave it. In consenting to the order, he may have been influenced by the harshness of McClellan's expression in his telegraphic counsel of the day before, which suggested, as one course, "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe."3 Lincoln said this day to one of his secretaries, "McClellan has acted badly towards Pope; he really wanted him to fail." 4 He had moreover read the despatches
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1 Warden, p. 457.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 102; McClellan's Own Story, p. 541.
3 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 98.
4 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 23. The kaleidoscopic character of the evidence will appear by reference to the variety of opinions of competent and honest military men and critics. Two believe that McClellan did all that a man could do to aid Pope ; and one of these intimates that Halleck was especially solicitous for Pope's success, that he might have a lever to use against McClellan. Another is of the opinion that McClellan disobeyed orders in putting off the departure of Franklin's corps from August 28 to August 29. Another feels sure that McClellan was much at fault in not sending Franklin more quickly to the relief of Pope, and intimates that the desire to have the command again shaped his action; a fifth arrives at the conclusion that McClellan was culpable for the detention of Franklin, and that both McClellan and Halleck were to blame for the delay of Cox and Sumner. — General George H. Gordon, General Stephen M. Weld, Col. Theo. Lyman, Col. Franklin Haven, Col. Thos. L. Livermore. Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. ii. pp. 118, 284, 296, 313, 333.
In spite of the contempt of Pope revealed in McClellan's private letters, and his expectation that the Army of Virginia would be "badly thrashed," it seems to me, reading the evidence in the light of McClellan's undoubted patriotism, that his purpose was good and his spirit right. The remark which General Cox heard him make to Franklin August 29 supports this view. "Go," he said, "and whatever may happen don't allow it to be said that the Army of the Potomac failed to do its utmost for the country." — Cox's Reminiscences, MS. It is conceded that if Franklin had been twenty-four hours earlier the result of the Second Battle of Bull Run would have been otherwise, and it may be admitted that if McClellan had been Lee and Franklin Jackson, the Sixth Corps would have been in the thick of the fight. But McClellan was slow, and to his characteristic procrastination, as plainly evinced when his favorite Porter fought the losing battle of Gaines's Mill, must be ascribed his fault, if fault there was.

of Porter to Burnside, and was apprehensive that McClellan's favorite general would not give Pope a zealous support.1 It must be noted that on August 30, when Stanton issued this order which shelved McClellan, the common belief in Washington was that Pope had gained a great victory at Groveton.2 If he had won the Second Battle of Bull Run, or even if he had not fought on the 30th, but waited for Franklin and Sumner, and then forced Lee beyond the Rappahannock, he would probably have been made general of the combined armies and McClellan formally relieved from command. Halleck's joy over the supposed success of his general was of short duration. News of the disaster of August 30 travelled fast, and by the following night he knew the whole truth, and was utterly dismayed. "I beg of you," he telegraphed to McClellan, "to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am utterly tired out." 3 Thirty-nine days had sufficed to demonstrate that he was not the great military leader so anxiously looked for; they had shown that he had all the faults of McClellan, and lacked some of his strong qualities. The despatches from Pope were alarming. In one he asked whether Washington was secure if his army should be destroyed; in another he disclosed his lack of confidence in the Potomac army, and its officers' lack of confidence in him.4 Pope's unpopularity was not confined to the officers, but extended to the men. Franklin's soldiers, in
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 104; vol. xii. part iii. p. 821.
2 Stanton's despatch, August 30, ibid., p. 766, Pope's despatch, p. 741; Warden, p. 457 ; McClellan's Own Story, p. 530; Cox's Reminiscences, MS.; Washington Evening Star, August 30. The following is the heading of the account of the Washington Daily National Intelligencer of August 30: Brilliant Success of General Pope — The Enemy Circumvented — He is driven from Manassas —Pursued and Worsted in a Second Battle.
3 August 31, 10.07 p. m., O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 103.
4 August 31, September 1, ibid., vol. xii. part ii. pp. 80, 83.

position on the Warrenton turnpike, mocked and taunted the troops leaving the field of Bull Run, jeered at the new route to Richmond, and made no secret of their glee at the downfall of McClellan's rival.1 In order to "avoid great disaster," it was Pope's advice that the army be drawn back to the intrenchments in front of Washington.2 Halleck in his disquietude had already telegraphed to Burnside at Falmouth, "Embark your troops as rapidly as possible for Alexandria." 3 McClellan did not "regard Washington as safe against the rebels. If I can quietly slip over there," he said in a letter to his wife, "I will send your silver off." 4 September 1 he went to Washington at the request of Halleck, who placed him in command of the defences of the capital and its garrisons. Towards evening of this day the advance of the Confederates occasioned the combat of Chantilly, which had no important result except that the killing of Generals Philip Kearny and Isaac I. Stevens deepened the gloom on the Union side.5

September 2 was an anxious day in Washington. Early in the morning came a despatch from Pope which told a sad tale of the demoralization of the army and the excessive straggling from the regiments of the Potomac army. "Unless something can be done," he continued, "to restore tone to this army, it will melt away before you know it."6 The President knew the one remedy,7 and in spite of the bitter opposition and remonstrance he was certain to encounter, placed McClellan in command of all the troops for the defence of the capital.8 Halleck had already ordered Pope to bring his forces within or near the lines of the fortifications;
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1 General Chas. F. Walcott, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. ii. p. 144.
2 September 1.
3 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 774.
4 12.30 p. m., August 31, Own Story, p. 352.
5 Cox's Reminiscences, MS.
6 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 797.
7 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 23.
8 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 807 ; McClellan's Own Story, p. 566.

there his authority passed to McClellan. In view of the "great danger to Washington," the general-in-chief asked Dix at Fort Monroe to send as rapidly as possible to the capital as large a part of the remainder of Keyes's corps as could be spared, and urged Burnside to hasten forward his troops.1 A number of gun-boats were ordered up the river, and anchored at different points in proximity to the city, and a war steamer was brought to the Navy Yard.2 All the clerks and employes of the civil departments, and all employes in the public buildings were called to arms for the defence of the capital.3 The sale of spirituous liquors at retail within the District of Columbia was prohibited.4 Excitement and alarm held undisputed sway.5

McClellan, elated at being called to the rescue, went forward to meet his soldiers. Encountering Cox, he said, "Well, General, I am in command again." Warm congratulations ensued. The two rode on until they met the advancing column of the army, Pope and McDowell at its head. When it became known that McClellan had been placed in command, cheers upon cheers from the head to the rear of the column were given, "with wild delight." 6 Inspired by the confidence of his men, he wrought with zeal. His talent for organization had full play, and in a few days he had his army ready for an active campaign. Lincoln's comment ran, "McClellan is working like a beaver. He seems to be aroused to doing something by the sort of snubbing he got last week." 7 At the cabinet meeting of September 2 the opposition to McClellan broke forth, with Chase and Stanton so earnest


_________________
1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. pp. 798, 799.
2 Washington Evening Star, September 2, 8.
3 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 807.
4 National Intelligencer, September 2.
5 Wash, corr., September 2, New York Herald; Washington Evening Star, September 3.
6 Cox's Reminiscences, MS. ; McClellan's Own Story, pp. 547, 567. Cox gives a graphic account of McClellan's apparently studied manner of responding to the cheers of his soldiers that "seemed to carry a little of personal good fellowship even to the humblest private soldier."
7 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 28.

that they fell to invective. Chase maintained that as a military commander he had been a failure, that his neglect to urge forward reinforcements to Pope proved him unworthy of trust, and " that giving command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels." "This, and more, I said," sets down Chase in his diary. All the members of the cabinet except Seward1 and Blair "expressed a general concurrence." Lincoln was distressed and perplexed; "he would gladly resign his place; " 2 but he argued that under the existing circumstances, McClellan was the best man for the command — an argument to which subsequent events gave force. Chase replied that Hooker, Sumner, or Burnside could do the work required better than McClellan.3

The President again offered the command of the army in the field to Burnside, who again declined it, saying: I do not think that there is any one who can do as much with that army as McClellan, if matters can be so arranged as to remove yours and the Secretary of War's objections to him.4 The intelligence came that Lee with his army was crossing the Potomac into Maryland. The Union troops must be sent in pursuit, and a commander for them must be designated. The President said to McClellan, "General, you will take command of the forces in the field."6 To Pope this word was sent: "The Armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report for orders to the Secretary of War:"6 thus ended his service as a general of the Civil War.7
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1 Seward was out of the city.
2 Cf. Washington's regret that he had not resigned the office of President.— Jefferson's Anas, cited by McMaster, vol. ii. p. 112.
3 Warden, p. 459 et seq. Sidney Howard Gay, managing editor of the New York Tribune, wrote A. S. Hill, its Washington correspondent: "What is the meaning of this appointment of a man as commander of the armies whom Mr. Lincoln has said over and over again is incompetent? Will Stanton resign? Will he be put out if he don't ?" — A. S. Hill papers, MS.
4 C. W., part i. p. 650.
5 Ibid., pp. 451, 453, 470. This was probably as early as September 5. See O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 182; vol. xii. part iii. p. 812; Own Story, p. 567.
6 September 5, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 813.
7 The sequences of Pope's Virginia campaign, other than those mentioned in the text, were the loss to the active army of the services of McDowell and Fitz John Porter as well as Pope, all of whom in happier circumstances might have been useful to the country. All had military ability and patriotism. The feeling in the army against Pope and McDowell was bitter; to some extent this was reflected in public sentiment. Pope's orders despatched him to the Northwest to watch the Indian tribes. McDowell, from whom Fortune's wavering wheel ever turned backward, was relieved from command. — Warden's Chase, pp. 462, 463; O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 197. The radical Republicans and friends of Pope demanded a victim. This they had in Fitz John Porter. He was tried before a general court-martial, which assembled November 27, 1862, and was sentenced "to be cashiered and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States." The sentence was approved by the President. The most damaging evidence against Porter was his despatches to Burnside, who, carelessly but with goodness of heart, transmitted them to Halleck for the President's eyes. (See Burnside's testimony before the court-martial.) Porter, feeling that he had been wronged, appealed frequently for a review of his case. President Hayes in 1878 ordered a Board of Army Officers to examine the record of the court-martial and any new evidence. — O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 512. This board, at whose head was General Schofield, exonerated Porter. President Hayes submitted the matter to Congress, which took no action. President Arthur, May 4,1882, by proclamation remitted so much of the sentence as had not been fully executed. — Ibid., p. 535. July 1, 1886, President Cleveland approved an act for the relief of Fitz John Porter. August 5 he was commissioned as colonel of infantry in the U. S. Army to rank from May 14, 1861, but without back pay. — Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 692; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 12. The record of the proceedings of the court-martial and the Board of Army Officers is printed in Senate Documents, No. 47, 1st Session, 46th Congress In an article "An Undeserved Stigma" (N. A. Review, December 1882) General Grant espoused warmly Porter's cause, the more remarkable as when President he had decided against Porter. Excellent reviews of the case by Ropes and Col. Thos. L. Livermore may be found in vol. ii. of the Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts See, also, Der Feldzug in Nord-Virginia in August, 1862, von Major F. Mangold, pp. 334, 335; contrariwise the Second Battle of Bull Run, J. D. Cox.
Although Pope testified strongly against Porter at the court-martial, he considered McClellan responsible for his lack of success. — O. R, vol. xii. part iii. p. 808. October 20 he wrote Halleck, "The greatest criminal is McClellan." — Ibid., p. 821.
Two passages from Halleck's letter to Pope of September 5 are worth citing: "The troops at present are under McClellan's orders, and it is evident that you cannot serve under him willingly. . . . The differences and ill-feeling among the generals are very embarrassing to the administration, and unless checked will ruin the country." — Ibid., p. 812.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.4. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].