History of the United States, v.4, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 17, Part 1: Recapitulation through Retreat to James River

HISTORY OF THE UNITED OF STATES

CHAPTER XVII

A Recapitulation of the salient events of the year ending with the spring of 1862 will be useful. April 12, 1861, the Confederate government began the war by the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The Northern and Southern people, who had confronted one another since the election of Lincoln, now prepared for conflict. The appeal to arms to try the cause which Congress had failed to settle by compromise met with a vigorous response from the North and from the South. Both organized armies. The parties to the war were, on the one hand, the Union, composed of twenty-three States with twenty-two million people, and, on the other hand, the Southern Confederacy, made up of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, eleven States in all, with a population of nine million. The cause of the war was slavery: the South fought to preserve and extend it; the North fought to repress and further restrict it. The real object was avowed on neither side. The North went into battle with the preservation of the Union blazoned on its banner, the South with resistance to subjugation. There was a measure of truth in each battle-cry. The North denied the right of secession, the South resolved to exercise it; and since there was substantial unanimity in the Confederate States, the war became one of conquest to be carried on by the invasion of the South by Northern soldiers. Three months went by while the armies were being organized. July 21, 1861, 29,000 Union soldiers and 30,000 Confederates met in battle at Bull Run, Virginia: the Union army was signally defeated With no signs of discouragement and with unabated enthusiasm, the North rose up again. In October the Confederate troops defeated the Federals at Ball's Bluff on the upper Potomac; this victory following the battle of Bull Run aroused in the Southerners a well-sustained confidence that they would in the end win their independence. But fortune turned, and the United States gained victories. In November, 1861, Port Royal, South Carolina, was taken, and with the new year Federal successes followed swiftly. General George H. Thomas overcame the Confederates at Mill Spring, Kentucky. General Burnside and Commodore Goldsborough took Roanoke Island, North Carolina. Flag-officer Foote captured Fort Henry. Grant, after one of the truly decisive battles of the war, forced the surrender of Fort Donelson on the 16th day of February, 1862, and seven weeks later repelled at Shiloh the northward advance of the Confederates, which was designed to retrieve their loss of Forts Henry and Donelson. Curtis drove the Confederates out of Missouri. Pope captured Island No. 10, and Farragut took New Orleans. Congress prohibited slavery in the Territories, abolished it in the District of Columbia, and, on the initiative and recommendation of President Lincoln, offered the slave States pecuniary aid in case they should take measures to emancipate their slaves.

These events bring us down to April, 1862. In the last chapter the story left McClellan with an army of 100,000 men besieging Yorktown. Up to April 11 there was no time when the Union army did not outnumber the Confederate, three to one; moreover, the Union general had the authority of his government to make an assault.1 Not to break the Confederate line of thirteen miles which stretched from the York River to the James 2 was an error; indeed it is true, as Joseph E. Johnston wrote, that "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack." 3 April 17 Johnston took command in person at Yorktown, and at that date the Confederate army had reached the number of 53,000.4 From this time on perhaps nothing could have been better than a continuance of the scientific siege operations which McClellan had begun soon after his arrival before Yorktown. He went on erecting siege works and planting heavy Parrott guns and mortars against the Confederate fortifications, maintaining an active correspondence with the department at Washington and with his wife at home. In his letters to the President and to the Secretary of War he resented bitterly that McDowell's corps had been withdrawn from his command; he complained of the smallness of his own force, and intimated that he was outnumbered by the Confederates; he had much to say of the rainy weather and of the roads deep with mud. To his worshipping wife he told of the disadvantages he was laboring under and of his many troubles in a tone that at times degenerated into childishness; indeed some of his letters sound like the utterances of a youth ungrown rather than of the captain of a great army. Others show him to be a prey to illusions. Not only "the rebels," but the "abolitionists and other scoundrels" are aiming at
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1 Official Records, vol. xi. part iii. pp. 76, 97, 425, 436 ; part i. pp. 14, 15. By the title of Official Records I designate the government publication: War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I. is to be always understood unless there is mention otherwise. In making references to these records the abbreviation O. R. will be used.
2 April 6 the President telegraphed McClellan: "I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River, at once." — O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 14. McClellan wrote his wife: "The President very coolly telegraphed me yesterday that he thought I had better break the enemy's lines at once! I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and do it himself." — Own Story, p. 308. 3 April 22, to Lee, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 458.
4 Johnston's Narrative, p. 117

his ruin. It is the men at Washington to whom he refers when he writes, "History will present a sad record of these traitors who are willing to sacrifice the country and its army for personal spite and personal aims."1 The President, yearning for the success of McClellan and willing to do anything in his power to bring it about, sent him Franklin's division of McDowell's corps, which reached him April 22. Still McClellan did not open a general attack from his batteries. April 28 he called for some 30-pounder Parrott guns from Washington, and brought forth this answer from the President: "Your call . . . alarms me chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"2

Crossing to the Confederate lines, one is impressed with the good fortune of the South in having an able commander for its principal army at the commencement of the war instead of being obliged, as was the North, to grope about through bitter trial and sickening failures. Johnston coolly watched the operations of his adversary, and made up his mind that Yorktown would be untenable when McClellan's elaborate siege operations were set in motion. Desirous of avoiding the loss of life which a bombardment would occasion, he timed nicely his evacuation of Yorktown and the adjacent works, withdrawing his army on the 3d of May, three days before the contemplated opening of a general fire from the heavier Union batteries. McClellan's procrastination had given the Confederates a precious month, in which they commenced the reorganization of their army, gave some measure of training to the Virginia militia, and brought reinforcements from the South.3 The evacuation of Yorktown took McClellan by surprise.4 Nevertheless he gave orders for immediate pursuit, while he himself remained at Yorktown to superintend the
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1 Letters to his wife, McClellan's Own Story, p. 310, ante, et seq.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 126, 130.
3 See vol. iii. of this work, pp. 606, 616.
4 "The action of the enemy almost always disappointed McClellan." — General Francis Palfrey, who was in McClellan's army in the Peninsular Campaign: Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 155.

embarkation of Franklin's division on transports which were to go up the York River.1 Hooker with his division overtook the enemy and began the battle of Williamsburg, which was fought without a plan, under confused orders and defective disposition of forces, and, though somewhat relieved by a brilliant exploit of Hancock, then commander of a brigade, resulted in a Union defeat and considerable loss. McClellan arrived on the field at about five o'clock in the afternoon, receiving, as he always did, loud and enthusiastic cheers from his men; but the battle of Williamsburg was over. He made a disposition of forces for the conflict which he expected would be renewed on the morrow; but that night the Confederates marched away from Williamsburg on their retreat to Richmond. McClellan followed with almost incredible slowness. The march from Williamsburg to the place where his army went into camp on the Chickahominy, a distance of forty to fifty miles, consumed a fortnight.2 The roads of course were bad, and Virginia mud is a factor to be taken into account in the consideration of many campaigns; but the young general exaggerated these obstacles and the inclemency of the weather, even as he overestimated the force of the enemy.3 Lincoln, who was undoubtedly weary of this constant grumbling, and observed that the Confederates marched in spite of bad roads and made attacks in spite of rough weather, once said: "McClellan seemed to think, in defiance of Scripture, that Heaven sent its rain only on the just and not on the unjust." 4
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1 "Curiously enough, there was almost always something for McClellan to do more important than to fight his own battles."— Palfrey, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 156.
2 Committee on Conduct of the War, part i. p. 20; Webb's Peninsula, p. 83.
3 In a somewhat merry mood McClellan enlivens his book with an anecdote of which he more than once thought during this campaign and from which he might have drawn an apposite lesson. McClellan asked an old general of Cossacks who had served in all the Russian campaigns against Napoleon how the roads were in those days. "My son," he replied, "the roads are always bad in war." — Own Story, p. 275.
4 Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 414.

On the morning of May 11 McClellan, who had then covered nineteen miles beyond Williamsburg, learned that the Confederates had evacuated Norfolk and destroyed the ironclad Merrimac,1 thereby leaving open to the Federal fleet the James River, which offered to the Union general a line of advance on Richmond more advantageous in every important military consideration. It made available to him the cooperation of the navy; it saved him the risk of braving the fever-breath of the Chickahominy swamps; it would have enabled him to threaten the most important communication of the Confederate capital with the States farther South.

McClellan is wise after the event, and in his report of August 4, 1863, and in his book acknowledges that the approach to Richmond by the James was a safer and surer route than the one adopted;2 but, unable to admit that he ever made a mistake, he ascribes his evident failure in strategy to the administration at Washington. Having asked repeatedly for reinforcements, he finally sent to the President on May 14 a respectful and reasonable despatch, the gist of which was: "I ask for every man that the War Department can send me by water." Four days later the Secretary of War replied that while the President did not deem it wise to uncover the capital entirely by sending the available forces by the water route, he had, however, ordered McDowell with his 40,000 men to march from Fredericksburg overland and join the Army of the Potomac either north or south of the Pamunkey River.3 He then directed McClellan to extend his right wing north of Richmond in order to establish this communication as soon as possible.4 This command, declares McClellan, "is the reason for my not operating on the line of the James." His excuse is not borne out by his own private correspondence of the time, which contains not even the vaguest
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1 O. R, vol. xi. part ill. p. 164.
2 Ibid., part 1. p. 28; McClellan's Own Story, p. 346; see, also, McClellan's article, The Century Company's War Book, vol. ii. p. 173.
3 The Pamunkey was the south branch of the York River.
4 O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 26, 27.

allusion to a desire for such a movement; in fact, the tenor of all his despatches and letters is that he expected to fight Johnston's army between the Chickahominy River and Richmond.1 Moreover, he knew on the 11th of May of the destruction of the Merrimac, and did not receive notice of the promised reinforcement by McDowell until the 18th. The full week intervening was his for considering and adopting the plan of moving on Richmond by the line of the James River. This he had unhampered power to do, and this is exactly what he ought to have done.

As soon as the destruction of the Merrimac was known, the Monitor and a number of gunboats started up the James. Their approach caused more of a panic in Richmond than did any direct menace of McClellan's army of 100,000 during the whole of the Peninsular Campaign. There were, indeed, anxious hearts in the capital city when the Union troops first appeared before Yorktown; but when McClellan, instead of attacking the Confederates, went on with his scientific siege operations, anxiety gave way to wonder and to contempt for his generalship. The fall of New Orleans was a blow, and the destruction a fortnight later of the Merrimac — "that great gift of God and of Virginia to the South " 2 — seemed disaster crowding upon disaster. Although McClellan's military ability was despised, the march of his well-trained and well-equipped army towards the capital of the Confederacy could not be looked on without apprehension. While there was a quiet confidence in Johnston, strictures on Jefferson Davis were not uncommon. Of him who was now acting as military adviser to the President and became later the greatest Southern commander, the Richmond Examiner, standing for a widely held opinion, said: "Evacuating Lee, who has never yet risked a single battle with the invader, is com
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1 See despatches in O. R., and letters to his wife in Own Story; testimony before Com. on Conduct of the War; also Webb's Peninsula, p. 87i Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 384 ; Swinton's pamphlet, McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed, p. 22.
2 Richmond Examiner, May 13.

manding-general;" and after Yorktown had been given up, sneered at "the bloodless and masterly strategy of Lee."1 We must bear all these circumstances in mind to understand the fear with which the people heard that the Monitor and the Federal gunboats were at City Point, within thirty-two miles of Richmond, then within twelve miles, then within eight. Davis had himself baptized at home and the rite of confirmation administered to him in the Episcopal Church of St. Paul's. He had appointed by public proclamation a day for solemn prayer.2 A prey to anxiety, he insisted that his wife and family should go to Raleigh. The families of the Cabinet secretaries fled to their homes. These facts and the adjournment of the Confederate Congress the previous month seemed to lend confirmation to a report now gaining ground that Richmond would be abandoned. The packing of trunks was the work of every household; refugees crowded the railroad trains; people fled in panic from the city with nothing but the clothes they had on. Nor was it baseless fear that made them flee.3 New Orleans, they thought, had been ignobly surrendered; what should save Richmond? Davis's letters to his wife breathe discouragement. I have told the people, he wrote, "that the enemy might be beaten before Richmond on either flank, and we would try to do it, but that I could not allow the army to be penned up in a city."4
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1 Richmond Examiner, April 21, May 6. General Lee's campaign in western Virginia the previous autumn had been considered a failure (see vol. iii. of this work, p. 489). "The press and the public were clamorous against him."— Long's Life of Lee, p. 130.
2 John M. Daniel, in an editorial in the Richmond Examiner of May 19, wrote: "In truth, these devotional proclamations of Mr. Davis have lost all good effect from their repetition, are regarded by the people as either cant or evidences of mental weakness. . . . When we find the President standing in a corner telling his beads and relying on a miracle to save the country instead of mounting his horse and putting forth every power of the Government to defeat the enemy, the effect is depressing in the extreme."
3 I have made up this description from the files of the Richmond Dispatch, Examiner, and Whig; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. i.
4 Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii.; Pollard's Second Year of the War. 4 Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 273; see, also, p. 271.

Alexander H. Stephens, a close observer of events in his Georgia home, said to a confidential friend: President Davis "acts as if he had not any confidence in the attainment of independence. I suspect he intends to imitate the career of Sydney Johnston. That is the way I read some of his conduct."1 The evidence seems good that the government archives had been sent to Lynchburg and to Columbia.2

May 15 the Monitor and the Federal gunboats reached Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond on the James River. There they encountered a heavy battery and two separate barriers formed of piles, steamboats, and sail vessels, and found the banks of the river lined with sharpshooters. As the boats advanced, the Confederates opened fire; this was soon returned and the battle was on.3 Richmond heard the sound of the guns and was not terrified, for the panic-stricken had left the city and the resolute citizens had stemmed the current of alarm. On the previous day the General Assembly of the Commonwealth had resolved that the capital should be defended to the last extremity, and appointed a committee to assure President Davis that all loss of property involved in this resolution would be cheerfully submitted to by the State and by the citizens. Davis said to the committee: It will be the effort of my life to defend the soil of Virginia and to cover her capital. I have never entertained the thought of withdrawing the army from Virginia and abandoning the State. If the capital should fall, the necessity of which I do not see or anticipate, the war could still be successfully maintained on Virginia soil for twenty years. To the sound of the enemy's guns Governor Letcher affixed his hand and seal to a call for a meeting at the City Hall for the purpose of providing
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1 Life of Stephens, Johnston & Browne, p. 415.
2 A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. 1. p. 126; Pollard's Second Year of the War, p. 32. The Confederate Secretary of War gave, May 10, the order to have a large part of the records and papers of his department packed in boxes for removal. — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 504.
3 See the different reports of this battle in Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. v., Documents p. 132 et seq.; O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 178.

for the defence of Richmond. News that the Federal gunboats had been repulsed was received before the time of the meeting, and added joy to the enthusiasm with which the assembled citizens listened to the pledges of the governor and mayor that the city should never be surrendered.1 Confidence was restored, and not again during this campaign of McClellan's was it so rudely disturbed. Here had been a fine chance for an energetic Union general who had studied to advantage his enemy. After the naval engagement of May 15, Seward, who was then on a visit to the scene of operations, expressed the opinion that a force of soldiers in cooperation with the navy on the James River " would give us Richmond without delay." 2 Of this Fabian commander who had failed to take advantage of the favors lavished upon him by fortune, the public of the Confederacy as well as the generals had their opinion confirmed, and could not conceal their derision at his lack of enterprise.3

In truth, if the hopeful North and the anxious South could have known McClellan's inward thoughts during these days, there would have been reason neither for hope on one side nor anxiety on the other. In his letters to his wife he spoke of his defeat at Williamsburg as "a brilliant victory," and asserted that he had given the Confederates "a tremendous thrashing." May 12 he asked, "Are you satisfied now with my bloodless victories?" and three days later he wrote, "I
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1 Richmond Whig, May 16, 19; Dispatch, May 16; Examiner, May 16, 19; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. i. p. 125; Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. v., Documents p. 424; Pollard's Second Year of the War, p. 33. For comment on this, see John M. Daniel's editorial in the Richmond Examiner of May 16.
2 Seward to Stanton, May 16, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 178. The President, Chase, and Stanton were at Fortress Monroe from May 5 to 11. Chase wrote McDowell May 14: "With 50,000 men and you for a general I would undertake to go from Fortress Monroe to Richmond by the James River with my revenue steamers Miami and Stevens and the Monitor in two days." — Life of Chase, Warden, p. 433, also ante, el seq.
3 Richmond Dispatch, May 16 to 28; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, vol. i p. 125.

think that the blows the rebels are now receiving and have lately received ought to break them up."1 I have already spoken of the President's order of May 17 2 directing McDowell to march with his corps from the camp opposite Fredericksburg towards Richmond to reinforce McClellan. This junction was never made. Stonewall Jackson now appeared upon the scene, and confounded the plans of the administration and McDowell.

It is hardly conceivable that the President and his advisers in Washington could have more effectually released the Confederate army from the main object of their consideration, the defence of Richmond, than by the disposition of forces in the Shenandoah valley and in western Virginia. Scattering of troops instead of concentration, variety in design instead of unity, the selection of generals who represented sections of political sentiment instead of applying to these appointments the sole test of merit, are obvious criticisms of their administration of affairs. Banks had a little army in the Shenandoah valley; Fremont, for whom the Mountain Department had been created, had another in western Virginia; to McDowell with his corps was assigned the special duty of protecting the Federal capital. All three forces should have been under the command of one man of military ability. The appointment of Banks had little to recommend it; and Fremont, who was appointed solely to placate the radical Republicans, was, in view of the military and administrative incompetence shown in his egregious failure in Missouri, a choice blameworthy in a high degree.3 The negotiations between Lincoln
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1 McClellan's Own Story, pp. 353, 355.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 28.
3 More than a month before the assignment of Fremont to this duty, Francis P. Blair, Jr., who was in spite of their personal quarrel a competent and honest witness, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: Fremont "was in a perfect panic of fear when he himself was in the field [in Missouri] and the enemy seventy miles off, and he himself surrounded by 35,000 or 40,000 men, well armed and equipped and with eighty cannon. I don't mean by this that he was in 'bodily fear,' but that he was paralyzed by his incapacity to deal with great affairs, overwhelmed by a responsibility to which he was unequal." —Part iii. p. 173. This testimony was given February 7, and the date of Fremont's appointment is March 11. See vol. iii. of this work, pp. 468, 481; also Ropes's Story of the Civil War, part Up 115

and Fremont at the time of his assignment to this command are a travesty of military business; they would have seemed appropriate in the appointment of a collector of the port of New York or Boston. Having yielded to the solicitations of the friends of "the pathfinder," that a place be made for him, the President was then subjected to strong pressure to increase his army to a size commensurate with his dignity. The force in the Mountain Department was supposed to be 25,000; unable to resist the influences, Lincoln detached Blenker's division of 10,000 from McClellan and gave it to Fremont. As a consideration Fremont had promised to undertake a campaign which involved a long march over the mountains and had in view the seizure of the railroad at or near Knoxville and the relief of the Unionists of East Tennessee. This project, though dear to the President's heart, was impracticable and romantic.1 Fremont made no serious attempt to execute it; and the mischief of the plan was that it kept a small army in western Virginia, where only two or three brigades were actually required, when these troops were imperatively needed in the Shenandoah valley as a reinforcement to Banks. In the early days of May the situation in the Shenandoah valley and mountains was broadly as follows. Banks had 9000 men at Harrisonburg, with orders from the War Department to fall back upon Strasburg. Shields with a division of
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1 See correspondence between Fremont and Lincoln, June 16, O. R., vol. xii. part i. pp. 660, 662; Lincoln to McClellan, March 31, O. R., vol. v. p. 58. Blenker was taken from McClellan just as the latter was about to start for the Peninsula, "at the expense of great dissatisfaction to General McClellan." See J. D. Cox's article in the Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 278. General Cox held a command under Fremont. On the President's anxiety for the occupation of East Tennessee, see Ropes's Story of the Civil War, vol. i. pp. 200, 206, 213; O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 96. For the condition of things in East Tennessee and the pressure on the President to send an army there for the relief of the Unionists, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. chap. iv.

10,000 at Newmarket had been under Banks, but had now been ordered to join General McDowell at Fredericksburg. Fremont had 15,000 troops of the Mountain Department stationed at different points in the Shenandoah Mountains; one of these detachments, 3500 strong, was under Milroy at a place called McDowell, on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, less than forty miles from Staunton; another detachment under Schenck, 2200 strong, was at Franklin, thirty-four miles north of McDowell.1 Stonewall Jackson had an effective force of 20,000.a Thus the Union troops in the theatre of operations outnumbered the Confederate in the ratio of at least three to two, without taking into account General McDowell's army of 30,000, which was watched by a Confederate force of about 10,000.3 Had there been a proper disposition of the means at hand, Jackson, who took the offensive, would have been opposed at each point by an equal force; as a matter of fact he outnumbered his enemy in each affair and each battle. In the planning of this campaign, the correspondence between Generals Lee and Jackson cannot fail to elicit admiration from men used to military affairs. Lee made some pertinent suggestions, emphasizing that they were merely for Jackson's consideration; for, he wrote from Richmond, "I cannot pretend at this distance
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1 I give round numbers for the different bodies of troops. I have arrived at these from various returns in the O. R., corrected by the correspondence and official reports. The Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 299, has been of assistance.
2 Jackson's report of May 3 gives his force of three brigades as 8397. O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 879. Ewell wrote, April 16, that he had over 8500 men and his division was "increasing very rapidly." Ibid., p. 860. There does not seem to have been any detachments from this force. Reinforcements had been ordered to Ewell, but were afterwards recalled. Edward Johnson had two brigades of three regiments each; 3500 is not, therefore, a high estimate of his force. This makes a total of 20,397, and I am inclined to think that Jackson's batteries of artillery should be added. See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 117.
3 For the Confederate force, see Lee to J. E. Johnston, May 8, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 500. I have previously referred to McDowell's army as 40,000: such it became after the junction of Shields.

to direct operations depending on circumstances unknown to me and requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and execution." 1 In reply Jackson asks in a deferential manner for reinforcements. "Now, it appears to me," he said, "is the golden opportunity for striking a blow. Until I hear from you I will watch an opportunity for attacking some exposed point." 2 Lee regrets very much his inability to send reinforcements. Jackson meanwhile had proposed three plans of operation, one of which he was disposed to adopt; Lee in reply tells him to choose that which seems to him best.3

Jackson promptly matured his plan. Sending for Ewell, whose division was a constituent component of his force, he directed, in personal conference, the part he should play in the undertaking about to commence. He had himself determined to strike at Milroy, leaving his own place at Swift Run Gap to Ewell, who should endeavor to hold Banks in check. By a swift march in a circuitous route in order to mask his movement, Jackson pushed on with his three brigades to Staunton: there he was joined by four companies of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute, who were glad to serve in defence of their loved valley, under their whilom professor,4 now venturing forth to great renown. West of Staunton he united with Edward Johnson's two brigades, and with his army now increased to nearly 12,000 he advanced on Milroy, whom he found, May 8, at McDowell. In response to an appeal for help, Schenck, by a march of thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours, had joined Milroy, and as ranking officer had taken command. He knew that he had a superior force to contend against, and his despairing questions bring to light the mismanagement on the Union side at the outset of this campaign. "Where is General Banks at this juncture? Where is Blenker's
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1 April 25, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 866.
2 April 28, ibid., p. 870.
3 Ibid., pp. 872, 875, 878.
4 See p. 461, vol. iii. of this work.

division?" he asked, and the day before, he had demanded from Fremont, his commanding general, "Answer me where you are, and with what force." Fremont, indeed, should have been in supporting distance, but he was fifty or sixty miles away.

Jackson had secured a hill overlooking the village of McDowell, whence could be seen the position of the Federals, and to some extent their strength. Milroy obtained permission to make a reconnaissance: the reconnaissance became a sharp engagement and a Union defeat. "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday," was the despatch of Jackson to Richmond. Schenck retreated that night, and was pursued by the Confederates to Franklin, where on May 14 he was joined by Fremont.1 Jackson, however, anticipating Joseph E. Johnston's orders received later,2 had begun the day before to retrace his steps with the design of co-operating with Ewell in an attack on Banks in the Shenandoah valley. This same plan had at the same time occurred independently to Johnston and to Lee.3 Jackson was a true Puritan soldier; it grieved him to march or to fight on the Sabbath. In his pursuit of Schenck, military considerations compelled him to press forward on Sunday, May 11, but having a chance for rest he dedicated half of the following day to "thanksgivings to Almighty God." 4 Two days later at McDowell, part of one of the regiments of the Stonewall brigade mutinied. The men had volunteered for twelve months, their time had expired, and they now maintained that to apply to their case the Conscription Act passed only thirty
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1 My authorities for this account are the correspondence in O. R., vol. xii. part iii.; Jackson's, Schenck's, Milroy's, and Fremont's reports with despatches, ibid., part i.; Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 285 et seq.
2 Dabney's Life of Jackson. 2 Dabney (p. 353) says Jackson received from Lee an order of May 11 to return, but no such despatch or letter is printed in the Official Records.
3 Johnston to Ewell, May 13. Taylor to Lee, May 14, Lee to Jackson, May 16, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. pp. 888, 889, 892.
4 Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 258; Dabney, p. 353.

days before was a breach of faith: they laid down their arms and demanded their discharge. Their colonel called upon Jackson for instructions. "What is this but mutiny?" he thundered. "Why does Colonel Grigsby refer to me to know what to do with a mutiny? He should shoot them where they stand." Jackson at once gave orders appropriate to this outburst of wrath, and the mutineers promptly returned to their duty. Continuing his rapid march, he rested the whole of Friday, May 16, to observe the national day of prayer appointed by President Davis.1 Pressing on through Harrisonburg, he united with Ewell near Newmarket, and with an army now 17,000 strong2 began a series of brilliant movements in which his undoubted genius had free scope, owing to the mistakes of Banks and of the War Department at Washington.

Stanton failed utterly to divine the situation. May 9 he repeated a former order to Banks to fall back upon Strasburg and to send Shields's division to General McDowell at Fredericksburg if the enemy was not in force in his front. Stanton was possessed with the fear of a direct attack on the Federal capital. "The probabilities at present point to a possible attempt upon Washington while the Shenandoah army is amused with demonstrations," he said in his despatch. "Washington is the only object now worth a desperate throw." Therefore Shields must march with all possible speed to support McDowell.3 Banks deprecated the detachment of this force, presaging his misfortune,4 and if he had been a soldier he would have protested with satisfying reasons against it, as Stonewall Jackson objected a week later when Johnston proposed to withdraw Ewell from his command.5
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1 Dabney, pp. 353, 354.
2 I cannot account entirely for the reduction of Jackson's force since the first part of May. I feel certain, however, of the correctness of both of my statements.
3 To Banks, May 9, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 150.
4 In a letter to Geary, May 9, ibid., p. 154.
5 See correspondence, ibid., p. 894 et seq.; Dabney, p. 359.

The possibility that Jackson would make a raid down the Shenandoah valley does not seem to have entered the mind of Stanton, for he further weakened Banks by ordering him to detach two of his regiments to relieve other men who had been guarding the railroad from Strasburg to Front Royal. Banks instantly complied, but telegraphed, " This will reduce my force greatly, which is already too small to defend Strasburg if attacked."1 The War Department had warning enough. J. W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, telegraphed, May 18, that the condition of affairs in the valley threatened disaster: the enterprising and vigorous Jackson, reinforced by Ewell, had begun a march northward with a view of destroying his railway, and he asked whether it would not " be most judicious to order back Shields to co-operate with Banks." 2 Shields was not so far along on his march toward General McDowell that he could not have been brought back in time to frustrate the Confederate plan; but his orders were not changed. May 20 Fremont telegraphed Banks that Jackson had passed the Shenandoah mountain and was reported to be moving towards his front:3 this despatch must have been transmitted to Washington. Moreover, on the 21st, Banks understood the situation, reported it with substantial correctness to Stanton, estimating with practical accuracy Jackson's and Ewell's united force at 16,000; to oppose this he had 6000 men, besides artillery, at Strasburg, and 2800 guarding the railroad between Strasburg and Manassas.4 Still Shields was permitted to keep on. May 22 he joined McDowell. The next day, Friday, the President and the Secretary of War paid General McDowell a visit for the purpose of making the final arrangements for his march towards Richmond. The General said that he could move the following Sunday. Do not start on Sunday,
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1 From Strasburg, May 16, O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 522 ; see, also, part iii. p. 161. 2 Ibid., part iii. p. 202.
3 Ibid., p. 208.
4 Ibid., part i. p. 523.

Lincoln by indirection said. Get a "good ready" and start on Monday. Thus it was arranged.1 The gratification of the President and his War Secretary at the condition of McDowell's army and their anticipation of its successful and imposing advance was followed by bitter disappointment at the news which awaited them on their return to Washington. Jackson had swooped upon a small Federal force at Front Royal and routed it.2 Fearing that his retreat would be cut off, Banks had abandoned Strasburg, and, fighting on the way, "ran a race" with Jackson to Winchester.3 Despatch after despatch that came from the theatre of operations to the War Department piled alarm on alarm. Reinforcements were ordered to Banks from Baltimore; Harper's Ferry sent him part of its garrison. At four o'clock on this 24th day of May, the President — it is he who now sends the most important despatches — directed Fremont to move from Franklin to Harrisonburg with the purpose of operating against the enemy for the relief of Banks. Between Strasburg and Winchester the Federal column was pierced. Receiving reports of this fighting, Lincoln at five o'clock suspended the order which had been given McDowell to unite with McClellan, and instructed him to send 20,000 men to the Shenandoah valley with the view of capturing Jackson's forces. To expedite these movements the Secretary of the Treasury went to Fredericksburg. At daybreak on Sunday, May 25, Jackson routed Banks at Winchester and, with hot pursuit of the "mass of disordered fugitives" and on the very point of destroying the entire force, drove them across the Potomac River. "There were never more grateful hearts
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1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 213; ibid., vol. xi. part i. p. 30; Warden's Chase, p. 435; McDowell's testimony, Report of the Joint Committee on Conduct of the War (this will hereafter be referred to as C. W.), part i. p. 263. "I called their attention to the fact," testifies McDowell, "that once before I had moved on Sunday and had been very much condemned for it all over the country. But I said I was ready to do so again." Reference is made to Bull Run. See vol. iii. of this work, p. 455.
2 May 23.
3 May 24. Lincoln's expression.

in the same number of men," wrote Banks, "than when at midday of the 26th we stood on the opposite shore."1

The despatches sent to Washington on Sunday, which were largely from panic-stricken men,2 alarmed the President and the Secretary of War. Their paramount object, which on Saturday was the capture of Jackson's army, now became mixed with fear for the safety of the capital. "Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are marching on Washington," telegraphed Stanton to the several governors of the Northern States. "You will please organize and forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State."3 This despatch and the response to it, reflecting the alarm at the capital, caused wild excitement at the North; it was afterwards spoken of in Massachusetts as "the great scare." The militia and home guards of many of the States were called out; regiments, among them the New York Seventh, were hurried to Baltimore and to Harper's Ferry. The President took military possession of all the railroads in the country.4 "I think the time is near," said Lincoln in a despatch to McClellan, "when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington."5 Part of
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1 Banks's report, O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 551; see Jackson's report, Ibid., p. 703; Correspondence, ibid., p. 643, part iii. pp. 219, 222; Warden's Chase, p. 435. Banks himself, however, had no lack of physical courage.
2 This may be said of only one despatch of Banks.
3 MS. War Department archives. In Stanton's handwriting. 4 MS. War Department; Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. v., Diary, p. 17; Schouler's Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 334; O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 297; Clark's History of the New York Seventh, vol. ii. p. 56; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 161; Appleton's Ann. Enc. 1862, p. 107. The order taking possession of the railroads is In Stanton's handwriting, although signed by Meigs.
5 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 32. After getting this, McClellan wrote his wife: "I have this moment received a despatch from the President, who is terribly scared about Washington, and talks about the necessity of my returning in order to save it. Heaven save a country governed by such counsels! . . . Banks has been soundly thrashed, and they are terribly alarmed in Washington. A scare will do them good, and may bring them to their senses." May 26 he wrote: "I feared last night that I would be ordered back for the defence of Washington." — Own Story, pp. 396, 397.

McDowell's force was recalled to the capital city. "Our condition is one of considerable danger," wrote Stanton, "as we are stripped to supply the Army of the Potomac and now have the enemy here."1 McDowell had promptly sent off Shields with his division, who now retraced the steps he had taken but a few days before; the rest of the force for the Shenandoah valley followed after. McDowell himself went to see the President for counsel and then took command in person. May 26 it was known that Banks had effected his crossing of the Potomac at Williamsport, that the Federal capital was secure,2 and that Harper's Ferry still remained in our possession, and its garrison with th« reinforcements on the way ought to be able to resist any probable attack.3 Hearing of the movements of Shields and Fremont, Jackson began on May 30 a rapid retreat.4 The President had a distinct plan for his capture or destruction which was to be accomplished by the converging movements of the several forces upon Strasburg, surrounding him and cutting off his retreat to the south. In the direction of this campaign Lincoln issued instructions in person6 or by telegraph to the different commanders, and from the White House and War Department continued daily to despatch orders. The plan was too complicated to succeed,6 being such an one as Lee himself would hardly have undertaken at so great a
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1 May 25, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 241.
2 Stanton and Meigs were again alarmed for the safety of Washington, May 29, on information received from Banks. The information should not have been credited. Their fear was groundless and was not shared by the President. O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 532 et seq.; part iii. p. 275.
3 Ibid., pp. 243, 248, 251.
4 Jackson's report, ibid., part i. p. 707.
5 Shields as well as McDowell had been called to Washington.
6 History of the Civil War in America, Comte de Paris, American ed., vol. 11. p. 47. General Sherman wrote his brother: "Banks's repulse was certain. Three converging armies whose point was in possession of the enemy was worse generalship than they tried to force on me in Kentucky of diverging lines with a superior enemy between. Our people must respect the well-established principles of the art of war, else successful fighting will produce no results." — Sherman Letters, p. 155.

distance from the field of operations. Moreover, in Banks and Fremont Lincoln had imperfect instruments for military designs; it was too much to expect that they would be efficient in a piece of intricate strategy.

The President urged Banks to follow the Confederates as they retreated, but he and his soldiers were demoralized. The commander of the Harper's Ferry garrison received like instructions; but while Jackson was retreating, some of his men, fearing an attack from the dreaded Confederate general, ran away.1 Both of these forces should have been at Jackson's heels harassing him, but they did practically nothing. It was five o'clock on the afternoon of May 24, while at Franklin, that Fremont received the order to march southward to Harrisonburg. For what he considered abundant reasons in the matter of unobstructed roads and available supplies, he went northward instead, and failed to communicate with the War Department for two days, when the President learning of his whereabout sent him this sharp despatch: "I see you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?" Receiving his excuses without a word of censure in rejoinder, Lincoln urged him forward. Although complaining of stormy weather, heavy roads, and many stragglers, and deeming it imperative to give his army oue day's rest, Fremont promised to be at Strasburg with his 17,000men Saturday, May 31, at five o'clock in the afternoon. The President had directed McDowell to be at Front Royal within supporting distance of Fremont at the same time. McDowell pushed forward Shields's division with celerity, and had it at the appointed place a day in advance; the rest of his 20,000 troops came up in time to be of assistance. But Fremont failed. Jackson made a swift march in spite of storm and mud. "Through the blessing of an ever-kind Providence," he wrote, "I passed Strasburg before the Federal armies under Generals Shields
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1 O. R. vol. xii. part iii. p. 290 et ante, also pp. 296, 303; part i. p. 531 et seq.

and Fremont effected the contemplated junction in my rear."1 Fremont and Shields pursued the Confederate general. There were two more battles in which he was victorious; indeed, after he had eluded the two armies May 31 and June 1, his safety was practically assured. June 8 the President ordered that the pursuit be stopped.2 Stonewall Jackson's campaign of one month was distinguished by rapid marches, energetic and successful fighting. With an effective force of 17,000 he had won a number of battles, taken rich spoil and many prisoners, alarmed Washington, and prevented 40,000 men from joining the Union army before Richmond.3

A careful study of this campaign leaves one doubting the wisdom of sending the detachment from McDowell to the Shenandoah valley. It must be borne in mind that Lincoln then knew almost exactly the size of Jackson's army.4 McDowell called the President's order "a crushing blow," obeyed it with "a heavy heart," and argued against it with a force it is difficult with the facts now before us to countervail :6 indeed we may easily believe that if he had commanded all the troops except McClellan's he would have managed affairs better than did the President. Although he made the mistake at first of underestimating Jackson's force,6 it is certain that with the special duty assigned him of protecting the Federal capital he would have run no risk on that score. A suspension of his forward movement, the sending of part of his force directly to Washington, whence it could easily be brought back, would have made that city absolutely secure, and kept his army well in hand for offensive opera
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1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 277 et seg., part i. p. 645 et seq., also p. 711; Dabney.
2 O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 653, part iii. p. 354. McDowell spoke of Fremont's "vigorous pursuit," ibid., p. 325.
3 On this campaign the Life of Stonewall Jackson by Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson (vol. i.) may be read with interest; see Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 115 et seq.
4 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 32; vol. xii. part iii. p. 243.
5 Ibid., p. 220.
6 This error lasted only two days. Ibid., pp. 221, 243.

tions should Jackson cease his advance. The dispiriting effect of this campaign's failure and the disorganization consequent on this derangement of McDowell's plans were apparent as late as June 27,1 so that a large part of his army was neutralized at a time of active operations about Richmond. Jackson's design went no further than to threaten an invasion into Maryland with a menace to the Federal capital; he sent word to Richmond that if the authorities would increase his force to 40,000 he would march on Washington, but it was not practicable to furnish such a reinforcement.2

It is true that Richmond was easily ours if McDowell with 30,000 or 40,000 men had joined McClellan, and the joint army had been handled with the energy which the situation demanded; but since McClellan did not skilfully dispose in battle his hundred thousand, it is difficult to believe that he would have managed the larger undertaking better. Moreover his feeling towards McDowell was unfriendly. Their respective orders were difficult to harmonize, and efficient and generous co-operation on McClellan's part was hardly to be looked for.3 But McDowell thirsted to retrieve his defeat at Bull Run, and had he arrived near the scene of action on the Chickahominy a little before May 81, it is possible that under the command of McClellan or independently he would have struck a decisive blow.

McClellan seemed to be aware that while Jackson was making havoc in the Shenandoah valley he should embrace the opportunity to strike at Johnston. "The time is very near when I shall attack Richmond;" "We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle," were his telegrams on successive days to the President.4.
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1 McDowell's Testimony, C. W., part i. p. 266.
2 Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 266; Dabney, p. 386; J. Davis to Jackson, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 905.
3 O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 27, 28, 30, part iii. pp. 176, 184; Webb's Th« Peninsula, p. 87.
4 May 25, 26, O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 32, 33,

McClellan had an army of 100,000; Johnston had 63,000.! Yet it is doubtful whether McClellan would have taken the initiative. He never reached his "ideal completeness of preparation,"2 and he fell short of understanding the opposing commander, even as he failed to arrive at a correct estimate of the enemy's force. "Richmond papers," he telegraphed, May 27, "urge Johnston to attack, now he has us away from gunboats. I think he is too able for that." 8 On the same day in a letter to his wife he told of his arrangements for "the approaching battle. The only fear," he continued, "is that Joe's4 heart may fail him."6 Four days later Johnston did attack, and with a measure of success, owing to McClellan's faulty disposition of his force. At the time of this battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines (which took place May 31), McClellan, who had advanced from Williamsburg on the east side of the Chickahominy, had only two of his five corps on the Richmond side of the river. It is true that a division of his army was necessary, for a part of it must be left on the north side of the river, both to cover the railroad that ran to White House, his base of supplies, and furthermore to insure a safe and effective junction with McDowell, which, as we have seen, was expected as late as May 24. But McClellan's distribution of his strength was wrong; for, inasmuch as Johnston could in little more than half a day concentrate
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 204. For Johnston's force I have followed the computation of G. W. Smith, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 219, but Johnston in his article in that book estimates his own force at 73,928 (p. 209). Robert M. Hughes in his biography of Johnston, p. 148, seems to accept this figure. See an interesting computation of General F. W. Palfrey in Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 170, where he arrives at the figure of 71,000, but he places McClellan's army at 100,000 to 110,000. All the authorities of weight, however, agree that the Federals outnumbered the Confederates at the time of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, in about the proportion of 3 to 2.
2 General F. W. Palfrey, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. 1, p. 168.
3 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 193.
4 Joseph Johnston. 5 McClellan's Own Story, p. 397.

nearly the whole of his army for an attack on the Union troops on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, McClellan should have placed his larger force to meet the greater danger.1 Johnston, knowing of the anticipated forward movement of McDowell, had determined to fall upon the Union army on both sides of the river before the junction could be effected; but when he learned that McDowell had abandoned the march southward, he resolved to strike at the two Union corps nearest to Richmond.2 May 31 was the appointed day. The afternoon and night before, a tropical storm had raged. Sheets of fire, lightnings sharp, and dreadful thunder-claps were fit precursors of the strife waged by the artillery of man.3 Water poured down from the clouds, and the treacherous Chickahominy, which had already risen from the spring rains, became a torrent, increasing the danger of the divided Union army and the eagerness of Johnston to give battle. Roads deep with mud and difficult for his batteries could not induce delay. Saturday, May 31, at some time after twelve o'clock, he attacked with vigor the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, drove them back, and came near inflicting on them a crushing defeat.

General Sumner saved the day at Fair Oaks. For two days McClellan had been ill at his headquarters, at Gaines's Mill, on the north side of the river, but was not incapacitated for business. This Saturday morning he should have feared for his bridges which maintained communication between the two wings of his army and which the flood in the river threatened to carry away. Common prudence, suggesting the possibility of attack, should have urged him to send at once
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1 Walker's History of the Second Army Corps, p. 20; General F. W. Palfrey, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 176; Comte de Paris, vol. ii. p. 53; Swinton's Army of the Potomac, p. 131.
2 From Johnston's report one would gather that he supposed only Keyes's corps had crossed the river. He did not alter his plan until after the morning of the 28th. O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 555.
3 "All night long, Zeus, the lord of counsel, devised them ill with terrible thunderings. Then pale fear gat hold upon them." — The Iliad, vii. 477.

Sumner's corps to the other side of the Chickahominy; but he delayed until he heard the sound of Johnston's guns, and then sent word to Sumner to be ready to move at a moment's warning. Sumner, every inch a soldier, knew the battle was on and thirsted to have his part in it. Comprehending the danger better than his chief, he at once marched his two divisions to his two bridges, halted, and anxiously awaited further commands. The order at last came to cross the river. Sumner's corps went over the swaying and tossing bridges, and preserved McClellan's left wing from rout. By the close of day the Confederates had driven the Federals on the left of their line back a mile or two, while those on the right, reinforced by Sumner, had held their own. But the Southern army had suffered a grievous loss in the severe wounding of General Johnston, who, knocked from his horse by the fragment of a shell near the end of the fight, was borne unconscious from the field.1 McClellan was at no time during the day on the side of the river where the fighting took place; the orders that he gave are dated from his headquarters north of the Chickahominy.

The result of the battle, Johnston's only partial defeat of the Federal left wing, instead of a rout, as had seemed probable, gave McClellan a great chance, which he seemed to appreciate. You ought to be able now to "hold your own," he sent word at five o'clock to Heintzelman.2 "I will post everything during the night so as to be able to cross at New Bridge to-morrow."8 The bridges by which Sumner had gone over had become impassable, and orders were given
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1 Davis wrote his wife June 3: "The poor fellow [Johnston] bore his suffering most heroically. When he was about to be put into the ambulance to be removed from the field, I dismounted to speak to him; he opened his eyes, smiled, and gave me his hand, said he did not know how seriously he was hurt, but feared a fragment of shell had injured his spine."—Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 292.
2 Heintzelman commanded the third corps and outranked Keyes, who had the fourth corps. Sumner commanded the second corps and outranked Heintzelman.
3 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 203,

from headquarters to throw others across the river. At 8.15 Sunday morning, June 1, New Bridge was finished and fit for the use of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Meanwhile the battle had been renewed, the Confederates were driven back, losing the ground which they had gained, and a great victory seemed within the grasp of the Union army. An able and energetic commander would have been with his fighting troops at daylight; he would have ordered several brigades to take the heights from which the Confederates commanded New Bridge; the approaches to this bridge uncovered, he would have brought across the river the major part of his two corps who had not been in the engagement of Saturday; and, encouraged by the unimpaired morale of his troops,1 the chances are more than even that he would have beaten the Confederate army and taken Richmond. McClellan did nothing of the sort. After his despatch to Heintzelman and the order for building the bridge, his native irresolution laid fast hold of him. He did not reach the field of battle Sunday until the firing had ceased, but his soldiers, highly gratified at his appearance, received him with "unbounded enthusiasm." 2 "Our faith in our commander was then absolute," writes General Palfrey, "and our admiration for him unlimited." The Union troops had pushed forward to within four miles of Richmond. Sumner, the ranking corps commander, asked McClellan if he had any orders to give. The answer was: No, I have no changes to make. I am satisfied with what has been done. The left wing of his army fell back to the lines it had occupied before the battle.3 The action of
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 749.
2 General Peck's report of June 2.
3 In addition to authorities specifically cited, see Correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. part i. and Hi.; Reports of Johnston, G. W. Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, Richardson, Hooker, Sickles, part i.; Testimony of McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, C. W., part i.; as to the bridges, Barnard's report, O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 112; his pamphlet on the Peninsular Campaign, p. 9; Walker, Palfrey, and Webb in works hitherto referred to; Johnston, Narrative, and Article in Century War Book, vol. ii.; G. W. Smith's article, ibid.; Life of Johnston, Hughes; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; G. W. Smith, Confederate War Papers; McClellan's Own Story. In the criticism of McClellan I have followed Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, p. 21, and Palfrey, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 199. Both were present at the battle.

I have not stated the chance of going into Richmond, June 1, as strongly as have some writers, for the reason that I do not believe the Confederates were badly demoralized. Barnard speaks, January 26, 1863, of "the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated" (O. B., vol. xi. part i. p. 131). February 18, 1863, General Sumner testified: "When Johnston was knocked from his horse and taken in a litter to Richmond, the rebel army became a confused mob" (C. W., part i. p. 366); also Heintzelman (p. 352). Webb (p. 117) writes the Confederates were "in a panic" June 1. I do not think the contemporary evidence supports these statements. Generals Sickles and Hooker, in their reports of June 7 and 8, speak of "the hurried retreat" and "wild confusion" of the enemy, June 1 (O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 819, 824; see comment of G. W. Smith, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 259 et seq.; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, chap, viii.), and the Confederate General D. H. Hill says in his report, undated, "Armistead's men fled early in the action" (O. B., vol. xi. part i. p. 945; see comment of Walker, History 2d Corps, p. 49). I hardly think such a condition in two parts of the field warrants the general statement that the whole army was demoralized.

The New York Herald correspondent telegraphed from McClellan's headquarters, June 6, that the "greatest consternation " had prevailed in Richmond, June 1. Barnard, in his political pamphlet published in 1864, quotes William Henry Hurlbut as to the disorderly retreat of the Confederates (p. 9). In Richmond, if we may consider the Richmond Dispatch, Examiner, and Jones's Diary sufficient authority, there was no panic; "anxiety" and "painful suspense" prevailed, but nothing more. The newspapers and Jones maintained that on both the days the Confederates had been successful. This belief grew with the inaction of the Union army, and allowed full course to the rejoicing over Stonewall Jackson's victories in the Shenandoah valley, which had begun before the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines.

I suppose that by the morning of June 1 the Confederate soldiers generally knew that Johnston was wounded, and were much depressed by the mishap. General McClellan was not aware of it June 1; his despatch to Stanton at noon of that day makes no mention of it. Nor did he apparently know of this misfortune to the Confederates until June 6, when he speaks of it as a matter of news in a letter to his wife (Own Story, p. 399). General Richardson, writing June 4, does not refer to it (Moore, Reb. Bee, vol. v. Documents, p. 87). The fact that Johnston had been wounded was published in the Richmond Dispatch of June 2, and entered by Jones in his Diary as of that date (vol. i. p. 132).

the two days may be summed up as a partial success of Johnston, and in the end a repulse of the Confederates.1
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1 Hamley, Operations of War, p. 173. The total Union loss was 5031, the Confederate 6134. — Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 219.


June 1 Robert E. Lee was placed in command of the Confederate army, but did not assume the direction of affairs until the fighting of that day was over.1 While Davis had unbounded confidence in Lee, and Stonewall Jackson thought that he had military talents of a high order,2 no one could at that time have dreamed of his latent genius. The Army of Northern Virginia (by this name it became known shortly afterwards) regarded him as the most distinguished of engineers, but they retained a vivid impression of his failure the previous autumn in western Virginia, and neither officers nor men were hopeful that he would direct with energy and ability operations in the field.3 Johnston had won their confidence and respect; all looked upon his hurt as a calamity, and few, if any, believed that his loss had been repaired. Lee at once summoned his general officers in council. Longstreet, the commander of a division, did not regard this as reassuring; he thought secrecy in war was necessary, and that a discussion of plans with brigadiers was either harmful or useless. Lee listened intently to their accounts of the late battle and to their present opinions; he disclosed nothing, but, when the tone of the conversation became despondent at the progress of the siege which the invaders were conducting, he endeavored to cheer up his officers, and in this was assisted by Davis, who joined the council before its members separated.4 Afterwards Lee made a careful survey of the position of his army, and directed that it be at once strongly fortified. He had some difficulty in overcoming the aversion to manual labor which obtained
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 568; Smith, Century War Book; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox. In the interim between Johnston and Lee, G. W. Smith had command.
2 Davis's Confederate Government; Life of Jackson, Mrs. Jackson, p. 234. When Jackson, who had been very desirous for reinforcements, heard of the appointment of Lee as military adviser to the President, he said to a friend: "Well, madam, I am reinforced at last." —Dabney, p. 335.
3 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 112; Life of Lee, Long, p. 163; Richmond Dispatch, July 9, 1862.
4 Longstreet, p. 112; Davis, p. 130; Long, p. 162.

among the Southern soldiers,1 but his constant personal superintendence combined with his pleasing authoritative manner to push things forward, so that he soon had his defensive works well under way.2 In one respect at least the substitution of Lee for Johnston was a gain for the Southern cause. Johnston and Davis could not work together, and while the fault lay more with the Confederate President,3 the general was not wholly blameless. Johnston's letters at this time are marked by an acerbity which is not absent even when he is writing to Lee, for whom he had undoubtedly a profound respect. But no one could quarrel with Lee, who in his magnanimity and his deference to his fellow-workers resembles Lincoln. Between the courtly Virginia gentleman, proud of his lineage, and the Illinois backwoodsman who came out of the depths, the likeness, in this respect, is as true as it is striking.

The harmony between Davis and Lee was complete. Something had already been done in the way of bringing reinforcements from the South, and under the new command this movement went on with vigor. In reading the orders, the despatches, the history of the army at this time, one seems to feel that a new energy has been infused into the management of affairs. Lee had a talent for organization equal to that of McClellan. In a few days he had matters well in hand and had gained the respect of the officers of his army. Unremitting in industry, he rode over his lines nearly every day. June 6 he noted "the enemy working like beavers," and wrote Longstreet: "Our people seem to think he will advance to-morrow morning. If so, I directed that he should be resisted." 4 Longstreet, who commanded the Confederate right, had expected an attack at any moment since the battle of Fair Oaks.5 In six days subsequent to that battle the
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1 Letter of Davis to his wife, June 11, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 31ft.
2 Long, p. 165 et seq.
3 See vol. iii. p. 459.
4 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 577.
5 Letter of June 7 to Johnston, ibid., p. 580.

Confederate defences were so far advanced that Lee had good ground for his hope that he could repel an assault.1 Although McClellan was in sight of the spires of Richmond, he had no intention of attempting to break through by storm the Confederate line of intrenchments. The weather was unfavorable. The heavy rains continued, and the Chickahominy became a flood interfering with the desired crossing of troops from the north to the south side of the river. The roads were so bad that the movement of artillery — an arm in which the Federals excelled — was extremely difficult if not impossible. The freshet in the James River was the greatest that had been known since 1847. In one street of Richmond the water came nearly up to the hubs of wagon-wheels, and owing to the condition of the roads the task of supplying the Confederate army was laborious and irksome. When Burnside visited, June 10, McClellan's headquarters, it took him four and a half hours to cover nine miles. He reported to Stanton that it was impossible to move artillery, and "but for the railroad the army could not be subsisted and foraged." 2

McClellan was begging for reinforcements, and the War Department did its best to comply with his demands. McCall's division of McDowell's corps was ordered to join him, and regiments were sent him from Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe. These troops went forward by water as McClellan desired. It had been intended to send him the residue of McDowell's army, and this general wrote: "I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service." 3 The President strained every nerve to help McClellan, but was unable to do all that he wished. June 15 he wrote: I now fear that McDowell cannot get to you either by water or by land in time. "Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at
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1 Long, p. 167.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 224; see also p. 223 and part i. pp. 45, 46; Richmond Dispatch, June 6, 6,7, 11; Richmond Whig, June 7; letter of Davis to his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 810.
3 June 8 or 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 220.

elbows and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again."1 At the time the order was given McCall to join the Army of the Potomac, Stanton telegraphed McClellan: "Please state whether you will feel sufficiently strong for your final movement when McCall reaches you." The reply came promptly: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery."2 June 12 and 13 McCall's division joined him: this with the troops from Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe gave him a total reinforcement, since the battle of Fair Oaks, of 21,000.3 The weather had now become fine. The roads were dry.4 It actually looked as if McClellan were going to give battle. June 13 his adjutant telegraphed Burnside: "General McClellan desires me to say that there is a prospect of an engagement here shortly;" and five days later he himself telegraphed the President: "After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit." 6 But a preposterous overestimate of the enemy's force and a shrinking from an order that would result in the profuse shedding of blood led him again to hesitate: he did not give the word that would have brought on a desperate battle. Perhaps at
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1 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 181.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 46; part iii. p. 219.
3 Ibid., part i. p. 47; part iii. p. 230.
4 Ibid., part i. p. 47; part iii. pp. 223, 225, 226; Richmond Dispatch, June 13, 14; McClellan's letters to his wife, June 11, 14, 15, Own Story, pp. 403, 404.
5 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 227, 223. I append most of McClellan's despatch of June 18. "Our army is well over the Chickahominy, except the very considerable forces necessary to protect our flanks and communications. Our whole line of pickets in front runs within six miles of Richmond. The rebel line runs within musket-range of ours. Each has heavy support at hand. A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works .... After to-morrow, we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." See also letter to his wife, June 15, Own Story, p. 405.

this time his irresolution and timidity stood his army in good stead. McClellan had 105,000 to Lee's 64,000,1 and when we take into account that a portion of his force was necessary to guard his communications on the north side of the Chickahominy, he had not preponderance enough to justify a direct attack on an army strongly intrenched. It is evident from Lee's and Davis's letters that nothing would have gratified them more.2 Whatever discouragement had prevailed immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks had vanished. "We are better prepared now than we were on the first of the month," wrote Jefferson Davis, June 23, "and with God's blessing will beat the enemy as soon as we can get at him." 3

As McClellan gave expression in writing to his many vacillating moods, it is difficult to know exactly what was his real plan, but we may accept the one which he outlined to his wife. "I shall probably," he gave her to understand, "make my first advance June 17 or 18. The next battle will be fought at ‘ Old Tavern,' on the road from New Bridge to Richmond. I think the rebels will make a desperate fight, but I feel sure that we will gain our point. ... I shall make the first battle mainly an artillery combat. As soon as I gain possession of the 'Old Tavern' I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault." 4 It was substantially this same plan that Lee, who seemed to know McClellan as well as did McClellan himself, divined and undertook to thwart. "Unless McClellan can be driven out of his intrenchments," he wrote Jackson, "he will move by positions [" gradual approaches " is the expression Lee employs in a previous letter] under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of Richmond."6 It was apparently the
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1 June 20, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 238; Allan, Army of Northern Virginia, p. 69.
2 Correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. part iii.; Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. it
3 To his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 314.
4 Letter of June 15, Own Story, p. 405.
5 June 16, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 602.

conventional design of an engineer officer, and was foreseen independently by Davis, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill.1 Knowing the Federal superiority in artillery, it is little wonder that they regarded the movements of the Union army with apprehension. Perhaps they did not guess what Lee seemingly took for granted, that McClellan's procrastination would bring to naught his strategy. Nothing indeed could have been more dangerous to the Union forces. Encamped in the swamps of the Chickahominy, unaccustomed to an atmosphere so damp and malarious, drinking the water of the marshes, his soldiers suffered from diarrhoea and fevers, many of them also from scurvy, with the natural result that the morale of his army had lowered distinctly from the 1st to the 20th of June.2 But more than this, his delay was even fatal in that it afforded Lee time to mature and execute a project which needed a greater genius than McClellan to frustrate. Davis visited the lines of the army frequently, and from his own observations and friendly intercourse with the commanding general, comprehended the situation and saw clearly the problem to be solved. "The enemy," he wrote June 13, "keeps close under cover, is probably waiting for reinforcements, or resolved to fight only behind his own intrenchment. We must find if possible the means to get at him without putting the breasts of our men in antagonism to his heaps of earth." 8 As a measure towards this end, Lee decided to reinforce with two brigades Jackson, who was still in the Shenandoah valley, directing
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1 D. H. Hill, the general of a division, wrote, June 10: "The enemy has now ditched himself up to the very gates of Richmond. In a week or two weeks at furthest he will open his siege batteries and the capital must fall." — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 587. Davis wrote his wife, June 11: "The enemy's policy is to advance by regular approaches covered by successive lines of earthworks, that reviled policy of West Pointism and Spades which is sure to succeed against those who do not use like means to counteract it." — Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310. Longstreet wrote D. H. Hill, June 16: "I don't think we have as much to apprehend in the way of an attack as the long guns." — O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 603.
2 C. W., part i. pp. 285, 286, 293; O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 228; Palfrey, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 208.
3 To his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 312.

him with his main body to "move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise . . . and sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications." 1 Lee, having made up his mind that a direct assault upon McClellan's left wing was "injudicious if not impracticable," would, with the larger part of his force, cross the Chickahominy and fall upon Porter, who commanded the right wing of the Union army.2 Proceeding with caution, he ordered Stuart with his cavalry to make a reconnaissance "around the rear of the Federal army to ascertain its position and movements." 3 Having now some apprehension that McClellan, if aware of the weakening of his force by the reinforcement to Jackson, might attack the Confederates, he asked the Secretary of War to influence the Richmond newspapers not to mention the project.4 June 16 Lee made a personal reconnaissance of the Federal position north of the Chickahominy, and the question to his military secretary, "Now, Colonel Long, how can we get at those people?" showed that he was still revolving the details of his plan.5 Shortly after this he submitted his ripened project to his President, showing that the successful execution of it depended upon the ability of the small Confederate force left before Richmond to hold in check the more powerful left wing of the Federal army which was on the south side of the Chickahominy. "I pointed out to him," writes Davis, in his relation of the
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1 Lee to Jackson, June 11, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 589.
2 The clause "while this army attacks General McClellan in front," which follows the cited part in the text of Lee's despatch to Jackson of June 11, prevents me from affirming that Lee as early as June 11 had substantially decided on the plan which he executed. Longstreet (From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 120) states that Lee had intended to attack McClellan's left wing while Jackson fell upon the right: at the suggestion, presumably of Longstreet, this was changed, the day after the return of Stuart from his reconnaissance (June 17), to the plan indicated in the text. See discussion of this subject in Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 165 et seq.
3 Lee's report, O. R., vol. xi. part ii. p. 490; Lee to Stuart, June 11, part iii. p. 590.
4 Lee to Randolph, ibid.
5 Long's Notebook, his life of Lee, p. 168.

interview, "that our force and intrenched line between that left wing and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resistance, and, if McClellan was the man I took him for, ... as soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy, he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old esprit de corps manifested itself in General Lee's first response, that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes, but immediately passing to the main subject, he added, 'If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchment, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there.'"1 Not long after this interview Jefferson Davis wrote his wife: "I wish General J. E. Johnston were able to take the field. Despite the critics who know military affairs by instinct, he is a good soldier, never brags of what he did do, and could at this time render most valuable service." 2

One week after he had given the order for the reinforcement of Jackson, Lee, apparently reckoning on McClellan's certain inaction, played upon the credulity of his adversary and the fears of the authorities in Washington. He knew that McClellan was in the habit of reading the Richmond journals, which, in view of their faithful regard of his former request, were now asked to publish the news that strong reinforcements had been sent to the Shenandoah valley. One newspaper asserted that Jackson, who now had as many men as he wanted, would drive Fremont and Shields across the Potomac, or, if they made a stand, would gain over them another glorious victory. This was evidence, the editor
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1 Davis's Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 132. a June 23, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 314.

continued, of the immense military resources of the South; there were men enough to defend Richmond and to swell Jackson's army.1 McClellan, who had received the same intelligence from deserters, fell into the trap and telegraphed the President, "If 10,000 or 15,000 men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence." 2 The War Department had like information from other sources, and induced the President to withhold troops from the Army of the Potomac that otherwise would have been sent. Yet Lincoln suspected this action of the Confederates to be a "contrivance for deception,"8 but seems to have been alone in his suspicion.

Meanwhile Jackson was swiftly and stealthily moving his army towards the Chickahominy. To be present at the personal conference which Lee desired, he left his troops fifty miles from Richmond with orders to continue their progress; and, riding with haste, met in council at mid-day on June 23 the commanding general, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill. Lee set forth his plan of battle, and assigned to each of his generals the part he should play. Jackson said that he would be ready to begin his attack on the morning of the 26th.4

While these astute soldiers were constructing this snare, what was McClellan doing? He had noted, June 23, the "rather mysterious movements" of the enemy; he had heard the next day that Jackson was marching towards him with the intention of attacking his rear, and that Confederate troops from Richmond intended to cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge.5 He ought to have been cudgelling his brains to guess Lee's plan and to devise measures to
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1 Richmond Dispatch, June 18; D. H. Hill, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 347; Richmond Examiner, June 19.
2 June 18, O. R, vol. xi. part iii. p. 233.
3 O. R, vol. xi. part iii. pp. 232, 234, 236.
4 Dabney, p. 434; Longstreet, p. 121; D. H. Hill, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 347.
5 Own Story, p. 408; O. R, vol. xi. part i. p. 49; part iii. p. 248.

thwart it; yet there is no evidence that McCLellan was at this time gravely anxious. He had been engaged m writing an essay in the form of a long letter to the President, instructing him in the matter of military arrests and the exercise oi military power in general, dictating to him what should be the course of the government in dealing with slavery: in short, the general admonished the chief magistrate with regard to his civil and military policy in the conduct of the war. Those parts of the letter that were not insolent were platitudes, and denoted a scattering of thought which augured ill in a man who had supreme responsibility. The injunctions that trenched upon the ground of the President would have been unbecoming in a general flushed with victory; in a commander who was not backed up by success they were outrageous. Not Lee nor Grant in any portion of his brilliant career can be conceived to have written to his President this letter of McClellan's.1

McClellan was getting ready for his gradual advance. The first step, which was taken by Heintzelman June 25 in front of Seven Pines, resulted in a skirmish, but led to nothing further. All attention is now concentrated on the north side of the Chickahominy. On the evening of the 25th, McClellan visited Fitz John Porter's headquarters,2 where he was confirmed in the impression that Jackson would assail his rear; and detecting indications of an attack on his front, he made arrangements accordingly.

Through unavoidable delays Jackson was half a day late. A. P. Hill with five brigades waited at Meadow Bridge until three o'clock in the afternoon of this June 26 for Jackson to perform his part; then fearing longer delay, he crossed the river and came directly in front of Porter. This brought on a battle in which the Confederates met with a bloody repulse.
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1 This letter is correctly printed by Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 447. While dated July 7, the correspondence (O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 48) shows that it had been substantially prepared by June 20. See remarks of Nicolay and Hay as to this, p. 449 et seq.
2 Porter commanded the right wing.

In the mean time D. H. Hill and Longstreet, with their divisions, had gone over the Mechanicsville bridge to the north bank of the Chickahominy, but arriving at a late hour of the day, only D. H. Hill's leading brigade took part in the engagement.

McClellan went to Porter's headquarters that afternoon or early evening, while the battle was still on. Obtaining a better idea of Jackson's object, his fear for the communications with his base at White House increased, and that apprehension doubtless entered largely into the consultation with his favorite general. Porter, full of energy and ambition, proposed that he should be slightly reinforced, with the purpose of holding his own on Beaver Dam creek, while McClellan with the main body of the army moved upon Richmond. His alternative was to fall back with his corps to a safer position. While McClellan was with Porter, he came to no decision, but on returning to his own headquarters, he arrived at the conclusion, either from a fuller knowledge of Jackson's movements or from reflection on what he already knew, that Porter's position was untenable, and ordered him to withdraw his troops to the selected ground east of Gaines's Mill, where he could protect the bridges across the Chickahominy which connected the Union right and left wings and were indispensable should a further retreat become necessary. Porter received this command at two o'clock in the morning, and at daylight began the movement, which was executed without serious molestation and in perfect order. At first he had hoped to get along without aid, although he requested McClellan to have Franklin's corps ready to reinforce him, but on posting his army in position he made up his mind that his force was too small to defend successfully so long a line, and therefore asked Barnard, the chief engineer of the army, who had conducted him to the new position, to represent to the commanding general the necessity of reinforcement, and also to send him felling axes for defensive purposes. Barnard went to the headquarters of the army on the south side of the Chickahominy at nine or ten in the morning, and being informed that the commanding general was reposing, failed to see McClellan and to deliver any word to him, so that he never received this appeal of Porter for additional troops.1 This was a grave mischance, and may have lost the Union army the day. Nevertheless, at seven in the morning, Franklin did receive an order to send Slocum's division to assist Porter; but at nine or ten o'clock, when part of the division had crossed the Chickahominy, the order was countermanded, and the troops who had gone over returned to their original position on the south side of the river.

On this Friday, June 27, was fought the battle of Gaines's Mill.2 Porter, who had at the commencement of the battle 20,000 to 25,000 men, contended against Jackson, Longstreet, and the two Hills, whose combined forces amounted to 55,000. Lee was in immediate command, and Jefferson Davis was on the battlefield. In their first onset the Confederates met with an obstinate resistance and were driven back. At two o'clock in the afternoon Porter called for reinforcements; and McClellan, who did not visit the field of battle that day, but remained at the army headquarters on the south side of the Chickahominy, ordered Slocum's division of 9000 men to his support. This time they joined him. Porter, who was making a magnificent fight and undoubtedly believed that he held in check the larger part of Lee's army, supposed that his commanding general with the 55,000 troops remaining on the south side of the river would embrace an occasion so conspicuous to overpower Magruder's 25,000 that stood between the Union left wing and Richmond, and to accomplish by a bold stroke the object of the campaign. In balancing the chances, the weight of authority, both Northern and Southern, is that success would have attended this operation. At the Union headquarters it was expected; by the Confederate generals it was feared. But in McClellan's orders and
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1 Porter states that the axes were received too late in the day to be service.
2 Or battle of the Chickahominy.

despatches, either official or private, there is no inkling that he pondered at any time that day so bold a project. Indeed, his estimate of the Confederate force precluded the barest consideration of it. He believed that Lee had 180,000 men, of whom 70,000 had assailed Porter, leaving between McClellan and Richmond, behind intrenchments, 110,000, on whom none but a foolhardy general would think of making a direct attack with an army only half as large. His attitude was confessedly defensive, and he measured the situation as if the Shakespearean saying,

"In cases of defence 't is best to weigh
The enemy more mighty than he seems,"1

were a maxim of war.

Magruder deceived McClellan, as he had done when the Union army lay before Yorktown; he also misled Franklin, Sumner, and Hooker, by attacking their pickets from time to time, and by opening a frequent fire of artillery on their works. At about five o'clock in the afternoon McClellan, hearing that Porter was hotly pressed, asked Franklin and Sumner if they could spare men for his assistance. Franklin, having now but one division, did not deem it prudent further to weaken his force, and Sumner reluctantly proffered two brigades, which were ordered across the Chickahominy. Nothing shows McClellan's timid tactics more clearly than his hesitation in reinforcing Porter. He loved Porter and would have rejoiced, without a spark of envy, to see him win a glorious victory. His despatches make evident how anxious he was to give efficient support to his right wing, yet, swayed by his overestimate of the enemy's force, he apparently accepted the judgment of his corps commanders without question, when considerations, both military and personal, should have led him to send one half of his left wing to Porter's aid. His telegram to the Secretary of War at the close of the day, "that he was attacked by greatly superior numbers
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1 Henry V., act ii. sc. iv.

in all directions on this side"1 (the Richmond side of the Chickahominy), remains an ineffaceable record of his misapprehension.

Meanwhile Fitz John Porter, as cool as if he were on parade,2 his tactics seemingly without defect, himself in the thick of the fight inspiriting his officers and men, repelled the assaults of nearly double his numbers, directed by the genius of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, led on by the courage and determination of the Hills and Longstreet. Higher praise can come to no general than that which Lee and Jackson unconsciously gave Porter in their reports. "The principal part of the Federal army was now on the north side of the Chickahominy," wrote Lee; both speak of the "superior force of the enemy." 8 All accounts agree as to the discipline and bravery of the soldiers of both armies. When we consider their small experience in battle, we may describe the impetuous attack of the Confederates as did Jackson the charge of one of their regiments, speaking of it as an " almost matchless display of daring and valor." We may also borrow from him the words "stubborn resistance" and "sullen obstinacy" to describe the work of defence. On the Union side Meade and John F. Reynolds, commanders of brigades, made their mark that day. But skilful as was the general, brave as were the soldiers, 31,000 men, with no intrenchments, with barriers erected along a small portion only of their front, could not finally prevail against 55,000 equally brave and as skilfully led. The end came at about seven o'clock. Lee and Jackson ordered a general assault; the Confederates broke the Federal line, captured many cannon, and forced Porter's troops back to the woods on the bank of the Chickahominy. Then cheering shouts were heard; they came from the brigades of French and Meagher of Sumner's corps which had been sent to the support of their comrades. They came too late to save
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1 At eight p. m., O. R, vol. xi. part iii. p. 266.
2 Walker's History 2d Army Corps, p. 62.
3 Lee's and Jackson's reports, dated, respectively, March 6, February 20,1863, O. R., vol. xi. part ii. pp. 492, 556. Jackson says "superior numbers."

the day, but they efficiently covered the retreat of Porter's exhausted and shattered regiments, who withdrew dejectedly to the south side of the river.1

In his despatches during the battle McClellan does not display bewilderment. At five o'clock he thought Porter might hold his own until dark, and three hours later his confidence was only a little disturbed,2 but by midnight he had reached a state of demoralization which revealed itself in his famous Savage Station despatch to the Secretary of War. "I now know the full history of the day," he wrote. "On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. . . . The sad remnants of my men behave as men. ... I have lost this battle because my force was too small. ... I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or
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1 My authorities for this account are: the correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. parts i. and iii.; McClellan's report of July 15, 1862, and general report of August 4,1863, ibid., parts i. and ii.; reports of Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Magruder, and Fitz John Porter, ibid., part ii.; of Barnard, Heintzelman, and J. E. B. Stuart, part i.; letters to his wife in McClellan's Own Story; Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862; Davis, Confederate Government, vol. ii.; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox; Long, Life of Lee; Dabney, Life of Jackson; letter of J. E. Johnston to Beauregard, August 4, 1862, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 432; Jefferson Davis, Memoir by his wife, vol. ii.; McClellan's, Franklin's, and Heintzelman's testimony, C. W., part i.; McClellan's, Fitz John Porter's, and D. H. Hill's articles, Century War Book, vol. ii.; Walker, History of the Second Army Corps; Palfrey, Papers of the Military History Society of Massachusetts, vol. i.; Webb, The Peninsula; Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, vol. ii.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. v.; Swinton, The Army of the Potomac. See Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 177 et seq.
2 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 265, 266.

to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."1 The news was a terrible blow to the President. The finely equipped army which had cost so much exertion and money, had gone forward with high hopes of conquest, and apparently bore the fate of the Union, had been defeated, and was now in danger of destruction or surrender.2 This calamity the head of the nation must face, and he failed not. Overlooking the spirit of insubordination in his general's despatch, with equal forbearance and wisdom, he sent McClellan a reply which, mingling circumspection with gentleness of spirit, offers the most charitable explanation possible of the disaster. "Save your army at all events," he wrote. "Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. ... I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. . . . It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government are to blame." 3 The day of Gaines's Mill ended the offensive attitude of the Army of the Potomac. The story now deals with its retreat during the rest of the Seven Days' Battles, as the fighting from June 25 to July 1 is called. The force under McClellan at the beginning of this episode was somewhat less than 100,000;4 Lee's force was between 80,000 and 90,000. A few days before the battle of Gaines's Mill McClellan had anticipated a possible severance of his com
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1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 61. The date of this is 12.20 A. it., June 28.
2 See Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 443; Schuckers's Chase, p. 447.
3 June 28, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 269.
4 From a collation of all accounts I feel quite certain that McClellan did not have 100,000 men fit for duty, but I cannot explain the decline in his force from 105,000, of June 20, to less than 100,000, June 25. The only detachment from the force I have found is that of Stoneman's cavalry and two regiments of infantry to guard the communication with White House.

communications with White House by ordering supplies up the James River for the purpose of establishing, if necessary, a new base at a convenient point below Drewry's Bluff. The contingency had now arrived. The defeat of Porter by a superior Confederate force on the north side of the Chickahominy had made it impossible for the Union Army to maintain its communications with White House; and McClellan, assembling his corps commanders at his headquarters on the night of Gaines's Mill, very properly issued the necessary orders to begin at once the movement for a change of base to the James. That he would undertake such an operation had not entered the mind of Lee. The Confederate general felt sure that McClellan would either give battle to preserve his communications, or else would cross the Chickahominy by the lower bridges and retreat down the Peninsula. But, during the forenoon of June 28, Lee, observing clouds of dust, which denoted the Federal army to be in motion, and having learned also that the railroad which brought them supplies had been abandoned, came to the conclusion that retreat down the peninsula was the alternative decided upon, and accordingly lay idle that day prepared to strike at the fit moment a telling blow. McClellan was allowed twentyfour hours to organize his retreat unmolested. Lee's misconception probably saved the Federal army from a crushing defeat, and secured the success of this operation. Many of the Union soldiers were busy that day in burning heaps of commissary and quartermaster's stores, while others loaded railway cars with the ammunition and shells of the siege guns, attached a locomotive under full head of steam, and, applying the torch, ran the ignited and exploding train into the river; still others set about the destruction of some of the officers' baggage. Meanwhile Keyes's corps marched across White Oak Swamp, and took a position to protect 5000 loaded wagons, 2500 head of cattle on the hoof, and the reserve artillery. Later in the day Porter followed. Everything progressed smoothly and in good order. It was a painful though necessary feature of the retreat that twenty five hundred sick and wounded who were in a summer hospital, with five hundred attendants, had been left behind.

Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.4. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].