History of the United States, v.3, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 16, Part 3: Internal Affairs of the Confederacy through Surrender of Ft. Donelson

The whole story of the people of the Confederacy during the war is one of such discomfort and privation that the demoralization prevalent, which seems to be an incident of all war and of large expenditure of public money, is sometimes lost sight of. This decay became apparent in Richmond in the year 1861. Vice had increased. Drunkenness and gambling were rampant. The simple and refined Virginia city had become an overgrown capital to which votaries of all sorts of wickedness flocked. The Examiner of October 22 spoke of "the rapid development of vice and vulgarity in Richmond," and asked, sarcastically, "Are not these the happy times of saturnalia?" 1 With the wide-spread gambling went extravagance, and, if Pollard may be credited, many defalcations of public money.2 The best women of Richmond undoubtedly exhibited in the first year of the war devotion to the Confederate soldiers and self-sacrifice; yet the evidence appears to show that there was some love of display, some extravagance, and some eagerness for gay excitement among people of quality after the battle of Bull Run which seemed to demonstrate that the Southerners would win their independence. Although commercial intercourse between the Union and the Confederacy had been declared unlawful by President Lincoln, under authority of an act of Congress, and the merchandise subject to confiscation,3 and although the bringing in of such goods was denounced in the South as a fraud on the Confederacy and as taking the gold out of the country, yet there was considerable smuggling. There is much complaint of speculators and extortioners who obtained goods from the North and sold them at extravagant profits. Jewish merchants were said to travel at pleasure between the Confederacy and the Union, wholly engaged in this illicit trade. The Richmond Examiner spoke of "the extensive system of smuggling which the dishonored and
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1 October 9 this journal had declared: "The city of Richmond is full of the vilest licentiousness. Among all the loathsome vices imported into it by the harpies who prey upon the army, that of gambling has become so prominent and brazen as to defy public decency as well as law, intruding its allurements on the most frequented parts of our most public streets. . . . The painted dens of San Francisco and 'hells' of the old federal city were not a whit more diabolical than the 'saloons' on Main Street, Richmond. . . . There is said to be now in this city a sufficient number of gamblers to form a regiment."
2 Life of Davis, p.153.
3 New York Tribune, August17; see, also, Schuckers's Chase, p. 318.

disreputable merchants of the South are carrying on across the northern border," and declared that "the smuggler is a worse enemy of the South than the infamous Dutchman who engages to shoot our people for thirteen dollars a month." 1 There was considerable intercourse between the North and the South, much of which the commanding generals on each side probably winked at. Northern newspapers were freely received at the South, and Southern journals found their way North. Exchange on New York was for a long time quoted regularly in the financial columns of the Richmond journals. As late as October 19 the Adams Express Company advertised in the Richmond newspapers that it would collect "notes, drafts, and bills, with or without goods, at all accessible points throughout the United States," and guarantee "prompt returns;" it also carried letters under certain conditions. Later still there were private letter-carriers going between Richmond and Washington and Maryland, who gained a good livelihood by charging $1.50 postage and bringing from the North divers articles which were desired in the Confederacy. In spite of the many discomforts and inconveniences, life in Richmond, as pictured in the newspapers and other contemporary accounts, does not seem to have been especially severe in the last half of 1861. The banks and railroad companies continued to pay dividends; Virginia State stock and Richmond city bonds appeared to have a ready sale. Business activity characterized the early days of the capital of the Confederacy. The factitious prosperity produced by the issue of paper money by the government was further stimulated by a flood of " shinplasters" which, to supply the place of silver small change that had disappeared, had been let loose by the corporation of Richmond, by the regular banks, and by spurious banking associations. The civil and criminal courts held their appointed terms. The advertisements in the journals are substantially such as appear in the time of peace,
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1 December 31.

and one notes with interest the usual announcements of runaway negroes. Most of the Southern cities celebrated the Fourth of July in the usual manner. Richmond had a merry Christmas. Its theatre was open and generally crowded; there were also concerts and balls. Its annual fair and cattle show, however, did not take place, for the Hermitage fair grounds had been converted into a vast camp. "Ceres has been dislodged by Mars," the chronicler said.1

Charleston did not share the prosperity of the Confederate capital.2 Its theatre was not open, and public amusements were almost entirely given up. Grinding necessity was the lot of that portion of the South the welfare of which depended on the marketing of the cotton crop. Cotton was kept in the interior and not sent forward to the shipping ports, for fear that by their capture it might fall into the hands of the enemy. When the federal forces took Port Royal and commanded the adjacent islands, on which was grown the sea-island cotton, the finest in the world, the planters without hesitation applied the torch to the year's product.3 December 11 Charleston suffered from a large
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1 Richmond Whig, October 1.
2 "We have suffered severely, we are suffering now. Property represents painfully uncertain sums. Business of all kinds is prostrated, fortunes have been swept away, and we have been forced to restrict our wants within the limits of mere comforts."—Charleston Courier, November 23.
3 "The Fires of Patriotism!—At eleven o'clock last night the heavens towards the southwest were brilliantly illuminated with the patriotic flames ascending from burning cotton. As the spectators witnessed it they involuntarily burst forth with cheer after cheer, and each heart was warmed as with a new pulse." "Burning the Crops.—We learn with gratification that the patriotic planters on the seaboard are hourly applying the torch to their cotton and other produce and effects. Those who have not had the heart to enter upon this work of praiseworthy patriotism and destruction themselves, have authorized the military authorities, before yielding anything that can in the least minister to Yankee lust and greed, to make the destruction complete before them. Parties from North Edisto and the neighborhood unite in asserting that cotton and valuables on the plantations, which could not be readily removed, were involved in one common flame and ruin."—Ibid., November 30. "The 'fires of patriotism' continue; thirteen cotton houses have been burnt on Port Royal Island, one on Paris, and one on St. Helena, since the Yankee occupation."—Charleston Courier, December 9; see, also, letter from Charleston of November 20 to the Manchester Guardian, cited in Life of Weed, vol. ii. p. 404.

fire. Five churches, the theatre, and several public buildings were burned, the loss being estimated at from five to seven millions. At any time this would have been a severe infliction upon a city of 48,000 people,1 but, following other grievous misfortunes, it was a hard blow to stand up under. But it did not daunt the spirit of the people. December 20 was the anniversary of the secession of South Carolina, and although St. Andrew's Hall, in which the ordinance had been passed, and Institute Hall, in which it had been ratified, were destroyed in the conflagration, the citizens of Charleston celebrated the return of the day, and gave mutual pledges that, in spite of their misfortunes, they had not a jot or tittle of regret for their action.2

Congress met December 2, and the next day heard the
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1 Census of 1861, Charleston Courier, November 4.
2 In addition to authorities specifically cited, I may say that in this account of life in the Confederacy I have studied the files of the Richmond Examiner, Whig, Enquirer, and Dispatch; the Charleston Courier; the Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Intelligencer, and Commonwealth. I refer particularly to the Richmond Examiner of June 5, 6, 20, 24, July 12, 23,25, August 1,9, September 6, 9, 20, 23,27, October 2, 8,9,10,11,12,15, 21, 30, November 6,9,11, 15, 22, December 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17; Richmond Enquirer, May 10, 15, 20-25, June 1,5, 26, July 2, 4,11, 25, 29, August 1, 3, 6, September 24, October 19, 31, November 1, 2; Richmond Whig, August 9, 13, September 3, 10, 20, 27, October 4, 5, 18, 29, November 1, December 20, 21, 27, 31; Richmond Dispatch, July 5, 25, August 6, 9,10,13,18, 20, October 1,2, 3, 5,8, November 12,13; Charleston Courier, July 29, 30, August 1, September 2, 4, 5, 7,11,21, 24,28, October 2, 5,8,9,18, 21, 22,24, November 11,12,13,25, 26,29, December 12,13,19, 20, 21; Atlanta Commonwealth, April 23, October 2; Atlanta Southern Confederacy, August 1, October 8, 12; Atlanta Daily Intelligencer, May 11, September 10; New Orleans Picayune, July 4, cited in Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. ii. p. 98; Pollard's First Year of the War (Richmond, 1862); Pollard's Life of Davis ; Davis's Confederate Government; A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Jones, vol. i.; Samuel Phillips Day's Down South; Mrs. Davis's Memoir of J. Davis, vol. ii.; Ely's Journal in Richmond; Richmond During the War, Sarah A. Putnam; Four Years in Rebel Capitals, T. C. De Leon; Life in the South, by a Blockaded British Subject (Catherine C. Hopley), vol. ii.

President's message. The reference in it to foreign affairs differed much from that of the previous 4th of July; the complacent tone had given way to one of sorrow and anxiety. Although Lincoln put the best face possible on the situation in general, we may gather from his omissions, as well as from his statements, that seven and one-half months of war had accomplished nothing towards bringing back into the Union a single one of the eleven Confederate States. In fact, the shedding of blood had made the chasm wider. The mention of that noble majority of Northern men on whom he relied for support and of whom he was fitly the representative served as a consolation. "It is gratifying to know," he said, "that the expenditures made necessary by the rebellion are not beyond the resources of the loyal people . .. that the patriotism of the people has proved equal to the occasion, and that the number of the troops tendered greatly exceeds the force which Congress authorized me to call into the field." He made no allusion to the exercise of extraordinary powers by the administration in which the warrant of the law had been exceeded; perhaps because he himself had misgivings about the necessity of many things that had been done by his agents. But the charge that the freedom of the press was materially abridged' is without full justification. Some restrictions were placed upon newspapers in Maryland and the other border States; editors were arrested in these States and also at the North; yet the impression one gets from perusing the Northern newspapers is that the public prints were substantially untrammelled.2 The subject of arbitrary arrests may not, however, be dismissed in a sentence. Fearing that the legislature of Maryland, which was to convene in September, would pass an ordinance of secession, the Secretary of War ordered the arrest of all or any part of its members and several citizens of Baltimore, if necessary, to prevent such action. Under
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1 See Russell's letter to the London Times, September 10.
2 This was also Dicey's opinion, Federal States, vol. i. p. 248.

this order General Dix apprehended ten members-elect of the legislature, the mayor of Baltimore, a congressman, and two editors; and at Frederick City, the meeting-place of the legislature, General Banks laid hold of "nine secession members." These men were subsequently confined in Fort Lafayette, New York, and in Fort Warren, Boston, where other state prisoners arrested in Kentucky and Missouri were also incarcerated.1 That these arrests were infractions of the Constitution need not for a moment be questioned. They were made on simple orders from the executive departments instead of on the proper warrants required by law. The prisoners were charged with no offence, were brought before no magistrate for examination, and the commandants of the military prisons were instructed to disregard any writ of habeas corpus issued in their behalf. Nevertheless, it would, it seems to me, be historical hypercriticism to find fault with the federal government for its exercise of these extraordinary powers in the border States. Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were high stakes which Lincoln and Davis were playing for, and that Lincoln won without lasting harm to the great rights of personal liberty must, in spite of some cases of injustice and many of hardship for opinion's sake, be a sufficient historical justification for his policy of precaution.2 In truth, that Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were for the Union, having furnished 40,000 soldiers for its army, and that western Virginia had been reclaimed, were almost the sole justification for the
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1 Official Records, vol. v. p. 193 et seq.; Marshall's American Bastile; Frank Key Howard's Fourteen Months in American Bastiles; letters of C. S. Morehead to J.J. Crittenden, Coleman's Crittenden, vol. ii. p.333 el seq.; Debate in the Senate, December 16,1861, and April 29, 1862; My Imprisonment, Rose O'N. Greenhow, London (1863).
2 See authorities cited in previous note; also Dicey's Federal States, vol. ii. p. 59. For Lincoln's statement regarding the Maryland arrests see Raymond's Lincoln, p. 378. Governor Hicks wrote General Banks, September 20: "We see the good fruit already produced by these arrests. We can no longer mince matters with these desperate people. I concur in all you have done."—Official Records, vol. v. p. 197.

President's statement in his message: "The cause of the Union is advancing steadily and certainly southward."

But this is not the whole story. Arbitrary arrests were made in the Northern States where the courts were open and where the regular administration of justice had not been interrupted by any overt acts of rebellion. Among the arrests were those of two men at Malone, a village in the extreme northern part of New York; an editor of the New York Daily News, at Burlington, N. J.; two citizens of Maine; a Vermont farmer, being enticed from his farm to Bennington, two miles away; a crippled newsboy for selling the New York Daily News on the Naugatuck Railroad, Connecticut; several citizens of Connecticut for getting up "peace meetings." There were many other similar cases. Most of these were apprehended by order of the Secretary of State, the others by that of the Secretary of War. Sometimes the authority of the officer was a simple telegram; in no case was the warrant such as the Constitution required. Little wonder was it that the critics of the administration asseverated that these arrests were made on lettres-de-cachet. These men, like those arrested from the border States, were charged with no offence, they were examined by no magistrate, and they were confined in Fort Lafayette or Fort Warren as prisoners of state.1 The justification made in
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1Marshall's American Bastile; Debate in the Senate, December 16. "The United States government assumes the right to arrest persons in any part of the country, and to keep them during its pleasure in confinement in charge of military officers. The courts of law are unable to give any redress, as the officers of the army decline to make any return to writs of habeas corpus."—Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, September 6, British Blue -Book. In a lecture delivered in New York and Boston, December, 1861, Wendell Phillips said: "Lieber says that habeas corpus, free meetings like this, and a free press are the three elements which distinguish liberty from despotism. All that Saxon blood has gained in the battles and toils of two hundred years are these three things. But to-day, Mr. Chairman, every one of them —habeas corpus, the right of free meeting, and a free press—is annihilated in every square mile of the republic. We live to-day, every one of us, under martial law. The Secretary of State puts into his bastile, with a warrant as irresponsible as that of Louis, any man whom he pleases. And you know that neither press nor lips may venture to arraign the government without being silenced. At this moment one thousand men at least are 'bastiled' by an authority as despotic as that of Louis, three times as many as Eldon and George III. seized when they trembled for his throne. . . . For the first time on this continent we have passports, which even Louis Napoleon pronounces useless and odious. For the first time in our history government spies frequent our great cities."

the Senate of these stretches of authority was that the persons apprehended were, by treasonable speaking and writing, giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and that their imprisonment was necessary for the safety of the republic. Yet the matter did not go unquestioned. Senator Trumbull introduced a resolution asking information from the Secretary of State in regard to these arrests, and in his remarks supporting it pointed out the injustice and needlessness of such procedure. "What are we coming to," he asked, "if arrests may be made at the whim or the caprice of a cabinet minister ?" and when Senator Hale asked, " Have not arrests been made in violation of the great principles of our Constitution ?" no one could gainsay it.

Public sentiment, however, sustained the administration in this action, and it was only from a minority in the Senate and in the country that the murmurs came.1 Nevertheless,
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1 "The applause with which each successive stretch of power is received by the people is a very alarming symptom to the friends of liberty and law."—Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, September 16, British Blue Book. Count Gurowski wrote in his Diary, January, 1862: "The thus called arbitrary acts of the government prove how easily, on the plea of patriotic necessity, a people, nay, the public opinion, submits to arbitrary rule. All this, servility included, explains the facility with which, in former times, concentrated and concrete despotisms have been established. Here every such arbitrary action is submitted to because it is so new, and because the people has the childish naive, but to it honorable, confidence that the power intrusted by the people is used in the interest and for the welfare of the people. But all the despots of all times and of all nations said the same. However, in justice to Mr. Lincoln, he is pure and has no despotical longings, but he has around him some atomistic Torquemadas."

This is also evident from the debate and action of the Senate. Trumbull's resolution was referred to the judiciary committee, of which he was chairman, but there it slept. Late in the session a bill relating to state prisoners passed the House (Congressional Globe, pp. 3106, 3184). Trumbull pressed this in the Senate, but was unable to get it considered. See, also, Raymond's Lincoln, p. 878; Trollope's North America, vol. ii. p. 205.

the protests were emphatic and couched in irrefutable logic.1 The criticisms were directed against Seward, who was deemed responsible for this policy. The Secretary of State, so Senator Pearce, of Maryland, asserted by implication, sits in his office, and by "a dash of his pen" sets "the electric fire in motion to order arrests at Cincinnati, at Chicago, at Baltimore, or even in Connecticut." 2 In truth, the apprehension of men in Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, and northern New York on suspicion that they were traitors, instead of leaving them to be dealt with by the public sentiment of their thoroughly loyal communities, savored rather of the capriciousness of an absolute monarch than of a desire to govern in a constitutional manner. A clever journalist, who had good opportunities for observation during the war, maintains that Seward was intoxicated with power, loving to exercise it with mere wantonness;3 and such a conception of his character serves well to explain many of his acts. The mischief of this policy was immediate, in that it gave a handle to the Democratic opposition, probably increasing its strength, and in that it furnished our critics over the sea an additional opportunity for detraction. The remote consequences which were feared—that our people would lose some of their liberties, that we had begun to tread the well-worn path from democracy to despotism— have not been realized.

It is true that acts of a cabinet minister, unless disavowed by the President, become his own acts, and in so far he must be held responsible for these arbitrary arrests. Nevertheless, it is not probable that Lincoln of his own motion would have ordered them, for although at times he acted without warrant of the Constitution, he had a profound
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1 See editorials in New York Tribune, September 19, October 21; Trumbull and Hale's remarks in the Senate, December 16.
2 December 16, Congressional Globe, p. 94.
3 Donn Piatt's Memories of Men who Saved the Union, p. 79.

reverence for it, showing in all his proceedings that he much preferred to keep within the strict limits of the letter and spirit of the organic law of the land, and that he exercised or permitted others to exercise arbitrary power with keen regret. It was undoubtedly disagreeable to him to be called by Vallandigham the Caesar of the American Republic,' and by Wendell Phillips "a more unlimited despot than the world knows this side of China," 2 and to be aware that Senator Grimes described a call at the White House for the purpose of seeing the President, as an attempt "to approach the footstool of the power enthroned at the other end of the avenue."3 The executive order issued February 14,1862, in the name of the Secretary of War, is evidence that Lincoln had no love for arbitrary arrests and cruel punishments and was willing to set limits to his own power. He directed "that all political prisoners or state prisoners now held in military custody be released on their subscribing to a parole engaging them to render no aid or comfort to the enemies in hostility to the United States;" to such as should keep their parole he granted " an amnesty for any past offences of treason or disloyalty which they may have committed;" the conclusion of the order was: "Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone."4 A commission which was at once appointed to carry this order into effect released many prisoners from custody.

The remark which Thucydides puts into the mouth of one of his characters, "War is not an affair of arms, but of money which gives to arms their use," fitly introduces a record of our financial operations. The Secretary of the Treasury reported that from July 1 to September 30, the first quarter of the fiscal year, the actual expenses of the
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1 Congressional Globe Appendix, p. 46.
2 Dicey's report of a speech he heard at Washington, Federal States, vol. i. p. 180.
3 Congressional Globe, p. 811.
4 Raymond's Lincoln, p. 880.

government had been $98,000,000, of which $7,500,000,1 or less than 8 per cent., had been derived from customs and miscellaneous sources, the receipts of revenue from duties not having come up to his expectations, and the taxation imposed at the special session of Congress yielding as yet no returns. Up to December 1 he had realized from loans $197,000,000. Of this amount there had been obtained $100,000,000 from the sale of three-years' bonds bearing 7.30 per cent, interest, and nearly $46,000,000 from the negotiation of $50,000,000 twenty-year 6 per cent, bonds on a 7 per cent. basis. The balance had come from the issue of United States notes payable on demand without interest,' and by the sale or by the payment to creditors of 6 per cent, notes, part of them running sixty days and part of them two years. The secretary estimated the expenses for the whole of the fiscal year at $543,000,000. He hoped the ordinary revenues would reach $40,000,000, and he recommended additional taxation to that provided by the act of August 5, so that an aggregate amount of $50,000,000 might be obtained. The balance must come from loans, some of which had been negotiated, but about $250,000,000 remained to be provided for by loans between December 9, 1861, the date of the secretary's report, and June 30, 1862, the close of the fiscal year. Chase would not recommend the further issue of United States notes, but advocated a national banking system, similar in its salient features to that of the present, which should work the gradual retirement of the notes of the State banks. The balance-sheet was not a cheerful one for a finance minister to present to the House of Representatives; there went with it an urging of retrenchment and reform in the public expenditures.

The only comfort which the secretary could find in the situation was that there had been "a considerable improvement in the condition of trade and industry." During the
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1 In treating of the financial operations round numbers are used.
2 $24,550,326 of these had been issued.

first months of 1861, on account of the political troubles, business men had gasped for breath. The outbreak of the war paralyzed trade. The loss of Southern custom was grievously felt by Eastern merchants and manufacturers, and the prospect of it had much to do with the eagerness of New York city for compromise while the question of compromise was mooted. The practical repudiation of commercial debts due the North by the South, the amount being estimated as high as $200,000,000,1 brought disaster and downfall. "The fabric of New York's mercantile prosperity," declared the New York Tribune of May 27, "lies in ruins, beneath which ten thousand fortunes are buried. . . . Last fall the merchant was a capitalist; to-day he is a bankrupt.'" Many men of wealth, apprehensive for the stability of the government, transferred their property to Europe,3 but how the country's cause lay at the heart of the people is exemplified by Asa Gray. "My wife and I," he wrote, October 4, "have scraped up $550, all we can scrape, and lent it to the United States."4 The financial pressure was severe. "I had a little Italian bluster of brushwood fire yesterday morning," said Lowell, in a private letter," but the times are too hard with me to allow of such an extravagance except on the brink of gelation. The horror of my tax-bill has so infected my imagination that I see myself and all my friends begging entrance to the P. H. (From delicacy I use initials.)"5 "The 1st of January
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1 New York Tribune, September 18; President's message of December 3.
2 The Tribune of September 18 said: "New York was largely a creditor of the South, and rebellion was held by her debtors throughout the seceded States as a receipt in full for the amount of their obligations. Not that a part of them have not professed and perhaps cherished a vague intent to pay some time or other, but there was no solace in this for the present sufferings of our prostrated merchants. Not less than $200,000,000 of Southern indebtedness to our city was blotted out as in a night. . . . Trade, of course, for a season sank to zero." See, also, Trollope's North America, vol. ii. p.76.
3 Schuckers's Chase, p. 330; Hooper in House of Representatives, February 3, 1862.
4 Letters, p. 470.
5 To Miss Norton, September 28, Letters, vol. i. p. 815.

January," wrote Emerson in 1862, " has found me in quite as poor a plight as the rest of the Americans. Not a penny from my books since last June, which usually yield five or six hundred a year; no dividends from the banks or from Lidian's Plymouth property. Then almost all income from lectures has quite ceased, so that your letter found me in a study how to pay three or four hundred dollars with fifty. ... I have been trying to sell a wood lot at or near its appraisal, which would give me something more than three hundred, but the purchaser does not appear. Meantime we are trying to be as unconsuming as candles under an extinguisher, and 'tis frightful to think how many rivals we have in distress and in economy. But far better that this grinding should go on bad and worse than we be driven by any impatience into a hasty peace or any peace restoring the old rottenness."1

The loans, amounting to $146,000,000, which Chase had negotiated, had been taken by the banks of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. To assist them in bearing the burden, he had "caused books of subscription to be opened throughout the country, and the people subscribed freely to the loan." These transactions had been made on a specie basis, involving the actual disbursement by the banks of a large amount of coin. The secretary and the banks worked together harmoniously, the banks appreciating that they and the government must stand or fall together.2 But these loans exhausted their resources. Saturday night, December 28,1861, the managers of the New York banks, after a meeting of six hours, decided that they must suspend specie payments. Gold soon brought a slight premium. This condition had to be considered by the House committee of ways and means, as, in conjunction with Chase, it matured its financial measure. The senators and representatives,
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1 J. E. Cabot's Emerson, vol. ii. p. 612.
2 An interesting account of some of these negotiations is given by Maunsell B. Field in chap. viii. of his Memories of Many Men and Some Women.


tives, being in closer contact with the people than the Secretary of the Treasury, were aware of their willingness and even eagerness to be taxed, notwithstanding that this generation had not known the imposition of a direct tax, an excise, or internal duties by the federal government. In January, 1862, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring their purpose of raising from taxation and from the tariff on imports at least $150,000,000.1 Thus there was a substantial agreement that any financial plan adopted must involve a material increase of taxation; accordingly a sub-committee of the ways and means went to work on a bill which should carry out the sentiment of Congress. To frame a tax-bill and get it through the House and the Senate would, however, require considerable time; when enacted, its operation would bring money into the Treasury but slowly. To devise immediate means to carry on the war was the province of another sub-committee of three, of which Spaulding, a bank president of Buffalo, was chairman. He went diligently to work as soon as the secretary's report was made. In a private letter of January 8, 1862, he stated the problem: "We must have at least $100,000,000 during the next three months, or the government must stop payment."' The question was, How should that sum be raised? Moreover, as Thaddeus Stevens, the chairman of the ways and means committee, said,2 the expenses of the government were $2,000,000 a day; the banks had broken down under the last loan to the Treasury and suspended specie payments, and they would not receive the Treasury demand notes; the secretary had attempted to pay creditors in the 7.30 bonds, but
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1 On public sentiment favorable to large taxation see New York World and New York Times, December 30,1861; article of Bryant in New York Evening Post of February 1, Godwin, vol. ii. p. 164; Hooper, February 3, and Roscoe Conkling, February 4, 1862, in the House of Representatives; letter of Asa Gray, February 20, 1862, Letters, p. 471.
2 History of the Legal-Tender Paper Money Issued during the Great Rebellion, E. G. Spaulding, p. 18. 3 February 6.

they at once declined 4 per cent. Spaulding's plan was to issue $100,000,000 of non-interest-bearing Treasury notes, making them receivable for all debts and demands due the United States, and a legal tender in payment of all debts public and private; it also made a legal tender the $50,000,000 of Treasury notes authorized by the act of the previous July. The legal-tender notes were to be exchangeable at par for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds, the issue of $500,000,000 of which should be authorized. This, in the form of a bill, the ways and means committee by a majority of one adopted, and Spaulding reported it to the House. Although in favor of the national banking scheme, he argued that it could not be adopted soon enough for immediate relief. Samuel Hooper, of Boston, a gentleman of large business experience, who had served on the sub-committee with Spaulding, and earnestly supported his plan, maintained that it was necessary to make the Treasury notes legal tender to render the government financially independent ;1 and Stevens asserted that without this quality the notes would not be taken by the banks or the people, and if forced upon the contractors and soldiers, they must "submit to a heavy shave before they could use them.'" Spaulding, Hooper, and Stevens agreed that the only other way of providing the immediate means was to sell the bonds of the government on the market for what they would fetch, as had been done in the War of 1812. While money for commercial purposes could be had at 5 per cent., the government could not borrow at 7.30, and large quantities of bonds forced on the market would cause a ruinous discount. Spaulding and Stevens thought that the 6 per cent, bonds would not bring more than sixty cents on the dollar; and "even then," Stevens declared, " it would be found impossible to find payment in coin." Their argument was summed up in the few words in which they both stated it: "This bill is a measure of necessity, not of choice."
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1 House, February 3.
2 Ibid., February ft

The opponents of the section making the treasury demand notes legal tender had the best of the argument. It is, declared Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, "a measure not blessed by one sound precedent, and damned by all;" you will "vastly increase the cost of carrying on the war" by the inflation of the currency; and you are exercising "an inferential or doubtful power" of the Constitution. Roscoe Conkling said that on the plea of necessity we were "invited to leave the trodden paths of safety, and seek new methods of 'coining false moneys from that crucible called debt';" he refuted the argument of necessity; he argued that the bill was "of very doubtful constitutionality," and that its moral imperfections were equally serious; "it will," he averred, "proclaim throughout the country a saturnalia of fraud, a carnival for rogues."1

After the Legal-tender bill had been reported, delegates from the banks of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston went to Washington to oppose its passage. They, with members of the boards of trade of several cities, met, January 11, the Secretary of the Treasury and several members of the ways and means committee of the House and of the committee of finance of the Senate. James Gallatin, a son of the great minister of finance, submitted a plan on the part of the banks, which was not satisfactory to the congressmen and senators present.2 Four days later, however, Chase and the bank delegates agreed upon a scheme3 which avoided making the Treasury notes a legal tender, and which comprised the passage by Congress, as soon as possible, of a National Banking act. The delegates then went home to urge the plan upon the bankers of their cities. January 20 the Boston delegate telegraphed that the Boston banks would not assent to the proposed arrangement; after which the Secretary of the Treasury no longer objected to the legal-tender
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1 House, February 4.
2 For the plan and objections see Spaulding, pp. 20, 21 ; also Gallatin's letter to Fessenden, printed in New York Tribune, December 31, 1861.
3 See Spaulding, p. 21; Warden, p. 406.

clause. January 22 he wrote a letter to Spaulding, expressing his regret that the course proposed should be deemed necessary.1 This being regarded as non-committal, the ways and means committee formally asked his opinion as to the propriety and necessity of the immediate passage of the bill by Congress. To this he replied January 29: "It is not unknown to the committee that I have felt, nor do I wish to conceal that I now feel, a great aversion to making anything but coin a legal tender in payment of debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is, however, at present impossible, in consequence of the large expenditures entailed by the war and the suspension of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements; and it has, therefore, become indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes. The making them a legal tender might, however, still be avoided if the willingness manifested by the people generally, by railroad companies, and by many of the banking institutions to receive them and pay them as money in all transactions were absolutely or practically universal; but, unfortunately, there are some persons and some institutions which refuse to receive and pay them, and whose action tends not merely to the unnecessary depreciation of the notes, but to establish discriminations in business against those who, in this matter, give a cordial support to the government, and in favor of those who do not. Such discriminations should, if possible, be prevented; and the provision making the notes a legal tender, in a great measure at least, prevents it, by putting all citizens, in this respect, on the same level, both of rights and duties." 2 This letter was read in the House by Spaulding, and, the secretary's authority being great, contributed much to the passage of the bill.

The Legal-tender act was passed by Congress for the reason that its supporters honestly believed the alternative to be a wasteful and even ruinous method of conducting the war. But they were mistaken. From the recommendations
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1 Spaulding, p. 27.
2 Congressional Globe, p. 618,

of the bankers and business men, and from their conferences with the Secretary of the Treasury and the senators and representatives, there was evolved a plan which was introduced into the House by Morrill, as the report of the minority of the ways and means committee, and which would apparently have provided for the pressing exigency. Recognizing that the government could not borrow for less than 7.30 per cent., Morrill proposed to have $200,000,000 of the $500,000,000 bonds issued at that rate, and, in addition, $100,000,000 of Treasury notes bearing interest at 3.65 per cent., payable in two years; these notes should be receivable for all debts and demands due the United States except duties on imports, should be paid out for the government salaries and supplies, and should be exchangeable at par for the 7.30 bonds; they were not to be made a legal tender.1 This plan, if adopted, would probably have been followed by the passage of a national banking act, instead of deferring it, as was actually the case, to the next session of this Congress. In the light of the plain principles of finance, and the results which followed our financial legislation, it seems clear that making the Treasury notes a legal tender was not a measure of economy, as it is conceded that our war was one of the most expensive ever waged. Spaulding and Stevens were perturbed at the possibility of the government stock selling at sixty cents on the dollar, but in a little more than two years they saw Europe buy our 6 per cent, bonds at about thirty-five cents.2 Whether Morrill's plan would have been less extravagant than Spaulding's depended on the avoidance of continued issues of Treasury notes, which was the result of the actual legislation, and on the conduct of the war according to business principles, by
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1 For full text of this substitute see Congressional Globe, p. 693. When voted on, February 6, it was slightly different from Morrill's statement of it, February 4, ibid., p. 632.
2 Francis A. Walker and Henry Adams, Adams's Historical Essays, p. 301 ; see the discussion of the financial management of the war in Henry C. Adams's Public Debts, p. 127 et seq.

selling the bonds on the market for what they would fetch. The choice lay between a forced loan without interest, as was the Legal-tender act,' or a voluntary loan from bonds and from interest-bearing Treasury notes not made a legal tender. It is an illusion to suppose that a government can in the long-run borrow on better terms by a forced than by a voluntary loan. There can be no doubt that if the committee of ways and means and Chase had set themselves resolutely to work to carry on the war on a policy of adequate taxation and voluntary loans, they would have succeeded as well as they did, and at a smaller cost than on the plan actually put in force. When the main factors of financial success were the resources and good-will of an energetic and fairly wealthy people, in conjunction with military achievements, it is ridiculous to maintain that the only feasible financial scheme was one at war with plain economic truths. If we arrive, then, at the conclusion—which it seems to me a careful consideration of all the facts must bring us to—that the Legal-tender act was neither necessary nor economical, what a pernicious piece of legislation it turned out to be! 2 It was grossly unjust, in that it made pre-existing
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1 On legal-tender notes being a forced loan, see Henry C. Adams's Public Debts, pp. 144-46. He says: "When a government decides in favor of forced circulation, it takes a step leading inevitably to the inflation of general prices, and to the depreciation of its own obligations of every sort. . . . Voluntary loans must be accepted as the only permanent and satisfactory foundation of credit transactions."

Baron von Hock, the Austrian financier, in his valuable Die Finanzen und die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten (Stuttgart, 1867), regards the issue of paper money during the war as unavoidable (pp. 471-72). The issue of paper money, he says, is conceded to be justifiable when a State is involved in a struggle for its own existence after all resources as those of taxation and credit are exhausted; but it is, he declares, the most expensive and detrimental of all means of raising revenue (pp. 455-56). His work gives a detailed account of the actual processes of the financial administration of the war. See, also, London Economist, January 18, May 17, June 28, 1862; Professor F. W. Taussig, ch. xii. vol. ii., of The United States of America, edited by N. S. Shaler (Appleton, 1894); Hugh McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century, p. 175.
2 Bryant, in an article in the Evening Post of February 14, entitled '' A Deluge at Hand," wrote, "The dikes of Holland were once pierced by a water-rat, and, the opening made by the animal rapidly enlarging, the ocean rushed in, sweeping away its barriers, and the land was laid under water," and he suggested that the following lines be prefixed to the bill:

"I hear a lion in the lobby roar;
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door?
Or shall we rather let the lion in,
And try if we can turn him out again?"

debts payable in a currency of less value than that in which they had been contracted, and it debauched the public mind by inculcating, on high authority, the notion that all requisite value could be given to money by decree. Eight years later, Chief Justice Chase said from his high seat that the Legal-tender act violated justice, that it was inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, and that it was prohibited by the Constitution.1 Francis A. Walker and Henry Adams wrote shortly afterwards: "The law of legal tender was an attempt by artificial legislation to make something true which was false." 2

We may regret that the good law, the good business sense, and the correct economic principles which Chief Justice Chase enounced in his two opinions on the Legal-tender act did not prevail with him in January and February, 1862. Had Secretary Chase followed out his first impresion______________________

1 8 Wallace, pp. 624, 625.
2 North American Review, April, 1870; Henry Adams's Historical Essays, p. 307. This essay, entitled "The Legal Tender Act," is an interesting and valuable historical review of this legislation, considered in the light of economic truths. In connection with it the article "The Bank of England Restriction," by Adams, in the same volume, is worthy of attention. The experience of England in the long French wars from 1793 to 1815 was appealed to by both sides in the debates in Congress. Reasoning from English experience, as shown in Adams's thorough and fair historical study, it seems to me clear that the Morrill plan, with the necessary consequences, would have proved more economical than the Spaulding scheme, for it is probable it would have kept our paper money nearer to a specie basis, and had it done so, it is obvious, the expense of the war would not have been so great. See a table calculated by Henry C. Adams, showing the gold value of Treasury receipts from public obligations of all sorts during the war, Public Debts, p. 131.

and vigorously opposed it, thus making himself a rallying-point for the Republican opponents, he could undoubtedly have defeated it, for he had much influence and a large following. When George Bancroft wrote him, "I am one of those who repose confidence in your superior ability and inflexible integrity,"1 the historian spoke for thousands of intelligent men, some of whom grieved sorely at Chase's action. "Let me say plainly," wrote William Cullen Bryant to Sumner," Mr. Chase is wrecking himself in the course he is steering, and I feel some solicitude that you should not drive upon the same rock."2 While it is proper that the economist should condemn the Secretary of the Treasury for his departure from the sound principles which he understood, it is right that the historian should remember that it is not so easy to arrive at a correct judgment in the harassing office of a finance minister who has a bankrupt treasury and large pressing obligations, as it is in the cool seclusion of the study. Nor must it be forgotten that the business men and bankers of the country differed from one another, and that their individual opinions fluctuated from day to day.3
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1 Letter of December 24, 1861, Chase Papers, MS.
2 Letter of February 13, Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.
3 Fessenden said in the Senate, February 12: "I declare here today that in the whole number of learned financial men that I have consulted, I never have found any two of them who agree; and, therefore, it is hardly worth while for us to plead any very remarkable degree of ignorance when nobody is competent to instruct us; and yet such is the fact. I can state to you, Mr. President, that on one day I was advised very strongly by a leading financial man at all events to oppose this legal-tender clause; he exclaimed against it with all the bitterness in the world. On the very same day I received a note from a friend of his, telling me that we could not get along without it. I showed it to him, and he expressed his utter surprise. He went home, and next day telegraphed to me that he had changed his mind, and now thought it was absolutely necessary; and his friend who wrote to me wrote again that he had changed his [laughter], and they were two of the most eminent financial men in the country."—Congressional Globe, p. 766. Blaine (Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i. p. 423) states that these gentlemen were James Gallatin and Morris Ketchum of New York city. Ketchum bad taken great interest in the subject, and, as a letter of James C. Welling to Chase of December 25, 1861, in the Chase Papers discloses, had written two communications to the National Intelligencer, discussing the new paper currency proposed by the secretary in his report. William Gray, a representative of Boston manufacturers, business men, and society, wrote Sumner, January 20: "The truth is, quackery is the order of the day; self-interest is working with immense power at Washington. Unpaid creditors of government, speculators, debtors, and many creditors who believe their debtors will be more able to pay in paper depreciated than in coin or specie equivalent, all urge disastrous measures. . . . There is no safety but in sound principles; events are too momentous for novel experiments; stand on the old landmarks of finance and we shall be safe." Amos A. Lawrence wrote Sumner, February 6: "There is great anxiety and considerable distress here among those who have had contracts with government, owing to the large amount long since due and unpaid. On this account it would be impossible for government at this time to purchase in this vicinity at a fair rate. When payment shall be made in the new issue of Treasury notes, it is absolutely necessary that these notes shall be a legal tender, however objectionable it may be in principle." C. H. Dalton, a representative business man, wrote, February 6, that half a dozen of the leading houses of Boston engaged in domestic manufactures and representing transactions amounting to thirty-five to forty millions annually, had united, in a letter to Representative Thomas, who opposed Spaulding's bill, affirming that "the legal-tender clause is a sad but necessary expedient." Edward Atkinson wrote, February 7: "In the accompanying letter I state my belief in the legal tender clause as a sad necessity. By this I mean that I fear it must pass. I do not believe in the real necessity. You cannot thus force a loan upon the people without depreciation. Nothing but confidence will give the government its money, and taxes, direct, immediate, and large, will thus give confidence; then small and large notes will pass freely, without the legal-tender clause." George Morey, a representative politician, wrote, February 8: "It is considered essential to our salvation that this bill should go promptly through the Senate. I have taken pains to converse with our most sagacious capitalists, bank men, and merchants, and they say that if this bill lags, and is not put through straight, we are doomed." These letters are from Boston, Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. William M. Evarts wrote Weed, February 2:" Our finances are in disorder and the administration in disgrace." A. T. Stewart wrote Weed, February 4, that "the finances of the government [are] now wretchedly managed."—Life of Weed, vol. ii. pp. 411, 412. Spaulding, in his book, prints many private letters to him, largely from bankers, favoring the legal-tender provision, and (p. 18) gives the opinion of the New York city press.

1 8 Wallace, 625; 12 Wallace, 575.

Chase explains his inconsistency in a frank manner,1 which excuses, but does not fully justify, his action as Secretary of the Treasury. He was not a trained financier, but he had a large, assimilating mind, and was able to learn the lessons of his new business fast.1 Having arrived at the conviction that prompt and decided action was imperatively necessary, and that the only measure which could speedily get through Congress was the bill of the ways and means committee, he gave it an earnest support. "Mr. Seward said to me on yesterday," he wrote Spaulding, February 3, "that you observed to him that my hesitation in coming up to the legal tender proposition embarrassed you, and I am very sorry to observe it, for my anxious wish is to support you in all respects. It is true that I came with reluctance to the conclusion that the legal-tender clause is a necessity, but I came to it decidedly and I support it earnestly. I do not hesitate when I have made up my mind, however much regret I may feel over the necessity of the conclusion to which I have come. . . . Immediate action is of great importance. The Treasury is nearly empty. I have been obliged to draw for the last instalment of the November loan; so soon as it is paid I fear the banks generally will refuse to receive the United States notes. You will see the necessity of urging the bill through without more delay." 3

February 6 the Legal-tender act passed the House by a vote of 93 to 59. Most of the Democrats voted nay, but the Republicans who divided from the majority of their party were of the best and ablest members of the body.4 The bill went to the Senate. Fessenden and Collamer opposed the legal-tender clause. Sumner4 and Sherman ad
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1 See Hugh McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century, p. 185. 2 Spaulding, p. 59; part of this letter was read in the House by Spaulding, February 3; see, also, Chase's letter of February 5, ibid., p. 71; also his letter to Bryant of February 4, Godwin, vol. ii. p. 165.
3 The nays were 29 Democrats, 13 Unionists, and 17 Republicans; 5 Democrats voted yea.
4 W. C. Bryant wrote Sumner confidentially, February 13: "I hope you do not mean to vote for the legal-tender clause in the Treasury-note bill, nor for the bill with that clause in it. It is clear to me that the framers of the Constitution never meant to confer upon the federal government the right of issuing Treasury notes at all, and the reason was that they meant to tie its hands from making them a legal tender. . . . The idea of a necessity for the measure is the shallowest of delusions. My friend Mr. John D. Van Buren, now at Washington in consultation with the ways and means committee on the taxation question—a better theoretical and practical political economist than any bank cashier or president in the country — can give you in ten minutes a scheme which will be sure to revive the credit of the country, and furnish the means of carrying on the war."—Pierce Sumner Papers, MS.

advocated it on the ground of necessity, and they both laid great stress on the point that it had the support of the Secretary of the Treasury. Without that, indeed, it would not have received the assent of the Senate. The crucial vote was on the motion to strike out the legal-tender clause, which was lost by 22 nays to 17 yeas.1 The bill, with several amendments, then easily passed the Senate, but before it became a law it had to go to a committee of conference. The important amendment to the House bill there agreed to was that the $500,000,000 of bonds were made 5-20's, and the interest on them was required to be paid in coin. This was to be procured by exacting the payment of the duties on imports in the same currency.

President Lincoln approved the bill February 25, but before this time his hand does not appear in this legislation. His private secretaries write that the affairs of the Treasury engaged his attention less than those of some other departments.2

The Confederate States never made their treasury notes a legal tender. The policy began to be seriously advocated early in 1862, the argument of necessity being brought into service; it came up for consideration by the Confederate congress from time to time during two years, but the belief that such an act would be unconstitutional — the provisions of the Federal and Confederate constitutions relating to the question
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1 Eight Republicans, 7 Democrats, 2 Unionists made up the affirmative vote; 2 Democrats voted in the negative.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 247.

tion were substantially the same — stood mainly in the way of its adoption.1

The Secretary of War, in his report to the President of December 1, estimated the strength of the army at 660,971 men; he had no doubt that a million troops might have been raised had not the number been restricted by Congress. Under instructions from the executive he had sent a special agent to Europe to purchase $2,000,000 worth of arms. He spoke highly of McClellan, who by energy and ability in the organization of the army had justly won "the confidence and applause of the troops and of the nation." The most important part of this report as originally written was omitted in the final revision. The secretary made the suggestion, in terms which could be construed to recommend it strongly, that the slaves should be armed, and when employed as soldiers should be freed. Without submission to Lincoln, the report as thus drawn had been mailed to the postmasters of the chief cities, with instructions to hand it to the press as soon as the President's message was read in Congress. When Lincoln ascertained this, he insisted that the copies which had been sent out should be recalled by telegraph, and that the report should be modified to accord with his own policy in regard to slavery.2

The astounding portion of Cameron's report was his reference " with great gratification ... to the economical administration of affairs displayed in the various branches of the service." In many ways, owing to the executive ability of Thomas A. Scott, assistant secretary, and to the capacity and honesty of Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster-General, the management of the War Department had been efficient and honest; but where the hand of its chief could be traced, a line of peculation followed. Instead of contracts, which mounted up to enormous sums, being awarded with an eye
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1 See J. C. Schwab, Political Science Quarterly, March, 1892; Richmond Dispatch, April 11; Charleston Mercury, April 10.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 125; Congressional Globe, 2d Session 37th Congress

single to the advantage of the government, they were, in many cases, given out to Cameron's political followers and henchmen as a reward for past services or in anticipation of future work. To cite the report of the committee on government contracts would profit us little, for it does not in set terms express the logical deductions which may be drawn from it; to analyze its testimony and point out special instances of apparent fraud would be tedious and might be inconclusive; but I venture the statement that no man of judgment can go over that report and that testimony, and check them by the opinions of honest and well-informed men of the day, without arriving at the conviction that the conduct of the Secretary of War was not that of a correct business man. There is no evidence of which I am aware that any of the money which was made out of the government by exorbitant prices, commissions, and the delivery of inferior goods found its way into Cameron's pocket. He had an ample fortune when he received the portfolio of the War Department,1 and that he was rich when he gave it up cannot be urged against him, but the suspicion existed at the time that he had not been clear in his great office. From the nature of the case it is impossible for me to mention all the evidence that has led me to these conclusions; but it is such that I could have no hesitation, although I have had regret, in expressing them. Some of the evidence to the extravagance and the worse than extravagance in the War Department I shall, however, adduce. "The truth is," said Senator Grimes to Fessenden, in a letter from Washington, November 13, 1861, " we are going to destruction as fast as imbecility, corruption, and the wheels of time can carry us;" further on he referred to "the flood of corruption that is sweeping over the land and perverting the moral sense of the people. The army is in most inextricable confusion, and is every day becoming worse and worse."2
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1 New York Tribune, November 5, 1861.
2 Life of Grimes, Salter, p. 156.

"The want of success of our armies," Chase wrote Cameron, November 27,1861, "and the difficulties of our financial operations, have not been in consequence of a want or excess of men, but for want of systematic administration. If the lack of economy and the absence of accountability are allowed to prevail in the future as in the past, bankruptcy and the success of the rebellion will be necessary consequences." 1 "We are thinking of a public meeting in favor of rigid economy in the public expenditures," wrote George Bancroft to Chase, from New York, December 24, 1861; "there is no use in disguising the consequences of our present extravagance."2 Nesmith, a Democrat from Oregon, and Hale declared in the open Senate that men high in office had been guilty of corruption;3 and Powell, a Democrat of Kentucky, put the charge more precisely. "If the statements contained in the report of the committee of investigation of the other House on government contracts are true," he said, "the head of the War Department and the head of the Navy Department must be written down in public opinion as possessed of a very great degree of stupidity or knavery. From one or the other they cannot escape."4 While it is true that one instance unearthed by the House committee reflected as severely on the Secretary of the Navy5 as anything it brought to light against the Secretary of War, several senators were at once ready to declare their unbounded confidence in the honesty of Welles, but none of them during this debate spoke for Cameron.6 The House
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1 Schuckers, p. 280.
2 Chase Papers, MS. 2 January 7, 1862, Congressional Globe, p. 203. 3 Ibid., p. 207. For other references to corruption in high places, see Conkling, pp. 85, 638, Dawes, pp. 298, 1382, 1840, Morrill, p. 632, Van Wyck, p. 711.
4 See Report of Committee, pp. 21, 24, 31, 34; Trollope's North America, vol. ii. p. 148. 6 Wilson, p. 205, Hale and Dixon, p. 246, Congressional Globe. In Sumner's private correspondence I find a letter from Montgomery Blair of January 14, 1862, testifying to Welles's invariable honesty. A good many people were thinking as A. B. Ely expressed it in a private letter to Sumner of January 14: "Cameron's report which contained the suppressed part about contrabands was got up by him and put out by him not because he cared anything about the slaves, but merely as a tub to the popular whale, so as to turn away inquiry from the corruptions of his department." Ely added, "Thad Stevens said Cameron would add a million to his fortune. I guess he has done it."—Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

of Representatives censured Cameron by a vote of 79 to 45, and refused to censure Welles by 72 nays to 45 yeas.1

January 11 the President sent Cameron a curt dismissal from the position of Secretary of War, and nominated him as Minister to Russia.2 It was given out at the time, and has since been asserted on authority, that Lincoln removed him from office for the reason that the position he had taken in his report respecting the arming of the slaves and the manner of his taking it had destroyed their harmonious relations.3 This seems to me, however, an inadequate explanation. Cameron's offence in this matter had not been as grave as that of Fremont, yet the President did not remove Fremont on account of his proclamation. The suppressed part of Cameron's report had been published in the newspapers and referred to in the House of Representatives,4 and the policy therein advocated met with favor from the radical anti-slavery people, who were now disposed to sym
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1 April 30, Congressional Globe, p. 1888.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. v. p. 128; Chase's Diary, entry of January 12, Field's Memories, p. 268; McClure's Lincoln, p. 150.
3 This was the explanation given by the New York Times, World of January 14, and Herald of January 15; Trollope's North America, vol. ii. p. 152. The New York Tribune of January 14, however, said: "The retirement of General Cameron will be attributed by some to his frankly expressed views on the contraband question, but (we are confident) incorrectly. . . The truth is that General Cameron has had very unprofitable friends. Himself patriotic and devoted to the heart's core, he has been surrounded and pressed upon by troops of noisy well-wishers who would have scorned the idea of selling their God for thirty pieces of silver so long as there was the faintest hope of making it forty. These have bored him into signing contracts by which they have made enormous profits at his expense as well as the country's." The Evening Post of January 14 took a similar view, and acquitted "Cameron of any participation in these robberies."
4 Congressional Globe, p. 79.

sympathize with him, as they had previously done with Fremont. John Bigelow across the sea detected this and asked Sumner, "Are Cameron and Fremont to be canonized as martyrs ?"1 Such a temper aided to cloud the real truth in regard to this change in the cabinet. But all the circumstances seem to point to the conclusion that popular sentiment in Congress and in the country demanded the removal of Cameron on account of a distrust of his efficiency and his honesty, and that the President recognized it as an opinion to which he must yield, enforced as it probably was by his own conviction that the War Department had been badly administered.2

Justice to Cameron demands mention of the special message of the President to Congress, in which he exculpated Cameron from one count in the resolution of censure by the House.3 Chase also defended him. December 25,1861, he wrote to Halstead: "You are unjust to Cameron, and I am bound as a man of honor to say so. I have seen him closely as most men here, and I am sure he has acted honorably and faithfully and patriotically. ... He challenges investigation of all his transactions on the score of corruption, and may do so, I believe, with entire safety."4 Sumner moved the confirmation of Cameron as Minister to Russia without the customary reference, and obviously did not believe the charges affecting his official integrity.5
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1 January 30, Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.
2 Field in his Memories, p. 266, relates a conversation between Lincoln and Seward which, if we could always rely on recollections, would directly substantiate this. I prefer, however, to rest my case on the natural inference from all the contemporaneous evidence concerning the matter.
3 May 26, Congressional Globe, p. 2383. The conventional correspondence between Lincoln and Cameron was not published until February 10. It was then dated back to January 11. Read in connection with the real facts in the case it would sustain the view I have taken in the text had not Lincoln in his letter expressed his confidence in Cameron's "ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust."—New York Evening Post, February 10.
4 Schuckers, p. 281.
5 Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 63. Several members of the House of Representatives also spoke in his favor.

The President appointed Edwin M. Stanton Secretary of War. Stanton, in his private correspondence of the summer of 1861, had expressed himself freely touching "the painful imbecility of Lincoln" and the impotence of his administration,1 and as he was neither politic nor reserved, he had undoubtedly been equally free with his comments in conversation with his friends and acquaintances in Washington, where he was then living. If Lincoln cared to listen to Washington gossip he might have heard enough of this sort, but if any of these stories came to him when he began to consider the appointment of Stanton, they did not weigh with him a feather in making up his mind that from location, previous party association, and fitness this Democratic lawyer from Pennsylvania was the man for the place. The appointment was acceptable to Seward and Chase,2 to Congress and to the country, for Stanton had gained the confidence of all by his sturdy patriotism when a member of Buchanan's cabinet.

The inaction of the Army of the Potomac, due at first to McClellan's incompetence, and afterwards to his illness during the fine weather and smooth roads of December and the first half of January,3 was a deep disappointment to the people. The senators and representatives were full of it. "We are in a condition now where we must stir ourselves on account of the expense," said Senator Wade to General McDowell, December 26, 1861. "It is awful; and we are endeavoring to see if there is any way in God's world to get rid of the capital besieged, while Europe is looking down upon us as almost a conquered people."4 "It is no wonder," declared Lovejoy in the House, January 6,
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1 Life of Dix, vol. ii. p. 19; North American Review, November, 1879, p. 482; also McClure's Lincoln.
2 Chase's Diary, entry January 12, 1862; letter to Zinn, January 16, Schuckers, p. 363.
3 Conkling in the House, February 4, Congressional Globe, p. 634.
4 Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, part i. p. 140.

1862,"that the people are growing impatient; it is no wonder that that impatience is becoming earnest in many portions of the country, and is almost reaching a point beyond that of passive emotion. The whole nation is waiting for the army to move forward. They have furnished the men and the money, and why does not the army move?" 1 Writing from the office of the Evening Post, New York, Parke Godwin asked Sumner," what the awful and disastrous inaction of our military men means? People here are rapidly becoming disgusted," he added, "even the most patient are losing heart; and all see that unless some grand blows are struck the war is gone."2 "When," asked John Bigelow, despairingly, from over the sea," are we to stop hearing of the great things our army and our navy and our young Napoleon are going to do, and to begin to hear of what they have done ?"3 Anthony Trollope read public opinion correctly when he concluded that "belief in McClellan seemed to be slipping away."4 Chase had lost confidence in the general of the army.5 Lincoln stood by McClellan, but he was convinced that Seward's diplomacy, Chase's finance, and his own hold on the people could be sustained only by military victories, or at all events by an
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1 Congressional Globe, p. 194.
2 Letter of January 10, Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.
3 To Sumner from Paris, January 80, ibid. Governor Morgan wrote Weed, January 11: "There is a very strong disposition to complain of the inactivity of our generals, as well as the enormous expense of the army."—Life of Weed, vol. ii. p. 418 j see remarks of Hale in the Senate, December 16, 1861, Congressional Globe, p. 93; Wilson, January 7, ibid., p. 205; Morrill and Conking in the House, February 4, ibid., pp. 632, 634.
4 North America, vol. ii. p. 27. Gurowski's Diary represents the development of a certain phase of sentiment. In September he wrote: "The country is — to use an Americanism — in a pretty fix, if this McClellan turns out to be a mistake." In December he set down: "The Congress appointed a war-investigating committee, Senator Wade at the head. There is hope that the committee will quickly find out what a terrible mistake this McClellan is, and warn the nation of him. But Lincoln, Seward, and the Blairs will not give up their idol."
5 Letter of January 5, Warden, p. 897.

earnest effort to win them. January 10 he called a council at the White House of Generals McDowell and Franklin, Seward, Chase, and the assistant Secretary of War; McClellan, not having yet recovered fully from his illness, was not present. The President said: "I am in great distress. If something is not done soon, the bottom will be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan does not want to use the army I would like to borrow it, provided I could see how it could be made to do something. What can be done with the army soon?" he asked McDowell. The general replied that it was feasible to attack the enemy at Centreville and Manassas, and he verbally outlined a plan of operation; this, further developed in writing, he read the next evening to the council. His conclusion as then stated was: "It seems to me the army should be ready to move in all of next week." Monday, January 13, McClellan met at the White House these gentlemen and also Montgomery Blair and General Meigs. The President explained how and why the advice of the two generals had been demanded, and requested McDowell again to expose his plan. This he did, ending with a natural apology to his superior officer for his action, which McClellan received coldly. The President then asked what and when anything could be done? McClellan replied that "the case was so clear a blind man could see it," and then, discussing matters of detail, made difficulties and befogged the issue. Chase, undoubtedly with impatience, put the direct question to the general what he intended doing with his army, and when he intended doing it? A long silence ensued. McClellan broke it at last, saying that it was his intention to have the general operations of the armies begin by a movement of Buell in Kentucky. He paused; then resuming speech said: "I am very unwilling to develop my plans, for I believe that in military matters the fewer persons to whom they are known the better. I will tell them if ordered to do so." The President asked: "Do you count upon any particular time? I do not ask what that time is, but

have you in your own mind any particular time fixed when a movement can be commenced?" McClellan replied, "I have." "Then," rejoined the President, "I will adjourn this meeting." 1

A fortnight passed away, and still the story ran, "All quiet on the Potomac." January 27 the President issued his "General War Order Number 1;" this "ordered that the 22d of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces." He followed this up with his " Special War Order Number 1;" this directed "that all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac ... be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing . .. Manassas Junction." 2

Meanwhile General George H. Thomas defeated a superior force of Confederates at Mill Spring, Kentucky.3 A little later General Burnside, in co-operation with Commodore Goldsborough, took Roanoke Island, North Carolina.4 Eclipsing far, however, every success on the federal side, and in its importance and influence matching the Confederate victory of Bull Run, was an achievement of General Grant in Tennessee.

In the West the Confederate line of defence was from Columbus, on the Mississippi River, to Bowling Green. Both of these places were in Kentucky: the first was called a " Gibraltar," the second the " Manassas of the West." Two other important points on this line in the State of Tennessee were Fort Henry, which defended the Tennessee River, and Fort Donelson, which commanded the Cumberland, the two rivers here being but eleven miles apart. If these forts were captured,
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1 In this narrative I have faithfully followed McDowell's memorandum, which he gave to Raymond in the spring of 1864. Raymond submitted it to Lincoln, who substantially confirmed the account except in one unimportant particular, Raymond's Lincoln, p. 772. McClellan gives an account of the conversation of January 13, Own Story, p. 156; see also Swinton's Army of the Potomac, p. 79.
2 Official Records, vol. v. p. 41.
3 January 10.
4 February 7.

captured, two important gateways would be open to the heart of the Confederacy. The troops in this field of operation were under the command of Albert Sidney Johnston, then esteemed the ablest general of the South. Halleck, with headquarters at St. Louis, had control of the Union forces in this department; Grant, under him, was at Cairo. The notion that this line ought to be broken occurred to several federal generals; that it entered into the minds of Grant and Flag-officer Foote is of the highest moment, for by their position and character they were fit men to head an expedition to break it. Acting upon reconnoissances made by General C. F. Smith and Foote, Grant urged Halleck that he be permitted to capture Fort Henry, and in this request for authority he was joined by Foote January 28. January 30 Halleck telegraphed the desired permission. February 1 Grant received by mail the detailed instructions; on the 2d the expedition of iron-clad and wooden gun-boats, and transports carrying the troops, started from Cairo under his and Foote's command. On the 6th he telegraphed Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. ... I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th." 1 The business had been done by Foote and his iron-clads. Owing to the badness of the roads, the troops were unable to make in time the march which was necessary for co-operation, and most of the Confederate garrison escaped to Donelson.

Albert Sidney Johnston heard with dismay of the fall of Fort Henry. "I determined," he afterwards wrote Davis, "to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and gave the best part of my army to do it, retaining only 14,000 men to cover my front, and giving 16,000 to defend Donelson."2 On account of the heavy rains, which made the roads impassable for artillery and wagons, Grant was unable to carry out his prophecy to the letter; but having sent the gun-boats and some of the troops around by water, he left Fort Henry on the morning
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1 Official Records, vol. vii. p. 124.
2 Ibid. p. 259.

of February 12 with about 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and marched across the country towards Donelson, arriving in front of the enemy about noon. "That afternoon and the next day," writes Grant, " were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible." 1 On the 13th there was some fighting, in which the Union troops got the worse of it. That night Foote with his gun-boats and reinforcements arrived. "On the 14th," wrote Grant, "a gallant attack was made by Flag-officer Foote upon the enemy's works with the fleet. The engagement lasted probably an hour and a half, and bid fair to result favorably to the cause of the Union, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the armored boats, so that they were carried back by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled also, having received a number of heavy shots about the pilothouses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps I concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially fortify and await repairs to the gun-boats.”2 Foote had been wounded. Discouragement and discomfort were supreme in the Union ranks that night. When the soldiers quitted Fort Henry the weather was spring like and warm; many of them had left behind their blankets and overcoats. Now a storm of sleet and snow prevailed. They had no tents, they were so near the enemy that they dared not light their fires, and their sufferings during that cold and pitiless night were intense.

The Confederate generals were Floyd—Buchanan's Secretary of War—Pillow, and Buckner. They and their men had been cast down by the fall of Fort Henry, but their spirits had risen with the repulse of the gun-boats, which had not cost them the injury of a battery or the death of a man. They saw, however, the arrival of the federal reinforcements with concern. That evening they held a council of war,
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1 Personal Memoirs, p. 298.
2 Official report, February 16, Official Records, vol. vii. p. 159.

and they were of one mind that Grant, with a constantly increasing force, would soon be able completely to beleaguer the fort, and that nothing remained for them but to make an attempt to cut their way through the besiegers and recover the road to Nashville. They determined to attack early the next morning.

Reinforcements had increased Grant's army to 27,000. McClernand's division was on the right, holding the Nashville road; Lew. Wallace's was in the centre, and C. F. Smith's on the left.

Extending beyond the earthwork of Fort Donelson was a winding line of intrenchments nearly two miles in length, defended on the outside at some points with abatis. These intrenchments were fully occupied by the Confederates. At five o'clock on the morning of February 15 Pillow's division sallied out and fell upon McClernand. The Union troops were not surprised, and made a stubborn resistance. The fight was hot, the snow was red with blood. McClernand sent to Grant's headquarters and then to Lew. Wallace for assistance, but Wallace decided that his instructions required him to maintain his actual position. Meanwhile Buckner, who commanded the Confederate right wing, had sent troops to Pillow. A second message reached Lew. Wallace, saying that McClernand's command was endangered. So Wallace, having learned that Grant was on a gun-boat more than five miles away, sent forward his first brigade, which, however, being imperfectly directed by a guide, did not reach a position to render effective help. McClernand, bearing the brunt of the battle, was outnumbered, his ammunition failed, and he was obliged to fall back. The fugitives who crowded up the hill in the rear of Lew. Wallace's line brought "unmistakable signs of disaster. ... A mounted officer galloped down the road shouting 'We are cut to pieces.'"1 The Confederates, having possession of the Nashville road, had a chance of escape, but they made no attempt
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1 Wallace's official report.

to avail themselves of it. They continued to advance on their retreating foes, when Lew. Wallace ordered his third brigade to check their onset; this was done with vigor; the charge of the enemy was repelled.

Early that morning Foote had requested Grant to come to his flag-ship for consultation, he himself being too badly injured to leave the boat. Complying with this request, the commanding general of the Union army was not, therefore, during this attack, on the field where he could direct operations. His conference with Foote terminated, he met, on going ashore, Captain Hillyer, of his staff, "white with fear ... for the safety of the national troops."1 The roads, which had been deep with mud, were now frozen hard. Travel on horseback was slow. The fight had been on the Union right of a line three miles long. Grant "was some four or five miles north of our left."2 He made his way back with the utmost possible speed. "I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre," he says.3 On the right, however, there was confusion. The fighting had ceased.

It was the intensest moment in Grant's life. The war had given him an opportunity to amend a broken career; should he fail in this supreme hour, another chance might never come to him. His unfortunate absence during the morning's battle would certainly be misconstrued. Yet he was equal to the emergency. He showed himself a true soldier and a compeller of men. "Wholly unexcited, he saluted and received the salutations of his subordinates," writes Lew. Wallace, who was in conversation with McClernand when Grant rode up. "It cannot be doubted that he saw with painful distinctness the effect of the disaster to his right wing. His face flushed slightly. With a sudden grip he crushed the papers (which looked like telegrams) in his hand. But in an instant these signs of disappointment
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1 Grant's Personal Memoirs, p. 305. 3 Ibid., p. 806.
2 Ibid.

or hesitation cleared away. In his ordinary quiet voice he said, addressing himself to both officers, 'Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken.'"1

Grant tells in an unaffected manner the story of his action. "I heard some of the men say," he writes, "that the enemy had come out with knapsacks and haversacks filled with rations. ... I turned to Colonel Webster, of my staff, and said: 'Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back; the one who attacks first now will be victorious, and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me.' I determined to make the assault at once on our left. ... I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: 'Fill your cartridge boxes quick and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so.' This acted like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him, and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short time." 2

It is seldom that a writer of the remarkable powers of description which Lew Wallace possesses sees a decisive battle from the stand-point of a general; it is, therefore, fitting that he should tell the story of this glorious charge. "Taking Lauman's brigade," he writes, "General Smith began the advance. They were under fire instantly. The guns in the fort joined in with the infantry, who were at the time in the rifle-pits, the great body of the Confederate right wing being with General Buckner. The defence was greatly favored by the ground, which subjected the assailants
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1 Century War Book, vol. i. p. 422.
2 Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 307, 308.

to a double fire from the beginning of the abatis. The men have said that 'it looked too thick for a rabbit to get through.' General Smith, on his horse, took position in the front and centre of the line. Occasionally he turned in the saddle to see how the alignment was kept. For the most part, however, he held his face steadily towards the enemy. He was, of course, a conspicuous object for the sharp-shooters in the rifle-pits. The air around him twittered with minie-bullets. Erect as if on review he rode on, timing the gait of his horse with the movement of his colors. A soldier said,' I was nearly scared to death, but I saw the old man's white mustache over his shoulder, and went on.'

"On to the abatis the regiments moved without hesitation, leaving a trail of dead and wounded behind. There the fire seemed to get trebly hot, and there some of the men halted, whereupon, seeing the hesitation, General Smith put his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft, and called out, 'No flinching now, my lads! Here—this is the way! Come on!' He picked a path through the jagged limbs of the trees, holding his cap all the time in sight; and the effect was magical. The men swarmed in after him, and got through in the best order they could—not all of them, alas! On the other side of the obstruction they took the semblance of re-formation and charged in after their chief, who found himself then between the two fires. Up the ascent he rode; up they followed. At the last moment the keepers of the rifle-pits clambered out and fled. The four regiments engaged in the feat planted their colors on the breastwork. Later in the day Buckner came back with his division, but all his efforts to dislodge Smith were in vain."' That night a large part of Smith's division bivouacked within the Confederate lines.

After he had commenced his advance Grant ordered a charge on the enemy's left, which was undertaken by Lew.
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1 Century War Book, vol. i. p. 433.

Wallace. A hill had to be won. When he made known the desperate character of the enterprise to his regiments, the men "answered with cheers and cries of 'Forward, forward !' and I gave the word."1 The charge was successful, the hill was gained. The sortie had cost the Confederates about 2000 killed and wounded; the loss of the Federals was somewhat greater. The night closed with the Union troops in possession of the Nashville road. There was no way of escape from Fort Donelson except by the river and by a road submerged from the river's overflow. Grant made arrangements for an assault at daylight the next morning. Hardly a doubt of its success could exist. Inside the fort there was dismay. An hour after midnight the three generals took counsel together. "I am confident," said Buckner, "that the enemy will attack my line by light, and I cannot hold them for half an hour." "Why so; why so, general?" Pillow demanded. "Because I can bring into action not over 4000 men, and they demoralized by long and uninterrupted exposure and fighting, while they can bring any number of fresh troops to the attack." Pillow rejoined: "I differ with you. I think you can hold your lines; I think you can, sir." "I know my position," exclaimed Buckner," and I know that the lines cannot be held with my troops in their present condition." Floyd, who outranked the others, broke in: "Then, gentlemen, a capitulation is all that is left us." This Pillow denied. "I do not think so," he said; "at any rate, we can cut our way out." Buckner replied: "To cut our way out would cost three-fourths of our men, and I do not think any commander has a right to sacrifice three-fourths of his men to save one fourth." To which Floyd replied: "Certainly not. We will have to capitulate; but, gentlemen, I cannot surrender; you know my position with the Federals;' it wouldn't do; it
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1 Lew. Wallace's official report.
2 On account of Floyd's operations in Buchanan's cabinet he was regarded generally at the North as a thief and an aggravated traitor. Threats were common that he should hang did he fall into the hands of the Union army. From the extensive circulation of Northern newspapers South, Floyd must have been aware of these menaces.

wouldn't do." "I will not surrender myself nor the command," declared Pillow," will die first." "Then I suppose, gentlemen," said Buckner," the surrender will devolve upon me." Floyd asked Buckner, "General, if you are put in command, will you allow me to take out by the river my brigade V "Yes, sir," was the reply; "if you move your command before the enemy act upon my communication offering to capitulate." Then Floyd turned to Pillow and said, "I turn the command over, sir." Pillow replied, promptly, "I pass it." This drew from Buckner the remark: "I assume it. Give me pen, ink, and paper, and send for a bugler."1

Two small steamers, which arrived at the fort about daybreak, furnished Floyd and about 1500 of his Virginia troops a means of escape. Pillow crossed the river in a skiff. Colonel Forrest took out 500 of his cavalry and a number of men from the infantry and artillery regiments, mounted on the artillery horses, over the road which was submerged by the overflow of the Cumberland.

Early Sunday morning, February 16, Buckner sent the Union general a letter, which brought forth the famous reply that gave him, by a play upon his initials, the name of Unconditional Surrender Grant. "Yours of this date," he wrote Buckner, "proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." The Confederate general was compelled to accept what he called "the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms." The surrender of Fort Donelson included 12,000 to 15,000 men, " at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property." 2
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1 Sworn statements of Nicholson, Henry, and Haynes, March, 1862, Official Records, vol. vii. p. 296.
2 Grant's official report of February 16. My authorities for this account, besides those specifically stated, are: official reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Jas. B. McPherson, A. H. Foote, General McClernand; reports of Gilmer, Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and Forrest, of the Confederate army, Official Records, vol. vii. p. 161 et seq.; Swinton's Decisive Battles of the War; Life of Albert Sidney Johnston, by W. P. Johnston; J. D. Cox, in the Nation, July 30,1885, February 25,1886; From Fort Henry to Corinth, Force; Hoppin's Life of Foote; Badeau's Military History of General Grant.

Men of the Northwest and men of the Southwest met here for the first time in battle on a large scale. Both armies were made up of raw troops; both fought well. The generalship on the Union side was distinctly superior. On account of their environment Western men were at the start better fitted to endure the hardships and adapt themselves to the conditions of soldiering in a rough country, than were men from the cities, the trim villages, and the rural districts, fairly provided with good roads, of New England and New York, and of such the Army of the Potomac was largely composed. But the main reason for the greater success of the Western armies cannot be found in any such slight differences in surroundings between peoples so homogeneous; and, making further allowance for the relief of the Western troops from the ever-present responsibility of defending the capital, we are forced to the conviction that in the chance of becoming skilled and self-reliant soldiers, the tremendous odds in favor of the three-years' men of the West over those of the East lay in their being led by Grant instead of by McClellan. Striking and refreshing to the student is it to turn from the excuses and subterfuges of McClellan's reports and letters to the direct and prompt manner in writing and action of Grant.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.3. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].