History of the United States, v.3, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 14, Part 2: Two Established Governments through Anderson Evaluates Ft. Sumter

In the once proud Union there were now two established governments. The Southerners at Montgomery had proceeded in an orderly manner, and made evident that they shared with the North the political aptitude which is the peculiar attribute of Americans. In spite of the strained relations between the sections, no formal check had been given to their business or other intercourse; mail communication was uninterrupted.1 The Northwest believed this severance of the Union a blow to its own prosperity, perhaps depriving it of the important outlet of the Mississippi River for its products. The South, considerate of the West, now declared by its congress the free navigation of the Mississippi River.2 While one may note in the Southern literature of this period a particular animosity towards New England, there is evident a feeling of friendliness to the West, in some instances going so far as to express the extravagant hope that some of the Western States might join the Southern Confederacy.

Pausing for a moment to reflect that the people of the North and the South were both God-fearing—that they professed the same religion,3 spoke the same language, read the same literature, venerated the same Constitution, had similar laws, and, with one exception, the same institutions —we may echo the regret of many men of 1861, What a
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1 "The postal service generally throughout the South was continued under the direction of the government of the United States up to the 31st May, 1861, when it was suspended by a general order of the department;" Horatio King, Postmaster General, January and February, 1861, in Lippincott's Magazine, April, 1872, p. 411. The date of discontinuance was May 27.— See Postmaster-General Blair's letter to Speaker of the House, July 12th, Congressional Globe, p. 115.
2 February 25; Statutes at Large, p. 36.
3 "The morality and religiousness of the Southern population were, on the average, not inferior to those of any other people."—Von Hoist, vol. vii. p. 272.

pity that they should separate! What force must such a feeling have had during the usual celebrations of the 22d of February, as one thought that the memory of Washington belonged, beyond a possible blotting out, to both sections! This feeling was signally illustrated at Charleston, where the revolution had commenced, and where the war was to begin. At sunrise Castle Pinckney, under the palmetto banner, fired thirteen guns to honor the birthday of the father of the common country; at noon Fort Sumter, with the Stars and Stripes waving, gave a national salute.

From the point of view of political expediency, it is difficult to find in the annals of constitutional government such mingled folly and rashness as the Southern people were now displaying. In the event of war they would have against them the odds of numbers, wealth, industries that could be used for producing war material, and the machinery and the prestige of the national government; while remaining in the Union they would have three of the four points of the game. The Republicans were in the minority in both the Senate and the House,1 and they had only one judge of the Supreme Court.2 The paramount tangible grievance of the South was, as we have seen, the alleged exclusion of its peculiar property from the common territories. But no satisfactory answer was ever made, or could be made, to Charles Francis Adams's trenchant questions in his speech in the House, January 31, except the one he himself gave. "Who excludes the slave-holders with their slaves?" he demanded. "Have they not obtained an opinion from the Supreme Court which will, in effect, override any and every effort of Congress against them? They can, if they choose, now go wherever they like on the public
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1 See vol. ii. p. 501, note 2. "If the Southern States had not run away, we had both houses of Congress, and Lincoln could have done nothing."—Richmond Whig, January 28.
2 McLean. The other judges were Taney, Wayne, Catron, Campbell, Democrats from the slave States; Grier, Nelson, and Clifford, Democrats from the free States. There was one vacancy.

domain. There is no majority in Congress itself to prevent their going, even if it had the power. Why do they not use that right? The reason is plain. It is not for their interest to go so far north. They will not leave the rich bottom-lands, still open for the profitable cultivation of the cotton-plant in the South, to go to a comparatively arid region farther off."1 The Supreme Court was now stronger for the principle laid down in the Dred Scott decision than when it was promulgated.2 Curtis had resigned, and Clifford, a Democrat of Maine appointed by Buchanan, had his place. Daniel, indeed, was dead, but had there been no secession the Senate would have confirmed the President's nomination of Black for the vacancy ;3 and Black was i n thorough sympathy with Taney's Dred Scott opinion.4 Does it not seem strange that a brave people should be sufficiently alarmed at a party platform and at declarations of party leaders to throw away such substantial advantages as they had in the Union? No truer word in this whole controversy was spoken than that by Charles Francis Adams, when he termed the alleged grievances of the South " mere abstractions."5 For the purpose even of saving slavery secession was a suicidal policy. Many thinking men in the North told the Southerners, in a strain of the utmost sincerity, that if civil war resulted slavery would have to go; and while Jefferson Davis made no public declaration to that effect, he saw with prophetic soul
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1 Congressional Globe Appendix, p. 125. The same point is touched upon by C. C. Washburn and M. W. Tappan, radical Republicans, in their minority report of the House committee of thirty-three. See Report, No. 31, p. 10.
2 For the composition of the court then, see vol. ii. p. 250. C. F. Adams wrote F. W. Bird, February 16: "As to the Dred Scott case, I regard it as yet only a dictum,. . . but every man of sense knows that it will be affirmed in the first case that may be brought up, and that in the meantime slaves are held under it in the various territories. And no action of the government will effectually prevent it."—MS.
3 Black was appointed February 6, but the appointment was never acted on. —C. F. Black, p. 24.
4 Reply to Senator Douglas (1859), ibid., pp. 214, 215; see vol. ii. p. 374.
5 Congressional Globe Appendix, p. 125. "For what, then, are we about to plunge into civil war? An abstraction."—Richmond Whig, January 3.

that such would be the end.1 Had the Southern people followed Stephens, or had they adopted the plan of delay urged by Davis, the course of history might have been different. But the variance between that impetuous majority in the cotton States 2 and these far-seeing statesmen arose largely from the way in which they envisaged the future. Some looked upon secession as a shrewd political move, which would enable the South to extort larger concessions than it could get while in the Union; 3 but a larger number believed that they could form a Southern Confederacy, and enforce to the fullest extent the sovereign rights of the States, without armed resistance from the North.4 Neither Davis nor Stephens had such illusions. "War I look for as almost certain," wrote Stephens, February 21, from Montgomery.5 Prepare yourselves for a long and bloody war, was the burden of Davis's speeches in his progress from Washington to the capital of his State; a great war is impending over the country of which no man can foresee the end, was his constant inculcation
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1 "He said, 'In any case, I think our slave property will be lost eventually.' "—Mrs. Davis, vol. i. p. 11. This was in February, just before going to Montgomery.
2 Cobden wrote Sumner, February 23: "The conduct of the South has disgusted everybody. I do not mean their desire to disunite—that they may have a right to do, and it may be for the interest of all parties. But they have shown a measure of passionate haste and unreasoning arrogance which has astonished all lookers-on. They have gone about the work of dissolving the Union with less gravity or forethought than a firm of intelligent drapers or grocers would think necessary in case of a dissolution of partnership." Edward L. Pierce has kindly placed at my disposal a large part of the Sumner correspondence from 1860-65, in which is the letter containing the above extract. I shall refer to it as the Pierce-Sumner papers, MS.
3 This view was represented in Georgia by Thomas R. R. Cobb, and according to Stephens the wavering scale in the Georgia convention was turned by his remark, "We can make better terms out of the Union than in it."—War Between the States, vol. ii. p. 321; Davis, vol. i. p. 227; Report of H. P. Bell, Georgia Commissioner to Tennessee, Journal of Georgia Convention, p. 368; J. D. Cox, in Atlantic Monthly for March, 1892, p. 390.
4 Davis, vol. i. p. 227; Roman's Beauregard, vol. i. p. 16; Life of Davis, Alfriend, p. 250.
5 Johnston and Browne, p. 387.

while at Jackson. The war will be long, he said to Judge Sharkey, on his way to Montgomery to be inaugurated, and it behooves every one to put his house in order.1

The last formal step in the election of Lincoln—the counting of the electoral votes in the presence of both houses of Congress—was looked forward to with a certain amount of apprehension, as fears prevailed that a conspiracy existed to prevent it, and also the inauguration of the President-elect, by seizing the Capitol and other buildings, with the archives of the government.2 General Scott, Black, Holt, Seward, and Governor Hicks, of Maryland, partook of this solicitude.3 A conspiracy to take the capital "has been actually formed," wrote Black to the President, "and large numbers of persons are deeply and busily engaged in bringing the plot to a head at what they conceive to be the proper time." 4 "Treason is all around and amongst us;" said Seward in a confidential letter, "and plots [exist] to seize the capital and usurp the government." "One friend came in this morning to tell me," he wrote, later, "that there are two thousand armed conspirators in the city, and the mayor is secretly with them."5 Considering the progress which the revolution had made, and the suggestion of the Richmond Enquirer, "Can there not be found men bold and brave enough in Maryland to unite with Virginians in seizing the Capitol at Washington ?"6 it is not surprising that anxiety was felt by
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1 Mrs. Davis, vol. ii. pp. 6, 8; Davis, vol. i. p. 230. He left Washington the latter part of January
2 "It is as well for the people of the free States to wake up to the fact that this country is in full revolution, and this capital in undoubted peril." —Pike to New York Tribune, January 5; New York Times, January 2, cited in Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i. Diary, p. 8. For an animated account of this alarm, see Chittenden's Lincoln, chaps, vi. and vii.
3 As to Scott and Hicks, see their testimony before the House committee, Report 79, pp. 52,166; as to Holt, see his letter to the President, February 18, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 147; Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, vol. iii. p. 167.
4 January 22, Crawford, p. 241.
5 Letters to his wife, December 29, 1860, January 18, Life of Seward, vol. ii. pp. 488, 497,
6 December 25, 1860.

these men who held positions of high responsibility. Yet such fears had, in fact, little foundation. Washington was abundantly secure so long as Virginia and Maryland remained in the Union.1 They were towers of defence, and Maryland recognized a special guardianship, as the capital city stood on what was once her own soil. She had not made the slightest move towards secession. Her governor, Hicks, had been elected as an American, had owned slaves since he was twenty one years old, and sympathized with the South; yet he declared that he desired to live and die in the Union, and absolutely declined, although urged to it, to convoke the legislature, which, being Democratic, might have called a convention of the people.2 In this he was sustained by the public sentiment of his State.3 Virginia's governor, Letcher, had summoned in special session the legislature, which passed a convention bill. The election of delegates, taking place February 4, resulted in a signal Union victory, which determined that Virginia should not secede before the 4th of March, and allayed any still remaining fears of violence in the federal
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1 A House special committee of five was requested to investigate this subject. It consisted of Howard (chairman), Dawes, Republicans; Reynolds, a Douglas Democrat; Cochrane and Branch, of North Carolina, Democrats. Hickman was first appointed, but he seems to have declined, Reynolds serving in his place. Howard, Dawes, and Reynolds left no stone unturned to discover the conspiracy, if any such existed, and they took a large amount of interesting and valuable testimony. Their report, February 4, was: "If the purpose was at any time entertained of forming an organization, secret or open, to seize the District of Columbia, attack the Capitol, or prevent the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it seems to have been rendered contingent upon the secession of either Maryland or Virginia, or both, and the sanction of one of those states."—Report of committee, p. 2; see letter of Howard to E. R. Hoar, February 7, 1870, cited by Henry Wilson, Atlantic Monthly, October, 1870, p. 467; also Congressional Globe, p. 316.
2 See his testimony before the House committee, p. 166; Greeley's American Conflict, vol. i. p. 849.
3 Hicks's letter to Handy, commissioner from Mississippi; his testimony; Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia for 1861, p. 443; Baltimore American, cited in Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i. Diary, p. 9.

City.1 Indeed, a fortnight previous, Seward, whose private letters had been those of an alarmist, had written Weed that" the plots against the city are at an end." 2 The President's judgment in this matter proved to be sounder than that of Black and Holt, for he did not share their apprehensions, but, appreciating the wisdom of taking precautionary measures, he authorized General Scott to bring several companies of United States troops to Washington to assist, if need be, the civil functionaries in the preservation of peace and order.3 February 13 the counting of the electoral votes took place in a quiet and regular manner.

Two days before his election was officially declared Lincoln started on his journey from Springfield to Washington. Having received many invitations from States and cities offering their hospitality, he stopped frequently, and made many speeches as he proceeded along his circuitous route. Greeted everywhere with enthusiasm, and listened to with profound respect, he may at this time have laid the foundations of that hold on the plain people which was to be of such rich benefit to him and to his country in the years that were to come.4 But if the purpose in view was to convince the reflecting Union men of the North that he was equal to the task before him which he himself thought "greater than that which rested upon Washington,"5 the journey can only be looked upon as a sad failure, and his speeches, except his touching farewell to his old friends and neighbors at Springfield, and his noble address in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, had
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1 See Pike to New York Tribune, February 5. The Union majority was estimated at 40,000, New York Tribune, February 6.
2 January 21. Life, vol. ii. p. 497; see, also, Pike to the New York Tribune.
3 See the President's messages of January 8 and March 2; General Scott's testimony. House Report 79, p. 61. Seven or eight companies, 420 to 480 men, were in Washington at the time of the electoral count, ibid.; 653 men and 32 officers at the time of the inauguration, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 494.
4 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. chap. xix.; Herndon, p. 488. The edition referred to is the first, that of Belford, Clarke & Co.
5 Farewell remarks at Springfield, Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 291.

better not have been delivered. To acquit himself with dignity in that position were difficult for any man; and Lincoln, now the cynosure of all eyes, did not have the knack of saying the graceful nothings which are so well fitted for the occasions on which he spoke. In his speeches the commonplace abounds, and though he had a keen sense of humor, his sallies of wit grated on earnest men who read in quiet his daily utterances. The ridiculous, which lies so near the sublime, was reached when this man, proceeding to grave duties, and the great fame that falls to few in the whole world, asked at the town of Westfield for a little girl correspondent of his, at whose suggestion he had made a change in his personal appearance, and when she came, he kissed her, and said, "You see I have let these whiskers grow for you, Grace."1 The next day's journal headed the account," Old Abe Kissed by a Pretty Girl."2

Lincoln could indeed have spoken well of the serious matters of which his mind was full, but prudence and propriety forbade that he should anticipate his inaugural address, which had been already prepared.3 At Indianapolis, while declining to commit himself, he threw out intimations indicating that he saw a clear distinction between the coercion of a State on the one hand, and the holding and retaking the United States forts and the collection of duties on the other; but his comparison of a Union on the Southern theory to a "free love arrangement," differing from the true relation of a "regular marriage," while it might have been effective in private conversation, was not a dignified illustration for the President-elect to use when addressing the people of a nation chaste in thought and prudish in expression. Lincoln enounced many good ideas, but it was one of the hardships of his position that his misses were dwelt upon, and his hits ignored. His remarks at Columbus: "There is nothing going wrong. . . There
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1 Herndon, p. 487, note ; Raymond, p. 141.
2 New York Tribune, February 18.
3 Herndon, p. 478.

is nothing that really hurts anybody;" and that at Pittsburgh, when, his features lighting up with a smile, he said: "There is no crisis but an artificial one,"1 created a painful impression; yet such utterances were dictated by a worthy motive; he really felt more anxiety about the outlook than he deemed it wise to show.2 His declaration in Independence Hall ought to have compensated for all such slips. "There will be no bloodshed," he assured the country, " unless it be forced upon the government. The government will not use force unless force is used against it."3

Lincoln's ignorance of the ways of the fashionable world told against him in New York city, where the tendency of refined people is to judge new men at first rather by their manners than by their qualities, and his wearing black kid gloves at the opera on a gala night gave rise to sarcastic comment.4 Receiving warnings at Philadelphia which he could not afford to disregard from General Scott, Seward, and two other friends that a plot had been concocted to assassinate him in Baltimore, he deviated from the published plan of going through that city by day, and proceeded secretly to Washington by night.5 This drew ridicule from his enemies, and expressions of sincere regret from many of his well-wishers, and augmented the prejudice against him which he must surmount. Nor did his bearing in Washington between his arrival and the inauguration do anything to
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1 For the Indianapolis and Columbus speeches, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. pp. 294, 296; for the Pittsburgh and Cleveland speeches, when he termed the crisis artificial, see Raymond, pp. 138, 140. Nicolay and Hay print the most important speeches, and Raymond prints them all. 2 Diary of a Public Man, entry February 20.
3 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 300.
4 Diary of a Public Man, entry February 20.
5 For a detailed account of this, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. chap. xx.; Lamon, p. 512; Lincoln and Men of War Times, McClure, p. 43; see, also, Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i. p. 280; Washburne's article in Reminiscences, by North American Publishing Company, p. 34; Chittenden's Lincoln, pp. 58, 65. Lincoln arrived at Washington on the morning of Feb 23

dispel the unfavorable impression that especially prevailed in the East touching his ability to cope with the difficulties he must meet. When Bowles, in a private letter to Dawes, wrote, " Lincoln is a 'Simple Susan,'" 1 he expressed a silent but a commonly held opinion. The hearts of many thoughtful persons must have failed as they contrasted Jefferson Davis, with his large public experience and high reputation, with this untried man from Illinois. Curiously enough, Thurlow Weed, whose grief at the nomination of Lincoln had been of surpassing bitterness, was now one of the few in the East who seemed to have full faith that he would prove adequate to the duty imposed upon him.2

Meanwhile the Peace Convention at Washington, sitting with closed doors, ex-President Tyler being in the chair, was with patriotic purpose laboring diligently to save the Union. Among the delegates were many men of character, ability, and distinction.3 While the proceedings were not
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1 February 26, Life of Bowles, Merriam, vol. i. p. 318. See, also, Springfield Republican, cited by National Intelligencer, February 21. 2 Weed on his return from Springfield wrote as an editorial in his journal, December 22, 1860, as follows: "An interview with Mr. Lincoln has confirmed and strengthened our confidence in his fitness for the high position he is to occupy; of his eminent qualifications for the great trust reposed in him; of his enlightened appreciation of the difficulties and dangers that surround us. . . .
"The American people will not have cause, so far as the head and heart of Abraham Lincoln are concerned, to regret the confidence they have reposed in him. He is not only 'honest and true,' but he is capable—capable in the largest sense of the term. He has read much and thought much of government, 'inwardly digesting' its theory and principles. His mind is at once philosophical and practical. He sees all who go there, hears all they have to say, talks freely with everybody, reads whatever is written to him, but thinks and acts by himself and for himself."
3 For example: Fessenden and Morrill, of Maine; Charles Allen and George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts; D. D. Field, J. S. Wadsworth, Erastus Corning, Francis Granger, William E. Dodge, General Wool, of New York; F. T. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey; Wilmot. of Pennsylvania; Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland; Tyler, W. C. Rives, G. W. Summers, J. A. Seddon, of Virginia; Guthrie, of Kentucky; Chase, W. S. Groesbeck, Thomas Ewing, of Ohio; Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana; S. T. Logan, J. M. Palmer, of Illinois; Harlan and Grimes, of Iowa. For a complete list of the delegates, see Debates and Proceedings of the Peace Convention, by Chittenden, himself a delegate from Vermont, p. 465. The convention met February 4.

published and secrecy was enjoined upon the members, the points of the important debates and the doings leaked out from time to time and — such was the shrinking of the country from civil war—occupied a larger space in the public mind than a due regard for historical proportion can accord to them. February 27, the nineteenth day of its session, the convention recommended to Congress a constitutional amendment as a plan of adjustment; but the important section, that relating to slavery in the territories, had been carried, the convention voting by States, by a majority of one only, the votes of three States which were divided not being counted. Moreover, several prominent members publicly announced their dissent from the prevailing voice of their respective delegations.1 The plan, being less favorable to the South than the Crittenden compromise and yet not satisfactory to the radical Republicans, lacked the support of a homogeneous majority, and went to Congress with no force behind it. On the morning of March 4, in the last hours of the Senate session, Crittenden offered the project of the Peace Conference. It came to a vote, receiving, however, only seven yeas, Crittenden and Douglas and two Republicans being among the number.2

The radical Republicans had from the first been opposed to the Peace Convention. Lowell represents well a phase of thoughtful sentiment. "The usual panacea of palaver was tried," he wrote; "Congress did its best to add to the general confusion of thought; and, as if that were not enough, a convention of notables was called simultaneously to thresh the straw of debate anew and to convince thoughtful persons that men do not grow wiser as they grow older." 3 Those who represented Michigan at Washington and at
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1 See Chittenden, p. 440 et seq., for proceedings of the nineteenth day. 2 The congressional day was March
2, see Congressional Globe, p. 1405; New York Tribune, March 5.
3 See article, "The Pickens-and-Stealin's Rebellion," Atlantic Monthly, June, 1861, p. 758. Pike called it the "fossil convention."—New York Tribune, February 9.

her State capital were opposed to compromise, therefore she had not appointed commissioners to the Peace Convention; but after it had been in session a week, her senators, at the request of Massachusetts and New York, advised her governor to send delegates. Senator Chandler's letter, which was made public before the convention adjourned, may be reckoned as one of the influences of the time. "I hope you will send," he wrote, "stiff-backed men or none. The whole thing (i.e., the convention) was gotten up against my judgment and advice, and will end in thin smoke. . . . Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would be awful. Without a little bloodletting this Union will not, in my estimation, be worth a rush."1 This letter affected painfully the Unionists of the border States and the conservative Republicans, but some hard-headed Northern men had arrived at this conviction, although few thought there was wisdom in giving vent to it.

Virginia voted in the Peace Convention against the section relating to slavery in the territories, her senators opposed the plan in the Senate, and ex-President Tyler, who had much to do with bringing about this conference, repudiated its action in a public speech at Richmond.2 The plan not being satisfactory to Virginia, it was idle to think that North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas would consider it a sufficient guarantee for their remaining in the Union, or that it would bring back the cotton States.

The historical significance of the Peace Convention consists in the evidence it affords of the attachment of the border slave States to the Union, and the lingering hope of
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1 Powell had this read in the Senate, February 27, but it was published in the Detroit Free Press, a Democratic newspaper, several days before; see, also, Life of Chandler, by Detroit Post and Tribune, p. 189.
2 Letters and Times of the Tylers, vol. ii. pp. 608, 616, 622. Tyler's suggestion, however, was to limit the conference to the border States, ibid., p. 579.

readjustment in North Carolina and Tennessee. The different ways in which it was regarded brings out the contrast between the sentiment of these communities and that of the cotton States. The commissioner of Georgia, who had been sent to Maryland to persuade her to join the secession movement, was discouraged to find Governor Hicks believing that the Peace Conference would agree upon a compromise that should be entirely acceptable to his State.1 A great obstacle, reported the commissioner, whose mandate had taken him to Raleigh, "to the immediate cooperation of North Carolina with the Confederate States was the belief entertained by the larger number of her citizens that the Peace Conference" would compose the dissension between the two sections.2 The Union men of Tennessee cherished the hope that the border State convention, as they called this body, would adopt a plan that would satisfy the slave States on the border and bring back into the Union those which had seceded. 3

The precipitate action of the cotton States helped the Union cause in the slave-holding communities farther north. Governor Hicks's loyalty to the federal government was more decided in February than in December.5 He had uniformly refused to summon his legislature, and the lukewarm response by the people to the irregular convention which assembled at Baltimore in February showed that he was steadily gaining adherents.5 The election in Virginia for
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1 Report of A. R. Wright of his visit of February 25, at Annapolis, Journal of Georgia Convention, p. 330.
2 Report of S. Hall of his visit of February 13, ibid., p. 343.
3 Report of H. P. Bell, Commissioner to Tennessee, ibid., p. 368. As to Missouri, see The Fight for Missouri, Snead, p. 60. On the desire for compromise in Kentucky, see Shaler's Kentucky, p. 235, and his article "The Border State Men of the Civil War," Atlantic Monthly, February. 1892, p. 253.
4 Compare his letter to the Mississippi commissioner, December 19, 1860, Journal of Mississippi Convention, p. 181, and his conversation with the Georgia commissioner February 25, Journal of Georgia Convention, p. 330; also Baltimore Daily Exchange, January 11.
5 Journal of Georgia Convention, pp. 328, 330.

members of her State convention had much significance.' The 152 delegates chosen were, with substantial correctness, classed as 30 so-called secessionists, 20 Douglas men, and 102 Whigs; which proves, asserted the Richmond Whig, a journal which argued strenuously for delay, that " the conservative victory in Virginia is perfectly overwhelming," the precipitators having sustained "a Waterloo defeat." 2 Nevertheless, it said, the meaning of this election must not be misapprehended. An impression obtained in the North that Virginia had "determined to remain in the Union as matters now stand, to submit to the rule of the new dynasty under the Chicago programme." This was a "pernicious error." Unless security were given that her constitutional rights would be respected, she would end her connection with the Northern States. Of the Virginia delegates elected to the convention only a half-dozen were "actual submissionists—that is, men in favor of the preservation of the Union under any and all circumstances.'3 The convention bill passed by the legislature of North Carolina provided that at the same time the people chose delegates they should vote on the desirability of the convention assembling. Eighty-two conservatives and 38 secessionists were elected; but the majority against the convention was 651.4 The high hopes of North Carolina, which the disunionists of the cotton States had entertained in December, were dashed by this election of January 28.5 Tennessee voted against a convention by nearly 12,000 majority, while the sentiment indicated in the choice of delegates was yet more decided against taking
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1 This took place February 4.
2 Issue of February 12. Lyon G. Tyler says the secessionists numbered only 25, vol. ii. p. 621.
3 Richmond Whig, February 8, 12; see also Summer's remarks in the Peace Convention, Chittenden, p. 158.
4 Tribune Almanac, 1862, p. 59; Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 538.
5 Compare Jacob Thompson's report of his visit at Raleigh, December 18, 1860, Journal of Mississippi Convention, p. 184, with S. Hall's report of his visit of February 11, Journal of Georgia Convention, p. 343.

any present steps towards secession.1 Even Arkansas had not responded to the disunion movement with the fervor that had been anticipated. While her people had voted for a convention, the conservatives had elected a majority of the delegates.2 Missouri, in its election for members of a convention, February 18, decided by a majority of 80,000 against secession, and not one secessionist delegate was chosen.3 Kentucky's legislature refused to call a convention, and adjourned before the middle of February.4

These elections, together with the peaceful electoral count, strengthened the uncompromising Republicans.5 Little doubt can exist that at this time a majority of the party was opposed to so wide a concession as the Crittenden compromise involved.6 Yet the public sentiment in the North was chameleon-like, and the compromisers, deriving hope from the elections, redoubled their efforts to meet the border-State men half-way. Feeling the public pulse with the sensitiveness of genius, the brilliant essayist told its beats
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1 Report of Commissioner Bell, Journal of Georgia Convention, p. 368; Appleton, pp. 677, 678. The so-called Union delegates had a majority of 64,000. On this vote see, also, Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. p. 250, note 1.
2 Appleton, p. 22, date of election, February 18; Report of Commissioner Fall, December 25, 1860, Journal of Mississippi Convention, p. 194.
3 Carr's Missouri, p. 284 et ante; Snead's The Fight for Missouri, p. 66.
4 Shaler's Kentucky, p. 240; Appleton, p. 395.
5 "It is sadly evident that the border States of the South are going to content themselves with much less than the Crittenden amendment. . . . The Republicans are so stiffened up by the late wonderful exhibition of Union sentiment that they will now grant only the promise of a national convention."—Washington correspondence, February 14, of Charleston Mercury. "The returns from Arkansas and Missouri are very encouraging to the Republicans, who now more than ever are convinced that the border States 'can't be kicked out.' They are not far wrong. Certainly nothing short of a steady kicking can do it."—Ibid., February 21. See, also, the Mobile Advertiser, cited by the National Intelligencer, February 26.
6 See New York Tribune for February, especially Pike's letters from Washington, the double-leaded editorial of February 18, with citations from the Republican press.

to the great historian across the sea, who was watching events with the eye of a philosopher, but with the anxious heart of a patriot. In a letter to Motley written from Boston, February 16, Holmes spoke of "the uncertainty of opinion of men. I had almost said of principles," he continued. "From the impracticable abolitionist, as bent on total separation from the South as Carolina is on secession from the North, to the Hunker, or submissionist, or whatever you choose to call the wretch who would sacrifice everything and beg the South's pardon for offending it, you find all shades of opinion in our streets. If Mr. Seward or Mr. Adams1 moves in favor of compromise, the whole Republican party sways like a field of grain before the breath of either of them. If Mr. Lincoln says he shall execute the laws and collect the revenue though the heavens cave in, the backs of the Republicans stiffen again, and they take down the old revolutionary king's arms and begin to ask whether they can be altered to carry minie bullets. .. . The expressions of popular opinion in Virginia and Tennessee have encouraged greatly those who hope for union on the basis of a compromise.2 The conservative Republicans appreciated better than the radicals the meaning of these elections. While the political reason of Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky inclined them to the North, their heartstrings drew them towards the South. On Virginia, especially, much depended. Her legislature by a unanimous vote of both houses had declared that if reconciliation failed, honor
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1 "I have rejoiced, as you of New York must certainly have done, in the spirit of conciliation which has repeatedly been manifested, during the present session of Congress, by your distinguished senator Governor Seward. I listened with no less gratification, while recently at Washington on an errand of peace, to the admirable speech of our Massachusetts representative, Mr. Adams. I might have been glad if both of them could have gone still further in the path of concession."—Robert C. Winthrop to the Constitutional Union Committee of Troy, February 17, Winthrop's Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 701.
2 Motley's Correspondence, vol. i. p. 360; see, also, Pike's despatch of February 5.

and interest demanded that she should unite her destiny with the cotton States.1 Seddon told the Peace Convention that Virginia was "solemnly pledged to resist coercion;"2 and by coercion he meant retaking the forts or collecting the duties in the Confederate States. It was certain that if Virginia seceded, North Carolina and Tennessee would follow. The disunionists also had hopes that her action would control that of Maryland and Kentucky.3

After the withdrawal of the senators and the representatives of the seceded States from Congress, the Republicans had a good working majority in the House, and, as against the combined opposition of Southern and Northern Democrats and South Americans,4 were in the Senate in a minority of only one. As a delayed measure of justice, the Senate passed the House bill of the previous session for the admission of Kansas as a State under the Wyandotte Constitution.5 The course of legislation was conciliatory and forbearing. Bills for the organization of the territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada were passed without a proposal from any Republican senator or representative to incorporate in them a section prohibiting slavery. Nor did any Republican senator express the desire to take up the House bill repealing the slave code of New Mexico, which had been passed at the first session of this Congress.6 Such action in either case would have been superfluous. The law of physical geography dedicated Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada to freedom, and an act of Congress was not needed.
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1 Adopted January 21, Letters and Times of the Tylers, vol. ii. p. 605. 2 February 19, Chittenden, p. 147.
3 Reports of Commissioners Wright, Hall, and Bell, Journal of Georgia Convention, pp. 328, 343, 368; Report of Commissioner Featherston, Journal of Mississippi Convention, p. 195.
4 The members of Congress of the American party from the Southern States were called South Americans.
5 Passed January 21, 36 to 16. The nays were all from the slave States, and all but one Democrats. The senators from Louisiana and Texas, and Iverson of Georgia were present and voted nay, Congressional Globe, p. 489.
6 See Douglas's remarks in the Senate, March 2, ibid., p. 1391.

All that propagandism, positive legislation, and executive compliance during the last seven years could do had been done to make New Mexico a slave territory, with the result that there were now twenty-two slaves within her borders.1 Two bills to strengthen the arm of the President by furnishing him military means, and two bills intended to provide specifically for the collection of duties in such a case as existed in Charleston—all of them called by the Southerners "force bills"—were introduced into the House, but were not passed.

Although the House, by 113 nays to 80 yeas, refused to submit the Crittenden compromise to the people,2 and although the Senate defeated it by 20 to 19 on a direct vote on the joint resolution proposing certain amendments to the Constitution,3 Congress, by a two-thirds vote of each House, recommended to the States a constitutional amendment which, as bearing on the question on whom rests the blame for the Civil War, is of the highest importance. The proposed Thirteenth Amendment was as follows: "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." This was carried by the conservative Republicans voting with the Democrats.4 By this amendment, which Lincoln in his inaugural address approved, the North said to the South, We will forever respect your peculiar
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1 Speech of C. F. Adams, House, January 31, Congressional Globe Appendix, p. 125.
2 February 27, Congressional Globe, p. 1261.
3 March 2 officially, really March 4, ibid., p. 1405. The votes in favor of it were the two South Americans, Crittenden and Kennedy, and the rest were Democrats. All against it were Republicans. Seward's name is not recorded. Cameron was not present, but would have voted nay. 4 The vote in the House, February 28, was 133 to 65, ibid., p. 1285. In the Senate, March 2, 24 to 12. The nays were: Bingham, Chandler, Clark, Doolittle, Durkee, Foot, King, Sumner, Trumbull, Wade, Wilkinson, and Wilson. Seward's and Cameron's names are not recorded, ibid., p. 1403.

institution in the States where it now exists.1 But it was not considered a sufficient concession by Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, and it had no effect whatever on the States which constituted the Southern Confederacy.2
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1 If it would have cemented the divided Union, it would undoubtedly have received the ratification of the requisite number of States. The legislatures of Maryland and Ohio agreed to it promptly, McPherson, p. 60, note.
2 Two propositions, reported by the House Committee of Thirty-three, which were a compromise, were passed by the House, but not considered by the Senate, see Congressional Globe, pp. 1261,1328. The proposition to admit New Mexico as a State was laid on the table by a vote of 115 to 71. Republicans and Democrats were mixed promiscuously in both the majority and minority. The admission of New Mexico as a State was first proposed by the Republicans as a concession; but the South, after examining all the conditions, being obviously afraid it would become a free State, did not consider it as such. This action is well summarized by McPherson, p. 58 et seq.
A minority in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia were disposed to be satisfied. Thos. A. R. Nelson, South American member of Congress from Tennessee, represented well this sentiment. In a letter to Brownlow of March 13 he gave his reasons. He wrote: "The proposition to amend the Constitution of the United States so [as] forever to prevent any amendment of that instrument interfering with the relation of slavery in the States we passed by a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress. This proposition, if carried out by the States, will remove the only real ground of apprehension in the slave States. It blows the irrepressible-conflict doctrine moon-high, and received the sanction of the author of that doctrine himself.
"The territories of Dakota, Colorado, and Nevada were created without the Wilmot proviso which accompanied these bills at the long session... .Though extreme Republicans deny that there can be property in man, this provision, with the Dred Scott case, leaves the territories open to occupation with slavery, and effectually yields the doctrine of protection in favor of the South.
"Although the Republicans, at the long session, when they had not the power, endeavored to repeal the New Mexican laws allowing slavery, yet, at the short session, when, by reason of secession, they had a majority in both houses, they left the matter untouched. Consequently slavery may exist and be protected in all the territories possibly open to slavery.
"At and for some time after the commencement of the last session of Congress a large majority of the Republicans had no idea of the true condition of things in the South. They looked upon the threats made by South Carolina and other cotton States as mere gasconade, such as they had listened to for thirty years, and supposed it would soon pass away. But after the secession of several of the cotton States they began to realize the danger, and a majority of their representatives were earnestly in favor of conciliation, though the extremists among them, as among us, were utterly opposed to anything of the kind....
"Under the circumstances, why should not the seceding States come back into the Union if the course of the Republican party on the slavery question is the true cause of their separation? Although they have not received all they demanded, yet they have a guarantee on the vital question, and their own doctrine of protection has been legally and practically acknowledged. The indications given by the last session of Congress are decidedly in favor of peace and compromise, and warrant the belief that, if anything is now wanted, it will, in due time and upon a proper appeal, be granted by the North. Why, then, should there be civil war, unless the secession leaders are determined to precipitate it, as they have already precipitated revolution? The people in the border States ought to be satisfied, or at least to acquiesce, in what has already been done."—Knoxville Whig, cited by National Intelligencer, March 25.

It has sometimes been asserted that the passage by the Senate of the Morrill tariff bill, which had been enacted by the House at the previous session, was a contributing cause to the secession of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. While it is true that objections were raised to the bill from this quarter,1 yet if it had any effect at all it was as a drop in the bucket.2 More important was its influence on English opinion. "I know on the very highest authority and from repeated conversations," wrote Motley from London to his mother, March 15," that the English government looks with deepest regret on the dismemberment of the great American republic. ... At the same time I am obliged to say that there has been a change, a very great change, in English sympathy since the passing of the Morrill tariff bill. That measure has done more than any commissioner from the Southern republic could do to alienate the feelings of the English public towards the United States, and they are much more likely to recognize the Southern Confederacy at an early day than they otherwise would have done. If the tariff people had been acting in league with the secessionists to produce a strong demonstration in Europe in favor of the
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1 See, especially, Clingman, Speeches and Writings, p. 545; Richmond Dispatch, February 9; Baltimore Daily Exchange, February 8. The New York Times also opposed it, editorial of February 15, as did the New York Evening Post, cited by the Tribune, March 14.
2 The bill was passed February 20, see chap. x1l.

dissolution of the Union, they could not have managed better."1

Jefferson Davis in his book intimates that the South would gladly have welcomed a general convention of the States for the consideration of differences and the amendment of the Constitution, but that this boon was denied them by the representatives of the North.2 This is obviously an error in memory, not unnatural considering the way in which Davis's work was written,3 and it would be unfair to assume that it was one of the arguments officially put forth to justify disunion, since the statement is so palpably untrue that no Southern writer would urge it after he had examined the evidence. Seward, Chase, and Lincoln advocated a national convention.4 The leader of the conservative Republicans, the exponent of the radicals, and the President-elect all agreed on this point, and such a project would have met with unanimous favor in the North. But the cotton States would not listen to it.

On the 4th of March Lincoln was peacefully inaugurated. His address, to which careful heed was given by an anxious and eager crowd, had been carefully prepared at Springfield. With the Constitution, Henry Clay's speech of 1850, Jackson's proclamation against nullification, and Webster's reply to Hayne as authorities, "he locked himself up in a room up-stairs over a store across the street from the statehouse," 5 and amidst dingy surroundings wrote an immortal state-paper. He submitted it to friends for approval and
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1 Motley's Correspondence, vol. i. p. 364. Compare article in London Economist of January 29, cited by New York Tribune, February 13, with London Times, cited by Charleston Mercury, April 4. The latter said: "Strange to say, the Southern congress enters bravely upon a policy of free trade, whilst the North cuts itself off from every European sympathy by the introduction of an ultra-protectionist tariff." Lowell wrote: "Nearly all the English discussions of the 'American crisis' which we have seen have shown far more of the shop-keeping spirit than of interest in the maintenance of free institutions."—Atlantic Monthly, June, 1861, p. 758.
2 Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 227.
3 See Derby's Books, Authors, and Publishers, p. 493.
4 Seward's speech of January 12; speech of Chase in the Peace Convention, Chittenden, p. 432; Lincoln's inaugural.
5 Herndon, p. 478,

advice; from Seward he received many suggestions, some of which he adopted.1 Lincoln now proclaimed to the country that he had no purpose to interfere directly or indirectly with slavery in the States; he intimated that he should enforce the Fugitive Slave law; 2 he held "that in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual." "No state," he continued, " upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and acts of violence within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances. ... To the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. ... In doing this there need be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. . . . The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. . . .

"One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. . . .

"Physically speaking, we cannot separate. ... In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will
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1 A very interesting relation of the story of this inaugural will be found in chap. xxi. vol. iii. of Nicolay and Hay.
2 "When," asked Douglas, at Springfield, April 25, "was the Fugitive Slave law executed with more fidelity than since the inauguration of the present incumbent of the presidential office ?"—Chicago Tribune, June 6; New York Tribune, May 1.

not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. .. . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature." 1

Purposely conspicuous on the platform where Lincoln stood was Senator Douglas, for he wished to give notice to his followers and the country that he proposed to support the President in his efforts to maintain the Union.2 The inaugural was generally satisfactory to the Northern people. Conservative and radical Republicans and Douglas Democrats alike approved it. Its power to win popularity lay in its being a straightforward and not uncertain expression of the predominating Union sentiment of the North. It was a paper such as Jackson, Clay, and Webster would have sanctioned had they been living, and nearly every voter at the North owned one of these statesmen as his political teacher and guide. But in the Confederate States Lincoln's inaugural was construed to mean war.3 It was similarly regarded in Virginia, and only the unconditional Unionists liked it in Maryland.4 This feeling was reflected
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1 It is hardly necessary to say that the entire inaugural deserves reading by the general reader as well as by the student of history. It is printed by Nicolay and Hay, Raymond, Holland, and Greeley.
2 Diary of a Public Man, entry of March 4; Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 836.
3 See despatch of Wigfall to Pickens, March 4, Official Records, vol. i. p. 361; letter of L. Q. Washington to Walker, Secretary of War, March 5, ibid., p. 263; Charleston Courier, March 8; Montgomery despatch to New York Tribune, March 4 and 5; Pike from Washington, March 4, ibid.
4 The policy indicated in the Lincoln inaugural "will meet with the stern and unyielding resistance of a united South."—Richmond Whig, March 5. "Civil war must now come. . . . No action of our convention can now maintain the peace. Virginia must fight. . . . War with Lincoln or with Davis is the choice left us."—Richmond Enquirer, March 5. See, also, despatch to the New York Tribune, Richmond, March 5. "The measures of Mr. Lincoln mean war."—Baltimore Daily Exchange, March 5. See citations from the press, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i., Docs., p. 39. In the Senate, March 6, Douglas spoke of the apprehensions which the inaugural had given rise to in the slave States, and declared "It is a peace-offering rather than a war message."—Congressional Globe, p. 1436.

in Wall Street in a decided downward movement of stocks.1

On the next day after the inauguration the President sent the names of his proposed cabinet to the Senate. Seward was named for the State Department and Chase for the Treasury; Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, as Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, as Secretary of the Navy; Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, as Secretary of the Interior. Edward Bates, of Missouri, was appointed Attorney General, and Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, Postmaster-General. As the intentions of Lincoln in regard to his cabinet became known the war of factions raged. The most important contest turned on Seward and Chase, for it was one in which opposing opinions in the Republican party clashed. Seward stood for a policy of peace, of conciliation, perhaps of compromise. Chase had made no secret of his opinion—"Inauguration first, adjustment afterwards." To Seward himself little or no objection was made. All conceded that his position in the party, his ability, his fitness entitled him to the first place in the cabinet. But he was hit by the fight made against his follower Cameron, and by the failure of his friends to prevent the appointment of Chase. Cameron agreed with Seward that conciliation was the correct policy. On this account the radicals opposed him. Governor Curtin and A. K. McClure, of Pennsylvania, strenuously objected to him on account of his personal character and a long-standing factional feud. Many were the considerations for and against Cameron, but in the end the scale was probably turned in his favor by the powerful advocacy of Weed and Seward. Seward's friends, however, were not successful in the exclusion
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1 Money articles, New York Tribune, March 6 and 7.

of Chase, and on that account, two days before the inauguration, Seward withdrew his acceptance of the position of Secretary of State. "The President is determined that he will have a compound cabinet," he wrote to his wife. "I was at one time on the point of refusing—nay, I did refuse for a time to hazard myself in the experiment."1 Nicolay and Hay have told of the infinite tact with which on this occasion Lincoln treated Seward;2 and if talent, as Chateaubriand said, is only long patience, what a talent for political affairs this inexperienced man from Illinois displayed at the outset of his executive career!

Pennsylvanians protested against the appointment of Chase, for in their view he was not sound on the tariff question. Conservatives objected to Blair, because he was radical and uncompromising, and because, being a true disciple of Andrew Jackson, he was ready to fight at once if need be for the restoration of the national authority. Lincoln listened to all objections and all protests ; he gave heed to all arguments, and though at times he hesitated and was on the point of changing his mind in regard to some of the appointments, the names he finally sent to the Senate made up the cabinet substantially as he had framed it in his mind the night of his election. 3

Meanwhile the Confederate congress 4 and executive were
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1 Letter of March 8, Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 518.
2 March 5, Seward withdrew his letter of resignation.
3 See chap. xxii. vol. iii., Nicolay and Hay; Life of Seward, vol. 11.; chapter on Lincoln and Cameron in McClure's Lincoln and Men of War Times; Lincoln and Seward, Welles; Diary of a Public Man, entries of February 28, March 2 and 3; Schuckers's Life of Chase, p. 206; Pike to New York Tribune, March 3; editorial, ibid., March 2, 7; Crawford, p. 320 ; Life of Thurlow Weed, vols. i. and ii. "In the Senate Simon Cameron declared himself desirous to preserve the Union 'by any sacrifice of feeling, and I may say of principle.'"—Life of Lincoln, Morse, vol. i. p. 197. A prevalent opinion was that Seward would be the master-spirit of the administration. "Seward is a necessity," wrote Bowles to Dawes, February 26; "Chase or Banks ought to be ; but let the New-Yorker, with his Illinois attachment, have a fair trial."—Life of Bowles, vol. i. p. 318.
4 "The members of the Confederate congress are extraordinary workers. Their sessions average about ten hours daily, and very little of the time is consumed in buncombe speeches."—Montgomery despatch to New York Tribune, March 6.

diligently at work at Montgomery. Beauregard had been made a brigadier-general, and sent to Charleston to take charge of the military operations in the name and by the authority of the Confederate States.1 On the day of Lincoln's inauguration the Confederate flag was raised over the Montgomery capitol, and two days later it was displayed from the Charleston custom-house. It had three broad stripes—the one in the centre white, the others red, with a blue union containing seven white stars. Davis was reluctant to give up the old national flag, asserting that in the event of war a different battle-flag would make a sufficient distinction between the combatants.2 The Confederate provisional congress remained in session until March 16. It authorized the raising of a military force of 100,000 volunteers to serve for twelve months, and the issue of $1,000,000 in treasury notes, bearing interest at the rate of one cent per day per $100, redeemable after one year. It passed acts to organize and support a navy; to organize a post-office department; to establish judicial courts. It passed the necessary appropriation bills.3 A commission of three, with Yancey at its head, was sent to Europe to obtain recognition for the new government, and to make treaties of amity, commerce, and international copyrights.4 The different States turned over to the Confederacy the property of the national government which they had taken, the State of
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1 He arrived there March 1, Roman's Beauregard, vol. i. p. 25.
2 See Montgomery despatches of March 4 to New York Tribune; Montgomery Advertiser, March 5, cited by the New York Tribune, March 11; Foster to Totten, March 7, Official Records, vol. i. p. 192 ; Mrs. Davis, vol. ii. p. 36; Appleton, p. 156; Diary of a Public Man, entry March 6. The provisional congress met in the Senate Chamber of the Montgomery capitol.
3 The Statutes at Large, Provisional Government of C. S. A., pp. 45, 47, 54, 57, 69, 70, 75.
4 Appleton, p. 131; Life of Yancey, Du Bose, pp. 588, 594, 600, 604; Statutes at Large, p. 93.

Louisiana receiving a special vote of thanks from the Confederate congress for the transfer of $536,000 in coin, which she had seized in the United States mint and custom-house at New Orleans.1

Before the Confederate congress adjourned it adopted a permanent constitution.2 It was the Constitution of the United States, with but three essential differences. It expressly affirmed the right of property in negro slaves; it made the recognition and protection of slavery in any new territory that might be acquired mandatory on congress; and in the different provisions touching the peculiar institution, seeking no refuge in the ingenious circumlocution of the federal Constitution, it used the words "slave" and "slavery." In the preamble it asserted the doctrine of the sovereignty of the States. It forbade congress to lay duties on foreign importations for the purpose of fostering any branch of industry. In two of these changes lay the essence of the secession; the other change gave expression to a largely held construction of the Constitution of the United States. Still another alteration was made, which, in view of the strong sentiment existing in the cotton States in 1859 favorable to the reopening of the African slave-trade,3 may seem extraordinary. The Confederate constitution prohibited the importation of negroes from any foreign country except the slave-holding States of the old Union.4 This clause was adopted by the vote of four States to two, South Carolina and Florida opposing it.5 It showed the
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1 Appleton, pp. 130, 430; Statutes at Large, p. 94.
2 The government of the Confederacy was carried on for one year under the provisional constitution, and the legislative body was called the provisional congress. The first congress under the permanent constitution met February 18, 1862.
3 See vol. ii. under Slave-trade, African; letter of Robert C. Winthrop, May 20, 1859, Winthrop's Addresses and Speeches, vol. ii. p. 698.
4 For the provision of the federal Constitution, see vol. i. p. 18.
5 Appleton, p. 161; National Intelligencer, March 28. To confirm this vote I had a search made in the journal of the Confederate congress, but it is silent on the subject. Mr. Thian, chief clerk of the adjutant-general of the army, to whom I desire here to express my thanks for assistance rendered, informs me that owing to press of other work this journal was not written out during the sessions. The clerk kept bills with the votes and other memoranda, and after the war J. J. Hooper, secretary of the congress, took these papers to his plantation with the intention of writing up the journal, but this he never did. When the papers came into the possession of the government, this work was done in Washington. Mr. Thian assures me that the journal is absolutely correct. I also wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Joseph W. Kirkley, of the War Department, for important assistance.

respect Southern statesmen had for the opinion of the enlightened world, and was thrown out as an allurement to foreign powers for their recognition, and as an inducement for the border slave States to join the Confederacy. It is probable that Southern senators and representatives would have objected to such a provision in the old Constitution, for, although urged to it by Winthrop, Crittenden did not deem it wise to make the article of his compromise that dealt with the foreign slave-trade a constitutional amendment, but offered it as one of the joint resolutions.1 Further alterations were made, all of which are of great interest to students of political science, and which are generally considered by them as improvements on the Constitution of 1787.2 The religious character of the people manifested itself in the preamble to their organic instrument by "invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God." The permanent constitution was adopted on March 11, by a unanimous vote of the seven States represented,3
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1 Letter of Winthrop to Crittenden, December 24, 1860, Life of Crittenden, Coleman, vol. ii. p. 239; Journal of Committee of Thirteen, p. 7. It must, however, be stated that every Southern senator in committee voted for the resolution.
2 In Jefferson Davis's book the constitutions of the United States and the Confederate States are printed in parallel columns, the changes being plainly shown, see vol. i. p. 648; see also p. 259, and Stephens's War between the States, vol. ii. p. 335. An excellent brief analysis of the Confederate constitution is given by Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion, p. 242.
3 Roll call of convention, March 11, War Department Archives, MS.; extract from the Journal of the Congress, Statutes at Large, C. S. A., p. 23.

and was promptly ratified by the different State conventions.1

When one thinks of the many fruitless attempts of peoples to devise wise systems of government, and of the many admirable constitutions on paper which have been adopted, but which have failed to find a response in the character and political habits of the men for whom they were intended, one might be lost in admiration at the orderly manner in which the Southerners proceeded, at the excellent organic instrument they adopted, at the ready acceptance of the work of their representatives, were it not that they were running amuck against the civilized world in their attempt to bolster up human slavery, and in their theory of governmental particularism, when the spirit of the age was tending to freedom and to unity. The sincerest and frankest public man in the Southern Confederacy, Alexander H. Stephens, told the true story. "The new constitution has put at rest forever," he declared, "all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution.... The prevailing ideas entertained by Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle socially, morally, and politically....

"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior
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1 South Carolina, April 3, by a vote of 138 to 21, Journal of South Carolina Convention, p. 248; Georgia, March 16, by yeas 276, nays none, Journal, p. 187; Mississippi, March 29, yeas 78, nays 7, Journal, p. 35; Louisiana, March 21, yeas 101, nays 7, Journal, p. 75; Texas, March 23, yeas 128, nays 2, Constitution of the State of Texas, etc., p. 36; Alabama, March 13, yeas 87, nays 5, Stephens's War between the States, vol. ii. p. 355, see, also, p. 339; Florida, April 22, by yeas 54, nays none. Proceedings of the Convention of the People of Florida at Called Sessions, pp. 31-33.

race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. . . .

"The great objects of humanity are best attained when there is conformity to the Creator's laws and decrees, in the formation of governments as well as in all things else. Our confederacy is founded upon principles in strict conformity with these laws. This stone, which was rejected by the first builders, 'is become the chief of the corner'— the real 'corner-stone'—in our new edifice." 1

It is obvious that when Lincoln took the oath of office he had two distinct purposes in his mind: to hold forts Sumter and Pickens, and to use all means short of the compromise of principle to retain the border slave States and North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas in the Union. On going to his office the morning of March 5 he found that the Sumter question was more perplexing than he had imagined. A letter from Holt, still acting as Secretary of War, gave the information that Anderson had written that his provisions would last only a few weeks longer, and that to reinforce the fort successfully with a view to holding it would require an army of 20,000 disciplined men.2 While the federal government, waiting the issue of the Peace Convention, had pursued a policy of inaction, the South Carolinians had been steadily at work on the islands in Charleston harbor, erecting batteries and strengthening the forts which bore on
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1 This speech was made in the Atheneum, in Savannah, March 21. I have made the citations from the speech as printed in Cleveland's Stephens, pp. 721, 723. That is taken from the report in the Savannah Republican made at the time. I have compared the quoted portions with the speech as printed in the New York Tribune of March 27, and in Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i., Docs., p. 44, and they agree. The Tribune gives the date of the speech as March 22. Johnston and Browne make an attempt to explain away the parts of the speech I have cited, see pp. 394, 396. "The Confederate States are confederates in the crime of upholding slavery." —London Punch, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i., Poetry, etc., p. 24.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 376; Official Records, vol. i. pp. 197, 202. Anderson's letter was received March 4.

Sumter. The President turned to General Scott for counsel, receiving the opinion that" evacuation seems almost inevitable." He was in a trying situation ; there had been so many defections in the military and civil service that he did not know on whom he could depend.1 Lincoln suspected even Anderson, and sending for Holt took him into a private room, and asked whether he had ever had reason to doubt the loyalty of the commander of Sumter. The President was relieved to learn that Holt had entire confidence in Anderson's fealty. What made the situation almost intolerable was "the scramble for office," which Stanton wrote "is terrific.'"1 "Solicitants for offices besiege the President," said Seward in a private letter, "and he of course finds his hands full for the present. My duties call me to the White House one, two, or three times a day. The grounds, halls, stairways, closets are filled with applicants, who render ingress and egress difficult." 3 Lincoln himself
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1 On the 1st of March, by direction of President Buchanan, General Twiggs had been "dismissed from the army of the United States for his treachery to the flag of his country, in having surrendered on the 18th of February, on the demand of the authorities of Texas, the military posts and other property of the United States in his department and under his charge."—Order of Secretary of War, Official Records, vol. i. p. 597; see Buchanan's letter to Dix of April 19, where he calls Twiggs a "hoary-headed rebel," Curtis, vol. ii. p. 542. General Dix wrote Anderson, March 4, that in the extreme Southern States there had been " a demoralization in all that concerns the faithful discharge of official duty, which, if it had pleased God, I could have wished never to have lived to see. The cowardice and treachery of General Twiggs is more disheartening than all that has transpired since this disgraceful career of disloyalty to the government commenced."—Curtis, vol. ii. p. 495. Anderson replied: "The faithful historian of the present period will have to present a record which will sadden and surprise. It would seem that a sirocco charged with treachery, cunning, dishonesty, and bad faith had tainted the atmosphere of portions of our land; and, alas ! how many have been prostrated by its blast!"—Letter of March 7, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 496. The adjutant-general of the army, Cooper, a native of New Jersey, resigned his position on March 7, and went to Montgomery to take a similar office in the Confederate States.
2 To Buchanan, March 10, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 580.
3 Letter of March 16, Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 530.

said, "I seem like one sitting in a palace, assigning apartments to importunate applicants, while the structure is on fire and likely soon to perish in ashes."1

Yet whenever the President could get away from the ceaseless clamor for office and recognition, the question what to do about Sumter occupied his mind. March 9 he held his first cabinet council and exposed the situation to his advisers. Thereupon ensued consultations with military and naval officers in regard to the feasibility of relieving the fort. March 12 General Scott formally gave his opinion that Anderson should be instructed to evacuate Sumter. Captain Gustavus V. Fox, of the navy, submitted a plan of reinforcement which to the President and a majority of the cabinet seemed practicable. Narrowing now the question to the matter of provisioning the fort and assuming that it was possible, Lincoln asked his cabinet at the meeting of March 15 whether, as a political measure, it were wise to attempt it. Seward, Cameron, Welles, Smith, and Bates said no; Seward made a plausible argument in support of his position. Blair emphatically answered yes, and Chase gave a conditionally affirmative reply.2 Lincoln held his decision in abeyance. For the purpose of gaining more light he sent Fox to Charleston, who, through the influence of an old comrade now in the South Carolina service, obtained
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1 McClure's Lincoln, p. 56. "It makes me heart-sick. All over the country our party are by the ears, fighting over offices worth one hundred to five hundred dollars." — Colfax to his mother, two weeks after the inauguration, Life of Colfax, Hollister, p. 173. The Diary of a Public Man, entry of March 7, speaks of "the strange and uncouth appearance of a great proportion of the people . . . lounging about the steps of the Treasury Department and the lobbies of the hotels. . . . Certainly, in all my long experience of Washington, I have never seen such a swarm of uncouth beings. The clamor for offices is already quite extraordinary, and these poor people undoubtedly belong to the horde which has pressed in here to seek places under the new administration, which neither has nor can hope to have places enough to satisfy one-twentieth part of the number."—North American Review, November, 1879, p. 488.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. chap, xxiii.; Crawford, chap, xxvii.; Official Records, vol. i. p. 196; Warden's Life of Chase, p. 370,

admittance to Sumter, and had a conversation with Anderson.1 To ascertain whether there was, as Seward had maintained, a latent Union feeling in South Carolina, the President induced Hurlbut, of Illinois, a personal friend, to visit his native city of Charleston, and learn the public opinion of the city and of the State from Petigru2—now the only Union man of prominence in the city—in whose office he had for four years studied law. Ward H. Lamon, a confidential companion of Lincoln, accompanied him. Hurlbut reported that the sentiment of South Carolina was unanimous for lasting separation, and that there was no attachment to the Union.3 Fox's visit confirmed him in the notion that his plan was entirely feasible.4 In the meantime, by direction of the President, an order had been sent by the war-steamer Mohawk to Captain Vogdes on board the sloop-of-war Brooklyn, lying off Fort Pickens, to land his company of artillery and reinforce that fort.5

Two of the Confederate commissioners 6 having arrived at Washington the early part of March, an attempt was made by them, through the influence of Senator Hunter, of Virginia, to get an informal interview with Secretary Seward. They knew that his policy was conciliatory, and that he was supported by Cameron and probably by General Scott, and they were aware that he believed that moderation would save the border States, and in the end induce the people of the Southern Confederacy to rebel against their leaders and return to the Union. While Seward's hopes were illusive, the commissioners thought it well he should indulge in them, for up to a certain point they could travel along together, he hugging his vain dreams while they paved the way for the surrender of Forts Sumter and Pickens and a peaceful
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1 Crawford, p. 370.
2 Ante, p. 124, note 3.
3 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 391 et ante.
4 Ibid., p. 389; Crawford, p. 371.
5 The order was given March 11, the Mohawk left March 12, Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 393; Official Records, vol. i. p. 360; ante, p. 284
6 Ante, p. 295. These were Forsyth and Crawford.

separation.1 Seward told Senator Hunter that if the commissioners made a formal demand and pressed for a reply, the result might be unfavorable. This being communicated to Forsyth and Crawford, they prepared a memorandum in which they agreed not to bring forward the object of their mission, provided the United States government should preserve the present military status in every respect.2 This paper Hunter presented to Seward, at the same time asking that he would grant the commissioners an informal interview. The secretary was "perceptibly embarrassed and uneasy," and answered that before giving his consent he must consult the President. The next day, March 12, he wrote a note to Hunter, saying, "It will not be in my power to receive the gentlemen of whom we conversed yesterday."3 Forsyth and Crawford then formally asked the Secretary of State to receive them as delegates of "an independent nation, defacto and de jure . . . with a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of this political separation upon terms of amity and good-will." Seward did not reply in the form of a letter, not deeming it wise to go even that far in an official recognition of the commissioners, but he prepared a memorandum which he placed on the files of the State Department, with instructions to furnish them a copy should they call for it; in this he declined official intercourse with Forsyth and Crawford.4

Justice Nelson, of New York, a man loyal to the core, and Justice Campbell, of Alabama, both of the United States Supreme Court, which had just ended its session, now appear in the negotiations. Campbell had been opposed to
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1 Forsyth and Crawford to Toombs, March 8, MS. Confederate Archives, Treasury Department, Washington.
2 Memorandum A to accompany Despatch No. 8, ibid.
Confederate Diplomatic Correspondence, MS. Treasury Department ; see also Crawford, pp. 323, 324; Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 402.
4 The letter of the commissioners is dated March 12, the memorandum of the secretary March 15, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i., Docs., pp. 42, 43; Crawford, p. 325.

the secession of his State, was "anxiously and patriotically earnest to preserve the government," and still had hopes of the restoration of the Union.1 He and Nelson after a careful examination had become convinced that the policy of coercion—and to them coercion had come to mean the retaking of the public property and the collection of the duties—could not be carried out "without very serious violation of the Constitution and statute."2 March 15, Nelson called on Seward, Chase, and Bates, and gave them his opinion, with the reasons for it. Seward, after listening to him with warm interest, confided in him his own embarrassment at the demand for recognition of the Confederate commissioners. Nelson suggested that it might be well to consult Campbell, and later brought him to the Secretary of State. The two justices advised Seward to reply to the letter of the commissioners, announcing that the desire of the government was for peace, and that it would pursue a policy of conciliation and forbearance. Seward rose from his seat and said: "I wish I could do it. See Montgomery Blair, see Mr. Bates, see Mr. Lincoln himself; I wish you would: they are all Southern men. Convince them! No; there is not a member of the cabinet who would consent to it. If Jefferson Davis had known the state of things here he would not have sent those commissioners; the evacuation of Sumter is as much as the administration can bear." 3 Campbell had been unaware that the withdrawal of Anderson was under consideration, and he quite agreed with Seward as to its effect; rejoicing that so
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1 Crawford, pp. 326, 345. Campbell "has been as anxiously and patriotically earnest to preserve the government as any man in the United States, and he has sacrificed more than any Southern man rather than yield to the secessionists."—Stanton to Buchanan, May 19, 1861, North American Review, November, 1879, p. 478; Curtis, vol. ii. p. 549; see, also, Thurlow Weed's article in Albany Evening Journal, cited by New York Tribune, May 24; also Tribune, May 3.
2 Campbell to Southern Historical Society, December 20, 1873, Crawford, p. 326.
3 Campbell's MS. Facts of History, Crawford, p. 328.

important a move towards adjustment would be taken, he proposed to see the commissioners and to write to Jefferson Davis at Montgomery. "And what shall I say to him upon the subject of Fort Sumter?" he asked. "You may say to him," replied the secretary, " that before that letter reaches him — how far is it to Montgomery?" "Three days," answered Campbell. "You may say to him that before that letter reaches him the telegraph will have informed him that Sumter will have been evacuated." "And what shall I say as to the forts on the Gulf of Mexico?" Seward replied, "We contemplate no action as to them; we are satisfied as to the position of things there."1

On the same day, March 15, Campbell had his first interview with Commissioner Crawford. He told Crawford that the opinion prevailed at Washington that " the secession movements were short-lived, and would wither under sunshine." The commissioner replied that he "was willing to take all the risks of sunshine . . . but that the evacuation of Sumter was imperative, and the military status must remain unchanged."2 Campbell left with Crawford a memorandum stating that he felt perfect confidence that Fort Sumter would be evacuated in the next five days; that the existing military status would not be altered; that an immediate demand for an answer to the communication of the commissioners would be productive of evil; and he earnestly asked that they would delay ten days before pressing for a reply.3 Campbell declined to say on whose authority he was giving these assurances, but Crawford correctly guessed it was on Seward's.4 That evening
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1 Crawford, p. 328, note; Campbell to Davis, April 3, Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 407; Crawford, Roman, and Forsyth to Toombs, March 22, MS. Confederate Diplomatic Correspondence, Treasury Department.
2 Campbell MS., Crawford, p. 329; the commissioners to Toombs, March 22.
3 MSS. United States Treasury Department, Crawford, p. 330; Campbell to Seward, April 13, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol, i.. Docs., p. 427; the commissioners to Toombs, March 22.
4 Campbell's MS., Crawford, p. 829.

Campbell communicated to the secretary, by letter, the substance of the memorandum he had left with Crawford.1 The five days went by without the evacuation of Sumter. Under pressure from the commissioners, Campbell and Nelson saw the Secretary of State, and as a result of the interview Campbell gave them, March 21, a memorandum saying, "My confidence in the two facts stated in my note of the 15th is unabated."' On the next day Campbell had another conversation with Seward, the gist of which he made a memorandum of and submitted it to the Secretary of State, afterwards leaving it with the commissioners. This paper ran thus: "Asa result of my interviewing of to-day, I have to say that I have still unabated confidence that Fort Sumter will be evacuated, and that no delay that has occurred excites in me any apprehension or distrust; and that the state of things existing at Fort Pickens will not be altered prejudicially to the Confederate States." 3 Accounts of the several interviews with Campbell and his memoranda were transmitted by the commissioners to the authorities at Montgomery.4 After March 22 Justice Nelson retired from the negotiations and left Washington.5

Meanwhile the country and senators in session at Washington were anxious and eager to know what would be done in regard to Sumter. The National Republican, which Stanton called the " Lincoln organ," announced that at the cabinet meeting of March 9 it was determined that both Sumter and Pickens should be surrendered. That at least Anderson would be withdrawn was the universal impression in Washington.6 The news spread quickly through
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1 Campbell to Seward, April 13, Moore, vol. i., Docs., p. 426.
2 J. A. C., MS. Confederate Archives, Treasury Department.
3 J. A. C, March 22; ibid., letter of Campbell to Seward, April 13.
4 March 22, MS. Confederate Diplomatic Correspondence.
5 Crawford, pp. 332, 333.
6 "As one of the editors of the National Intelligencer in 1861, I was authentically informed of this purpose [the evacuation of Sumter] by Secretary Seward, not only for my guidance as a public journalist, but with the request that I should communicate the fact to George W. Summers, the recognized leader of the Union majority in the Virginia convention." —James C. Welling, in the Nation, December 4, 1879; Stanton to Buchanan, March 12, 14, Holt to Buchanan, March 14, Curtis, vol. ii. pp. 531-33; National Republican, March 11; Pike and other Washington correspondents to New York Tribune, March 10 and 11.

the country. Outside of New York city the Republicans and many other Union men heard it with dismay. Douglas, however, argued in the Senate that South Carolina was entitled to Sumter and Florida to Pickens, and that "Anderson and his gallant band should be instantly withdrawn." The report caused an excited and buoyant stock-market in Wall Street.1 The Charleston Mercury and the Charleston Courier stated, March 12, that Sumter would be obtained by South Carolina without a fight.2 Lamon, who was regarded at Charleston as a "confidential agent of the President," told Governor Pickens that he had come to make arrangements for the withdrawal of the garrison.3 He gave Anderson to understand that the order would soon be sent

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1 "The people are now agitated by the intelligence that Fort Sumter is to be abandoned. Here I think there will be no decided demonstration of disapproval. But in the country it will be different. The disappointment will be very great, and it will go far to turn the current against the new administration."—Dix, from New York, to Buchanan, March 14, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 533; Weed to Seward, Crawford, p. 328; editorials in New York Tribune, March 11 and 12; Pike to New York Tribune, March 11; Douglas's speech, March 15, Congressional Globe, p. 1461; money article, New York Tribune, March 12. The report March 11 was that it would require 10,000 men and a strong naval force to reinforce Sumter; by March 19 Anderson's despatch, received by Holt March 4, was substantially known to the public, see New York Tribune.
2 Cited by New York Tribune, March 15.
3 " I know the fact from Mr. Lincoln's most intimate friend and accredited agent, Mr. Lamon, that the President of the United States professed a desire to evacuate Port Sumter, and he (Mr. Lamon) actually wrote me, after his return to Washington, that he would be back in a few days to aid in that purpose."—Letter of Governor Pickens, August 3, Charleston Courier, August 6; also Pickens's Message, November, 1861, Crawford, p. 373; Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 272; Beauregard to Anderson, March 26, Official Records, vol. i. p. 222; Beauregard to Walker, ibid., p. 282.

for the evacuation of the fort,1 and on his return to Washington he said to Stanton that he was satisfied Sumter could not be successfully reinforced.2 The Russian minister assured Commissioner Roman that Seward was averse to war, and tried to bring about a meeting between the two over a cup of tea at the Russian legation, but the secretary did not deem it wise to accept the informal invitation.3 Both the British and Russian ministers manifested their sympathy with the aim of the Confederate commissioners.4

By March 28 the perplexities which environed Lincoln had thickened. That day General Scott advised the abandonment of Pickens as well as of Sumter. The President that evening gave his first state dinner,5 and just before
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1 Anderson to Thomas, Adjutant General, April 1, 4, Official Records, vol. i. pp. 230, 237; Crawford, p. 374. Lamon's visit to Sumter was made March 25.
2 Stanton to Buchanan, April 3, North American Review, November, 1879, p. 475. Anderson had no confidence in Fox's plan, see Crawford, p. 371.
3 Crawford and Roman to Toombs, March 26, MS. Confederate Archives, Treasury Department. April 4, Secretaries Chase and Smith met Forsyth at dinner at the house of Senator Douglas, Russell's Diary, p. 62.
4 Crawford and Roman to Toombs, March 26.
5 W. H. Russell, correspondent of the London Times, was present at this dinner, and has given an interesting account of it, Diary, p. 41. General Scott had been invited, and had come to the White House, but on account of an indisposition was unable to remain. Russell relates : "In the conversation which occurred before dinner, I was amused to observe the manner in which Mr. Lincoln used the anecdotes for which he is famous. Where men bred in courts, accustomed to the world or versed in diplomacy, would use some subterfuge or make a polite speech or give a shrug of the shoulders as the means of getting out of an embarrassing position, Mr. Lincoln raises a laugh by some bold west-country anecdote, and moves off in the cloud of merriment produced by his joke. Thus, when Mr. Bates was remonstrating apparently against the appointment of some indifferent lawyer to a place of judicial importance, the President interposed with, ' Come now, Bates, he's not half as bad as you think. Besides that, I must tell you he did me a good turn long ago. When I took to the law, I was going to court one morning, with some ten or twelve miles of bad road before me, and I had no horse. The judge overtook me in his wagon. "Hallo, Lincoln! Are you not going to the court-house? Come in, and I'll give you a seat." Well, I got in, and the judge went on reading his papers. Presently the wagon struck a stump on one side of the road; then it hopped off to the other. I looked out and I saw the driver was jerking from side to side in his seat, so says I, "Judge, I think your coachman has been taking a little drop too much this morning." "Well, I declare, Lincoln," said he, "I should not wonder if you are right, for he has nearly upset me half a dozen times since starting." So putting his head out of the window, he shouted, " Why, you infernal scoundrel, you are drunk!" Upon which, pulling up his horses and turning round with great gravity, the coachman said, " By gorra! that's the first rightful decision you have given for the last twelvemonth."' While the company were laughing, the President beat a quiet retreat from the neighborhood of the attorney-general."

the members of the cabinet left for their homes, he imparted to them privately the general's last recommendation. All, with the possible exception of Seward, were amazed. Blair expressed in hot words his indignation at Scott's course, and aimed his shafts indirectly at the Secretary of State.1 The next day a formal cabinet council took place. Lincoln again asked his advisers their opinion about Sumter. Only Seward and Smith were now in favor of abandoning the fort. Chase, Welles, and Blair decidedly maintained that it should be relieved. Bates was non-committal.2 The manifestations of public sentiment and the protests of the radical Republican senators, joined perhaps to a clearer comprehension of the public duty, had had their effect.3 At the close of the cabinet meeting, the President directed that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy prepare an expedition which should be ready to move by sea as early as the 6th of April.4 Still he had not positively decided that he would send supplies to Sumter. This expedition was to be "used or not according to circumstances." 5
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 394 ; Official Records, vol. i. p. 200 ; Lincoln and Seward, Welles, pp. 57, 65.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 429 et seq.
3 The opinion of the radical Republicans was expressed in Trumbull's resolution of March 28, although they did not deem it prudent to take a vote on it, which the Democrats were anxious to do, Congressional Globe, p. 1519.
4 Official Records, vol. i. p. 226; Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 433.
5 Lincoln's message to Congress, July 4,1861.

When Lamon was at Charleston he told Governor Pickens that he hoped to return in a few days for the purpose of arranging the removal of Anderson and his garrison.1 South Carolina had long been impatient at the occupation of a fort commanding the harbor of her chief city by the force of what she regarded a foreign nation; her governor shared this impatience, and March 30, unquiet at hearing nothing from Lamon and seeing no move towards the evacuation of Sumter, he communicated by telegraph to the Confederate commissioners Lamon's statements and his own disappointed hopes. This despatch, through Justice Campbell, went to the Secretary of State, who in turn showed it to the President. April 1 Seward informed Campbell that "the President was concerned about the contents of the telegram—there was a point of honor involved; that Lamon had no agency from him, nor title to speak, nor any power to pledge him by any promise or assurance"; and so anxious was he that Governor Pickens should know this that he preferred a request to Campbell to question Lamon in a private interview, which the justice declined to do. On this same day Seward and Campbell had two conferences, and after the first one, on the main point involved, the secretary went to consult the President. On his return he wrote on a piece of paper, which he handed to Campbell, "I am satisfied the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." "What does this mean V asked Campbell; "does the President design to attempt to supply Sumter?" "No, I think not," answered Seward. "It is a very irksome thing to him to surrender it. His ears are open to every one, and they fill his head with schemes for its supply. I do not think that he will adopt any of them. There is no design to reinforce it."2 Campbell thought the
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1Pickens's message, November, 1861, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 272; ante, p. 333, note 3.
2 Campbell's MS., Crawford, p. 338; see also Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 273.

writing "was a departure from the pledges of the previous month," but, as interpreted by the verbal explanation, he "did not consider it a matter then to complain of." Still feeling that his mediation had not been fruitless, he wrote Jefferson Davis, April 3: "I do not doubt that Sumter will be evacuated shortly, without any effort to supply it; but in respect to Pickens I do not think there is any settled plan. . . . All that I have is a promise that the status will not be attempted to be changed prejudicially to the Confederate States without notice to me. It is known that I make these assurances on my own responsibility. I have no right to mention any name or to pledge any person."1

As early as April 4 the President decided to send to the succor of Fort Sumter the expedition which, March 29, he had ordered to be got ready.2 For several days there had been unusual stir in the War and Navy departments. It was known that they were preparing an expedition at the Brooklyn Navy-yard. It took air that the government had decided not to withdraw Anderson, that Sumter would be provisioned and Pickens reinforced 3 These reports coming to the ears of Campbell, he asked Seward by letter, April 7, whether they "were well or ill founded." The secretary replied, "Faith as to Sumter fully kept — wait and see," meaning that the government would not make an attempt to supply the fort without giving notice to Governor Pickens.4 April 6, Robert S. Chew, a clerk in the State
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1 Cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 411.
2 Cameron to Anderson, April 4, Cameron to Fox, April 4, Official Records, vol. i. p. 235; ante.
3 See New York Tribune and its Washington despatches, April 1 to 6; Russell's Diary, entry April 3, p. 59; Stanton to Buchanan, April 3, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 538; various despatches of the commissioners to Toombs, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. p. 2 et seq.
4 MSS. cited by Crawford, p. 340, and Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. p. 36; Campbell to Crawford, April 7, MS. Confederate Diplomatic Correspondence; see, also, Campbell's letter to Seward, April 13. Seward's answer to Campbell was made April 8. That day the commissioners called for and received a copy of the memorandum on the files of the State Department, which Seward had caused to be placed there March 15, ante, p. 329; to it they made a reply. For the correspondence, see Moore's Rebellion Records, vol. i., Docs., p. 42; Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 675.

Department, was sent to Charleston with instructions drafted by Lincoln's own hand to give the proper notification.1 Arriving there the evening of April 8, and being at once accorded an interview, he read to Governor Pickens what the President had written: "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort." 3

I have related with considerable detail the story of the Seward-Campbell negotiations, for the reason that Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens in their books have urged the duplicity of the Washington authorities in this affair as a contributing justification to the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter,' and for the further reason that Justice Campbell, whose sincerity and straightforwardness cannot be questioned, averred that "the equivocating conduct of the administration" was the "proximate cause" of the commencement of the war in Charleston harbor.4 If, as these gentlemen more or less distinctly assume, the President consented to this negotiation, and knew of the assurances which Seward gave, his course cannot successfully be defended. Nicolay and Hay do not tell us in set terms how far he was privy to the quasi-promises of his secretary, but from their narrative it is a reasonable inference that he knew little or nothing about them. Secretary Welles, writing in 1873, says emphatically that the President did not know of Seward's assurance that Fort Sumter would be evacuated, and never gave it his sanction.5 Considering
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. p. 43.
2 Official Records, vol. i. p. 291; Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. p. 35.
3 Davis, vol. i. p. 268 et seq.; Stephens, vol. ii. p. 351.
4 Letter to Seward, April 18.
5 Lincoln and Seward, p. 56.

Lincoln's character and manner of action, nothing but the most positive evidence should convince us that he was in any way a party to this negotiation, and of this there is none. His disturbance at the effusive and unauthorized representations of Lamon1 goes to show that if he had become aware of the lengths to which his secretary was going, he would have called a halt and insisted that those who had been misled should be undeceived. The truth is that the assurances to Campbell were simply those of an officious Secretary of State whose vanity had grown by what it fed on, until now he deluded himself with the idea that he and not another was the executive of the nation. He had strenuously objected to the part of Lincoln's inaugural which asserted, " The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government;"2 he seemed to see so clearly the political wisdom of giving up Sumter that, when he came to have on his side General Scott and the majority of the cabinet, he did not for a moment suppose that the President would act contrary to counsel of such preponderating weight, and in his expressions to Campbell he was absolutely sincere.2 But Jefferson Davis was not deceived. He knew Seward through and through, for when in the Senate the two had been intimate;4 and although at this time he fell into the mistake of regarding the secretary as the power behind the throne, he was not misled in the affair of Sumter. At this time Davis worked in his office from nine to six,5 and having been used to executive business, we may be sure that no important despatch went out from
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1 Ante.
2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 319.
3 See article of Thurlow Weed in the Albany Evening Journal, copied by New York Tribune of May 24, and cited by McPherson, p. Ill; see, also, New York Tribune, May 18.
4 See Mrs. Davis, vol. i. pp. 571, 579; conversation of Thomas Starr King and Davis, 1859, article of J. M. Gitchell, San Francisco Call, February 26, 1893. For Seward's opinion of Davis at this time, see Russell's Diary, entry March 27, p. 40.
5 Mrs. Davis, vol. ii. p. 40.

Montgomery the substance of which he did not know. "The government," wrote Walker, Secretary of War, to Beauregard, April 2, "has at no time placed any reliance on assurances by the government at Washington in respect to the evacuation of Fort Sumter, or entertained any confidence in the disposition of the latter to make any concession or yield any point to which it is not driven by absolute necessity."1 The secret instructions from Montgomery to the commissioners were "to play with Seward, to delay and gain time until the South was ready."2 The commissioners were little if at all deceived. They, like every one who had facilities for getting correct information, were aware that there was a decided difference of opinion in the cabinet, and that if the peace party prevailed, the Confederacy would obtain Fort Sumter without firing a shot;3 they thought, as did Stanton and many others, that the Seward faction would carry the day,4 but regarding the Secretary of State as unscrupulous,5 they did not place absolute reliance on his assurances. Justice Campbell, believing that Seward was the President in fact, and trusting him implicitly, was the only sufferer on the part of the South.6

Whether in private conversation with Lincoln Seward received any intimation which with rash assumption he construed into an adoption of his own views, neither the biographies of Lincoln nor of Seward disclose. Douglas said that the President had assured him that Sumter would be evacuated as soon as possible;7 but as he was eager for
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1 Official Records, vol. i. p. 285; see also Toombs to commissioners, March 28, cited by Crawford, p. 333.
2 Statement of Forsyth to Crawford, 1870, p. 333.
3 Forsyth to Walker, March 14, Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 404.
4 Stanton to Buchanan, March 16, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 534.
5 "We rely for his [Seward's] sincerity upon his wisdom, and not upon his integrity."—Forsyth and Crawford to Toombs, March 26. March 22 the commissioners had referred to the possible "treachery of Secretary Seward," MSS. Treasury Department; see their conversation with Russell, entries April 3, 5, Diary, pp. 59, 63.
6 Crawford, pp. 333, 345.
7 Diary of a Public Man, entry March 11. Douglas at this time stood on a friendly footing with the President. "Lincoln and the family at the White House are represented to be greatly elated at Douglas joining in defence of the new administration."—Stanton to Buchanan, March 12, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 531.

such action,1 we may readily believe that he gave to some indirect or qualified statement of Lincoln a positive interpretation. I feel quite sure that the President gave to no one a more certain expression of his thoughts than he did to Francis P. Blair, to whom, after the cabinet meeting of March 15, he said that it had not been fully determined to withdraw Anderson, but he thought such would be the result.2 Between March 5 and March 29 the President hesitated; he looked on both sides of the question, heard all arguments, and weighed every consideration. The difficulties of the situation were great, and they were made greater because the three men, General Scott, Seward, and Chase, in whose experience or ability he had great confidence, and on whom he was disposed to lean, proved, so far as concerned the important question in March, broken reeds. General Scott again tried his hand at state-craft, and proposed to Seward four alternative policies. The two which he thought the most desirable were to offer the Crittenden compromise to the South, or to say, "Wayward sisters, depart in peace."3

Of the impracticable and optimistic notions of the Secretary of State we have seen much. "Seward is infatuated," wrote Sumner; "he says in sixty days all will be well."4 But all that I have related is as nothing in folly compared to the "Thoughts for the President's consideration," submitted April 1. "We are at the end of a month's administration," Seward wrote, "and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign." For the home policy he proposed: "Change the question before the public from one upon slavery or about slavery for a question upon union or
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1 See his Senate speech of March 15.
2 Statement of Blair to Crawford, p. 364.
3 Letter to Seward, March 3, 1861, National Intelligencer, October 21, 1862.
4 To John Jay, March 27, Memoir of Sumner, Pierce, vol. iv. p. 17.

disunion;" evacuate Fort Sumter; "defend and reinforce all the forts in the Gulf."

For the foreign policy: "I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia. .. . And if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war against them. But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. . . . Either the President must do it himself ... or devolve it on some member of his cabinet. . . . It is not in my especial province. But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility."1 Egregious folly this seems to us to-day. Wild, erratic, and indefensible would such a policy have been in 1861. Yet it is true that a popular notion then prevailed to some extent—though it was not, so far as I know, held by any able public man except Seward —that if a foreign war were brought about, the alienated sections would unite in amity, and like brothers fight the common foe under the old flag.2 The President's reply showed Seward that Lincoln was determined to be the master; yet he argued kindly the question of domestic affairs, ignored with rare consideration the wild foreign policy suggested, and with magnanimity kept secret this correspondence.3
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1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 445.
2 Russell got some conception of this feeling. After a long interview with Seward at the State Department, April 4, he wrote : " It was matter for wonderment that the foreign minister of a nation which was in such imminent danger in its very capital, and which, with its chief and his cabinet, was almost at the mercy of the enemy, should hold the language I was aware he had transmitted to the most powerful nations of Europe. Was it consciousness of the strength of a great people, who would be united by the first apprehension of foreign interference, or was it the peculiar emptiness of a bombast which is called buncombe f In all sincerity I think Mr. Seward meant it as it was written."—Diary, p. 61. In England there existed "an apprehension that the reunion may be cemented upon the basis of hostile measures against Great Britain."—Charles Francis Adams to Seward, June 21, Message and Docs., p. 109.
3 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 448; on this subject see remarks of Morse, Life of Lincoln, vol. i. p. 275 et seq.

Chase clearly comprehended the situation. He saw there were but two alternatives, war or peaceable separation. But while he estimated aright the horrors of civil war, he did not perceive that it was practically impossible for the two governments to remain long at peace even if disunion were now agreed to. When, therefore, of the two evils he preferred to recognize "the organization of actual government by the seven seceded States as an accomplished revolution" 1 he put himself out of sympathy with the policy the President had set forth in the inaugural address. It is not probable that Lincoln thought out the only two alternatives as logically as did Chase.2 With true greatness he did not shake his own judgment by peering into a future full of trouble.3 As a result of mature reflection he had declared, "Physically speaking we cannot separate." To this truth
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1 Letter of Chase to Taft, April 28, Life of Chase, Warden ; see, also, McClure's Lincoln, p. 52; Russell's Diary, p. 55; Cox's Three Decades, p. 63; Diary of a Public Man, entry March 3. It is worthy of note that one of England's leading statesmen, and a friend of the North, thought the problem could be best solved by peaceful separation. Cobden wrote Sumner, February 23 : "I am watching with intense interest the conflict which is raging on your continent. Were I a citizen of a free State in your Union, I should hold up both hands for peaceful and prompt separation. My earnest prayer is that you may avoid civil war, from which no advantage to any party can accrue. Let your voice be raised for peaceful separation."—Pierce-Sumner papers, MS.
2 "The writer revisited Washington for a day or two, some two weeks or more after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, and was surprised to hear and see on every hand what were to him convincing proofs that an early collision with the Confederates was not seriously apprehended in the highest quarters."—Greeley's American Conflict, vol. i. p. 429, note.
3 "Men of genius who accomplish great things in this world do not trouble themselves with remote and visionary aims. They encounter emergencies as they rise, and leave the future to shape itself as it may."— Froude's Caesar, chap. xiii. "It was not in Cromwell's nature to look far into the future... . 'No one rises so high as he who knows not whither he is going.' In these words Cromwell revealed the secret of his life—the refusal to adopt any definitely premeditated plan of action, and the resolution to treat each occurrence as it arose in the light vouchsafed to him when the need of action was felt."—Gardiner's History of the Great Civil War, vol. iii. pp. 290, 816.

he was determined to hold, and in conformity with it he proposed to conduct the affairs of the nation. Yet, for the very reason that in his dealings with the seceded States he was inflexible in his purpose to preserve the Union, so, with the aim of retaining Virginia, he was willing to go to the utmost verge of conciliation. He fully appreciated that to save her from secession would insure Maryland and Kentucky, and bring a lever to bear upon North Carolina and Tennessee. Virginia's convention had met February 13.1 It was plainly apparent that while a majority of the delegates were opposed to the secession of their State, they were equally strong in their resistance to a policy of coercion on the part of the federal government towards the Confederate States. After the declaration of policy in the President's inaugural address, the sentiment favorable to secession increased in Virginia.2 What Lincoln called the execution of the laws, the Virginians denominated coercion. Seward, however, thought much good could be accomplished by working on the Union men of the convention. In this he had the approval of the President, who, knowing that the Unionists were anxious for the withdrawal of Anderson, probably intended to use the evacuation of Sumter, if he should be forced to it by military necessity, as an inducement for them to adjourn the convention sine die, which would retard for a while the secession movement.3 The report that the troops were to be withdrawn from Charleston harbor was good news to the Union men of Virginia, though unwelcome to the precipitators, and caused a reaction of
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1 Ante, pp. 301, 309.
2 On the reception of the inaugural, ante, p. 318; see proceedings of the convention, Appleton, p. 731: "All accounts here represent the secession feeling in Virginia to be rapidly strengthening and extending. It would not surprise me to see Virginia out in less than ninety days, and Maryland will be close at her heels."—Stanton to Buchanan from Washington, March 12, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 531; see, also, Richmond Whig, March 26.
3 See the testimony of J. B. Baldwin, J. M. Botts, and J. F. Lewis, before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st Session 39th Congress; The Great Rebellion, J. M. Botts, p. 194 et seq.; Dabney's Narrative, Southern Hist. Soc. papers, vol. i. p. 445 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. chap. xxv.

sentiment friendly to the North.1 But when it became apparent that Sumter would not be evacuated the secession wave rose again.2 Nevertheless, as late as April 4 the convention voted down by 89 to 45 a resolution to submit an ordinance of secession to the popular vote.3

March 31 the President determined to send an expedition from New York to reinforce Fort Pickens, in conformity with a plan submitted to him by Captain Meigs.4 Captain Fox was busy preparing the Sumter expedition, and while Lincoln had virtually decided, April 4, to send it, yet, as the earliest moment that it could be ready was the 6th, he reserved in his mind the privilege of countermanding it or changing its destination, should he hear that his former order touching Fort Pickens had been executed.5 For what was needed for the effect it would have on the North and on Europe was a vigorous assertion at some point of the national authority. The question naturally arose, Could not this be done at Pickens, and the tender susceptibilities of the Virginia Unionists nursed by the withdrawal of the troops
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1 "The removal from Sumter [i.e., the intention to evacuate it stated in a letter from Welling, on the authority of Seward, ante, p. 332] acted like a charm—it gave us [i.e., the Union men] great strength. A reaction is now going on in the State. The outside pressure here has greatly subsided. We are masters of our position here, and can maintain it if left alone."—Geo. W. Summers to J. C. Welling, Richmond, March 19, 1861, the Nation, December 4, 1879; Richmond Whig, March 14, 26; Holt to Buchanan, March 14, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 532.
2 P. S. to letter cited in preceding note: "What delays the removal of Major Anderson? Is there any truth in the suggestion that the thing is not to be done after all? This would ruin us." See, also, Richmond Whig, April 8 and 9. April 3 Russell wrote in his Diary : " It is stated, nevertheless, that Virginia is on the eve of secession, and will certainly go if the President attempts to use force in relieving and strengthening the federal forts."— p. 60. "The rumors from Richmond are very threatening; secession is rapidly gaining strength there."—Stanton to Buchanan, April 3, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 538; also Baldwin's account of his interview with the President, April 4, in his testimony.
3 Appleton, p. 733; New York Tribune, April 5.
4 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 436.
5 Ante, p. 328; Lincoln's message of July 4.

from Sumter? April 6 the President heard that the order of March 11 for the reinforcement of Fort Pickens had not been carried out.1 He no longer hesitated. As he said later, when he took the people of the North into his confidence, " The strongest anticipated case for using it (the expedition to supply Fort Sumter) was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward."2 The President's decision was right. It would have been also right had Vogdes landed his company at Pickens; and while, all the circumstances considered, no blame can attach to him for being tardy, it would have been better if he had come sooner to this determination. It was apparent that public opinion at the North would sustain the administration in any measure for the relief of Major Anderson.3 Since the night when he transferred his force from Moultrie to Sumter he had been her hero. That movement represented the time when the government had ceased to be swayed by Southern ideas and influences, and had come under the direction of men of national opinions. Moreover, South Carolina had begun the revolution; Charleston was its centre. For its influence on the North and on Europe one expedition to Sumter were worth a dozen to Pickens. Lincoln had to contend with a united people in dealing with the Southern Confederacy; but he had not a united North at his back. Clearly the best chance of uniting the North lay in some just assertion of national authority in the harbor of Charleston. He had been elected President of the United States, and with his view of the indissolubility of the Union, he owed it to his country to make the attempt to keep its flag waving where the revolution had commenced. He owed it to himself as well, for the world does not forgive the man who, when the extremity comes, will not fight for the throne or the chief power of the State to which his title is clear.
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1 The reason of this is clearly related by Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. p. 7.
2 Lincoln's message of July 4,
3 The President's interview with Governors Curtin of Pennsylvania, Morton of Indiana, and Washburn of Maine, must have confirmed him in his decision, New York Herald, New York World, April 5.

To a hard-headed thinker like Lincoln it must have been patent that the surrender of Sumter would only adjourn the difficulty. Sumter obtained, the Confederate States would demand Pickens; Pickens in their possession, they would ask for the recognition of their government. The Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee Unionists would urge the giving up of Pickens, and in case the North did not make concessions which she had already repeatedly refused, they would press the policy of peaceful separation, and thus shaking a rod over Lincoln's head,1 make his position intolerable, and lose him the respect of the North and of Europe.2

April 6, Judge Magrath, of Charleston, was advised by a friend in Washington that an attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter. On the next day Anderson's purchases of fresh provisions were stopped by General Beauregard, who at the same time called out the rest of the contingent troops. April 9 the Sumter mails were taken possession of, and the official letters sent to Montgomery.3 The President's formal notification of his design to send provisions to Anderson was immediately telegraphed by Beauregard to the Confederate Secretary of War. Jefferson Davis and his cabinet now had a momentous question to decide, and they gave it a long and profound consideration. Toombs at first said, "The firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen; and I do not feel competent to advise you."4 Later during the council he opposed the attack. "Mr. President," he declared, "at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose us every friend at the North. You will wantonly strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death.
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1 Lincoln's own expression according to the testimony of Botts.
2 How it appeared to the average Englishman is well illustrated by Russell's notes of April 8, Diary, p. 69.
3 Official Records, vol. i. pp. 287, 289, 292.
4 Walker's statement to Crawford, p. 421.

It is unnecessary; it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal."1 Yet the Confederate States, as they had assumed the position of an independent nation, could not brook it that a foreign power should retain a strong fortress commanding one of their important harbors. To South Carolina this occupation of territory over which she held sovereignty was intolerable, and to the people of Charleston the flaunting of the Stars and Stripes before their eyes was a daily insult. The pressure of the State and the city on the Confederate government for the possession of Fort Sumter had already been importunate, and now that the hope of obtaining it by negotiation was gone, Davis could no longer resist the current; but in allowing himself to be carried along with it, he committed a stupendous blunder.

Two days after Governor Pickens had received notice of the intention to send supplies to Anderson, Davis ordered Beauregard to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and, if it was refused, to proceed "to reduce it."' In accordance with this order Beauregard sent, on the afternoon of April 11, three aides to make the demand of Anderson, who, after consultation with his officers, refused compliance; but when he handed the aides his written reply he said, " Gentlemen, if you do not batter the fort to pieces about us, we shall be starved out in a few days."3 This remark was deemed by Beauregard so important that he telegraphed it to Montgomery in connection with Anderson's formal refusal to evacuate Sumter. Walker, the Secretary of War, by direction of Davis, immediately replied: "Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the meantime he will not use his guns against us unless ours should be employed against Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort
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1 Life of Toombs, Stovall, p. 226.
2 Official Records, vol. i. p. 297.
3 Ibid., pp. 13, 59.

as your judgment decides to be most practicable."1 Four aides at once took this proposition to Anderson, handing it to him three-quarters of an hour after midnight of April 11. He had a long conference with his officers, and gave his answer at 3.15 on the morning of the 12th. "I will," he wrote, . . . "evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant, and I will not in the meantime open my fires upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my government, . . . should I not receive prior to that time controlling instructions from my government or additional supplies." 2 The aides, in accordance with their instructions from Beauregard, read the letter, promptly refused Anderson's terms, and notified him that in an hour their batteries would open fire on the fort. The four men who in the last resort made the decision that began the war were ex-Senator Chesnut, Lieutenant-Colonel Chisolm, Captain Lee, all three South Carolinians, and Roger A. Pryor, a Virginia secessionist, who two days before in a speech at the Charleston Hotel had said, "I will tell your governor what will put Virginia in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour by Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow!" 3 The aides went immediately to Fort Johnson and gave the order to fire. At 4.30 a.m. a shell fired from a mortar of that battery "rose high in air," writes Crawford, who was standing on the parapet of Sumter, "and, curving in its course, burst almost directly over the fort." 4 This was the signal for the bombardment to begin.

With Anderson's last response before them, would General Beauregard or Jefferson Davis have given the word to
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1 Official Records, vol. i. p. 301; Davis's message to the Confederate Congress, April 29, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i., Docs., p. 171.
2 Ibid., pp. 14, 60.
3 Foster's Diary, Official Records, vol. i. p. 18, also ibid., pp. 31, 60; Crawford, p. 424 ; Doubleday's Sumter and Moultrie, p. 141; Charleston Mercury, cited by McPherson, p. 112 ; Pollard's Davis, p. 309.
4 Crawford, p. 427; see Official Records, vol. i. p. 60.

commence the attack? As affairs turned out it was an equivalent of Davis's conditions. As things were, it was an endeavor of Anderson to meet Beauregard half way, for he disapproved of the Fox expedition, and on both military and political grounds believed that his government ought to give him the order to evacuate the fort.1 It was impetuosity, not sound judgment, which impelled Chesnut and his companions to make a peremptory decision instead of consulting their chief, which would have involved only an hour's delay.

Beauregard, his officers, and Governor Pickens were needlessly alarmed about the relief expedition.2 It was three days late in getting off from New York. Fox had arranged that it should consist of the war-ships Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane; the steam-tugs Uncle Ben, Yankee, and Freeborn; and the merchant steamer Baltic, with two hundred men and the necessary supplies on board. The Powhatan carried the armed launches and the sailors to man them; the tugs were intended to convey the provisions to the fort and tow the launches. The Baltic, on board of which was Fox, arrived off Charleston at three o'clock on the morning of April 12, and found there only the Harriet Lane. The two stood in towards the bar to make, under a flag of truce, an offer of provisions to the fort, but as they drew near they observed that the bombardment of Sumter had commenced. Though the Pawnee arrived at seven, war having actually begun, nothing could be accomplished without the tugs and the Powhatan. One tug had been detained in New York by her owner. By a heavy northeast gale the Uncle Ben had been driven into Wilmington, and the Yankee as far south as the entrance to Savannah. Owing to a confused and

1 See his letter to Thomas, April 8, Official Records, vol. i. p. 294.
2 Beauregard to Cooper, Adjutant-General C. S. A., April 27, Official Records, vol. i. p. 30 ; Pickens to Walker, April 9, ibid., p. 292; Reports to and Orders of Beauregard, ibid., p. 299 et seq.

unsystematic administration of affairs at Washington and to the meddling of Seward the Powhatan had been detached from the Sumter expedition and had joined that destined for the reinforcement of Pickens. It was impossible even to attempt the execution of Fox's plan. The expedition was a failure. Fox and his companions watched the bombardment, chafing at their powerlessness to render their brothers-in-arms any assistance.1

Had Chestnut brought Anderson's last communication to Beauregard, he, being a careful man, might have submitted it to Davis, and it is more than probable that the Confederate President would have said, Wait. That the Montgomery government was solicitous to avoid the attack is evident from the anxious inquiry of Walker the morning of April 12, "What was Major Anderson's reply to the proposition contained in my despatch of last night?" 2 For it must not be forgotten that the primary object of the Sumter expedition was not to bring troops and munitions of war, but merely to furnish the garrison with a necessary supply of food. By this time both Lincoln and Davis undoubtedly felt that war was inevitable, and on account of the influence on public sentiment at the North both were anxious to avoid striking the first blow, and disposed to proceed with the utmost caution. Davis had good reason to regret that matters so fell out that the South became the aggressor; while Lincoln might well thank his stars for that blunder, since it gave him in his time of trouble a united North.3
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1 Fox to Cameron, April 19, Official Records, vol. i. p. 11 ; Crawford, p. 416 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 383, vol. iv. chaps, ii. and iii.
2 Official Records, vol. i. p. 305.
3 Beauregard, of course, in his report assumes the action of his aides as his own, Official Records, vol. i. p. 31, and Davis defends the attack on Sumter, message of April 29. In his book he argues that the South was not the aggressor, vol. i. p. 292. Stephens maintains that the attack on Sumter was rendered necessary in self-defence, vol. ii. p. 39. "I heard many discussions during the war between parties of Northern and Southern soldiers, when opportunities offered, such as at truce meetings or with prisoners of war. When the Southerners asserted that all they wanted was to be let alone, the invariable reply was, Who began the war? Who struck the first blow? Who battered the walls of Fort Sumter ? '— Life in the Confederate Army, Watson, p. 98; see, also, conversation reported by W. H. Russell, Diary, p. 204.

Half an hour after Fort Johnson gave the signal the fire from the Confederate batteries became general. Sumter remained silent for two hours. The garrison were on half-rations; their bread exhausted, they breakfasted on pork and damaged rice. At seven o'clock they began returning the fire of the Confederates. An artillery duel followed. There being no great disparity in the armament of the two forces, the contest would not have been unequal had Anderson possessed a full garrison. His force of officers, privates, musicians, and non-combatant laborers was a total of 128. Opposed to him was the South Carolina army of from 5000 to 6000 men. It was made up largely of the best blood of the State. Planters and their sons, men of wealth and family of Charleston, did not scruple to serve in the ranks.1 In the gray of the morning, when the roar of the cannon was heard, the city poured out its people. They thronged to the wharves and the Battery. On no gala occasion had the reporter seen so many ladies on this favorite promenade as now turned out to witness the opening scene of the great tragedy of the Civil War.2 As they gazed upon their beautiful bay what a spectacle they beheld! Fort Johnson, Fort Moultrie, the Cumming's Point, and the other batteries were firing continuously at Sumter. When
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1 Roman's Beauregard, vol. i. p. 29; Charleston correspondence New York Tribune, January 11, 12, 16; Charleston Under Arms, by J. W. De Forest, Atlantic Monthly, April, 1861; Russell's Diary, pp. 100,105. "Many of those who serve in the ranks are worth from £5000 to £10,000 a year —at least, so I was told; and men were pointed out to me who were said to be worth far more. One private feeds his company on French pfit6s and Madeira, another provides his comrades with unlimited champagne . . . ; a third . . . purchases for the men of his 'guard' a complete equipment of Enfield rifles."—Russell to the London Times, from Charleston, April 21.
2 Charleston Courier, April 13; Roman's Beauregard, vol. i. p. 48.

Anderson began, he replied first to Cumming's Point, then to the enfilade battery on Sullivan's Island, and "next opened on Fort Moultrie, between which and Fort Sumter a steady and almost constant fire was kept up throughout the day." 1 "What war ever had a more dramatic beginning! Charleston, reflecting on the history of South Carolina in union with the other states since 1776, and on the crowded hours of stirring events from the November election of 1860 to this 12th day of April, now saw the "circumstance of glorious war," and heard in hostile array

"the mortal engines whose rude throats
The immortal Jove's dread clamors counterfeit."

The duel continued all day. In the afternoon, owing to an insufficient supply of cartridges, the fire of Sumter slackened; after dark it entirely ceased. The Confederate mortars threw shells at intervals of a quarter of an hour during the whole of the night. The night was dark and rainy, the wind and tide were high. Beauregard, afraid that troops and supplies might be thrown into Sumter from the fleet, commanded the utmost vigilance at the channel batteries and on Morris and Sullivan's islands. Early on the morning of the 13th the bombardment was renewed. "Fort Sumter," wrote Moultrie's commandant, "opened early and spitefully, and paid especial attention to Fort Moultrie."2 At about nine o'clock the officers' quarters in Sumter took fire from the shells or hot shot of the Confederates, who thereupon redoubled the rapidity of their fire. The flames spread to the barracks; by noon they had enveloped all of the wood-work, and made it evident that the powder-magazine would have to be closed. Anderson gave the order to remove as much powder as possible, and by great exertion fifty barrels were taken out and distributed around in the casemates. The doors of the magazine were shut
________
1 Beauregard's report, Official Records, vol. i. p. 81.
2 Official Records, vol. i. p. 41. III.—23

and earth was packed against them. But now the fire spread with such swiftness that the powder in the casemates was in danger, and all but five barrels were thrown into the sea. The cloud of smoke and cinders almost suffocated the men; they threw themselves upon the ground and covered their faces with wet cloths, or crept to the embrasures for a breath of fresh air. The flames reached the magazine of grenades, and explosion after explosion followed. The fire of Sumter ceased; that of the Confederates came thick and fast. To show that the Union soldiers were undaunted, Captain Doubleday ordered that a few rounds be fired. At each discharge the Confederates "cheered the garrison for its pluck and gallantry, and hooted the fleet lying inactive just outside the bar."1 At 1.30 in the afternoon the flag-staff was shot away and fell to the ground; with all possible promptness the flag was raised again. In the interval the fire of the Confederates slackened. The disappearance of the flag prompted ex-Senator Wigfall to go from Cumming's Point to Sumter in a small boat, under a flag of truce, with a request for the suspension of hostilities, and, leading Beauregard to think that Anderson was in distress, caused him to send three other aides with an offer of assistance. These visits resulted in terms of evacuation being offered by Beauregard and accepted by Anderson. The story is told in the report of Anderson, written on board the steamship Baltic, off Sandy Hook: "Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge walls seriously injured, the magazine surrounded by flames, and its door closed from the effects of heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no provisions remaining but pork, I accepted terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him . . . prior to the commencement of hostilities, and marched out
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1 Beauregard's report, Official Records, vol. i. p. 33.

of the fort Sunday afternoon, the 14th instant, with colors flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private property, and saluting my flag with fifty guns." 1

Judged by loss of life, no battle could be more insignificant; not a man on either side was killed. Judged by the train of events which ensued, few contests in our history have been more momentous.

Charleston gave itself up to joy. The Confederate flag waving over Sumter seemed to its people a glorious sight. The churches were crowded. At the Catholic cathedral a Te Deum was celebrated with great pomp. The venerable Episcopal bishop at St. Philip's and the rector at St. Michael's attributed "this signal and bloodless victory to the infinite mercy of God, who specially interposed his hand in behalf of their righteous cause." 2 During the week rejoicing of a more profane character was prolonged.3 Montgomery celebrated
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1 Anderson to Cameron, April 18, Official Records, vol. i. p. 12. For accounts of the bombardment of Sumter see especially Foster's Journal and Beauregard's reports, Official Records, vol. i. pp. 16, 28 et seq.; Crawford, chap, xxxii. The reports of the subordinate Confederate officers are of interest, Official Records, vol. i. p. 35 et seq. Also see Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. chap. iii.; Doubleday's Sumter and Moultrie, chaps, x. and xi. On the number of South Carolina troops see Pickens's despatches, Official Records, vol. i. p. 292. "We had 7000 men along the shores of our two sea islands. Of these 6000 men never lifted weapon at Fort Sumter."—Charleston Mercury, May 14. The official return furnished Russell, April 21, was as follows:
Morris Island 2625
Sullivan’s Island 1750
Stone and other points 750
Charleston 1900
7025
—Letter to London Times.
2 Roman's Beauregard, vol. i. p. 49; Charleston despatches to New York Tribune, April 15; letter of April 14; Charleston Mercury, April 15.
3 Russell writes under date of April 18: "The streets of Charleston present some such aspect as those of Paris in the last revolution. Crowds of armed men singing and promenading the streets, the battle-blood running through their veins —that hot oxygen which is called 'the flush of victory' on the cheek; restaurants full, revelling in bar-rooms, club-rooms crowded, orgies and carousings in tavern or private house, in tap-room, from cabaret—down narrow alleys, in the broad highway. Sumter has set them distraught; never was such a victory; never such brave lads; never such a fight. ... It is a bloodless Waterloo or Solferino."—Diary, p. 98.

with enthusiasm the first triumph of the Confederate arms.1

The expedition to Fort Pickens was successful. After the reinforcement it had a garrison of eleven hundred soldiers and laborers and six months' supplies, and it remained in the possession of the Union forces during the entire Civil War.2
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1 Montgomery despatch to Richmond Examiner, April 13; New York Tribune, April 15; Pollard's Davis, p. 112.
2 For an account of this expedition see Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv. chap. i.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.3. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].