History of the United States, v.3, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 13, Part 3: Declaration of Causes through President Sustains Anderson

Four days after the passage of the ordinance a decent respect to the opinions of mankind prompted the convention to adopt a "Declaration of the immediate causes which induce and justify the secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union," and to publish it to the world. This Declaration recited the history of the colonial struggle for self-government, of the league known as the Articles of Confederation, and of the adoption of the Constitution to show that the States were sovereign and that the country's organic instrument was a compact between them. By the Personal Liberty acts the non-slaveholding States had deliberately broken the constitutional compact, "and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation." The debate in the convention on the Declaration showed that while all were at one regarding the legal right of secession, this grievance touching the infraction of the Fugitive Slave law was but a lawyer's plea. But the hearts of all South Carolinians beat in unison with the writer of the Declaration when he spoke of the injustice of the North in excluding the South from the common territory, and when he affirmed in bitter complaint that the Northern States "have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery," and elected a man for President "because he has declared that 'this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.'" On the same day that this declaration was adopted the convention voted an Address to the people of the slave-holding States. The Address drew an ingenious comparison between their present position and that of their ancestors in the colonies towards Great Britain ; it declared that "all confidence in the North is lost in the South;" it asserted State sovereignty; it closed with what the South deemed an adequate defence of slavery, and a generous and pathetic appeal to their sisters "to join us in forming a confederacy of slave-holding States." It was a franker paper than the Declaration. Yet one part of it was much criticised in the convention, and it was indeed an uncandid plea when, in the list of grievances, the North was charged with gross injustice for the tariff legislation of the country. As a matter of fact, both the senators and all the representatives of South Carolina had voted for the existing tariff of 1857; and since 1846 the United States had practically enjoyed a revenue tariff and one of a lower scale of duties than had been in force since 1816.1 But the Address was drawn up by R. B. Rhett, a rigid doctrinaire and a disciple of Calhoun, and he maintained that since 1832, when the cause of the trouble was avowedly the revenue policy of the government, South Carolina had suffered, without interruption, a grievous wrong. Yet there was method in his adherence to a one-sided theory, and in his speech in convention defending the Address he argued truly that to get the confidence and sympathy of England, France, and Germany, it was wiser to go to the world with a protest against a high protective tariff than with a protest against the non-execution of the Fugitive Slave law.2
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1 See chap. xii.
2 For the Declaration and Address, see Appendix to the Journal of the South Carolina Convention, pp. 325,340. I would urge students of history to read both of these papers. The Declaration is printed in Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i. Docs., p. 3, and in McPherson's Political History, p.15. McPherson also prints the Address, p. 12, and gives the debate in the convention, p. 16. The Declaration and the Address were published in the New York Tribune, December 27. The Declaration, the Address, and the debate are published in the Charleston Mercury of December 22 and 25. A motion to lay the Declaration on the table was defeated. Ayes 31, nays 124. Journal of the Convention, p. 82

Whether doctrinarianism or crafty policy predominated in the mind of Rhett, the complaint of the tariff was inconsistent then, and became more inconsistent later when the Southern Confederacy enacted the United States revenue laws of 1857, and South Carolina consented to that policy by her ratification of the provisional Constitution.1

Neither the Declaration nor the Address was equal to the occasion; nor were they worthy of a convention which had at its disposal so much real ability and valuable public experience. An impartial observer must conclude that they do not make out a case to justify setting on foot a revolution.2 South Carolina's manifesto, owing in some degree to the difference of theoretical opinion which displayed itself when her sons came to set down the reasons for secession, seems weak beside her action. In practice, those sons fully agreed; in theory, they differed; and this difference cropped out when Rhett, a nullifier of 1832, prepared one paper, and Memminger, a Unionist of 1832, reported another. A consideration of these papers is, moreover, instructive, in that it evidences how difficult it is for enlightened men to formulate a justification of a cause which the rest of the civilized world condemns. One point is common to the Declaration and the Address, and of all reasons given for secession it is the most significant. The convention asserted in both of these manifestoes that the Northern States had violated the Constitution ; that they had not respected its limitations, but had construed it in their own selfish interests. There can be no doubt that every member of that convention sincerely believed those assertions; and if
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1 The vote on the ratification was 138 to 21. The Charleston Mercury made a protest against the tariff legislation (see editorial of February 12, 1861); and there was some objection in the convention (see Journal, p. 227).
2 See Alexander Stephens's caustic remarks on the Address. Private letter to his brother, Johnston and Browne, p. 375. Stephens's argument against secession is unanswerable.

we would understand the devotion of the South to what it called a sacred principle for the four years of the Civil War, this honest belief must be borne in mind.

The adoption of the ordinance of secession by South Carolina produced a profound impression at the North. While such action had been expected, there was hoping against hope that something might turn up to prevent it. In Baltimore the feeling was painful.1 At some places in Virginia there were demonstrations of joy.2 In the cotton States much enthusiasm characterized the reception of the news and satisfaction prevailed.3 A particular interest centred on New Orleans, for the reason that Louisiana and Texas were comparatively tardy in the secession movement. The intelligence came there in the evening. An actor announced it from the stage of the Varieties Theatre. Wild enthusiasm prevailed; the play could not go on. The audience, after venting its glee in the theatre, rushed into the street and assisted at an impromptu meeting, at which the Marseillaise was played, zealous speeches in favor of the secession of Louisiana were delivered, and a bust of Calhoun, decked with the cockade, was exhibited.4

Public sentiment in the other cotton States 5 decidedly favored following South Carolina in the policy of secession, unless their grievances were redressed by the North.6
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1 Baltimore Daily Exchange, December 22.
2 At Richmond, Norfolk, and Portsmouth, New York World, New York Tribune, December 22.
3 Ibid., Charleston Mercury, December 21.
4 Charleston Mercury, New York Tribune, December 22.
5 I include in the term cotton States, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. This classification is not scientific, but I know of no better way to designate the seven States that first seceded. Between them the political sympathy was so close that it is at times necessary to speak of them as one community.
6 The best evidence of this is that five conventions elected by the popular vote passed ordinances of secession in January, and Texas did likewise early in February. But trying for the moment to eliminate "this knowledge of the end," which Sir Arthur Helps put down as "one of the most dangerous pitfalls which beset the writers of history," I made a study of public opinion in the cotton States as it might be gathered from their news papers, and those of the border and Northern States of November and December, fortifying these authorities with a careful reference to the other political literature of the time; and the conclusion I arrived at, which I have stated in the text, seems to me beyond dispute. As it is an important fact that this might have been appreciated while the Senate committee of thirteen was considering the Crittenden Compromise, I quote from two acute judges of popular feeling. "The disunion sentiment is paramount in at least seven States."—Thurlow Weed in his famous article of November 30. "The secession of South Carolina, which must be looked upon now as an accomplished fact, will inevitably very soon be followed by the secession of all the cotton States . . . unless prompt and energetic measures are taken by the leading men of the North. ... At this moment the patriotic men in the Gulf States are using every effort in order to bring about a joint convention. In this they are violently opposed by the disunionists, who are for immediate and separate action. The latter are undoubtedly in the ascendency."— Letter of August Belmont to Governor Sprague of Rhode Island, December 6. Letters of August Belmont privately printed, p. 12. "The secession movement of the South has lost all the character of bluster and threat, which our Northern friends supposed too long was its principal element. The most conservative men have joined in it, right or wrong; they feel that their institutions and property are not any longer safe with the Union, and that self-preservation commands action before the Federal power passes into hands which they take for granted are hostile to their section. They do not threaten, but they want to be allowed to go out peaceably. The great majority are for immediate action, but the Union men are striving to postpone secession if possible until the 4th of March."—Belmont to Sprague, December 13, ibid., p. 14

Between November 18 and December 11, conventions to consider a line of action in the present crisis had been called in all of them except Texas, whose Governor, Samuel Houston, a sturdy Union man, for a while blocked the movement. It will advantage us to consider somewhat in detail the course of opinion in Georgia, for the reason that she was the empire State of the South, and on her action depended whether the government of the Confederate States should be formed; and further for the reason that while the so-called Union party was possibly no stronger than in Alabama and Louisiana, it made in Georgia a better fight against secession. This contest has for us a particular interest in that it was prosecuted under the leadership of one of the truly representative men of the South, Alexander H. Stephens. Yet the story of his career is not that of the typical Southerner who in those days reached political eminence. Although of good family, he was born to poverty, and his life from the age of six to fifteen was that of many a New England country lad. He did the chores of the farm and of the house, tended the younger children, fed the loom, was general errand-boy, and planted and ploughed the corn. The duties that were put upon him he discharged conscientiously. Of play he had none, of schooling in early life but little. At fifteen he had had perhaps in all two years of school; he could read well, could spell almost every word in Webster's spelling-book, and in arithmetic had advanced as far as the rule of three. At that time becoming an orphan by the death of his father, his deep religious convictions and habitual melancholy attracted the attention of some good and pious men who, thinking they saw in him the material of a Christian preacher, assisted him to a school and college education. But he chose the profession of law, at twenty-two was admitted to the bar, and in six years became one of the ablest lawyers of Georgia. Serving an apprenticeship in the legislature of his State, he was in 1843 sent to the national House of Representatives, and was continually re-elected until 1859, when, having served sixteen years, and reached the age of forty-seven, he voluntarily retired. He had a small and slender frame, weighing eighty-four pounds when he began the practice of law, and ninety-two pounds at the age of forty-eight. This diminutive physique, combined with youthful appearance, told against him in the struggle of life. In the first canvass he made for Congress the Whigs frequently mistook their candidate for a mere stripling, but his effective manner of speaking and his thorough knowledge of his subject soon dispelled the illusion. Frail and sickly from his birth, in manhood he became a victim to dyspepsia, and often brought to his labor an aching head and a body tormented by pain. Wonder might indeed be ours at the place he fills in his country's history, did we not remember that much of the world's conspicuous work has been done by men whose brains throbbed with distress, and whose bodies were on the rack. The faith of the boy developed in the man into deep-souled piety and a godly walk. Yet he was given to morbid introspection, and took of human affairs a gloomy view; his thoughts, sometimes tinged with superstition, and at other times with the moralizing of the melancholy Jaques, dwelt constantly on the brevity of life. Such feelings were heightened by his lack of companionship, for until he had reached the age of twenty-four, when began his warm and lasting friendship with Toombs, he had not a sympathetic associate, and he never married. No Puritan was more austere. The first time he saw the waltz he wrote, " Oh, the follies of man, and how foolish are some of his ways!" A witness to the coquetry of a handsome young woman, he exclaims, "Alas the world 1"1 and with the purity of thought and sensitiveness of soul of a girl he shrunk from obscenity. Yet in physical courage he was a true Southerner. Twice, at least, he was eager to fight a duel; on one occasion, in an affray, the gleaming blade of his adversary's knife descending towards his throat failed to extort a word of retraction. Apparently free from any desire to make money, he was economical, yet kind-hearted and generous. In his Georgia home he dispensed an open and frank hospitality after the fashion of his peers. As early as 1834 Stephens had arrived at the conviction of the sovereignty of the States and the right of secession. In the troubles of 1850 he was a prominent figure, ardently upholding the rights of the South.2 "I tell you," he then wrote his brother, "the argument is exhausted. . . . We have ultimately to submit or fight."3
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1 Johnston and Browne, pp. 86, 95. 2 See vol. i.
2 January 21, 1850, Johnston and Browne, p. 245. This characterization 1 have drawn mainly from their admirable biography of Stephens. Some touches I have derived from Cleveland's Stephens, from his sketch in Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, and from Stephens's The War Between the States.

Such was the man who, flinging popularity to the winds, now emerged from his retirement in an endeavor to stem the tide which in his State was setting towards secession. His description of the irrepressible conflict, given in answer to the inquiry of a friend why he had withdrawn from public life, shows that he had long been alive to the danger against which the country was running. "When," he said, "I am on one of two trains coming in opposite directions on a single track, both engines at high speed, and both engineers drunk, I get off at the first station."1 Inconsistencies there had been in the public utterances of Stephens, but no one doubted his sincerity or his devotion to principle. An expression in a private letter, when he was urged to correct a misconception in the public mind about a personal matter, manifests a noble self-assurance that came from treading in a straightforward course. "So I am right with myself," he wrote, " I care but little for the opinions of others."2 It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to name another man who had such respect from all sections of the country as Alexander H. Stephens at this time enjoyed. His speech, therefore, of November 14 before the legislature of Georgia attracted immense attention.3 He did not deem the election of Lincoln a sufficient reason for secession, nor did he believe that the Southern people had been "entirely blameless." Lincoln would be "powerless to do any great mischief;" the Senate and the House were against him. The revenue policy of the national government was no reason for secession. "The present tariff," he declared," was voted for by Massachusetts and South Carolina. The lion and the lamb lay down together." The only tangible present grievance that the South had was the Personal Liberty acts of certain Northern States, which aimed at nullifying the Fugitive Slave law; but redress for this should first be demanded in the Union. He earnestly asked for delay; he
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1 Johnston and Browne, p. 353; see also vol. ii. pp. 453, 490.
2 Johnston and Browne, p. 854.
3 Ibid., pp. 368, 369; ante, pp. 147,179.

advised that all other means should be exhausted before trying the remedy of secession; and he suggested a conference with all the other Southern States.1

From the point of view of a man who believed that a State had the right to withdraw from the Union and who was in full sympathy with the South, this speech was an irrefragable argument against the expediency of immediate secession. Had cogent reasoning and policy prevailed with the Georgia people, they would have put themselves under the guidance of Stephens instead of yielding to the impulse of that disunion sentiment which, beginning at least as early as 1849, had, since the formation of the Republican party, been waxing strong. The dominant feeling found fit and able leaders in Toombs and Governor Brown. The night before Stephens's celebrated speech, Toombs had addressed the legislature, urging immediate secession.2 November 18 the legislature unanimously passed the bill calling a convention, and fixed upon January 2,1861, as the day for the election of delegates. A spirited canvass ensued. Stephens, his brother, and others exerted themselves to get men chosen who would favor co-operation with the other slave States, a policy that meant delay. This programme provided for a conference with the border as well as with the cotton States,3 and fifty-two members of the legislature united in an address to the conventions of South Carolina,4 Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, asking them to defer final State action until a general convention of the Southern
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1 I would urge the historical student to read this speech. Most of it is printed in The War Between the States, vol. ii. p. 279; it may also be found in Johnston and Browne, p. 580, and Cleveland's Letters and Speeches, p. 694. The speech was published in the New York Tribune of November 23.
2 Stephens's War Between the States, vol. ii. p. 284.
3 See letter of Linton Stephens, November 29, which Alexander H. Stephens says represented the prevailing views of the Co-operationists, ibid., p. 317.
4 See report of De Saussure explaining why the request could not be complied with, Journal of South Carolina Convention, Appendix, p. 345.

States could be held.1 Alexander H. Stephens, however, had little hope of success. November 30 he wrote George Ticknor Curtis that he feared Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi would follow the example of South Carolina and secede. Speaking for his own State he said, "There are a large number of people who will sustain my position; but I feel that the odds are against us."2 His speech had brought him letters from many parts of the country, all but one of which showed a yearning for the preservation of the Union;3 that speech had, as we have seen, formed Lincoln's motive for opening a correspondence with him;4 and it made him the focus of the sentiment in Georgia which favored delay. In spite of the effort to restrain the people of his State, and in spite of the words of encouragement that came to him from the border States and the North, he was in despair. "I fear," he wrote December 3, "it will all come to nought; that it is too late to do anything; that the people are run mad. They are wild with passion and frenzy, doing they know not what."5 Immediately after his resignation of the Treasury Department, Howell Cobb issued an address in which he declared that there was "no other remedy for the existing state of things but immediate secession." 6 But the dominant sentiment of Georgia needed no fostering from the leaders who had been her representatives in the national arena. The
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1 This address was issued from a meeting held December 14. See National Intelligencer, December 22; New York Tribune, December 21.
2 Cleveland, p. 159. The same day he wrote confidentially to his brother: "I am daily becoming more and more confirmed in the opinion that all efforts to save the Union will be unavailing. The truth is, our leaders and public men who have taken hold of this question do not desire to continue it on any terms. They do not wish any redress of wrongs; they are disunionists per se, and avail themselves of present circumstances to press their objects; and my present conviction is that they will carry the State with them by a large majority."—Johnston and Browne, p. 369.
3 Ibid.
4 Ante.
5 Johnston and Browne, p. 870.
6 Howell Cobb Memorial Volume, p. 32; see also synopsis of his speech at Macon, Augusta correspondence New York Tribune, December 21.

middle of December Toombs wrote a public letter, in which, after reciting that "upon the questions that we have wrongs and that we intend to redress them by and through the sovereignty of Georgia, the State is unanimous," and that all look to "separation from the wrong-doers as the ultimate remedy," he said that the only difference of opinion which came to the surface was in regard to the time at which secession should be decreed. To immediate action or indefinite postponement he was equally opposed; but he did favor secession on the 4th day of March, 1861. Yet he went on to say: " I certainly would yield that point to correct and honest men who were with me in principle, but who are more hopeful of redress from the aggressors than I am, especially if any such active measures should be taken by the wrongdoers as promised to give us redress in the Union."1 This letter was not well received by the precipitators.2 The minute-men in Augusta, wrote Stephens, "are in a rage at Toombs's letter. They say that he has backed down, that they intend to vote him a tin sword. They call him a traitor. ... I see that some of the secession papers have given him a severe railing." The fire-eaters are generally discussing the letter, "saying that they never had any confidence in him or Cobb either. . . . These are," moralized Stephens, "but the indications of the fury of popular opinion when it once gets thoroughly aroused. Those who sow the wind will reap the whirlwind." 3 By December 23 Toombs had changed his tone. This was, without doubt, partly owing to the action upon him of the public sentiment of his State, and to the hearty acclaim with which the secession of South Carolina had been received in the cotton States; but the occasion which prompted his emphatic telegraphic despatch to Georgia — the rejection the day before of the Crittenden
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1 This letter was published in the Savannah Republican of December 17, cited in the New York Tribune, December 21.
2 Letter of Stephens, December 22, to R. M. Johnston, Johnston and Browne, p. 870; Macon, Ga., correspondence New York Tribune, December 20.
3 Letter to Linton Stephens, December 22, Johnston and Browne, p. 370.

Compromise by the Republican members of the committee of thirteen — had much to do with it. "I tell you," he declared, "upon the faith of a true man, that all further looking to the North for security for your constitutional rights ought to be instantly abandoned.. . . Secession by the 4th day of March next should be thundered from the ballot-box by the unanimous voice of Georgia on the 2d day of January next." 1

There were at this time in the border slave States of Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri unconditional secessionists and unconditional Union men; but the great body of the people, although believing that the wrongs of the South were grievous and cried for redress, deemed secession inexpedient; they thought that South Carolina had been precipitate, and that the other cotton States, in making preparation to follow her, were unwise. In this mass of public sentiment shades of difference existed. Those who leaned to the South were emphatic in asserting the right of secession; those who leaned to the North were ardent in professing their attachment to the Union. All denied either the right or the feasibility of coercion; all thought that the troubles were susceptible of a peaceful settlement. Again, differences obtained among these States and in different parts of the same State concerning the strength of the Union and secession sentiments and the bias towards the South or the North; but in all of them the Crittenden Compromise would have commanded a large majority, and its adoption would almost universally have given heartfelt satisfaction. North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas partook more of the feeling of these communities than of the feeling which was carrying everything before it in the cotton States.2
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1This telegram of December 23 is printed in Greeley's American Conflict, vol. i. p. 384; it was published in the Charleston Mercury of December 24 and presumably in all of the Southern newspapers.
2 See editorial in Richmond Enquirer, November 16; public letters of ex Governor Wise (November 19), H. L. Hopkins (November 22), Senator Mason (November 23), published in Richmond Enquirer of November 30, also editorial of December 25; Baltimore Daily Exchange, November 12, December 1, 10, and 12; New York Tribune, November and December, especially the citations from the press of the border States; Letters and Times of the Tylers, vol. ii. p. 574 et seq.; Shaler's Kentucky, chap. xv. ; Carr's Missouri, chap. xiii.

At the first session held after the adoption of the ordinance of secession by South Carolina, the national House of Representatives received a communication from her congressmen formally dissolving their connection with that "honorable body." 1 December 22 the South Carolina Convention elected by ballot three commissioners, Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr, who were sent forthwith to Washington, "empowered to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light houses, and other real estate . . . within the limits of South Carolina." The convention proceeded on the theory that the partnership known as the Union was now dissolved by the withdrawal of one of its members; that while the real estate on which the public works had been erected reverted to the sovereign State, the works themselves, having been constructed at the common cost, should be paid for by the retiring partner. It was also a logical sequence from this hypothesis that an accounting should be had, to determine South Carolina's share of the public debt and her share of the assets, "held by the government of the United States as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member." Then a balance should be struck, and if the value of the property which South Carolina took within her boundaries was greater than her credit on the books of the concern, she would pay the difference in money.3 The
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1This was December 24. The letter was dated December 21, and signed by but four of the members, McQueen, Bonham, Boyce, Ashmore, Congressional Globe, p. 190.
2 See the credentials of the commissioners, Official Records, vol. i. p. Ill; for this theory well stated see Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Davis, vol. i. p. 209; also letter to the President of Isaac W. Hayne, Attorney-General of South Carolina and special envoy, January 31, 1861, House Committee Report No. 91, p. 66.

commissioners arrived at Washington the afternoon of December 26, and the next day they received the startling intelligence that Major Anderson had secretly removed his force to Fort Sumter, had dismantled Fort Moultrie, spiked the cannon, burned the gun-carriages, and cut down the flag-staff.

Anderson had chafed at the difficulties of his position. The responsibility which the President should have assumed was thrust upon a major of the army, who had been enjoined not to irritate the people of Charleston, and yet had been directed to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, which of itself was a constant and increasing source of irritation. It was, moreover, apparent that a single misstep on his part might lead to the shedding of blood and the commencement of civil war; and no army officer ever had a keener sense of a soldier's duty or felt a more loyal devotion to his flag than Anderson. He soon saw that Sumter was a better coign of vantage than Moultrie, and that the possession of it by the Charlestonians would make his own position untenable.1 The expression of a desire for Fort Moultrie, which had been frequent in Charleston since the State began making ready for secession, developed after the passage of the ordinance into an utterance of threats to take it.3 Anderson kept himself well informed of the public feeling and of the probability of its taking shape in official action, and when the commissioners departed, December 24, for Washington, he became convinced that if they were not successful in their negotiations, an attack on him would be made.3 He was equally convinced that Fort Moultrie was a
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1 Anderson to Cooper, November 28, December 9,22, Official Records, vol. i. pp. 79, 89, 105. In Sumter at this time there was a gang of workmen under the charge of Captain Foster of the Engineers engaged in completing and strengthening the work.
2 Anderson to Cooper, December 6, Official Records, vol. i. p. 87; see also Foster to De Russy, December 18, ibid., p. 96; Crawford's The Genesis of the Civil War, p. 100; Charleston correspondence New York Tribune, December 11, 22.
3 Anderson to Cooper, December 22, Official Records, vol. i. p. 105 ; Charleston correspondence New York Tribune, December 22; Crawford, p. 101.

position he could not defend.1 This, indeed, had been the subject of his daily and nightly thoughts ever since he came into command, and he had determined to make the removal several days before it was actually accomplished.2 Taking counsel with no one, and intrusting the secret only to the officers under him when it became necessary to do so for the execution of his plan, he decided to transfer his force to Sumter the evening of December 26. He had carefully and prudently worked out all the details of his project, and, no suspicion of it being excited in Charleston, he executed it without any interference.3 When Charleston woke up the next morning and looked out on the bay, it saw, instead of the stars and stripes waving over Moultrie, a cloud of smoke hanging about it, indicating that some strange event had happened. When the truth became known, the city was filled with excitement, indignation, and rage.4 The convention went into secret session. Governor Pickens acted with promptness.

The South Carolina congressmen, in their interview with Buchanan early in December,4 understood him to pledge himself that the military status in Charleston harbor should
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1 “When I inform you that my garrison consists of only sixty effective men, that we are in a very indefensible work, the walls of which are only about fourteen feet high, and that we have within 100 yards of our walls sand-hills which command our work, and which afford admirable sites for their batteries and the finest covers for sharp-shooters, and that besides this there are numerous houses, some of them within pistol-shot—you will at once see that if attacked in force, headed by any one not a simpleton, there is scarcely a probability of our being able to hold out long enough to enable our friends to come to our succor."—Private letter of Anderson published in Richmond Whig, December 24, cited by Crawford, p. 100; see also Anderson's letter, ibid., p. 70; Anderson to Cooper, November 28, December 1, 6, Official Records, vol. i. pp. 78, 81, 87, Cooper to Anderson, December 14, ibid., p. 92.
2 See letter to his wife, cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii. p. 47, note.
3 See Crawford, p. 102 et seq.; Doubleday's Sumter and Moultrie, p. 59 et seq.
4 Charleston Mercury, December 28; Charleston correspondence New York Tribune, December 27; Crawford, p. 108.
5 Ante p. 182.

not be changed without giving them due notice.1 From this and from quasi-negotiations carried on between Gist and the President through the intermediary of Trescot,2 then Assistant Secretary of State and afterwards agent of South Carolina, Pickens believed that Buchanan had promised to maintain the situation unchanged until the commissioners should arrive at Washington to treat for the possession of the forts and other property of the United States.3 Indignant at what he considered a violation of this agreement, he sent Colonel Pettigrew to Sumter to recite the understanding to Anderson and to demand "courteously but peremptorily" that he should return to Fort Moultrie. Anderson replied: I knew nothing of an agreement between the President and the governor. My position was threatened every night by the troops of the State. One hundred riflemen on the sandhills which commanded the fort would make it impossible for my men to serve their guns. "To prevent this I removed on my own responsibility, my sole object being to prevent bloodshed." Being in command of all the forts in the harbor, I had the right to transfer my force from Moultrie to Sumter. "In this controversy," he continued, "between the North and the South, my sympathies are entirely with the South. These gentlemen [turning to the officers of the post who stood about him] know it perfectly well. But my sense of duty to my trust is first with me, and this rules my action." Anderson met the demand which Colonel Pettigrew had brought with this answer: "Make my compliments to the governor, and say to him that I decline to accede to his request; I cannot and will not go back."4
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1 See statement of Miles and Keitt to the convention, Official Records, vol. i. p. 135.
2 Crawford, p. 81.
3 See the governor's communication to the convention, December 28, Official Records, vol. i. p. 252; also his message, Journal of the S. C. Senate, January 4, 1861, Crawford, p. 41.
4 Crawford, pp. 110, 111; Anderson to Cooper, December 27, Official Records, vol. i. p. 3. On Anderson's sympathy with the South, see also Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 216.

At a quarter before noon the command at Fort Sumter was drawn up near the flag-staff, forming one side of a square; the workmen, one hundred and fifty in number, formed the other three sides; as all uncovered, the chaplain thanked God for their safe arrival at the fort, praying that the flag might never be dishonored and that it might soon wave again over a united people. At the end of the prayer Major Anderson rose from his knees, and as the battalion presented arms and the band played the Star Spangled Banner, he raised the flag to the masthead and led the cheer that saluted the glorious ensign.1 Three days later he wrote his former pastor: "Unwilling to see my little band sacrificed, I determined, after earnestly awaiting instructions as long as I could, to avail myself of the earliest opportunity of extricating myself from my dangerous position. God be praised! He gave me the will and led me in the way. How I do wish that you could have looked down upon us when we threw the stars and stripes to the breeze at twelve o'clock on the 27th! . . . I am now, thank God, in a place which will, by His helping, soon be made so strong that the South Carolinians will be madmen if they attack me. . . . You see it stated that I came here without orders. Fear not! I am sure I can satisfy any tribunal I may be brought before that I was fully justified in moving my command."2

Immediately after Governor Pickens received Anderson's answer refusing to return to Fort Moultrie, he gave orders to have his troops take possession of that post and of Castle Pinckney: this was done, and over them the palmetto flag soon waved.3 On the same day, December 27, in obedience to an ordinance passed by the convention the day previous, the collector of the port and all the officers
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1 Crawford, p. 112 ; Doubleday, p. 71.
2 Crawford, p. 130; see also Anderson's official report, December 27, Official Records, vol. 1. p. 3 ; also letter of December 28, ibid., p. 112.
3 Crawford, p. 113 ; letter of Foster, December 27, Official Records, vol. i. p. 108; letter of Anderson, ibid., p. 8.

of the custom-house entered into the service of South Carolina; the collector received duties and transacted all other business in her name, depositing the funds remaining, after the payment of salaries and expenses, in the Treasury of the State.1 Over the custom-house he raised the flag of South Carolina.2 December 30, the United States arsenal, with a large quantity of arms and ammunition, was seized by the order of the governor.3 All the property of the national government in the city and harbor of Charleston, except Fort Sumter, was now under the protection of the palmetto standard. The flag on the post-office indicated a new and foreign power, but this one bond with the common country had not yet been severed; the mails were delivered and sent the same as before the ordinance of secession was passed, United States postage-stamps were necessary to insure the forwarding of letters, and the postmaster of Charleston continued to account to the department at Washington.4

In ability and character the South Carolina commissioners were worthy of the important trust confided to them. Robert W. Barnwell was a Harvard graduate and a lawyer, who had represented his State in the national House and Senate, and had been president of the South Carolina college; more of a student than a politician, he especially delighted in the study of theology; he was a gentleman of elegant manners, and when at Washington had been noted for his religious walk, his urbanity and manliness. At first opposed to immediate secession, he had now full sympathy
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1 See letter of Colcock, collector, to the convention December 28, Journal of South Carolina Convention, p. 128 ; see also pp. 95, 171.
2 Crawford, p. 116 ; Official Records, vol. i. p. 109.
3 Report of Humphreys, store-keeper to ordnance bureau, Official Records, vol. i. p. 6 et seq.; for quantity of arms in the arsenal and of ordnance in Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie, see report of Maynadier, captain of ordnance, ibid., p. 130.
4 See Report of the Post-office Department, March 26, 1861, Journal of Convention, Appendix, p. 403.

with the purpose of his State.1 James H. Adams was a Yale graduate, an anti-nullifier of 1832, had served several sessions in the legislature, and had once been governor. James L. Orr had been a member of the national House ten years, and once its speaker; while ready at this time to defend with ardor the action of South Carolina, he impressed an old friend as being a Union man at heart.2 Abler and better members of the convention could not have been selected for this mission. On their arrival at Washington, Wednesday, December 26, they found that an interview with the President had been arranged for them by Trescot 3 at one o'clock on the next day. Trescot was at their house early on this Thursday morning when Senator Wigfall of Texas entered and gave them the news of Major Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter. All expressed their disbelief in the intelligence, and when Floyd, who had just been announced, came into the room, Trescot remarked: "Governor,4 Senator Wigfall has just brought us this news [repeating it], and as you were coming up-stairs I said I would pledge my life this movement was without orders." "You can do more," Floyd replied; "you can pledge your life that it is not so. It is impossible. It would be not only without orders, but in the face of orders."5 Trescot took Floyd's
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1 See Charleston correspondence New York Tribune, December 22 ; Jefferson Davis's remarks in the Senate, January 9, 1861.
2 See Diary of a Public Man, entry December 28, 1860, North American Review, August 1879, p. 129.
3 Now the agent of South Carolina.
4 Floyd had been governor of Virginia and was generally addressed by this title.
5 This conversation is reported by Trescot (Crawford, p. 143); and I have no doubt of its substantial correctness. See Buchanan's Defence, p. 185 ; Diary of a Public Man, December 28. But Floyd's statement that the removal to Sumter was "in the face of orders" is incomprehensible. Crawford thinks it probable that Floyd never read the Buell memorandum until it was called for by the President, p. 74. I have not seen any evidence to substantiate Floyd's statement in his Richmond speech of January 17,1861: "Major Anderson, . . . after receiving these instructions (the Buell memorandum) wrote to the Secretary of War, 'I could not change my position, for I have no authority to do so.'"

carriage, hastened to his home, and soon returned with two telegraphic despatches for Barnwell; these Barnwell read and handed them to Floyd, saying, "I am afraid it is too true." Floyd hurried to the department and sent his famous telegraphic inquiry,1 receiving immediately from Anderson the more famous reply: "I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain if attacked my men must have been sacrificed and the command of the harbor lost. ... If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight." 2

In the meantime Trescot had driven to the Capitol, had communicated the news to Jefferson Davis and Senator Hunter, and had induced them to go with him to see the President. The President saw them after a short delay. "Have you received any intelligence from Charleston in the last few hours?" asked Davis. "None," was the reply. "Then," said Davis, "I have a great calamity to announce to you." After stating the facts, he continued, "And now, Mr. President, you are surrounded with blood and dishonor on all sides." 3 Buchanan was amazed at the news.4 "My God!" he exclaimed, "are misfortunes never to come singly? I call God to witness, you gentlemen, better than anybody, know that this is not only without but against my orders. It is against my policy." The visitors urged the President to act immediately and order Anderson back to Fort Moultrie, and this indeed was his first impulse,5 but he finally decided that he must consult his cabinet, and await further information.6 It was a heated cabinet session that day.
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1 "Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement. Explain the meaning of this report."
2 For the full text of this despatch see Official Records, vol. i. p. 8.
3 Trescot's narrative, Crawford, p. 143.
4 Buchanan's Defence, p. 180; Curtis, vol. ii. p. 371.
5 Trescot's narrative, Crawford, p. 144; Buchanan's letter of December 31 to the commissioners, Official Records, vol. i. p. 118.
6 Crawford; Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 215.

Two decided opinions were revealed. Floyd asserted that nothing in Anderson's orders justified his movement, and the President was inclined to agree with him. Judge Black, who was now Secretary of State, sent for the Buell memorandum and the President's modification of it, read them, and then stoutly maintained that Anderson had acted in perfect accordance with his instructions, and that he deserved high praise.1 We may without hesitation accept this opinion of Black as a right historical judgment.

This cabinet meeting furnished Floyd an opportunity to extricate himself with a shadow of honor from an ignominious situation. Found out in irregular and apparently corrupt financial transactions, for he had used the credit of the government in the attempt to prop the failing fortunes of some unscrupulous contractors, word had been sent to him on December 23 by the President, through their common friend Breckinridge, that he could no longer remain in the cabinet, and that he ought to resign.' Buchanan hourly expected his resignation, yet he came uninvited to the cabinet meeting of December 27, and his unusually peremptory manner made it clear that he was using this movement of Anderson to make an issue on which he might resign without disgrace. At the evening session he read "in a discourteous and excited tone" a paper asserting that the solemn pledges of the government had been violated, and that the only remedy left to avoid civil war was to withdraw the garrison from Charleston harbor. Two days later he formally resigned: the President promptly accepted his resignation, and placed Postmaster-General Holt in charge of the War Department.2

Owing to the stir caused by the removal of Anderson to Fort Sumter, the President's interview with the South Carolina
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1 Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black, C. F. Black, p. 12.
2 Buchanan's statement, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 408; Buchanan's Defence, p. 185; see also C. F. Black, p. 13. For a fuller consideration of this matter, see note at the end of the chapter.
3 At first ad interim, afterwards as full Secretary, ibid.

commissioners had been adjourned to the next day; it then took place. At the beginning of it Buchanan gave the commissioners formal notice that he could receive them only as private gentlemen, and not as envoys from a sovereign State. They maintained that the faith of the President given early in December to the South Carolina congressmen had been broken, and they pressed him with earnestness to order Anderson back to Fort Moultrie. Buchanan fenced. "But, Mr. President," urged Barnwell, "your personal honor is involved in this matter; the faith you pledged has been violated; and your personal honor requires you to issue the order." "You must give me time to consider," he replied; "this is a grave question." "But, Mr. President," said Barnwell for a third time, "your personal honor is involved in this arrangement." Buchanan, annoyed at this persistence, answered: "Mr. Barnwell, you are pressing me too importunately; you don't give me time to consider; you don't give me time to say my prayers. I always say my prayers when required to act upon any great State affair."1 The commissioners were unable to obtain any promise from the President. Considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon him to induce him to yield,2 and now an effort was made by Orr to get Seward to use his influence and position in favor of the restoration of the status in Charleston harbor.3 On the other hand, General Scott begged that Fort Sumter should not be evacuated, but that troops, ammunition, and provisions should be sent.4 A letter from the commissioners, dated December 28, was sent to the President. It went over the ground of the interview more formally, asserted that until the Anderson movement was explained the commissioners would be forced to suspend negotiations, and
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1 Crawford, p. 148; Buchanan's Defence, p. 181; reply of the commissioners, Official Records, vol. i. p. 122.
2 Ibid., p. 144; reply of the commissioners, Official Records, vol. i. p. 123.
3 Diary of a Public Man, entry December 28.
4 Official Records, vol. i. p. 112.

ended with urging that the troops be immediately withdrawn from Charleston harbor.1

The difference between Buchanan and the South Carolinians in regard to the interpretation put upon the interview with the congressmen amounts to nothing. They held that there was on his part a pledge. This he denied, but he affirmed with truth that he had acted in the same manner as he would have done had he entered into "a positive and formal agreement."2 South Carolina had indeed no reason to complain of President Buchanan. Barely had a people played at revolution with less hinderance from an essentially strong government. The North, however, had abundant grounds of complaint that the executive of the nation had not asserted its legitimate authority and acted in accordance with the dominant sentiment of the country. If Buchanan had known that Anderson contemplated the occupation of Sumter, he would have peremptorily forbidden any such movement. It is one of many indications of his lack of ability to deal with the business in hand that when, December 21, he read the Buell memorandum, he failed to see any good reasons for thinking that the event in which Anderson was authorized to transfer his force had already happened. In trying times, when events come crowding fast, when every day seems too short for what there is to do, when yesterday's neglect encroaches on to-day's duty, and when to-day's indecision lends trouble to the morrow's plans, men who possess executive ability have so disciplined their minds that they let their routine work go, refusing to consider the unimportant things in order that their time may be employed in concentrating their attention upon the weighty matters, in the decision of which are bound up the welfare of their country and their own fame; and, when a conclusion must be reached in an affair of moment, they are ready
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1 For this letter see Official Records, vol. i. p. 109.
2 Letter of Buchanan to the commissioners, ibid., p. 117.

to give hours, and, if necessary, a day, wholly to its consideration, sleeping over it, if the case admits; and finally, when the decision is to be set down in writing—as this is the shape that in modern times most far-reaching executive acts take — every word is weighed, and every sentence is analyzed in order that the paper may convey distinctly the meaning of the author. Buchanan wasted his time and strength in quibbles; he had neither for a matter of transcendent consequence.1 In November and December, 1860, the most important spot in the country under his management was Charleston; the most important executive order that went out was that left by Buell at Fort Moultrie: this Buchanan did not see until several days after it was placed on file in the War Department, and when at last he read it, he failed to understand its scope or to grasp the situation that confronted Major Anderson.

South Carolina and the North disagreed in the constructions they respectively put upon the acts of the last days of December, even as the Calhoun and Webster theories of the Union and the Constitution differed. South Carolina maintained that Major Anderson, in removing his force from one position in the State which he occupied only on sufferance, pending negotiation, to another position within her jurisdiction, solely for the purpose of being able to retain the stronghold for a foreign power against the will of South Carolina, had "waged war," and that her
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1 Lowell's criticism of Buchanan's course in November was hardly too severe. He spoke of him as "a so-called statesman. . . who knows no art to conjure the spirit of anarchy he has evoked but the shifts and evasions of a second-rate attorney, and who has contrived to involve his country in the confusion of principle and vacillation of judgment which have left him without a party and without a friend; for such a man we have no feeling but contemptuous reprobation. . . . There are times when mediocrity is a dangerous quality, and a man may drown himself as effectually in milk and water as in Malmsey."—Atlantic Monthly, January, 1861. This magazine appeared late in December. Although the names of the contributors were not given in the magazine, it was known that Lowell wrote this article. See New York Tribune, December 29.

consequent acts were "simple self-defence."' The North, on the other hand, held that all the forts belonged to the United States; that its troops had the right to occupy any and all of them; that Anderson's movement was not only right but expedient, being a proper and necessary measure of self-defence; that acts of war had indeed been committed, but that these acts were the occupation of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney, the taking possession of the arsenal and the custom-house, and that in all this South Carolina had been the aggressor. Which was right? Had the question been submitted to the ballot, the voice of the people, taking the country as a whole, would have been with the North. The "God of Justice" and the "God of Hosts" whom South Carolina invoked,2 when the question was appealed to the last resort, decided that the voice of the people was the voice of God. As an historian has no choice in a case of this kind but to accept the decision of the event,3 we may therefore affirm without hesitation that
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1 Letter of the commissioners to the President, Official Records, vol. i. p. 124.
2 Ibid.
3 This view is so well stated by General J. D. Cox, in a review of Crawford's The Genesis of the Civil War, in the Nation for January 8,1888, that I quote from it as support for the assertion in the text. "The war itself settled some things by the complete assent of all intelligent men of the South. The appeal to arms in this case as in others was the submission of a controversy to the ultima ratio regum and its decision. We believe that every statesman of the Southern States, who to-day claims to be a citizen of the United States, distinctly and unequivocally holds that this contention was decided by the war in favor of the national view, and that, by virtue of such decision, the national view is determined to be and is the constitutional law of the United States. . . . We do not say that they were not sincere and earnest in their own contention. We do not say that they now admit that they were morally or even theoretically wrong in their position, . . . but. . . they agree with us that the constitutional principle is settled. In their anxiety to avoid strife, the officers of the United States often fell short of the national claim that the ordinance of secession was revolutionary, and that the first shouldering of a musket or opening of a trench was an act of war. He who writes history now has the great advantage that this principle is settled," and he should "logically and clearly stick to it in his analysis of events,"

South Carolina's revolution had proceeded to overt acts of war.

The South Carolina commissioners awaited an answer. The President wavered, but in the end, following the bent of his sympathies, he prepared a reply favorable to their cause. The draft of this paper is not in existence,1 but, from Judge Black's criticism of it, we know that it was a pusillanimous answer, and that in uttering it Buchanan made a further descent in that path of abasing his country which he had trod since the November election. I feel quite sure that he did not design to withdraw the troops from Charleston harbor, or agree formally to order Anderson back to Moultrie, but it seems clear that the restoration of the status quo was a legitimate consequence of the position which he took.2 Late on Saturday evening, December 29, the President submitted to his cabinet the draft of his proposed answer. Toucey alone approved it. Thomas of Maryland, who was now Secretary of the Treasury, and Thompson did not deem it sufficiently favorable to the claim of South Carolina, while Black, Holt, and Edwin M. Stanton, now Attorney General, opposed it on the ground that it conceded too much. No conclusion was reached.
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1 Curtis, vol. ii. p. 380.
2 In spite of Seward's authority, and he had undoubtedly good channels of information, I do not think the President entertained the idea of withdrawing the troops. Seward wrote Weed, December 89: "The South Carolina interest demands the withdrawal of Anderson and abandonment of the forts. . . . The President inclines to yield. ... I am writing you not from rumors, but knowledge."—Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 487; see also letter to Lincoln, ibid., p. 488. Buchanan distinctly stated in his letter of December 31 to the commissioners, Official Records, vol. i. p. 118, "Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency." I think most of the evidence tends to confirm that statement. On the contrary, see reply of the commissioners, ibid., p. 123. The commissioners would have been satisfied with the restoration of the status quo, see Trescot's narrative, Crawford, p. 159; Diary of a Public Man, entry December 28. And, indeed, they might well be, as it would have led to the eventual abandonment of the forts by the United States. This certainty makes the point discussed in this note of little importance,

That night Judge Black spent in deep reflection. His feeling of personal devotion to Buchanan and his sentiment of duty to the country wrestled together. He had put up with the President's sins of omission, but could he be a party to the almost complete surrender of the national authority? In the morning his mind was made up. He told Stanton, Holt, and Toucey that, regarding the President's purpose as fixed, he had determined to resign. Stanton, and perhaps Holt, would have followed his example. Although it was Sunday,1 Toucey hastened to the White House and informed Buchanan, who sent for Black. The interview was painful to Black, on account of the conflict between his loyalty to the President and his conviction that the course proposed meant disaster and ruin to the country; while it was unpleasant to Buchanan, since he had to choose between giving up Black and giving up his policy. The balance turned in favor of Black. The President gave him the draft of the proposed answer, and asked him to modify it in conformity to his views. Black went to his office and, with his feelings at white heat, wrote the celebrated memorandum. Stanton was with him and copied the sheets as fast as they were written.2 Black showed a perfect comprehension of all the points involved; he understood thoroughly the rights and duty of the federal government; he saw with unerring sagacity the correct policy to be pursued: and all this he expressed with such cogency that this memorandum, constituting as it did the turning-point of Buchanan's policy, and preventing an abject compliance with arrogant demands, is worthy of the most careful consideration and the highest praise.3 In unanswerable
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1 December 30.
2 Essays and speeches of J. S. Black, C. F. Black, p. 13 et seq.; see also Lincoln and Men of War Times, McClure, p. 277.
3 The great importance of this memorandum induces me to quote a large part of it: The President having seemed to admit by implication that South Carolina was an independent nation, Black said:
"1. I think that every word and sentence which implies that South Carolina is in an attitude which enables the President to 'treat' or negotiate with her, or to receive her commissioners in the character of diplomatic ministers or agents, ought to be stricken out, and an explicit declaration substituted, which would reassert the principles of the message. It is surely not enough that the words of the message be transcribed, if the doctrine there announced be practically abandoned by carrying on a negotiation.
"2. I would strike out all expressions of regret that the commissioners are unwilling to proceed with the negotiations, since it is very clear that there can be no negotiation with them, whether they are willing or not.
"3. Above all things, it is objectionable to intimate a willingness to negotiate with the State of South Carolina about the possession of a military post which belongs to the United States, or to propose any adjustment of the subject or any arrangement about it. The forts in Charleston harbor belong to this government—are its own, and cannot be given up. It is true they might be surrendered to a superior force, whether that force be in the service of a seceding State or a foreign nation. But Fort Sumter is impregnable and cannot be taken if defended as it should be. It is a thing of the last importance that it should be maintained, if all the power of this nation can do it; for the command of the harbor and the President's ability to execute the revenue laws may depend on it.
"4. The words 'coercing a State by force of arms to remain in the confederacy—a power which I do not believe the Constitution has conferred on Congress,' ought certainly not to be retained. They are too vague, and might have the effect (which I am sure the President does not intend) to mislead the commissioners concerning his sentiments. The power to defend the public property—to resist an assailing force which unlawfully attempts to drive out the troops of the United States from one of the fortifications, and to use military and naval forces for the purpose of aiding the proper officers of the United States in the execution of the laws—this, as far as it goes, is coercion, and may very well be called 'coercing a State by force of arms to remain in the Union.' The President has always asserted his right of coercion to that extent. He merely denies the right of Congress to make offensive war upon a State of the Union such as might be made upon a foreign government.
“5. The implied assent of the President to the accusation which the commissioners make of a compact with South Carolina by which he was bound not to take whatever measures he saw fit for the defence of the forts, ought to be stricken out, and a flat denial of any such bargain, pledge, or agreement inserted.
"6. The remotest expression of a doubt about Major Anderson's perfect propriety of behavior should be carefully avoided. He is not merely a gallant and meritorious officer who is entitled to a fair hearing before he is condemned. He has saved the country, I solemnly believe, when its day was darkest and its perils most extreme. He has done everything that mortal man could do to repair the fatal error which the administration have committed in not sending down troops enough to hold all the forts. He has kept the strongest one. He still commands the harbor. We may still execute the laws if we try. . . .
"7. The idea that a wrong was committed against South Carolina by moving from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter ought to be repelled as firmly as may be consistent with a proper respect for the high character of the gentlemen who compose the South Carolina Commission. It is a strange assumption of right on the part of that State to say that our United States troops must remain in the weakest position they can find in the harbor. It is not a menace of South Carolina or of Charleston, or any menace at all. It is simple self-defence. If South Carolina does not attack Major Anderson, no human being will be injured, for there certainly can be no reason to believe that he will commence hostilities. The apparent objection to his being in Fort Sumter is that he will be less likely to fall an easy prey to his assailants.
"These are the points on which I would advise that the paper be amended. I am aware that they are too radical to permit much hope of their adoption. If they are adopted, the whole paper will need to be recast." —Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black, C. F. Black, p. 15.

logic he vindicated the national doctrine, justified and commended Major Anderson in the strongest terms, refuted with crushing force the claim of South Carolina, and ended with: "I entreat the President to order the Brooklyn and the Macedonian1 to Charleston without the least delay, and in the meantime send a trusty messenger to Major Anderson to let him know that his government will not desert him. The reinforcement of troops from New York or Old Point Comfort should follow immediately. If this be done at once all may yet be not well, but comparatively safe. If not, I can see nothing before us but disaster and ruin to the country."

There was entire consistency between this memorandum of Black, Secretary of State, and the opinion of November 20 of Black, Attorney-General.2 In the memorandum he appreciated and reflected the difference in meaning now
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1 The Brooklyn, a steam sloop-of-war, "a new and formidable vessel of twenty-five guns;" the Macedonian, a war vessel of twenty-two guns, Nicolay and Hay, vol. ii. p. 382, vol. iii. p. 164; they were at the Norfolk navy yard.
2 Ante.

attached to the word coercion from that which it implied in November;1 and he felt that the tone of the paper should be modulated to the progress of events; that, South Carolina having seceded and committed acts of war, the words of the executive addressed to her should be more forcible than the message to her when she was preparing to withdraw from the Union.

The memorandum, which embodied also the sentiments of Stanton and Holt, went to the President and caused him to modify the answer to the commissioners which he had prepared. The altered paper was delivered to them Monday, December 31. It has by no means the ring of Black's logic; yet the President, forced to eat his own words, did it with ready skill, and he indicated a policy that suffered Black, Stanton, and Holt to remain in his cabinet without prejudice to their national views. In answer to the request of South Carolina that he should withdraw the troops from Charleston harbor, he said, "This I cannot do; this I will not do;" and he announced, "It is my duty to defend Fort Sumter."3 Buchanan's action tallied with his word. December 30, General Scott, not knowing of Floyd's resignation, had asked the President's permission to send a reinforcement to Fort Sumter; 3 this was immediately granted, and the general made out an order to have the Brooklyn ready, and to put on board of her at least 200 men from Fortress Monroe, with arms, ammunition, and supplies.4 The President then suggested that, out of courtesy, it would be well to defer sending the order until he should receive a reply from the commissioners, and in this Scott promptly
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1 Ante, p. 133.
2 For this letter of the President, see Official Records, vol. i. p. 115 ; Curtis, vol. ii. p. 386.
3 Scott to the President, Official Records, vol. i. p. 114.
4 The date of the order is December 31, ibid., p. 119. The President received the request of General Scott the evening of December 30, and gave the permission the morning of December 31, Buchanan in the National Intelligencer, November 1, 1862; Buchanan's Defence, p. 188.

concurred.1 January 2,1861, their answer came. It presented the South Carolina argument with force, but it was arrogant in manner and insolent in tone.2 Appreciating that men of national views were now in the ascendency in the cabinet, knowing that Anderson would not only be sustained, but that an order to send him reinforcements had been issued,3 they smarted from a sense of failure of their mission, and let their bitter disappointment get the better of their native courtesy.4 The reading of this reply in cabinet meeting excited general indignation. Buchanan, feeling keenly the insult to the dignity of his office, wrote, "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it," and ordered that the letter with these words endorsed upon it be sent back to the commissioners.5 He then turned to the Secretary of War, Holt, and said, emphatically, "It is now all over, and reinforcements must be sent."6

Anderson's removal of his force to Fort Sumter had electrified the Northern people, but, before venting their feeling of joy, they waited with breathless suspense to see whether he would be supported by the administration. During the days of gloom and humiliation since the November election they had searched in vain for a hero. It now seemed as if one had been found,7 but for a happy fate
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1 As "the delay could not continue more than forty-eight hours," National Intelligencer, November 1,1862; Buchanan's Defence, p. 190.
2 It is printed in Official Records, vol. i. p. 121, and Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. i. p. 597. The letter is dated January 1.
3 Trescot's narrative, Crawford, p. 159.
4 Although Jefferson Davis defended the commissioners and criticised the President, he admitted that their reply was "harsh in some of its terms," remarks in the Senate, January 9, 1861. It is said that Orr objected to sending any reply, Diary of a Public Man, entry January 1, 1861.
5 This was done. See Curtis, vol. ii. p. 392; Buchanan's Defence, p. 183. The commissioners left Washington the afternoon of January 2. They had in their letter stated that to be their purpose.
6 Buchanan to Thompson, January 9,1861, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 402.
7 "The feeling of the country has been unmistakably expressed in regard to Major Anderson, and that not merely because he showed prudence and courage, but because he was the first man holding a position of trust who did his duty to the nation."—Lowell's "E Pluribus Unum," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1861, p. 239.

he needed the backing of the President. Despite the secrecy of the cabinet meetings, public rumor, though incorrect in detail, reflected passing well what was going on in the inner councils of the nation. On the last day of the year it became known that the troops would not be withdrawn from Charleston harbor, and that Anderson would not be ordered back to Moultrie. The North had passed a dismal Christmas; a merry New Year's now made amends. Every one breathed freer and held up his head. All hearts beat high; all breasts heaved with patriotic emotion; all felt that their country and their flag meant something. A salvo of artillery, beginning with the New Year, resounded throughout the Northern cities, continuing until Saint Jackson's Day,1 when cheers for " Old Hickory " mingled in fit unison with cheers for Major Anderson.2 The House of Representatives, by an imposing majority, voted approval of his "bold and patriotic act."3 No one imagined that the difficulty was solved, but all felt that their government had adopted a manly tone, and that they need no longer hang their heads with shame as they gave heed to the opinion of Europe. For the change of policy that caused this revulsion of feeling, for the vigorous assertion at last in word and in deed that the United States is a nation, for pointing out the way in which the authority of the federal government might be exercised without infringing on the rights of the States, the gratitude of the American people is due to Jeremiah S. Black.

Note.—The irregular financial transactions of Floyd attracted so
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1 January 8, the anniversary of the battle of New Orleans.
2 Editorials and Washington despatches, New York Tribune, December 28, 29, 31; ibid., January 3, 9, 1861; Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. i., Diary, pp. 9, 10,11, 14. "The marked change in the policy of the administration is felt in the very air to-day."—" S" to the New York Times, Washington, January 2,1861.
3 By a vote of 124 to 56, Congressional Globe, p. 281.

much attention at the time that, although not strictly necessary for a full understanding of the progress of events, I cannot pass them over with only the allusion in the text (ante, p. 225). Russell, Majors & Waddell, a firm who had large contracts with the War Department for transportation of army provisions over the Western and Southwestern plains, becoming embarrassed after the panic of 1857, induced Floyd to accept, as Secretary of War, drafts of theirs in anticipation of their earnings; he also wrote to various banks and individuals, urging the purchase or discount of these drafts. This practice began in 1858; it was brought to the notice of the President, probably in the early part of the year 1860; he told Floyd that it was improper and should be discontinued; Floyd promised not to accept another draft (Curtis, vol. ii. p. 407), but did not keep his promise. From time to time the contractors retired the acceptances. But their affairs apparently went from bad to worse, and so many of the acceptances of the Secretary of War were afloat that it became difficult to negotiate them, and in July, 1860, the contractors needed additional help to prevent some of them from going to protest. At this juncture, Bailey, a clerk in the Interior Department, having charge of trust funds, who came to Washington "a bankrupt in fortune, and a political adventurer seeking office," but who had good recommendations from Alabama and South Carolina, saved Floyd's credit by letting Russell have $150,000 of Indian trust bonds, he taking in their place a similar amount of Floyd acceptances: this he did, as he said, to prevent Floyd's " retirement in disgrace from the cabinet." (Bailey was a connection of Floyd.) From time to time more bonds were needed and obtained, the Floyd acceptances being substituted for them, until the deficit reached $870,000. December 22 the President was informed of this theft, and he requested Floyd's resignation. A special committee of the House of Representatives was appointed to investigate the affair in the usual way. It was composed of one anti-Lecompton and one administration Democrat, two Republicans, and one American. It took a large amount of testimony and made a unanimous report. It exonerated fully Thompson, the Secretary of the Interior; it ascertained that nearly $7,000,000 in acceptances had been issued, a record of which had been mostly kept on loose pieces of paper, and of which a large amount was still outstanding. It declared that these acceptances were "unauthorized by law and deceptive and fraudulent in their character;" "that Russell, Majors & Waddell not only absorbed all the sums earned by them under their contracts, and sold all the bonds they received from Bailey, but also raised very large sums of money upon the acceptances issued by the Secretary of War;" and that Floyd's action could not be reconciled "with purity of private motives and faithfulness to public trusts."—See House Report No. 78, 36th Congress, 2d Session The President ordered Floyd to be indicted for malversation in office.—Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black, p. 266. The indictment, however, against him was quashed on a technicality.—New York Tribune, March 21, 1861; Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 701. It is not surprising that Floyd was then, and has since been, written down a thief, but the statement of C. F. Black, which undoubtedly represented the opinion of his father, is conclusive evidence to the contrary. "There is no evidence," he writes, "against him of anything worse than reckless imprudence; not a cent from any money proceeding from these premature acceptances could be traced to his hands, and it is very clear that he had no connection whatever, in thought, word, or deed, with the abstraction of the Indian trust bonds from the Interior Department. He left Washington empty-handed—so poor that he had to borrow the money which paid the expenses of taking his family to Virginia."—See C. F. Black, p. 13.

Another charge against Floyd must be examined. It is that, anticipating the war between the sections, he sent to the Southern arsenals in the spring of 1860 to aid the South in her preparation a large quantity of muskets and rifles, and that in the same year he was instrumental in making an unfair distribution, and one favorable to the South, of the arms for which an annual appropriation was made by Congress to equip the militia of the several States. At the North, this charge was generally believed in 1861 and during the war; and it met with much credence on account of General Scott's support of it in his controversy with Buchanan in 1862. See National Intelligencer, November 13, December 6, 1862. It occasionally appears in the history books. It has been used as part of the chain of the proof to show that the South was better prepared for the war than the North, and it is sometimes employed to bolster a theory of the secession, which I shall later carefully examine. Of the 115,000 arms sent for storage to the Southern arsenals in the spring of 1860,105,000 were condemned muskets, not worth over $2.50 each, and 10,000 were percussion rifles, calibre .54. The Southern States, in 1860, did not apply for, nor get, their full quota of new arms. These two facts plainly appear from the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs and the evidence submitted with it, Report No. 85, 36th Congress, 2d Session The report was made February 18, 1861; Stanton, the chairman, was a Republican from Ohio. The truth is more systematically stated in Buchanan's replies to General Scott, National Intelligencer, November 25 and December 18, 1862; in Buchanan's Defence, p. 223 ; in J. S. Black's open letter to Henry Wilson, C. F. Black, p. 267; the subject is also treated with detail by Curtis, vol. ii. p. 411. It is perfectly clear that before the election of Lincoln Floyd was not a secessionist.

Between the November election and his resignation some of his acts are suspicious, and seemed at the time treacherous to many steadfast Union men. November 14 he sold the State of Alabama 2500 of the condemned muskets; November 24, 10,000 to a known agent of South Carolina; 5000 each to Mississippi and Louisiana, all at $2.50 each. The last 10,000 mentioned, however, came from the arsenal of Baton Rouge, La. See Report of Com. on Military Affairs; letter of Lamar to Floyd, and Floyd's reply, War Department Archives; for the correspondence leading to the South Carolina purchase, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. ii. p. 319 et seq.

Captain Foster of the Engineers, in charge of the work at Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney, had with some address, on December 17, obtained from the United States arsenal in Charleston forty muskets to arm his two ordnance sergeants and his laborers in case of necessary defence. This transfer of arms occasioned much excitement in Charleston and an official remonstrance. The matter was referred to Floyd, who immediately ordered Foster to return the muskets to the arsenal, in which at this time were stored over 21,000 muskets and rifles. See report of Maynadier, Official Records, vol. i. p. 130. For the correspondence relating to the forty muskets, ibid., p. 94 et seq. The story is interestingly told by Nicolay and Hay, vol. ii. chap. xxix.

October 20, Floyd directed verbally the Captain of Ordnance Maynadier to send guns to the unfinished forts of Ship Island, Miss., and Galveston, Texas. When it was ascertained what the Pittsburgh arsenal could furnish, Floyd gave the order (December 20) to Maynadier to have sent from there 110 columbiads and eleven thirty-two pounders. No guns could have been mounted at Ship Island for months. The Galveston fort would not have been in full readiness for its armament in less than five years. When preparations began to be made in Pittsburgh for this shipment, and the citizens came to know for what points the guns were destined, public feeling was strongly stirred up. Remonstrances were urged upon the President, with the result that he directed Holt, who was now acting Secretary of War, to rescind the order: the guns were not shipped. See report of House Com. on Military Affairs, February 18, 1861; Buchanan in the National Intelligencer, November 25, 1862; Buchanan's Defence, p. 224; Curtis, vol. ii. p. 416; New York Tribune, December 27, 28, 29.

Buchanan states that Floyd was "an avowed and consistent opponent of secession" (Defence, p. 187) until receiving the request to resign, and Black's testimony is to the same effect. (Open letter to Henry Wilson, C. F. Black, p. 266.) It is now so commonly admitted that Buchanan was a very truthful, sincere, and honest man that I have not emphasized the fact; Black was scrupulously veracious and exact: their testimony, therefore, is of the highest value. But at the best Floyd was a Unionist of the Virginia States-rights school;1 opposed to " the coercion of a sovereign State;" determined "not to reinforce the forts and not to allow them to be taken by an unlawful force" (Crawford, p. 59). Undoubtedly he thought, until the secession of South Carolina, that she had as much right to the arms belonging to the general government as had Massachusetts. Such a sentiment would explain all his acts except that connected with the transfer of the ordnance from Pittsburgh ; and the perfected order for that was not given until after he had learned of the theft of the bonds from the Interior Department avowedly in his interest (see letter of Bailey to Floyd, December 19; Report of Com. p. 95). Trescot had no such confidence in Floyd's devotion to Southern interests as he had in Cobb's and Thompson's (see his private and confidential letter to Drayton, November 19, MS. Confederate Archives,
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1 "Union was a question of expediency, not of obligation. This was the conviction of the true Virginia school, and of Jefferson's opponents as well as his supporters; of Patrick Henry, as well as John Taylor of Caroline, and John Randolph of Roanoke."—Henry Adams's History of the United States, vol. i. p. 142.

cited by Nicolay and Hay, vol. ii. p. 322). No one can devote the least attention to Floyd's administration of affairs without being struck by his utter incapacity for the proper and systematic transaction of business. He had a poor conception of what he should do, and an imperfect understanding of what he had done.

My apology for devoting so much space to Floyd is for the reason previously mentioned, and furthermore for the desire to do entire justice to Buchanan, who has of course a certain responsibility for the acts of his secretaries. I am aware that it is a work of supererogation to defend Floyd from treachery which he and his friends boasted that he had committed. See his speech at Richmond, New York Herald, January 17,1861; Pollard's History of the First Year of the War, p. 67; Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians, Reuben Davis, p. 395. Floyd afterwards served in the Confederate army, but not with honor.

I should have been glad to end this chapter and my account of the year 1860 with citations of the salient points of Benjamin's speech made in the Senate, December 31, but the absolute need of compression forbade. It may be found on p. 212, Congressional Globe, and, as a strong presentation of the argument for the right of secession and for the injustice and inexpediency of coercion or of any attempt to enforce the laws in South Carolina, it may be read with profit. Benjamin was of Hebrew parents, wealthy, the ablest lawyer of the South in public life, and a fit representative of Louisiana, one of the more conservative of the cotton States. While sincerity does not inhere in his utterances as it does in so marked a degree in those of the South Carolina leaders, of Toombs, Stephens, and Jefferson Davis, this speech is an adroit plea of a clever attorney on behalf of a client for whom he held a brief.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.3. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].