History of the United States, v.2, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 8: President-Making through Election of Buchanan

CHAPTER VIII

The attention of the country was at this period divided between the doings at Washington and in Kansas and President-making. Astute Democratic politicians felt that success depended largely upon the man whom their convention should nominate. Kansas was the question before the country, and a logical adherence to Democratic ideas would seem to demand the nomination of Douglas or Pierce. The one had inaugurated the new policy, the other had enforced it. They were both popular in the South, and it could not now be gainsaid that Southern principles and Southern interests were the dominant force in the Democratic party. Pierce was the first choice of the South, and Douglas the second. Either would have been eminently satisfactory; and had the President or senator concentrated the whole Southern strength, it would have made him the nominee.

But there were Southern politicians who saw what the majority of Northern Democrats saw—viz., that while the South would be almost solid for any possible nominee of the party, the important consideration was to nominate the man who could secure the greatest number of electoral votes from the North. All except two slave States, Maryland and Kentucky, which Fillmore might dispute, were certain to vote for the Democratic nominee; but Northern votes were needed to elect, and the probable Democratic States were Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and California. Of these, Pennsylvania was the most important, her vote being considered absolutely necessary.
James Buchanan was a Pennsylvanian; he had been out of the country when the Kansas-Nebraska act was passed, therefore he now loomed as a candidate. Two adroit Southern politicians—Wise of Virginia and Slidell of Louisiana— early espoused his candidacy.1 This question, however, had to be answered to the South: was he sound on the Kansas-Nebraska policy, as were the battle-scarred veterans Douglas and Pierce? A private letter, written the previous December from London, by Buchanan to Slidell was published, in which he said that the Missouri Compromise was gone forever, and the settlement made by the Kansas-Nebraska act should be inflexibly maintained. 2

In May, Buchanan more precisely defined his position in a speech made to a committee from the Pennsylvania State convention, which had unanimously recommended him for the presidency.3 It is clear that it was the aim of the friends of Buchanan to show before the convention that he was in harmony with Democratic principles as understood in the South.

Yet Pierce and Douglas were regarded as the Southern candidates, while Buchanan was supported by substantially all those Democrats who deprecated the repeal of the Missouri Compromise or who had consented to it only after
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1 See letters of Wise, Letters and Times of the Tylers, vol. ii. p. 521 et seq. "I have no idea," Wise writes, September 23d, 1855, " that any slave-holding Democrat can get the next or any nomination for the presidency." November 18th, 1855,he writes: "Our policy is to go in for Buchanan with all our might;" see also letter from Wise, March 5th, 1856, published in New York Evening Post, April 21st. As to Slidell, see Life of Buchanan, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 173.
2 Buchanan to Slidell, London, December 28th, 1855, New York Tribune, April 5th, 1856; New York Times, April 8th, copied from the Washington Union.
3 The resolutions of the Pennsylvania Democratic State convention and Buchanan's remarks are printed in the Congressional Globe, vol. xxxii. p. 1195. The speech of Jones, of Pennsylvania, who had them read in the House, impresses one with the efforts made by the friends of Buchanan to curry Southern favor.

long hesitation.1 The outside pressure from the North in favor of the nomination of Buchanan was very strong. But in the preliminary work it became apparent to his supporters that if the friends of Pierce and Douglas combined, they could name the candidate, while to secure the necessary two-thirds for the Pennsylvania statesman seemed a difficult undertaking. But as the delegates were on the way to the convention, the news of the assault on Sumner came to them,2 and before the convention got to work they heard of the destruction of Lawrence. One of these events was the natural result of the Kansas policy of Pierce and Douglas, the other seemed its logical concomitant. The responsibility of these two for the unhappy state of affairs in Kansas was intensified, and, if the question of availability should exercise paramount influence, the nomination of either was rendered impossible.

The convention met at Cincinnati the 2d day of June, and adopted its declaration of principles without opposition. The platform condemned the aims of the Know-nothings; declared that "the Democratic party will resist all attempts at renewing, in Congress or out of it, the agitation of the slavery question;" and resolved that" the American Democracy recognize and adopt the principles contained in the organic laws establishing the territories of Nebraska and Kansas as embodying the only sound and safe solution of the slavery question."3

On the first ballot Buchanan had 135 votes, Pierce 122, Douglas 33, and Cass 5. Buchanan received 103 votes from the North and 32 from the slave States. He had all the delegates from Virginia and Louisiana. This proved a nucleus for Southern support, and was of importance, as the Buchanan movement was engineered by Wise and Slidell.
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1There was an important exception; the Hards of New York were for Buchanan; the Softs for Pierce and Douglas.
2 Forney's Anecdotes of Public Men, vol. ii. p. 254.
3 See History of Presidential Elections, Stanwood, p. 200.

Pierce received 72 and Douglas 14 votes from the slave States. Fourteen ballots were taken, both Buchanan and Douglas gaining at the expense of Pierce. On the tenth, Buchanan received a majority of the votes cast. After the fourteenth trial Pierce was withdrawn. The fifteenth stood: Buchanan, 168; Douglas, 118. The Southern votes of Pierce, with the exception of those from Tennessee and three from Georgia, had gone to Douglas; his New England friends had divided.1 The sixteenth ballot showed practically no change. After it was taken Richardson obtained the floor and read a despatch from Douglas, which stated that Buchanan, having obtained a majority of the convention, ought to be nominated, and he hoped his friends would "give effect to the voice of the majority.'2 Buchanan then received the nomination by a unanimous vote. John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, was chosen as the candidate for Vice-President, Kentucky being considered one of the doubtful slave States.

Buchanan's nomination was the triumph of availability and a concession to Northern public sentiment. He had engaged himself to give fair play in Kansas, and it was supposed that he desired to see that territory come into the Union as a free State.3 Until the assault on Sumner, the chances of the three candidates were apparently equal. Preston Brooks in Washington and the border ruffians in Lawrence turned the tide in favor of Buchanan.4 The party was afraid to go to the country with Douglas or Pierce as standard-bearer on account of the connection of each with the existing troubles in Kansas.
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1 National Intelligencer; Boston Post; History of Presidential Elections, Stanwood, p. 199.
2 New York Tribune.
3 Forney's Anecdotes of Public Men, vol. i. p. 325; vol. ii. p. 254.
4 Forney's Anecdotes of Public Men; National Era, June 12th. The account of S. M. L. Barlow, cited by Curtis, vol. ii. p. 170, ignores the preponderance of Northern sentiment for Buchanan, but gives an interesting history of the work done for him at Cincinnati.

The nomination of Buchanan was eminently satisfactory to Northern Democrats. The conservative and high-minded men of the party were pleased, believing that the Union would be safe in his hands. He was expected to attract the support of conservative Whigs, who thought Fillmore had no chance, and who were alarmed at the sectional character of the Republican party. The politicians not holding office were well satisfied, for the nomination of Buchanan seemed to insure victory. He could carry Pennsylvania, which Douglas or Pierce would probably have failed to do. The Key-stone State was necessary to success; for if it did not go Democratic at the October election, little reliance could be placed on the other Northern Democratic States. Pennsylvania, said a Democratic editor who, having been ardently in favor of Pierce, greeted the rising sun, has long been the key-stone of the Democratic arch, and will now be the key-stone of the Union.1 A careful reading of the Democratic journals impresses one that the convention had made the strongest nomination possible.2 The disappointed candidates early pledged their support, and this was honestly given.

The arguments freely used to gain adherents for Buchanan at the North at first threatened to hurt his cause at the South. That a man was acceptable to the few Free-soil Democrats who still encumbered the old party was no recommendation to Southerners; but when they looked into his record, they became assured that he might serve their section as well as Pierce had served it. The Richmond Enquirer, a most ardent pro-slavery journal, examined the congressional career of Buchanan and found that "he never gave a vote against the interests of slavery, and never 
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1 Boston Post, June 7th.
2 This was also the opinion of Republicans. Seward wrote his wife, June 10th: "The temper of the politicians [meaning Republican politicians], I see, is subdued by Buchanan's nomination, and indicates retreat, confusion, lout in the election."—Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 277.

uttered a word which could pain the most sensitive Southern heart."

The declaration of principles adopted at Cincinnati was sometimes called a "Douglas platform"1 and sometimes a "Southern platform."2 The platform might be represented as looking one way and the candidate the other. But when the committee notified Buchanan of his nomination, his speech in reply satisfied the South. He fully endorsed the Cincinnati platform. He said that the slavery question was paramount, and the endeavor of his administration would be to settle it in a manner to give peace and safety to the Union and security to the South. He believed that the Kansas-Nebraska bill was necessary as a fit supplement to the compromise measures of 1850. When Buchanan had finished his formal speech, he said: "If I can be instrumental in settling the slavery question upon the terms I have named, and then add Cuba to the Union, I shall, if President, be willing to give up the ghost and let Breckinridge take the government."3 Senator Brown, of Mississippi, one of the committee, heard this remark, and it so aroused his enthusiasm that he wrote to a friend: "The great Pennsylvanian is as worthy of Southern confidence and Southern votes as Calhoun ever was."

The nomination of Fremont 4 was virtually decided upon before the Republican convention met. It was a selection reached by a full comparison of views in the press, in private correspondence, and confidential conversations, and an honest and open canvass of the merits and strength of prominent Republicans. If merit alone were considered, everything pointed to Seward as the proper nominee, for no man in the country so fully represented Republican principles and aims. But if his unpopularity with the anti-slavery
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1 See speech of Douglas, New York, June 11th; Boston Post, June 13th.
 2 National Era, June 12th.
3 Letter of Senator Brown to S. R. Adams, June 18th, published in National Era, August 21st.
4 Infra, p. 181.

Know-nothings made it seem unwise to put him up, and if the Whigs, though numerically the largest portion of the Republican party, were willing to sacrifice their desire of having an ancient Whig for their standard-bearer, then consistency demanded the nomination of Chase. The more radical members of the party were clearly of this conviction. Dr. Bailey, of the National Era, was at first for Chase and later for Seward. For the sake of sharply defining their principles he was content to wait, if need be, until 1860 for the election of a President.1 Theodore Parker wrote to Sumner that his first choice was Seward, and his second Chase ;2 and the historian feels no hesitancy in affirming that as the Republican party of 1856 had more disinterested and sincere men in its ranks than any party in this country before or since, as its members were honestly devoted to a noble principle, it was not true to its constitution and aims when it passed over Seward and Chase and descended upon Fremont.

Had the party with one accord looked to Seward as its leader; had the majority of its prominent and influential men, after canvassing all the points and weighing all the arguments, settled down to the conviction that the logic of the situation and the character of the party demanded his nomination, he would have accepted it gladly and entered into the contest with spirit. It was personal enmities, his too Whiggish views, and the question of availability that forbade. Yet had he decided to make a fight for the nomination, his friends would have urged it with pertinacity and zeal; care would have been taken to send delegates to Philadelphia favorable to him; and after a contest with Fremont, he
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1 Dr. Bailey "is eaten up with the idea of making Chase President," Greeley wrote Dana, December 1st, 1855, New York Sun, May 19th, 1889. "Seward wants to be the candidate, and Dr. Bailey, of the National Era, is for him, content to wait till 1860 for a victory."—Samuel Bowles to H. L. Dawes, April 12th, 1856, Life of Bowles, Merriam, vol. i. p. 172.
2 Life of Parker, Weiss, vol. ii. p. 180.

would undoubtedly have been nominated.1 Seward was bold in words, timorous in action; he hesitated to claim the place which was rightfully his. It is possible that his own mind was warped by the reasoning of Thurlow Weed, his political mentor, who, regarding the situation with the narrow eye of a practical politician, would not have Seward run the race when there was so little probability of his election.2 After it had been decided that he should not contest the nomination, he expressed a plaintive regret that he had taken the course marked out for him.3 Yet it is hardly supposable that even his optimism was proof against the prevailing opinion that his election was impossible; and his confident expression in the Senate was not the judgment of cooler moments.4 By the 18th of April it was known that
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1 John A. King, in his speech at the Republican convention, said: "I had hoped that circumstances would have permitted us to present to this convention the name of W. H. Seward. I believe, if that state of things could have existed, that name would have received the universal approbation of this convention." Robert Emmet, the temporary chairman of the convention, said at a ratification meeting in New York city: "Had it not been for the refusal of Mr. Seward himself, who charged his friends not to permit his nomination, he would have been nominated;" see also Life of Thurlow Weed, vol. ii. p. 245. I may add that in the contemporaneous political literature the indications are numerous that Seward would have received the nomination had a well-directed effort been made in his behalf. See also Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i. p. 126.
2 See Seward's letter to Weed, April 4th; to his wife, June 6th, 13th, 14th, 17th, Life of Seward, vol. ii. pp. 269, 276,277, 278.
3 See his letter of May 4th to Thurlow Weed, Life of Thurlow Weed, vol. ii. p. 244.
4 Seward said in the Senate, March 12th: "I give those honorable gentlemen [Douglas and Toucey] notice that they have but about three hundred and fifty days left in which they will have the power of wielding the military and naval arms of this nation." In a confidential letter to Baker in 1855, Seward shows great doubts of Republican success in 1856, and adds, "I do not want that you and I should bear the responsibility of such a disaster," and " I am by no means ready to accept the command, if tendered."—Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 252.

Seward was not a candidate for the nomination.1 The disappointment of the Democrats and conservative Americans at this virtual announcement seemed to confirm the wisdom of the decision.2

There was a common objection to Seward and Chase; they were too pronounced on the slavery question. Both were on record in favor of the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and of the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, points on which it was deemed unadvisable to make an issue at the coming election. Moreover, the Chase movement never acquired popular strength outside of Ohio, and by the middle of April he was no longer seriously considered a candidate. Some time during the winter the Republicans, who were casting about for an available candidate, lighted upon Fremont. His fitness had been urged by the German press;3 he was early nominated for President by Banks, who said, at a dinner in Boston, that Fremont would soon write a letter defining plainly his position on the Kansas question.4 Early in April this letter appeared.4 It had the earmarks of shrewd politicians. Addressed to Governor Robinson of Kansas, an old California friend, it was nothing but a warm expression of sympathy with the free-State cause in Kansas. It gave notice to the public that he was a formal candidate for the Republican nomination, and the comments to which it gave rise made the fact apparent that he had powerful backing. Francis P. Blair, John Wentworth, Banks, Thurlow Weed, and Greeley were for him. 6 Dan Mace, a
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1 See editorial in New York Times of that date.
2 See New York Times, April 22d and 25th.
3 The New York Abend-Zeitung maintained that the first suggestion of his name came from the German press.
4 Reminiscences of a Journalist, Congdon, p. 152.
5 It is printed in the campaign Life of Fremont, by John Bigelow, p. 447.
6 See Life of Thurlow Weed, vol. ii. p. 245. See the strong argument for an available candidate, New York Tribune, April 30th.

prominent and influential congressman from Indiana, a former Democrat, spoke for a large number when he wrote: "It will never do to go into the contest and be called upon to defend the acts and speeches of old stagers. We must have a position that will enable us to be the charging party. Fremont is the man for the operation."1

As an available candidate, Fremont had strong recommendations. He had been a Democrat, and the feeling among those who were formerly Democrats was that one of their number ought to be the standard-bearer.2 The Germans, among whom were not a few educated and liberty-loving men, exiles from the fatherland after the failure of the revolution of 1848, were enthusiastically in his favor.3 Yet he was not obnoxious to the Know-nothings; and, as was said by Emmet, the temporary chairman of the convention which nominated him, Fremont" had no political antecedents."4

Two days after the letter of Fremont to Robinson was published, Pike wrote to the New York Tribune from Washington : " Among the Republicans there is a strong apparent current for Fremont. Some say it is all set running by the politicians and will not do." 5 After the virtual withdrawal of Seward, the preponderance of opinion was that availability should determine the candidate;
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1 This was a private letter, written April 20th, but the Indiana Courier published it, and it was copied by the New York Evening Post.
2 See, for example, the letter of Dan Mace already cited; also article in John Wentworth's Chicago Democrat, quoted by New York Evening Post; also New York Abend-Zeitung, June 14th.
3 New York Abend-Zeitung, June 6th and 13th; Die Freie Presse, Philadelphia, cited by Evening Post, June 18th; New York Stoats-Democrat, June 13th; see quotations from several German papers, New York Evening Post, June 16th. A majority of the hundred German papers in the country were for Fremont, statement made by Schneider, of the Illinois Staats-Zeitung at the convention.
4 At the ratification meeting, New York city.
5 Pike's First Blows of the Civil War, p. 322.

but every one did not admit that the most available candidate was Fremont. Frequent mention began to be made of Judge McLean, of the United States Supreme Court.1 He had long been in public life. A cabinet officer under Monroe and John Quincy Adams, he had been appointed to the Supreme bench by Jackson, and this position he had filled twenty-six years. He was a man of talents and of spotless integrity; and there can be no question that he was much better fitted for the presidency than Fremont. When the presidential nomination now became a possibility, he began to define his opinions. To correct a misapprehension regarding his position, he wrote a letter stating that he had never doubted that Congress had power under the Constitution to prohibit slavery in a territory, but it was equally clear Congress could not constitutionally institute it.2 A few days before the Republican convention met, a second letter from Judge McLean was published. The troubles in Kansas were, in his opinion, "the fruits of that ill-advised and mischievous measure—the repeal of the Missouri Compromise;" and the remedy was "the immediate admission of Kansas as a State into the Union under the constitution already formed." 3

Conservative Republicans advocated McLean; also antislavery Americans and those who distrusted Fremont. Pike, one of the editorial staff of the New York Tribune, and more radical than his chief, was from the first opposed to Fremont. As soon as his candidacy was avowed, Pike wrote from Washington to the New York Tribune: "Of the prominent candidates, Colonel Fremont is the most questionable by his antecedents, and the one upon whom strong doubts centre. Let there be no haste, and no dropping of the substance in the pursuit of the shadow. The opposition to
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1 McLean was from Ohio.
2 McLean to Cass, Washington, May 13th.
3 McLean to Chief Justice Hornblower, of New Jersey, dated June 6th, published in the New York Evening Post, June 14th.

Nebraskaism stands on a principle. In the selection of a candidate this must be recognized first of all. Availability is good in its place; but let all look sharp that we do not abandon what we know to be good for that which, though promising, may prove deceptive."1

When the choice was narrowed down to McLean and Fremont, Pike much preferred McLean. The rebukes that he received from his associates in New York accurately represent the drift of opinion. "We do not consider Judge McLean quite S. O. G. here,"2 wrote Greeley; "but if you know any facts making in favor of his orthodoxy, please send them on. . . . Considering how forcibly you have written in favor of having a candidate of whose zeal and fidelity there could be no dispute, we feel that there is something that needs explaining in your recent zeal for McLean. Friend Pike, do you know that is a Delilah of a town in which you chance just now to be lodged? Have you heard that it is unfavorable to the rigidity and perpendicularity of backbone? Do you know that men have gone there honest and come away rascals? Have you heard that a virtue less savage than mine would hardly have been proof against its manifold and persistent seductions? Beware, O friend and compatriot!" 3

Charles A. Dana wrote to Pike in the same strain: "Do not growl about an old fogy like McLean. One of the first of duties is to get rubbish out of the way. He belongs decidedly to that category. With you, I do not care who is the candidate so it is not a marrowless old lawyer whose mind has illustrated itself by so many perverse and perverting decisions. Why do you not stick to your original idea in going to Washington—that of getting some straight-out man nominated? For a fellow who started with that virtuous
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1 April 12th, Pike's First Blows of the Civil War, p. 322.
2 Sound on the goose—political slang of the day.
3 Private letter from Greeley to Pike, May 21st, Pike's First Blows of the Civil War, p. 337.

purpose, it seems to me you have deteriorated. You ought to rejoice at the interment of such a candidate rather than shed tears by the quart when he is done for."1

Fremont could lay claim to no experience in civil life. He had, indeed, been for a short term senator from California, but his exertions were wholly confined to matters of local interest. At that time (1849-51) he said he was a Democrat by principle and education; but as he belonged to the anti-slavery portion of the party in California, he was defeated when seeking a re-election.2 What brought him before the public mind were his daring and energetic explorations in the West; a halo of romance clung around his expeditions. A glamour was cast over his affairs of love. The story of his attachment to the daughter of Senator Benton, her devotion, and their romantic marriage crowned his heroic exploits. He was now but forty-three years old; active and adventurous, he seemed a fit leader for a young and aggressive party, and it was expected that the qualities which had made him a determined explorer would make him an executive officer of decision. The movement in his favor, initiated by the politicians, took the popular heart; in the West, wrote Bowles, it "is going like prairie fire."3

It may be safely said that the larger portion of prominent Republicans who thus yielded to the argument of availability were not actuated by the desire for office, or the wish to have a hand in the disposition of the patronage; but they feared that, unless they got the executive and the command of the army, Kansas might be made a slave State. The mass of Republicans sincerely felt that the cause of freedom was bound up in the success of their party. They were therefore gratified when, on the 29th of April, Fremont
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1 Private letter of Dana to Pike, May 21st, Pike's First Blows of the Civil War, p. 338.
2 See Life of Fremont, Bigelow, pp. 390, 438.
3 Samuel Bowles to H. L. Dawes, April 19th, Life of Bowles, Merriam, vol. i. p. 172.

planted himself squarely in favor of the Republican idea. He wrote a letter to a New York meeting, saying that he was inflexibly opposed to the extension of slavery.1

Yet from one point of anti-slavery sentiment came the anxious inquiry of Theodore Parker to Sumner, "Do tell me how far is Fremont reliable ?" 2 and from another point, Lincoln wrote E. B. Washburne, urging him and his Republican associates in Congress to go to Philadelphia and use their exertions and influence in favor of McLean. 3

The delegates who met at Philadelphia the 17th of June were not chosen by means of complicated party machinery. In their selection, there had been no strife. No animated contests between those favoring different candidates had occurred. Other conventions have had more prominent and abler men, but no national political convention of a great party was ever composed to so large an extent of sincere, unselfish, and patriotic citizens as that which began its deliberations on this anniversary day of Bunker Hill. The Republican movement was in that state where it attracted only men of earnest convictions. In some localities, aspiring souls made sacrifices when they took part in it. The high social and trade influences of New York City and Philadelphia were arrayed against it, and even in Boston many old Whig families of aristocratic pretensions held aloof from the new party. Where success was problematical, the prospect did not allure hangers-on and office-seekers. It is one of the curiosities of politics that this convention of honest and competent men made a nomination that Republicans have not ceased to apologize for. Yet they did but register the popular will.4
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1 Life of Fremont, Bigelow, p. 449.
2 May 21st, Life of Parker, Weiss, vol. ii. p. 180.
3 Note of E. B. Washburne in The Edwards Papers, p. 246.
4 As my view of the convention and its result differs from that of E. B. Washburne, justice to my readers demands that I should quote what he says: "I was present not as a member, but as an interested spectator. The nomination of Fremont was a set-up job from the beginning, and all the opposition which was offered to that nomination by many of the most influential, judicious, and patriotic men of the party could avail nothing. . . . All chances for the election of a Republican President in 1856 were deliberately thrown away by the Philadelphia convention, and, it might be said, in the face of light and knowledge. In the state of feeling then existing in the country, Judge McLean, or any Republican statesman of national reputation, could have easily been elected. The first time I saw Dayton after the defeat of the Fremont and Dayton ticket, I told him what I believed then, and what I believe now, that if the ticket had been reversed he would have been elected President of the United States."—Note to The Edwards Papers, p. 246, written in 1884. I should have been glad to adopt this view, but, with all deference to the advantages and long political experience of Washburne, I do not believe the contemporary evidence warrants it; yet as the candid expression of a spectator, and of one who knew what little inside history there was of the convention, it should not be overlooked.

When the convention were ready to ballot, the name of Chase was formally withdrawn. Every one understood from the first day that Seward was not a candidate. The New York delegation, influenced greatly by Thurlow Weed, were enthusiastically in favor of Fremont. Judge Spalding, of Ohio, by authority withdrew the name of McLean, and Fremont would then have been nominated with but few dissenting voices, had not the indomitable Thaddeus Stevens begged for delay. He said that the only man who could carry Pennsylvania, McLean, had been withdrawn, and he asked that the convention adjourn in order that the Pennsylvania delegation might have time to consult in view of the changed conditions. His wish was acceded to. He then made an impassioned appeal to his fellow-delegates from Pennsylvania, many of whom were for Fremont, to support McLean unanimously. "I never heard a man speak with more feeling or in more persuasive accents," wrote Washburne. "He closed his speech with the assertion that the nomination of Fremont would not only lose the State of Pennsylvania to the Republicans, but that the party would be defeated in the Presidential election."1
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1 E. B. Washburne, The Edwards Papers, p. 246. See also article of Russel Errett on the Convention of 1856, Magazine of Western History, vol. x. p. 257. He was present at the convention, and writes: "I do not think Stevens thought success probable (however possible it might be) with McLean; but with anyone else it was impossible, in his view." He "thought the fate of the party was bound up in his candidate."

The delegates reassembled. At the request of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Ohio, the name of Judge McLean was again placed before the convention and an informal ballot taken. It resulted in 359 votes for Fremont and 196 for McLean. From the Republican point of view, the doubtful States were Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and California. Since the nomination of Buchanan, the hope of winning Pennsylvania from the Democrats seemed almost vain. A majority of the delegates from all of these States except California voted for McLean.1

A formal ballot was now taken, Fremont receiving all but 38 votes. William L. Dayton, of New Jersey, was nominated for Vice-President. On the informal ballot which preceded this nomination, Abraham Lincoln received 110 votes.2

Before the nominations were made, the platform was unanimously adopted amidst great enthusiasm. The convention resolved that "it is both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery." It severely arraigned the administration for the conduct of affairs in Kansas, and demanded that Kansas should be immediately admitted as a State with her present free constitution. It "Resolved, That the highwayman's plea, that 'might makes right,’
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1 From Pennsylvania, 71 delegates voted for McLean, 10 for Fremont; New Jersey, 14 for McLean, 7 for Fr6mont; Indiana, 21 for McLean, 18 for Fremont; Illinois, 19 for McLean, 14 for Fremont. Ohio gave McLean 39 votes out of 69, and Maine 11 out of 24. Each State had a representation in the convention equal to three times its electoral vote. 2 In this account of the convention I have consulted the New York Evening Post, New York Times, New York Tribune, Life of Fremont by Bigelow.

embodied in the Ostend circular, was in every respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction."1

Since by common consent, availability was to determine the candidate, it seemed at the time as if the convention had acted wisely in nominating Fremont instead of McLean. The nomination of McLean would have been looked upon as a bid for the Know-nothing vote; it would probably have lost more Germans than it attracted Americans, and would have hampered the party in its future course.2 The discussion on a resolution that touched upon the Know-nothing question, its adoption, and the firm and enthusiastic determination to nominate Fremont were evidence that the Republicans wished to cut loose from their Know-nothing affiliations and make the fight on one cardinal principle. In Pennsylvania the anti-slavery and American ideas had been so closely intertwined that it seemed to Stevens and his sympathizers that all was lost if the Americans were not placated. The convention listened to their arguments with attention, but were not convinced.

There was another objection to the nomination of McLean. He was on the Supreme bench, and a feeling prevailed that judges of the highest court lowered themselves and their court when they entered into a contest for the presidency.3
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1 The platform, with all but one resolution, may be found in History of Presidential Elections, Stanwood, p. 205.
2 The New York Abend-Zeitung of June 13th said that hardly one tenth of the Germans would vote for McLean. See also Von Hoist, vol. v. p. 363. After the election (December 23d), Dana wrote Pike: "In my judgment, we are a great deal better off as we are than we should have been with McLean elected; but as for his coming within a gunshot of Fremont's vote, it is all gammon. He could not have carried the Northwest, and would not have got over 170,000 in this State."—First Blows of the Civil War, p. 354. Fremont received in New York State 276,007 votes.
3 This view is ably argued in a leading editorial of the New York Tribune, June 5th. The confidential expression of a brother justice is of interest: "Judge McLean hopes, I think, to be a candidate for the office. He would be a good President, but I am not willing to have a judge in that most trying position of being a candidate for this great office."—Letter of B. R. Curtis to Geo. Ticknor, April 8th, 18S6, Memoir of B. R. Curtis, vol. i. p. 180.  

The North Americans, as those were called who seceded from the American convention that nominated Fillmore, held a convention shortly before the Republicans and nominated Banks for President. He declined. When the delegates, who had adjourned pending the action of the Philadelphia convention, reassembled, they nominated Fremont.1

The country was too much excited over the assault on Sumner and the destruction of Lawrence, and too much interested in the outcome of the political conventions, to pay much attention to an important diplomatic transaction which came to a head on the 29th of May. On that day Congress was informed that the President had ceased to hold intercourse with the British minister, Crampton, had sent him his passport, and had revoked the exequaturs of the British consuls at New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati. The offence was that they had conducted in this country an extensive system of recruiting for the British foreign legion, in violation of the laws and sovereign rights of the United States. The acts complained of had been performed the previous year while England was in the midst of the Crimean war. 2 The withdrawal of Crampton and
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1 But they did not endorse the nomination of Dayton; they named Johnston, of Pennsylvania, for Vice-President. As an intimation of the different shades of opinion, it may be noted that the conservatives seceded from the North American convention and nominated Commodore Stockton for President. The abolitionists, who believed in political action, had already nominated Gerrit Smith for President and Frederick Douglas for Vice-President; but it was well understood at this time that there were practically only three tickets in the field. Any one who wished to vote could find a representative of his principles in Buchanan, Fremont, or Fillmore. See New York Herald, June 21st.
2 See Marcy to Dallas, May 37th.

the three consuls had been asked for, but the request was refused by the British government.1

Before the President had promulgated his decision, the action was in English official circles deemed probable; and Dallas, our minister at London, felt certain that when the news of Crampton's dismissal came, he would in turn receive his passports from the British government. 2 In one of his anxious moments he had a talk with the experienced Russian ambassador, who assured him that there was no cause for worry; that if Crampton were dismissed, the English government would make light of it, or their indignation would be "mildly expressed and of very short duration." "No ministry," the Russian added, " would last a month, in the present condition of England, that should quarrel with the United States."3 By the last of May, however, "the public pulse was at fever heat" in England. Dallas wrote: "If the Times and the Post 4 are reliable organs, I shall probably quit England soon, never to return; an indiscriminating retaliation amounts to an original insult, and will require many years to be forgotten. It will not surprise me if I should turn out to be the last minister from the United States to the British Court."5
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1 "The President's whole cabinet felt so kindly to Crampton that they examined narrowly the evidence against him, and would gladly have believed that he had been innocent of violating the neutrality of America towards the contending nations, but were at last unwillingly convinced of the fact."—Life of Jefferson Davis, by his Wife, vol. i. p. 569.
2 Private letter of Geo. M. Dallas to Marcy, April 20th, Letters from London, p. 22.
3 Dallas to Marcy, May 6th, ibid., p. 33.
4 The Post was the official organ of the ministry.
5 Dallas to Mr. D., June 6th, Letters from London, pp. 43,45. "Those who endeavor to persuade themselves that we shall learn the dismissal of Mr. Crampton without enforcing the retirement of Mr. Dallas are calculating upon an amount of endurance totally inconsistent with the character of Englishmen."—London Times, June 5th, cited in the New York Times, June 24th.
"The dismissal of Mr. Crampton must be followed by the dismissal of Mr. Dallas."—London Post, June 13th, cited in New York Times, July 1st.

But when the news came that Crampton had been dismissed, it was found that no one was in favor of war except a few officials and some of the newspapers. The manufacturing and mercantile classes made themselves felt as being unconditionally opposed to war with the United States.1 The Liverpool Reform Association protested against it.2 Immense placards were posted all over England by order of the Manchester peace conference, protesting in the most emphatic terms against war with America.3 The country was much relieved when Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons "announced formally the determination of the cabinet 'not to terminate their present amicable relations with Mr. Dallas.'" 4 The sentiment of the Northern States was decidedly averse to war with England. It was felt that nothing should be permitted to divert the attention of the country from the serious domestic question which agitated it from one end to the other. During this whole controversy Northern people reposed entire confidence in Marcy; they thought the honor of the country safe in his hands, and were certain that they would not be forced into war with England unless it were unavoidable. 5

The party conventions had formulated their principles
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1 Letters from London, p. 47.
2 New York Times, July 1st.
3 New York Herald, June 23d.
4 Dallas to Marcy, June 17th, Letters from London, p. 50.
5 See, for example, the New York Independent, March 20th; Pike to the New York Tribune, April 28th; see also Washington correspondence Journal of Commerce, July 8th; and Dallas to Marcy, June 17th, Letters from London, p. 51.
"Probably no greener Secretary of State ever entered upon the duties of that post; yet few or none ever filled it more effectively. Several of his State papers will long be treasured and admired, and he may be said to have reflected honor even on the administration of General Pierce—an achievement to which few men would have proved equal. That he was its good genius was very generally realized. That he never approved nor countenanced the violation of the Missouri Compromise is beyond doubt."—New York Tribune, July 11th, 1857, on the occasion of Marcy's death.

and put up their candidates. The vital question, from whatever side it was approached, turned on Kansas; yet Congress had passed no act and determined on no policy in regard to the territory. Senator Crittenden proposed that a request be preferred to the President that he send Lieutenant-General Scott to Kansas—"a man," said Crittenden, "who in such a contest carries the sword in his left hand, and in his right, peace, gentle peace"—but the proposition did not meet the approval of the Democratic majority.1 Yet the Democrats could plainly see that if they expected to carry the doubtful Northern States at the presidential election, it was necessary that they should make an effort to allay the existing troubles in Kansas. Five days after the adjournment of the Republican convention, on the 24th of June, Senator Toombs introduced a bill which, in fairness to the free-State settlers, went far beyond the measure that earlier in the session had been drawn by Douglas to carry into effect the recommendations of his report and the message of the President.

The bill provided that a census should be taken in Kansas; that all white males twenty-one years old, who were bona-fide inhabitants on the day of the census, should be registered as voters; that the voters should proceed to elect on the Tuesday after the 1st day of November next delegates to a constitutional convention. Irregularities and fraud at the election, and intimidation of voters, were guarded against. There were to be five competent persons, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to carry into effect the provisions of the act. Under their direction the census was to be taken and the registration of
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1 This proposition was made at the suggestion of R. C. Winthrop, of Boston, to whom Crittenden writes: "When it was first offered it appeared to be received with general favor; but the reflections and, I suppose, the consultations of the night brought forth next day a strong opposition. The source of this was no doubt in the White House and its appurtenances."—Life of Crittenden, Coleman, vol. ii. p. 129.

voters made. The delegates were to meet on the first Monday of December, when, if deemed expedient, they should proceed to form a constitution and State government for admission into the Union as a State.

Toombs said that his object was "to preserve and protect the integrity of the ballot-box," and to have "a fair and honest expression of the opinion of the present inhabitants" of Kansas. If other means more proper and effectual could be devised by the Senate, he was willing to adopt them. He had provided for the election in November in order that there might be sufficient time to determine those who were justly entitled to vote; he chose the presidential-election day, as voters in adjoining States would be occupied at their own homes and unable to interfere with a fair expression of the popular will in Kansas. When Toombs said that he was willing to take the will of the people in a proper and just manner and abide by the result, he was sincere. An old Whig, he had the Whig love of the Union. Believing that its existence depended on the defeat of Fremont, he was willing to make concessions to Northern public sentiment for the sake of averting Republican success. In January he had delivered a lecture on slavery in Boston, where he was listened to with attention. The conservative Whigs turned out to hear a moderate exposition of Southern views from one whom they deemed a liberal-minded and whole-souled Southern gentleman.1 A month after his return from Boston, he expressed the opinion in the Senate that Kansas would probably be a free State.2 A few days before he introduced his bill, however, he saw Stringfellow at Washington, whom Stephens regarded as "our main man in Kansas." Stringfellow had come direct from the territory and had given Toombs reason to believe that there was a fair prospect of making Kansas a
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1 See extracts from the Boston Traveller and Journal, cited by the Liberator, February 1st and 15th.
2 February 28th, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 116.

slave State.1 Toombs was an able lawyer and an honest man; though harsh and intolerant in expression, he was frank in purpose.2 He undoubtedly thought that by the operation of his bill there was an even chance, but no more, of Kansas becoming a slave State.

On the 30th of June, Douglas introduced from the committee on territories what was substantially the Toombs bill. He remarked that as thirty-seven of the ninety-one days of the session of the Senate since the House was organized had been devoted to the Kansas question, he should insist that an early vote be taken on the measure proposed. An animated and able debate followed. Hale confessed that the bill was nearly unexceptionable in its terms; 3 Trumbull admitted that "a liberal spirit seems to be manifested on the part of some senators of the majority to have a fair bill," and in many of its features it met his approbation;4 Seward regarded the measure as a concession, if not a compromise; 5 and Simonton wrote to his journal that "upon its face it seems to be one of the fairest measures ever proposed to an American Congress." 6

So long as the discussion was confined to the details of the bill the Democrats had the better of the argument, and they occupied a fairer position, apparently, than the Republicans. Wilson objected that it was unfair to register as voters only those who were now residing in the territory, when the free-State men had been plundered, outraged, and driven out of the territory, and when their leaders had been
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1 Letter of A. H. Stephens to his brother, June 14th, Life of Stephens, Johnston and Browne, p. 309.
2 See Greeley's opinion, Letter from Washington to the Tribune, February 28th.
3 July 1st, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxii. p. 1520.
4 July 2d, ibid., vol. xxxiii. pp. 778, 781.
5 Ibid., p. 789; but in a letter to his wife, Seward called it "the new sham evasive Kansas bill," Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 280.
6 Letter to New York Times, July 2d; but he prefaced that remark by saying that the bill was "an ingenious fraud."

imprisoned, or had escaped to avoid arrest. To this the reply was made that Buford's men had been expelled by Colonel Sumner, but it was easily shown that at this game the free-State party had suffered more than the other.1 This objection was, however, fully obviated by an amendment offered by Douglas and agreed to.2

The territorial laws were inveighed against by the Republicans. It was understood by some senators that the bill abrogated the obnoxious laws, but as doubt remained, an amendment was adopted that did render them null and void in unequivocal terms.3 The operation of the bill would undoubtedly liberate the free-State prisoners.

Another objection was that the appointment of the commissioners rested with the President, who, Wade had no doubt, would appoint Atchison and Stringfellow or men of like principles.4 This was met by the statement of Cass, in whom every one had confidence, that he felt authorized to say that the President would impartially select the commissioners from the "different shades of party in the country," and would, moreover, appoint the best men that could be got.5

Yet if this objection, as also another that no provision was made to submit the Constitution to a vote of the people of Kansas, still remained, the Republican senators could not overlook the fact that they had been asked to amend the bill and perfect it.6 There would probably have been no difficulty in incorporating a section requiring ratification by the popular vote before the measure left the Senate. The Republican House might have proposed to name the commission in the bill, 7 and it is not certain that the Senate
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1 See Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. pp. 773, 774.
2 Ibid., p. 795.
3 See Seward's remarks, ibid., p. 791, and the Geyer amendment, p. 799.
4 Ibid., p. 756; see also Seward's remarks, p. 792.
5 Ibid., vol. xxxii. p. 1519; see the reiteration of Douglas and Pugh, vol. xxxiii. pp. 295, 866.
6 So stated by Trumbull, ibid., p. 781.
7 See New York Times, July 7th.

would have objected, for in the closing days of the session a spirit of compromise between the two Houses prevailed; or the persons the President intended to appoint might have been submitted to the leaders of both parties. It is unlikely that he would have refused to do his part towards an adjustment of the differences,1 for the manifestations of Northern sentiment were having a potent effect at the White House.

The difference between the Douglas bill introduced in March and the present measure was great. It showed the effect of Northern sentiment which had been stirred up by the assault on Sumner and the destruction of Lawrence. The enthusiasm at the Republican convention alarmed the Democrats, and the election of Fremont seemed not improbable.2 Under these influences, they were disposed to meet the Republicans more than half-way; and had the Toombs bill been introduced before the startling events occurred which had so profoundly affected the country, the conservative Republicans would have determined the course of the party, and a successful effort would probably have been made to arrive at a compromise on the basis proposed. 3 But now, if the Democrats had receded, the Republicans had advanced. Their convention had declared for congressional prohibition of slavery in the territories. While it was probable that the Toombs bill would make Kansas a free State,4 it was not certain, and the Republicans would now only accept a certainty.

When the Republicans in the senatorial debate passed from the criticism of details to the general principle, their
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1 See letter of A. H. Stephens, Johnston and Browne, p. 315.
2 "The Democrats are profoundly alarmed. Hence their change from denunciation to compromise, concerning Kansas."—Seward to his wife, July 5th, Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 282.
3 See a very careful editorial in the New York Times of March 8th.
4 See New York Tribune, July 9th; Kansas Crusade, Thayer, p. 245; Spring's Kansas, p. 210. 

position, in the light of history, was invulnerable. Seward rose to the height that the occasion demanded. He objected to the bill because "it treated the subject of slavery and freedom as if they were equal, to be submitted to a trial by the people," and he plainly intimated that no amendment would satisfy him unless it prohibited slavery in Kansas.1

Toombs and his Southern friends thought that when they offered freedom an equal chance with slavery, the measure of justice was full. Douglas and his followers pretended to think so. Seward, on the other hand, with the approval of the Republican party, maintained that the one principle was more sacred than the other and demanded especial protection from the general government. This position was fraught with weightier consequences than they dreamed. Reid, of North Carolina, saw the future more clearly than did the Republicans, and told the Senate solemnly that if a majority of the Northern people became prepared to endorse the doctrine avowed by Seward, the Union could not last an hour longer.2

The Toombs bill came to a vote the 2d of July, and was passed by 33 to 12. The nays were practically a measure of Republican strength in the Senate,3 and in that slow-changing body the time seemed indeed far distant when a majority could be secured to vote for giving freedom a better chance in the territories than slavery.

The proposition of the Republicans was to admit Kansas as a State under the Topeka Constitution. A bill providing for this had been introduced early in the session by Seward, and the Republicans came gradually to take that position.4 When the national convention was held, no opposition was made to the resolution declaring that policy. It was
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1 Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 794.
2 Idem, p. 792.
3 Dodge, a Democrat from Wisconsin, voted against the bill on account of instructions from his legislature; but Fish and Sumner were absent.
4 See letter of Pike to New York Tribune, April 24th, Pike's First Blows of the Civil War, p. 322.

consistent, therefore, that Seward should maintain that his bill was a sure and just way of settling the difficulty, for it would immediately admit Kansas as a free State. On the day after the Senate passed the Toombs measure, the Republican House gave answer by voting a bill to admit Kansas under the Topeka Constitution.1

The alternative offered by the Republicans does not deserve the commendation that may be freely awarded to their opposition to the Toombs bill. The Topeka Constitution had been adopted by a self-styled convention which had not the authority of law, was irregular, and only represented a faction.2 To admit Kansas as a State with a Constitution thus framed and a government so established would have been a monstrous precedent. It is doubtful whether the trained legislators among the Republicans would have advocated such a policy, had they not known that by no possibility could such a measure pass the Senate.3 But defective as the proposal was before Congress, it was strong before the country. It had the merit of simplicity, and a noble end in view. It must be looked upon as an election cry rather than as a serious effort by the Republicans to settle the difficulty by a legislative expedient.

The House did not consider the Toombs bill. Nor did it endeavor to compose the differences between it and the Senate, for the Dunn proposition could not be called such an attempt. One section of that bill restored the Missouri restriction, which of course could not pass the Senate; while other provisions were not satisfactory to many Republicans, although they voted for the measure. It was put through under operation of the previous question, and without any debate whatever.4
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1 The vote was 99 to 97.
2 See p. 103.
3 When the House bill was considered in the Senate, the Toombs bill was substituted for it, and passed a second time.
4 The bill is printed in the Congressional Globe, vol. xxxii. p. 1815. The vote was 89 to 77. Dunn was a Fillmore man; he acted sometimes with the Republicans, but could not always be depended upon.

The Democrats charged that the Republicans did not desire to settle the trouble; that " bleeding Kansas" was a thrilling party catchword which they had use for until November. "An angel from heaven," declared Douglas in the Senate, "could not write a bill to restore peace in Kansas that would be acceptable to the abolition Republican party previous to the presidential election." 1 It is true the lower motive was mixed with the higher. The Republicans were but men. Of these former Whigs and Democrats, politics had been the trade of many who were keenly alive to the potent effect of an expressive cry in a political campaign. They were backed by the free-State settlers of Kansas, who opposed the Toombs bill, while the pro-slavery party favored it.2 The Democrats were well satisfied with the advances they had made, and they adopted a resolution in the Senate to print twenty thousand copies of the Toombs bill, which they purposed to circulate as an electioneering document.

The majority of the House committee which had been sent to Kansas to investigate affairs made their report July 1st, and the facts elicited contributed much to the congressional discussion of this question. The committee had examined three hundred and twenty-three witnesses,3 and the evidence was annexed to the report. The statement of the majority was signed by Howard and Sherman, and is an able and fair paper. Its conclusions are indisputable, and established that—The territorial elections were carried by fraud; that the territorial legislature was an illegally
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1 July 9th, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 844. Three years later Douglas had the same notion. He said to Cutts: "It was evident during all the proceedings that the Republicans were as anxious to keep the Kansas question open as the Democrats were to close it, in view of the approaching presidential election."—Constitutional and Party Questions, p. 108.
2 See protest of Lieut.-Gov. Roberts, New York Times, July 15th; Lawrence (Kansas) correspondence of the New York Times, July 11th and 21st; Sara Robinson's Kansas, pp. 319, 323.
3 Spring's Kansas, p. 108; see p. 155.

constituted body, and its enactments were null and void; that neither Whitfield nor Reeder was legally elected delegate; that "in the present condition of the territory a fair election cannot be held without a new census, a stringent and well guarded election law, the selection of impartial judges, and the presence of United States troops at every place of election; . . . the various elections held by the people of the territory preliminary to the formation of the State government \i. e. under the Topeka Constitution] have been as regular as the disturbed condition of the territory would allow; and the Constitution passed by the convention held in pursuance of said elections embodies the will of a majority of the people."

On the 11th of July, Oliver made a minority report which has historical interest: in it was submitted the testimony telling the story of the Pottawatomie massacre by John Brown and his party. In the speech which Oliver made elucidating his report, he stated that, although the committee heard of these assassinations while on the Missouri border, Howard and Sherman refused to take evidence concerning them, on the ground that under the resolution of the House the committee had no power to examine into transactions which had taken place since their appointment.1

However, the report of Oliver, the testimony submitted, and the explanation of it in his speech, put the matter before the country, and it is amazing that the horrible story did not do appreciable injury to the cause of the free-State party by bringing about a reaction in public sentiment at the North. The outrages on the Northern settlers were a never-failing argument of Republican journals and speakers. Their record showed that in a year and a half seven free-State men had been killed by the border ruffians, 2 while on the Pottawatomie in a single night five pro-slavery men had been deliberately and foully murdered. The evidence was
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1 See amplification of this statement, and colloquy between Oliver and Sherman, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 1012; also Spring's Kansas, p. 145.
2 New York Tribune, June 14th.

brought before Congress and the country in a shape that told a clear and convincing tale; it is the material that historians and biographers now mainly use when they construct the story. Yet the Democratic press, senators, and representatives, excepting Oliver, made almost no use of it. Their accounts are meagre, their allusions fragmentary and rare. The first news of the massacre was published equally by journals of both parties; but soon there appeared a free-State version which admitted the killing, but averred that a pro-slavery gang was caught in the act of hanging a free-State settler, and, in effecting the rescue, his friends shot five of their enemies. This explanation was widely circulated by the Republican journals and believed by their readers; but it was given an emphatic denial by Oliver in his report and speech; and although the report was published by the Democratic newspapers, it was not made the subject of earnest comment, nor was attention called to the speech.1
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1 In carefully looking over the debates on Kansas, I found, with the exception of the speech of Oliver, made July 31st, but one reference to the massacre on the Pottawatomie, that of Toombs, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 869; but he was apparently prevented from enlarging upon it by the sharp inquiry of Fessenden: "Have you any proof of it?"
   I have examined or have had examined the files of the New York Journal of Commerce, the New York Herald, the Philadelphia Pennsylvanian (Forney's paper), the Washington Union, and the Cleveland Plain Dealer, and I am struck with the fact that substantially no use was made of this occurrence, which offered a good occasion for the to quoque argument. All of these were Democratic journals, with the exception of the New York Herald, which occupied a peculiar position. It believed that Kansas ought to be a slave State, and yet it supported Fremont. For its reason for supporting Fremont, see extract from it in the Liberator of August 15th. There is not an editorial comment in the Herald. The Journal of Commerce had a short editorial mention when it published the testimony (June 19th). By the Pennsylvanian, Brown is not referred to, the massacre is mentioned simply as a report, Oliver is spoken of twice, but no allusion is made to his speech. The Cleveland Plain Dealer published part of the testimony without comment. The Republican papers generally did not publish the Oliver report, says the Journal of Commerce, July 23d.
   G. W. Brown, the editor of the Herald of Freedom, of Lawrence, in 1856, writes in 1879-80: "The opposition press, both North and South, took up the damning tale ... of that midnight butchery on the Pottawatomie. .. . Whole columns of leaders from week to week, with startling head-lines, liberally distributed capitals, and frightful exclamation points, filled all the newspapers." He further states that he believes had it not been for that massacre Fremont would have been elected. See Reminiscences of Old John Brown, p. 26. If G. W. Brown were writing from recollection, he probably had in mind the six border-ruffian papers, published in Kansas and on the Missouri border. The Missouri Republican, published in St. Louis, was also full of the matter; but it had a correspondent who commanded a border-ruffian company in Kansas, Captain Pate. The Burlington (Iowa) Gazette had a fierce editorial on the subject, June 25th. But the papers I have previously named are fairly representative of the tone of the Eastern Democratic press. That the Pottawatomie massacre had a marked influence on Kansas affairs in the summer of 1856 there is abundant reason to believe (see p. 165); but I have not been able to discover that it had any influence detrimental to the Republicans in the presidential canvass.

Contrasting this treatment with the stirring articles in the Republican papers, suggested by the Howard report, one is led to the conviction that the Democrats failed to make good use of their opportunities; for they continued to rehearse their threadbare charges against the emigrant-aid companies and the New England men who went out bearing Sharpe's rifles. The truth is that the Pottawatomie massacre was so at variance with the whole course and policy of the free-State party in Kansas up to that time that its horrible details were not credited in the East. The Kansas outrages were regarded as the stock-in-trade of the Republicans, and, until this affair took place, they were anxious to have full light cast on occurrences in the territory. The testimony of impartial observers was that the pro-slavery men were lawless and aggressive, and the free-State settlers submissive, industrious, and anxious for liberty and order.
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1 See letter from Lawrence, Kansas, July 1st, of a conservative Whig who went there with the idea that the stories of Kansas outrages were got up for political effect. Boston Bee, cited by the Liberator, July 18th.
   T. H. Gladstone who, according to Olmsted, was a very impartial observer, writes: "Whatever testimony I gathered in Kansas was, for the most part, obtained from pro-slavery men." "Among all the scenes of violence I witnessed, it is remarkable that the offending parties were invariably on the pro-slavery side."—The Englishman in Kansas, T. H. Gladstone, pp. 12, 64. The whole book is an elaboration of these two statements.
   See also extract from letter of Dr. Smith, a conservative and ex-mayor of Boston, cited by Wilson, July 9th, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 856; also a private letter quoted ibid. ,p. 853. When Seward (June 11th), Wilson (July 2d, 9th), and Wade (July 9th) described and denounced in emphatic terms the Kansas outrages, it is surprising that the Democrats did not retort with the story of the Pottawatomie massacre. See Congressional Globe, vol. xxxii. p. 1394; vol. xxxiii. pp. 755, 773, 854.  

Their previous good character prevented the country from believing that the killing done in their name by one of their number was an unprovoked massacre.1

Distrust in the border-ruffian accounts now caused the line of Democratic argument to be drawn differently from what might have been supposed. They maintained that the stories of the Kansas outrages were exaggerated;2 that many of them were manufactured in the Republican newspaper offices ;3 that at election riots in Eastern cities more men were killed in twelve months than in the same length of time in Kansas.4 The stately Democratic organ of New York city announced with satisfaction that "Kansas outrages are becoming scarce."' Everywhere may be observed Democratic anxiety to keep Kansas affairs out of sight, while the Republican journals and speakers insist all the more strongly on making them a subject of continual agitation.
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1 See, for example, speech of Barclay, a Democrat, July 1st, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxii. p. 1523.
2 Stephens, June 28th, ibid., vol. xxxiii. pp. 725, 727; Brown, ibid., vol. xxxii. p. 1387; Weller, ibid., vol. xxxiii. p. 842; Pugh, ibid., p. 867.
3 See the Daily Pennsylvanian,, June 18th and 23d, July 1st; also Washington Union.
4 Stephens, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 725; Geyer, ibid., p. 787; Albany Argus, July 1st.
5 Journal of Commerce, June 24th.

The committee on elections of the House had reported against the admission of Whitfield as a delegate and in favor of that of Reeder; but the House took a different view. It decided that neither was entitled to the seat, the vote against Whitfield standing 110 to 92, and against Reeder 113 to 88.

The Republicans had on all occasions criticised the executive administration of Kansas affairs. In the closing days of the session this took shape by the House attaching to two appropriation bills riders which dictated to the President a limited policy in the interest of the free State settlers of Kansas. After a committee of conference the House receded from its amendments to one of the bills, but on the army appropriation it made a stubborn fight. This amendment had been offered by John Sherman, and virtually prohibited the employment of United States soldiers by the President to enforce the laws of the Kansas territorial legislature. The Senate struck it out. Three conferences failed to bring the two Houses to any agreement. On the 18th of August, while the representatives were considering the matter, the hour arrived which had, by joint resolution the preceding month, been fixed upon as the time of adjournment, and the speaker declared the House adjourned without day. The army appropriation bill had thus failed to become a law. Despite the excitement attendant upon this disagreement on a question that already shook the country from side to side, the closing scenes in the Senate and House were orderly and dignified. Banks had made an efficient speaker. By his prompt decisions and impartial bearing, serious difficulties were tided over.

The President immediately called an extraordinary session of Congress, and the two Houses convened August 21st. The congressional game of battledore and shuttlecock between the House and the Senate went on for a while; but August 30th the House receded from its position, and passed the army appropriation bill without the Kansas amendment by a vote of 101 to 98. The result was not reached by some of the Republicans backing down, for all the supporters of Fremont voted to adhere, but the Buchanan and Fillmore men acting together were sufficient to control the House.1 Although this House has for convenience been spoken of as Republican, since it chose Banks as speaker and adopted some Republican measures, the majority was always uncertain.2 Indeed, it was only because the Democrats and Americans did not act unitedly, or were more irregular in their attendance, that the Republicans were able to carry any points whatever. 3

With the adjournment of Congress the contest was transferred to the country,4 and the issue was clearly marked. Fremont represented the people who emphatically condemned the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; who demanded that Congress should prohibit slavery in all the territories, and that Kansas should be admitted as a free State. Buchanan accepted unreservedly the Cincinnati platform, and in his letter he elaborated one resolution sufficiently to show to any doubting ones at the South that he was sound on the policy inaugurated by the Kansas-Nebraska act. At the same time, he was well aware that to win the doubtful Northern States some issue other than the Douglas and Pierce Kansas policy must be thrust forward into the canvass. His letter gave the key-note of the Northern campaign, and was adroitly worded so as to rouse the enthusiasm of the moderate Democrats who had been his especial support in the convention, and also to attract conservative
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1 All Fillmore men present but Dunn voted with the Democrats.
2 "This House of Representatives is like the moon. It shines brightest and smoothest at a distance. More than half the majority are Americans engaged in demoralizing the Congress and the country."—Seward to Weed, April 21st; see also letter to his wife, July 5th, Life of Seward, vol. ii. pp. 270, 282.
3 See article in New York Tribune, September 3d. On the irregularity of the attendance of Southern men, see letters of A. H. Stephens, Johnston and Browne, p. 315.
4 The extraordinary session of Congress came to an end August 30th.

Whigs who could not fully approve the formal declarations of any one of the parties. Taking for a text an allusion in the platform, he averred that the Democratic party was strictly national; he hoped that its mission was to overthrow all sectional parties; he made reference to the warning of the Father of his country against forming parties on geographical lines, and maintained that the Democrats were devoted to the cause of the Constitution and the Union.1

In taking this ground, Buchanan operated on a powerful sentiment. It could not be denied that not only were the Republicans unable to carry a slave State, but that south of Mason and Dixon's line and the Ohio River their ticket would not practically receive a vote. It had long been the custom in nominating candidates for President and Vice-President to take one from the North and the other from the South. While there had been exceptions to this rule, they had occurred in a condition of country very different from the present.2 Fremont, born in Savannah, and educated in Charleston, South Carolina, was a citizen of California, and Dayton was from New Jersey. The strength of Buchanan's dignified allusion lay in the fact that the sectional character of Republican principles forced upon them, by the very nature of the case, sectional candidates. The free States had 176 electoral votes, while the slave States had but 120, and on account of the enthusiasm following the Republican convention it was not deemed improbable
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1 The letter may be found in the Campaign Life of Buchanan, by Horton, p. 414. It is dated June 16th. Only the first portion of the letter is given by Curtis. While the letter was written before the Republican Convention, there was no question whatever that both the candidates nominated would be from the North. In a public letter, July 2d, to the Tammany Society, of New York city, he made his meaning specific, and spoke of the National Democratic party "rallying to defend the Constitution and the Union against the sectional party who would outlaw fifteen of our sister States from the confederacy."
2 In 1828, Adams and Rush, who made one ticket, were from the North, and Jackson and Calhoun, who made the other, were from the South.

at the South that Fremont might carry every non-slaveholding State.1 The idea caused great irritation. This feeling was immediately typified in the action of the citizens of a Virginia county, who banished from their midst a resident because he had been a delegate to the Philadelphia convention. 2

In a speech at Albany, Fillmore gave plain expression to the sentiment which Buchanan, in his carefully prepared formal paper, had only hinted at. "We see," Fillmore said, "a political party presenting candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency selected for the first time from the free States alone, with the avowed purpose of electing these candidates by suffrages of one part of the Union only to rule over the whole United States. Can it be possible that those who are engaged in such a measure can have seriously reflected upon the consequences which must inevitably follow in case of success? Can they have the madness or folly to believe that our Southern brethren would submit to be governed by such a chief magistrate? . . . I speak warmly on this subject, for I feel that we are in danger. . . . We are treading upon the brink of a volcano that is liable at any moment to burst forth and overwhelm the nation." 3

The Southerners did not delay to point Buchanan's allusion and Fillmore's statements. "The election of Fremont," wrote Senator Toombs," would be the end of the Union, and ought to be. The object of Fremont's friends is the conquest of the South. I am content that they shall own us
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1 See in Georgia Telegraph a letter from New York, July 10th, cited by New York Tribune.
2 See letter of Underwood of July 7th to New York Evening Post, cited by the Liberator, August 15th.
3 This speech was made June 27th. It is printed in the New York Tribune, July 2d. The important part of it may be found in the Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 716, where is also printed Fillmore's letter accepting the American party nomination.

when they conquer us, but not before."1 Governor Wise, who had supported Buchanan at Cincinnati, wrote: Fremont's "election would bring about a dissolution of the American confederacy of States, inevitably."3 The Richmond Enquirer declared that "the election of Fremont would be certain and immediate disunion."3 Senator Slidell, a trusted friend of Buchanan, wrote: "I do not hesitate to declare that if Fremont be elected, the Union cannot and ought not to be preserved."4 Senator Mason averred that in the event of Republican success " but one course remains for the South—immediate, absolute, eternal separation." 5 Quotations of like tenor from Southern public men and newspapers may be multiplied; they came for the most part from the supporters of Buchanan. 6 John Minor Botts, who was on the Fillmore electoral ticket in Virginia, took occasion to say that if Fremont were elected the South would not break up the Union; and the Richmond Enquirer
___________________________
1 To a Virginia friend, dated Washington, July 8th, printed in the New York Tribune of August 13th.
2 Richmond, September 6th, to a friend in Pennsylvania, published by the Pennsylvanian. It must be remembered that the Pennsylvanian was Forney's paper, and that he was the trusted friend of Buchanan.
3 August 29th.
4 To the Louisiana Central Committee, New York Evening Post, September 11th.
5 September 29th, letter declining to be present at the Brooks dinner, New York Times, October 14th.
6 See Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. pp. 775, 792, 1206; Georgia Constitutionalist, September 22d; citations in National Intelligencer, September 30th, Liberator, October 10th, and Evening Post, October 6th and 7th. The South Carolina utterances were radical. Keitt at Lynchburg, Evening Post, September 22d; Charleston Mercury, cited by the Post, September 29th; Boyce and Orr, ibid., October 17th; Brooks and Butler, the Liberator, October 24th. "The Southern press, of every political shade of opinion, with hardly an exception, threatens disunion in the event of defeat in the present contest for the presidency."—New York Times, August 29th. The New Orleans Picayune and Daily Bee, however, repudiated the disunion talk, and so did Senators Houston, Bell, and Clayton. See New York Times, Sept 19th.

demanded that he should at once quit Virginia, advising him not to "wait for honors of ostracism nor provoke the disgrace of lynching."1

The feeling of many Northern Whigs found its aptest expression in a letter of Rufus Choate. Of this great lawyer we have a confidential opinion from a true friend, and one who was often pitted against him in forensic contest. Richard H. Dana wrote: Choate "has shown himself the brilliant, rich, philosophical orator, the scholar, and the kindly, adroit, and interesting man. He has not commanded respect as a man of deep convictions, earnest purpose, and reliable judgment." 2 Although this characterization was written three years previous to 1856, it shows that Choate from his very nature could have little sympathy with the aggressive anti-slavery movement; but, before he declared himself for Buchanan, he meditated long and earnestly, and weighed the arguments of all sides with care. Had he been less conscientious, he would naturally have drifted into the support of Fillmore, as did his intimate friends Everett and Hillard and as did Winthrop, whose manner of envisaging a subject was much the same.3 But as the contest was between Fremont and Buchanan, it seemed to Choate that the patriot must decide between the two. Having decided, "silence," said he, " in such a sad state of things as environs us now is profoundly ignominious."4 There were more friends and pleasanter associations among the Republicans, but duty seemed to point the other way, and his declaration for Buchanan was disinterested and sincere. He made for the Democrats a beautiful and forcible argument; and an element of power in the campaign was the decision to support Buchanan of men whom he fitly represented.
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1 September 22d.
2 This was written in 1853, Life of R. H. Dana, by C. F. Adams, vol. L p. 246.
3 George Ticknor was also for Fillmore, Life and Letters, vol. ii. p
4 Reminiscences of Rufus Choate, Parker, p. 292.

"The first duty of Whigs," wrote Choate to the Maine Whig State Central Committee," is to unite with some organization of our countrymen to defeat and dissolve the new geographical party, calling itself Republican. . . . The question for each and every one of us is . . . by what vote can I do most to prevent the madness of the times from working its maddest act—the very ecstasy of its madness— the permanent formation and the actual present triumph of a party which knows one half of America only to hate and dread it; from whose unconsecrated and revolutionary banner fifteen stars are erased or have fallen; in whose national anthem the old and endeared airs of the Eutaw Springs and the King's Mountain and Yorktown, and those later of New Orleans and Buena Vista and Chapultepec, breathe no more. . . . The triumph of such a party puts the Union in danger. .. . And yet some men would have us go on laughing and singing at a present peril, the mere apprehension of which, as a distant and bare possibility, could sadden the heart of the Father of his country, and dictate the grave and grand warning of the Farewell Address." If the Republican party, Choate continued, "accomplishes its objects and gives the government to the North, I turn my eyes from the consequences. To the fifteen States of the South that government will appear an alien government. It will appear worse. It will appear a hostile government. It will represent to their eye a vast region of States organized upon anti-slavery, flushed by triumph, cheered onward by the voices of the pulpit, tribune, and press; its mission to inaugurate freedom and put down the oligarchy; its constitution the glittering and sounding generalities of natural right which make up the Declaration of Independence. . . . Practically the contest, in my judgment, is between Mr. Buchanan and Colonel Fremont. In these circumstances, I vote for Mr. Buchanan."1
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1 The whole letter is well worth reading. It is printed in Brown's Life of Choate, p. 321.

In this letter there was powerful reasoning. While Choate maintained that Fremont's election was certain danger, the success of Buchanan would by no means extinguish the hope of having Kansas a free State. If there were a just administration of affairs in the territory, which there was good reason to expect from Buchanan, and if it were delivered " over to the natural law of peaceful and spontaneous immigration," when the proper time came it would "choose freedom for itself," and it would "have forever what it chooses." It is indeed impossible to assign to Choate's letter a weighty influence, for he was not widely known out of New England and New York, States which went overwhelmingly for Fremont; yet the considerations urged were those that in various shapes determined the votes of enough Northern men to elect Buchanan. For it was a transition period in politics, and, since the two great parties had clearly defined their position, there were many citizens still uncertain which way to go.1 It was to these floating voters, who were Americans or Whigs and devoted to the Union, that arguments like that of Choate appealed with irresistible force.2

But on those who were already Republicans the reasoning had no effect whatever, for, from their point of view, the assumption that Fremont's election would cause disunion was unwarranted. They did not believe that the Southern threats were sincere. Their opinion was represented by the remark of Senator Wilson. "Threats have been thrown out," said he, "that if the 'Black Republicans' triumph in 1856, the Union will be dissolved. . . . Sir, you cannot kick out of the Union the men who utter these impotent threats.'"3 The whole tone of the Republican
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1 See on this point remarks of Seward at Auburn, October 21st, Works, vol. iv. p. 278.
2 The letter of Choate drew out many replies; perhaps the most celebrated was that of George W. Curtis, published in the New York Times, September 11th.
3 In the Senate, April 14th, cited by Von Hoist.

canvass, the speeches on the stump, the able discussion of the situation by the press, show that these menaces were regarded as Southern gasconade. The Fremont newspapers made haste to copy the most violent speeches and articles, for it was their opinion that a wide circulation of these threats would help their cause.1

After-events demonstrated that, in this respect, Fillmore and Choate understood the situation better. The private and confidential correspondence of the time shows that these expressions were not bluster. "Should Fremont be elected," wrote Buchanan, August 27th, to a friend in Boston, " he must receive 149 Northern electoral votes at the least, and the outlawry proclaimed by the Republican convention at Philadelphia against fifteen Southern States will be ratified by the people of the North. The consequences will be immediate and inevitable."2 Two weeks later he wrote confidentially to Professor Read: "I am in the daily receipt of letters from the South which are truly alarming, and these from gentlemen who formerly opposed both nullification and disunion. They say explicitly that the election of Fremont involves the dissolution of the Union, and this immediately."' In a private letter, Governor Wise said: "The Southern States are going strong and unanimous. . . . They will not submit to a sectional election of a Free-Soiler or Black Republican. ... If Fremont is elected . . . this Union will not last one year from November next. . . . The country was never in such danger."4 "It is quite sensibly felt by all," wrote ex-President Tyler," that the success of the Black Republicans would be the knell of the Union." 5
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1 There is hardly a number of the New York Times or Tribune that does not support this statement. Where the matter is specifically discussed, see for example New York Times, September 26th, October 3d, and October 14th; New York Tribune, August 13th. See also the opinion of the Springfield Republican, Life of Bowles, Merriam, vol. i. p. 155.
2 Curtis, vol. ii. p. 180.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
4 August 15th, Letters and Times of the Tylers, vol. ii. p. 531. 5 July 21st, ibid., p. 532. 

It was fortunate, indeed, that the Republicans could not lift the veil and peer into the future. Had that power been given them, their party would only have developed slowly and through painful effort, for, while the sentiment of freedom was now strong at the North, that of the Union was stronger. The potent reason of the grand Republican expansion of 1856 was that the statesmen and politicians had marked out a way in which the moral and intelligent feeling of the country could assert itself without bating a jot of love for the Union or reverence for the Constitution.

Never in our history, and probably never in the history of the world, had a more pure, more disinterested, and more intelligent body of men banded together for a noble political object than those who now enrolled themselves under the Republican banner. The clergymen, the professors in the colleges, the men devoted to literature and science, the teachers in the schools, were for the most part Republicans. The zeal of many preachers broke out in the pulpit, and sermons were frequently delivered on the evils of slavery, the wrong of extending it, and the noble struggle freedom was making on the plains of Kansas. The Northern people of 1856 were a church-going people, and it must be reckoned an element of weight in the campaign that so large a proportion of the clergy exerted their influence directly or indirectly in favor of Fremont. On the Sunday before election, most of the ministers of New England preached and prayed from their pulpits against the success of Buchanan.1 From the partisans of Buchanan and Fillmore came constant deprecation that ministers should so forget their holy calling as to introduce politics into the pulpit.2
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1 Letter of Buchanan to Joshua Bates of London, November 6th, Life of Buchanan, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 183. Choate would not have found this letter pleasant reading. Buchanan calls New England "that land of isms," and Boston "a sad place."
2 See the New York Tribune, July 12th, 19th, August 13th, 16th, October 11th; New York Herald, September 13th, and the file of the Independent, passim; also New York Times, September 30th.

In number, influence, and circulation, the religious press was overwhelmingly on the side of the party opposed to slavery-extension.1 The religious journal was generally published to reach the bulk of its readers on Saturday, that the subjects it discussed might be read and pondered in the quiet hours of the Sabbath. Its arguments received, therefore, the most careful attention, and the work of making voters for Fremont continued even on the day when the secular newspapers did not appear. Some of the expressions call to mind the puritanical fervor of an earlier time. The Independent, the ablest religious journal of the day, recognized in the nomination of Fremont "the good hand of God;" and as election day drew near it said: "Fellow Christians! Remember it is for Christ, for the nation, and for the world that you vote at this election! Vote as you pray! Pray as you vote!" 2

Professors Silliman of Yale and Felton of Harvard had spoken out for Fremont in a manner which betokened that they represented the preponderant opinion of their college faculties; and the feeling in these older colleges was a type of that prevailing in most of the institutions of learning at the North.3

Impressed by the importance of the issue, literary men forsook their quiet retreats to help the cause they deemed sacred. Emerson addressed a town meeting; Longfellow took part in a political gathering; Bryant entered into the canvass with ardor, and advocated the election of Fremont by speech as well as by pen; and George William Curtis frequently spoke to his fellow-citizens urging them to vote for the Republican candidates.4 Washington Irving declared
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1 See New York Herald, September 13th and 15th; the Independent, September 18th.
2 June 26th and October 16th.
3 See New York Tribune, July 19th; Life of Silliman, Fisher, vol. ii. p. 251.
4 New York Tribune, July 19th; also Life of Bryant, Godwin, vol. ii p. 91.

his purpose of voting for Fremont.1 Longfellow wrote to Sumner that one reason why he did not want to go to Europe was on account of losing his vote in the autumn. "I have great respect for that now," he continued, "though I never cared about it before."2 He notes in his journal that all the guests with whom he dined one day at Prescott's were Fremont men.3 N. P. Willis, one of the best-known litterateurs of his day, relates how he drove five miles one night to hear Curtis deliver a stump-speech. He at first thought the author of the Howadji "too handsome and well-dressed" for a political orator, but, as he listened, his mistake was apparent. He heard a logical and rational address, and now and then the speaker burst "into the full tide of eloquence unrestrained." Willis declared that although fifty years old he should this year cast his " virgin vote," and it would be for Fremont. 4 Harriet Beecher Stowe published another anti-slavery novel, which, though far inferior to her masterpiece, found many readers.5 Whittier in passionate verse begged votes for Fremont.

The history of this phase of the campaign would not be complete without extended reference to the oration of George William Curtis, delivered to the students of the Wesleyan University at Middletown, Connecticut, on the subject," The Duty of the American Scholar to Politics and the Times."6

"I would gladly speak to you," said he, "of the charms of pure scholarship; of the dignity and worth of the scholar; of the abstract relation of the scholar to the State. . . . But
____________
1 Philadelphia Times, cited by the New York Times, November 1st.
2 June 24th, Life of Longfellow, S. Longfellow, vol. ii. p. 282.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Private letter, published in the New York Evening Post, cited by New York Times, October 8th.
5 Dred, A Tale of the Dismal Swamp. The publishers stated that sixty thousand copies were sold in twelve days, New York Tribune, October 18th; see also the Liberator, October 3d.
6 Delivered August 6th.

would you have counted him a friend of Greece who quietly discussed the abstract nature of patriotism on that Greek summer day through whose hopeless and immortal hours Leonidas and his three hundred stood at Thermopylae for liberty?" And the American scholar of to-day must know "that freedom always has its Thermopylae, and that his Thermopylae is called Kansas. . . . Because we are scholars, shall we cease to be citizens?" In the Senate, a "scholar pleads the cause dear to every gentleman in history, and a bully strikes him down. In a republic of freemen, this scholar speaks for freedom, and his blood stains the Senate floor. There it will blush through all our history. That damned spot will never out from memory, from tradition, or from noble hearts.... Of what use are your books? Of what use is your scholarship? Without freedom of thought, there is no civilization or human progress; and without freedom of speech, liberty of thought is a mockery." The orator continued: "There is a constant tendency in material prosperity, when it is the prosperity of a class and not of the mass, to relax the severity of principle;" but every state has a class "which by its very character is dedicated to eternal and not to temporary interests; whose members are priests of the mind, not of the body, and who are necessarily the conservative party of intellectual and moral freedom. . . . The scholar is the representative of thought among men, and his duty to society is the effort to introduce thought and the sense of justice into human affairs. He was not made a scholar to satisfy the newspapers or the parish beadles, but to serve God and man. While other men pursue what is expedient, and watch with alarm the flickering of the funds, he is to pursue the truth and watch the eternal law of justice." The duty of the American scholar "in this crisis of our national affairs" is to fight the battle of liberty by resisting the extension of slavery. "The advocacy of the area of its extension is not a whim of the slave power, but is based upon the absolute necessities of the system." But now "twenty millions of a moral people, politically dedicated to Liberty, are asking themselves whether their government shall be administered solely in the interest of three hundred and fifty thousand slave-holders. . . . Young scholars, young Americans, young men, we are all called upon to do a great duty. Nobody is released from it. It is a work to be done by hard strokes and everywhere. I see a rising enthusiasm, but enthusiasm is not an election; and I hear cheers from the heart, but cheers are not voters. Every man must labor with his neighbor—in the street, at the plough, at the bench, early and late, at home and abroad. Generally, we are concerned in elections with the measures of government. This time it is with the essential principle of government itself."

This finished oration suffers much by detached quotation. Read as a whole, one sees the argument unfolding, and is led on step by step to the point where the scholar is made to see that he would be recreant to his high calling if he did not vote and work for Fremont. It had a wide circulation,1 and to college men, and men who read much, it spoke with mighty accents. The sincere and thoughtful orator had an earnest purpose; he looked upon politics from a lofty plane. Certainly no candidate for President has ever had his election urged in words that breathe forth purer aspirations, and more sublime and cogent reasons have never been given for political work. The voter who was influenced by that argument must have felt that he had been borne into a political atmosphere which was freed from foul exhalations.

To the conservative, practical man of 1856, the formal, measured words of James Buchanan must have seemed the essence of practical wisdom; the ardent phrases of Curtis, while fit perhaps for professors and students, quite inadequate as a guide of political action. Yet only a few years were needed to show that the inferences drawn by Buchanan
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1 It was published in the New York Weekly Tribune of August 16th. The circulation of the paper that day was 173,000. The oration was afterwards published in pamphlet form by a New York house.

became for him a stumbling-block and a foolishness. A few years more demonstrated that the speculative truth proclaimed by Curtis was the highest practical wisdom.

It was appreciated that the first voters and the young men would be an important element on the Republican side in the campaign. Sumner, who, in the words of Seward, was "contending with death in the mountains of Pennsylvania," 1 wrote: "It is the young who give a spontaneous welcome to Truth when she first appears as an unattended stranger. . . . The young men of Massachusetts act under natural impulses when they step forward as the body-guard of the Republican party. When the great discoverer Harvey first announced the circulation of the blood, he was astonished to find that no person upwards of forty received this important truth. It was the young only who embraced it." 2

Fillmore received an accession of strength by the endorsement of the national Whig convention held at Baltimore September 17th. It was remembered that the day was the anniversary of Washington's Farewell Address. One of the resolutions alluded to his warning against geographical parties; another condemned the Democrats equally with the Republicans. The position of the Fillmoreans may be described as oscillating between the other two parties. In the same speech in which Fillmore had expressed his alarm at the sectional character of the Republican party, he had severely condemned the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Although he was first nominated by the Americans, the peculiar tenets of that organization made no figure in the canvass.3 Side by side with the political canvass in the States went on the contest in Kansas. It had now degenerated into a
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1 Letter of Seward to his wife, August 17th, Life, vol. ii. p. 287.  
2 Letter from Cresson, Pa., August 5th, New York Weekly Tribune, August 30th.
3 See Seward's speech at Auburn, October 21st, Works, vol. iv. p. 279.

guerrilla warfare. The adventurous spirits among the free-State men had been worked up to violence by the destruction of Lawrence, and the pro-slavery party were inflamed by the massacre on the Pottawatomie. Missouri and Kansas border ruffians robbed, plundered, and murdered their antagonists. A new route from the North by the way of Iowa and Nebraska had been opened by which parties of Northern adventurers came into the territory. In their violent deeds these imitated the ruffians. Occasionally the factions would meet, and a skirmish, dignified in Kansas history with the name of a battle, would result. Free-State marauders robbed frugal pro-slavery residents, and the border ruffians pillaged the industrious free-State settlers. The historian of Kansas confesses it difficult to determine "which faction surpassed the other in misdeeds."1 In the populous districts civil war raged. Women and children fled from the territory. Men slept on their arms. The country was given over to highway robbery and rapine; "the smoke of burning dwellings darkened the atmosphere." 2 The Kansas of 1856 " weltered in havoc and anarchy." 3 Yet the loss of life was not so great as might be supposed. Competent authority, after systematic and thorough investigation, estimated the loss of life from November 1st, 1855, to December 1st, 1856, at about two hundred. The destruction of property in the same period was considered to be not less than two million dollars, of which one-half was directly sustained by the bona-fide settlers of Kansas.4

Reeder was advocating free Kansas in the Eastern States; Robinson was in prison. The direction of the free-State cause fell to James H. Lane, an erratic person, a man without character, who sought by any means political advancement. John Brown also figures as a leader in this guerrilla
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1 Spring, p. 176.
3 Geary's farewell address.
2 Spring, p. 190.
4 Report of commissioners of Kansas territory, July, 1857. Reports of Committees, 2d Session 36th Congress, vol. iii. part i. p. 92.

warfare. Urged on by a gloomy fanaticism, he thought there was no way of destroying slavery except by killing slave-holders. Although the name of Lane became a terror to the pro-slavery party, and John Brown was truly called "the old terrifier," it does not appear that their misdirected energy accomplished aught towards making Kansas free territory. Although their martial operations were directed with skill and bravery, they were in the end borne down by superior numbers with the result of "a total military collapse of the free-State cause."1

If we confine our attention simply to the local transactions in the territory, it cannot be maintained that any advantage accrued to freedom in Kansas from the time of the destruction of Lawrence to September 9th, the day of the arrival at Fort Leavenworth of Governor Geary, who took the place of Shannon. The check given to Northern emigration by the unsettled state of affairs was but a superficial gain for the pro-slavery party, for the tale of "bleeding Kansas" was being told in eloquent accents and with profound results at every Republican meeting east of the Missouri river.

Although Lane and Brown were this summer the prominent representatives of the free-State cause, yet the Northern settlers were not united in approving of their predatory and guerrilla warfare. While it is true that one of the Kansas factions did violent deeds in the name of law and order, and the other committed crimes in the name of liberty, it is also true that, in a balancing of acts and character, the free-State adherents of 1856 stand immeasurably superior to the pro-slavery partisans in everything that goes to make up industrious, law-abiding, and intelligent citizens. The free-State men lost by far the larger amount of property, and the destruction caused by the pro-slavery faction was much the greater. 2
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1 Spring, p. 190.
2 The destruction of property owned by pro-slavery men from November 1st, 1855, to December 1st, 1856, was $77,198.99; that owned by free-State men, $335,779.04. Property taken or destroyed by pro-slavery men, $318,718.63; that by free-State men, $94,529.40. Awards made by Kansas Territory Commissioners, 1859, Reports of Committees, 2d Session 36th Congress, vol. iii. part i. p. 90. My authorities for this brief sketch of Kansas history during the summer of 1856 are Spring's Kansas; Geary and Kansas, by Gihon; Sara Robinson's Kansas; The Englishman in Kansas, Gladstone; Publications of the Kansas Historical Society; Conquest of Kansas, Phillips; Six Months in Kansas; Letter from Lawrence, September 7th, to the New York Times; Life of John Brown, Sanborn; Life of John Brown, Redpath.

Although the influence upon the national political campaign exerted by the conflict in Kansas can hardly be overestimated, the details of the conflict are comparatively insignificant and need not detain us. But the story of Kansas, which in our day Professor Spring has told impartially and without "a blur of theory," is not the story that the truth-seeking voter of 1856 heard at Republican meetings and read in Republican newspapers. The correspondents of the New York Tribune and New York Times furnished, for the most part, the facts on which a judgment was based. While they were diligent, able, and interesting newspaper writers, they were strong partisans, ready to believe the most atrocious outrages related of the border ruffians, and apt to suppress facts that told against their own party.1

The Republican newspapers were full of Kansas news, arranged under startling head-lines and commented upon in emphatic editorials. That their efforts in forming public sentiment were effective is evident when the truth-seeking Emerson could publicly declare: "There is this peculiarity
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1 " That the excitement in the Eastern and Southern States in 1856 was instigated and kept up by garbled and exaggerated accounts of Kansas affairs, published in the Eastern and Southern papers, is true, most true; but the half of what was done by either party was never chronicled!"—Report of Commissioners of Kansas Territory. See also an impartial article in the New York Times, September 9th; also Reminiscences of John Brown, G. W. Brown, p. 48.

about the case of Kansas, that all the right is on one side."1 The Democratic journals and speakers had little to say about the marauding operations of free-State adventurers. There are, indeed, occasional references to the Northern army under the lead of "the notorious Jim Lane;" but in the main, when forced to meet the stories of Kansas outrages, they have, as Emerson said, " but one word in reply—namely, that it is all exaggeration, 'tis an abolition lie."'

Meetings for the relief of Kansas were continually held. Reeder had everywhere crowded audiences when he discoursed on the theme nearest his heart. A convention of Kansas aid committees assembled at Buffalo to discuss the past work and arrange for future operations. Since it was the unanimous opinion that the efforts for raising men and money should be redoubled, Gerrit Smith immediately subscribed fifteen hundred dollars per month during the war.3 The Tribune asked for a special subscription from their readers for the aid of freedom in Kansas, and from time to time published the names of the donors.4 At a Kansas relief meeting held in Detroit, Zachariah Chandler, a candidate for United States Senator from Michigan, put down his name for ten thousand dollars.5 Emerson, with quaint sincerity, said that, in order "to give largely, lavishly," to the Kansas people, "We must learn to do with less, live in a smaller tenement, sell our apple-trees, our acres, our pleasant homes. I know people who are making haste to reduce their expenses and pay their debts, not with a view to new accumulations, but in preparation to save and earn for the benefit of the Kansas emigrants."6 Indeed, one of the
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1 Remarks at a Kansas relief meeting in Cambridge, September 10th, the Liberator, September 19th; Miscellanies, p. 241.
2 Ibid.
3 Tribune, July 19th. He had previously given $10,000 to the cause, Life of Smith, Frothingham, p. 233.
4 July 24th. The amount subscribed up to November 15th, as published in the Weekly Tribune of that date, was $15,523.19.
5 June 2d, Life of Chandler, Detroit Post and Tribune, p. 120.
6 Liberator, September 19th; Miscellanies, p. 243.

potent arguments for the Republican cause was summed up in the expression "Bleeding Kansas." The Democrats taunted the Republicans by saying that they were trying to elect their candidate by "shrieks for freedom." This was immediately taken up as a watchword, and when the summer elections went their way, they were glad to announce that "Iowa, Maine, and Vermont, shriek for freedom."

Yet on the part of the Republicans it was an educational campaign of high value. Their newspapers in zeal and ability were superior to those of the other side. New York city, then as now, took the lead in journalism, and it is an indication of how the press stood everywhere at the North, except in Pennsylvania, when we note that the four great organs of public opinion, the Tribune, Times, Herald, and Post, supported Fremont. The publication of campaign documents was immense, and great care was taken to circulate them freely. Never before had such serious reading-matter been put into the hands of so many voters, and never before had so many men been willing to take time and pains to arrive at a comprehension of the principles involved in a presidential canvass. An indication of Republican willingness to repose on the wisdom of the fathers is shown by the publication of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as a part of a campaign document. The widespread interest is betokened by the appeal of Henry Ward Beecher in the Independent for money to print tracts which were to be sent "up and down the hills and valleys of Pennsylvania, carrying truth, by the silent page, to hundreds and thousands of men who have never been reached by the living speaker." 1

The influence of women was a factor of inestimable value. The moral side of the political question they were well fitted to grasp. That slavery was wrong, that it ought not to be extended, seemed to them primal truths; and the unobtrusive sway of mothers, wives, and sisters was exerted
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1 October 2d.

with greater effect than ever before in public affairs. Certainly government by the people has shown few more inspiring spectacles than the campaign of 1856 at the North.

The conduct of the Republicans during the canvass was almost faultless. The private characters of Buchanan and Fillmore were above reproach; but even had they not been so, their personal affairs would have attracted little attention, for the overpowering sway of the principles at issue was everywhere manifest. Perhaps the only charges that can be made against the Republican press are, exaggeration regarding Kansas affairs and giving currency to a supposed statement of Toombs without sufficient foundation. He was falsely reported to have said that he would yet "call the roll of his slaves under the shadow of Bunker Hill monument."1 Buchanan's share in the Ostend manifesto was properly used against him, but the Cuban question was so entirely swallowed up in the territorial that this line of attack attracted little attention.

The Democrats, wishing to turn away Northern consideration from the real issue, were free with personal imputations against Fremont. The assertion that he was or had been a Roman Catholic gave the most trouble, for the Republicans desired to gain the Know-nothing vote. The most authoritative denials did not prevent the reiteration of the charge.2 Charges were also made against the integrity of Fremont on account of certain operations in California.3
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1 See the Liberator, February 15th; Pike's First Blows of the Civil War, p. 344; Life of Theodore Parker, Weiss, vol. ii. p. 223.
2 Reminiscences of a Journalist, Congdon, p. 154; New York Weekly Tribune, August 9th and October 18th.
3 See remarks of Toombs, Congressional Globe, vol. xxxiii. p. 771; Life of Fremont, Bigelow, chap. xiv.; New York Tribune, September 3d. The charges were believed in California, and there he was not at all popular. H. H. Bancroft, vol. xviii. p. 702. In his own State he received less than one-half of the vote of Buchanan, and a much smaller vote than Fillmore.

In the light of his subsequent career, it can not be said that these were disproved to the satisfaction of a judicial mind; but they were not for a moment credited by his supporters, and did not have an appreciable influence on the result. Nor did the apparently admitted story that he was involved in California speculations, and that his notes would not sell in the New York market at even two per cent, a month, affect his popularity.1

The contest at the South between Buchanan and Fillmore was sluggish and uninteresting. There were practically but two doubtful States, and the August State election in Kentucky demonstrated that Fillmore could only hope to carry Maryland.

The sagacious politicians of each side stated the problem thus: Of the 149 electoral votes necessary to elect, Buchanan was sure of 112 from the South. He must get, then, the twenty-seven votes of Pennsylvania and ten more. Either Indiana or Illinois would give the required number, or New Jersey and California together. These five were the only doubtful Northern States. Fremont was reasonably certain of 114 electoral votes. To be elected he must also get Pennsylvania and eight more, or else carry all the doubtful States except Pennsylvania; but the chance of securing Pennsylvania was much better than that of getting all of the others. Thus the contest practically settled down to the Keystone State, and it was doubly important because a State election preceded the presidential election of November.

The issue had been made. On both sides the conditions for success were understood. It needed only to persuade and get out the arbiters. A campaign ensued which, for enthusiasm and excitement, surpassed any the country had seen except that of 1840. The old voters were constantly reminded of that memorable year. There was no difficulty in getting up Republican meetings. Processions numbering
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1 New York Tribune, August 27th.

thousands were common; good music and inspiring campaign songs were constantly heard, and there were few gatherings not graced with the presence of intelligent and devoted women. The meetings were immense. At Pittsburgh, the number assembled was estimated at one hundred thousand freemen. It was said to be a greater gathering than either the Dayton or Tippecanoe meeting of 1840.

"The truth is that the people are much more for us than we have supposed," wrote Dana. "I have been speaking around a good deal in clubs, and am everywhere astonished at the depth and ardor of the popular sentiment. Where we least expect it, large and enthusiastic crowds throng to the meeting and stay for hours with the thermometer at one hundred degrees. It is a great canvass; for genuine inspiration, 1840 could not hold a candle. I am more than ever convinced that Fremont was the man for us."1 The prominent men of the country could be frequently heard. It is an indication of the varied talent enlisted in the cause that on one evening Hale and Beecher, and on the next Wilson and Raymond, addressed a large crowd of New York city Republicans. Seward did not speak until October 2d. The reason he assigned was that his health was so impaired that he needed rest.2 Dana wrote confidentially that" Seward was awful grouty."3 The reflection must have come to him that he, instead of one who only began to labor in the vineyard at the eleventh hour, might have been the embodiment of this magnificent enthusiasm.

In reply to an invitation to attend a meeting in Ohio, Sumner wrote from Philadelphia: "I could not reach Ohio except by slow stages; and were I there, I should not have the sanction of my physician in exposing myself to the
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1 C. A. Dana to Pike, July 24th, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 346. 2 Letter to Howard at Detroit, September 12th, published in the New York Tribune.
3 August 9th, to Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 347.

excitements of a public meeting, even if I said nothing. This is hard—very hard for me to bear, for I long to do something at this critical moment for the cause."' A few days after this letter was published, Republicans had the opportunity of reading an account of a numerously attended banquet in South Carolina given to Preston S. Brooks by the constituents of his district, where, amid vehement cheering, he was presented with a cane on which was inscribed, "Use knock-down arguments." 2

Banks one afternoon delivered a speech in Wall Street from the balcony of the Merchants' Exchange, and was listened to by twenty thousand men. 3 You ask me "as to Banks's speech," wrote Greeley to an intimate friend. "I think St. Paul on Mars Hill made a better—I mean better for Mars Hill; I am not sure that Banks's is not better adapted to Wall Street. I trust Banks himself does not deem it suited to the latitude of Bunker Hill or Tippecanoe."4

Besides reading documents and listening to speeches, the enthusiasm manifested itself in street parades and torchlight processions. Pioneers with glittering axes marched ahead, Rocky-Mountain glee-clubs sang campaign songs, and the air rang with shouts of " Free speech, free soil, and Fremont," the lusty bands dwelling upon "Fremont" with the staccato cheer.5 Although in liveliness and enthusiasm
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1 Sumner to Lewis D. Campbell, published in the New York Times, October 3d.
2 See New York Times, October 8th, where is published a full account of the proceedings and speeches. This affair attracted much attention from the Republican press.
3 New York Times, September 26th.
4 Greeley to Pike, October 6th, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 350.
5 A letter to the Nation of September 18th, 1890, states that the staccato cheer was invented during this campaign; but the writer is mistaken in the statement that the torchlight companies were called "Wideawakes." I have not seen that name used in any of the campaign literature. The "Wide-awakes" were a Republican invention of 1860 (see History of Lincoln, Nicolay and Hay, vol. ii. p. 284); but the term " wideawake" was used by the Know-nothings (see the "Wide-awake Gift, a Know-nothing Token for 1855 ").

this resembled the 1840 campaign, there was a marked difference. The Whigs had then gone to the country without a platform, and the canvass was a frolic; now the Republicans advocated a platform which was so positive in its utterances that no mistake could be made about its meaning. There was, therefore, now a serious devotion to principle, and an earnest determination that the Harrison campaign lacked. The jollity of 1840 is the delight of the humorist; the gravity of 1856 is the study of the political philosopher.

It is difficult to apportion the enthusiasm between a cause and a candidate; but after drinking deep of the campaign literature, one is forced to the conviction that much was for the cause and little for the man; that Republican principles added lustre to the name of Fremont, while Fremont himself gave little strength to the party other than by the romantic interest that was associated with his record as an explorer.' His nomination was indeed received with enthusiasm. Several campaign biographies were published which familiarized the public with the stirring events in his life; but while his "disastrous chances," his "moving accidents by flood and field," and his "hair-breadth 'scapes" made him a hero in the eyes of youth who fed on Cooper and Gilmore Simms, the fuller knowledge of his career was unsatisfactory to many earnest and thoughtful Republicans. The most was made of his being "the brave Pathfinder." The planting of the American flag on the highest peak of the Rocky Mountains was deemed an heroic feat. Yet practical people could not fail to inquire why the qualities of a daring explorer fitted a man to be chief magistrate of the republic at a critical juncture. Little by little, it began to be understood that Fremont was a vulnerable candidate, and, while the charges of corruption were not believed, it was admitted they needed explanation. He did
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1 His romantic marriage added to this interest, and " Fremont and Jessie" was a favorite campaign cry. Jessie Benton was the name of his wife.

not, therefore, stand before the country with the same character of absolute integrity as did Buchanan and Fillmore.1

The Iowa congressional election in August was favorable to the Republicans. In September, Maine and Vermont gave unmistakable evidence of the direction in which the tide was setting in New England. Maine was an old Democratic State; the Republican candidate for governor was Hannibal Hamlin, who, though voting against the Kansas-Nebraska bill, had not formally severed his connection with the Democratic party until June of this year. Then from his place in the Senate he had declared that, as he considered the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the cause of all the present ills, and as the Cincinnati convention had endorsed that repeal, he could no longer act with the Democrats, but must oppose them with all his power. He was now elected governor of Maine by a handsome majority. In Vermont three quarters of the votes were cast for the Republican ticket.

The Republicans were highly elated at these results. All eyes were now turned to the "October States"—Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. No concern was felt about Ohio, and much less depended upon Indiana than on the Keystone State. The election of October 14th in Pennsylvania was for minor State officers, that of canal commissioner being the most important. There were two tickets in the field— one the regular Democratic, the other the Union, which was supported by Republicans, Americans, Whigs, and anti-Nebraska Democrats2 for, stated differently, one ticket had the support of the "Buchaniers," the other that of the "Fremonters," and ostensibly of the "Fillmoreans." 
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1 My authorities on the campaign of 1856 are New York Tribune, Times, Herald, and Post, the Independent, the Liberator, Boston Post, Boston Atlas; Life of Samuel Bowles, Merriam; Political Recollections, Julian; Reminiscences of a Journalist, Congdon.
2 There were three State officers to be elected on a general ticket. One of the candidates was an old-line Whig, another was a Republican, and the third an anti-Nebraska Democrat.

The contest was vigorous and excited. The Republicans were aggressive. They pointed to " bleeding Kansas;" they charged that the civil war in that territory was a result of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and they demanded a policy which should incontestably make Kansas a free State.

Their best speakers traversed Pennsylvania, making eloquent and able appeals, and the State was flooded with campaign documents. It was clearly discerned where the danger lay. West of the Alleghany Mountains, the enthusiasm for Fremont was like that in New England, New York, and Ohio; but as one travelled eastward a different political atmosphere could easily be felt, and when one reached Philadelphia, which was bound to the South by a lucrative trade, the chill was depressing.' The business and social influences of conservative Philadelphia were arrayed against the Fremont movement. The Pennsylvania Dutch, by whom the eastern counties were largely peopled, were set in their way of political thinking; they distrusted change. They were told that Fremont was an abolitionist; they believed that abolitionism was dangerous to the Union; they were attached to the Union, for its existence implied order and security; they were thrifty and prosperous, and much preferred order to the liberty of the black man. Campaign work such as had stirred to the depths New England, New York, Ohio, and the Northwest was carried on by the Republicans to a greater extent in Pennsylvania. They hoped that, while this was a community slower to educate, it would yield to persistent and overflowing effort.

The Democrats dodged the issue. Instead of defending the Douglas and Pierce policy, they averred that the Union was in danger. "I consider," wrote Buchanan, privately, "that all incidental questions are comparatively of little importance in the presidential question, when compared with
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1 See article by Russel Errett, Magazine of Western History, July, 1889. "There is no Republican organization or life in eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey."—Seward to his wife, August 3d, Life of Seward, vol. ii. p. 284.

the grand and appalling issue of union or disunion. ... In this region the battle is fought mainly on this issue. We have so often cried 'wolf' that now, when the wolf is at the door, it is difficult to make the people believe it; but yet the sense of danger is slowly and surely making its way in this region." 1

The appeal for the Union was a legitimate party cry, and it answered well in Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania Dutch counties, but there were parts of the State where an additional argument was needed. The manner in which this necessity was met reflects, in the light of subsequent history, discredit on Buchanan or his managers. Howell Cobb, of Georgia, who had the reputation of a straightforward man, and who in 1851 had distinguished himself by a vigorous canvass in his State against the disunion faction, and John Hickman, a congressman from Pennsylvania who had voted for the admission of Kansas under the Topeka Constitution, spoke from the stump all over the Chester valley, advocating Buchanan's election, and promising fair play in Kansas.2 At many Democratic mass-meetings in different parts of the State, banners were borne on which was inscribed "Buchanan, Breckinridge, and Free Kansas," the orators maintaining that Kansas was certain to be free if Buchanan were elected.3 Forney, who was chairman of the Democratic State central committee, and at that time an intimate personal and political friend of Buchanan, avers that this line of argument was based on a positive promise from him that there "should be no interference against the people of Kansas." 4
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1 Life of Buchanan, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 180. Buchanan lived near Lancaster, in the southeastern part of Pennsylvania.
2 Forney's Anecdotes of Public Men, vol. ii. p. 239.
3 See Wade's speech in the Senate, December 4th; New York Times, October 7th, November 19th. "All over the country the Democratic party put upon their flags, transparencies, and banners 'Buchanan, Breckinridge, and Free Kansas.' "—John Sherman, House of Representatives, December 8th.
4 See Forney's Anecdotes, vol. i. pp. 15 and 361; vol. ii. pp. 240, 421. In a speech at Tarrytown, N. Y., September 2d, 1858, Forney declared that during the canvass of 1856 Buchanan said to him a thousand times: "The South must vote for me, and the North must be secured; and the only way to secure the North is to convince those gentlemen that when I get in the presidential chair I will do right with the people in Kansas. I am now sixty-six years of age. I have reached that time of life when I cannot have any ambition for re-election, and if I have, the only way to secure it is to be strong with my own people at home. I watched this struggle from my retirement in London; I have seen what I conceive to be the mistakes of others. I am not responsible for the administration of President Pierce; therefore I will inaugurate a new system." Forney further said: "I sowed the State with private letters and private pledges upon this question. There is not a county in Pennsylvania in which my letters may not be found, almost by hundreds, pledging Mr. Buchanan, in his name and by his authority, to the full, complete, and practical recognition of the rights of the people of Kansas to decide upon their own affairs."—New York Tribune, September 3d, 1858.

The advocacy of the Democratic candidates by Reverdy Johnson, an old-line Whig, and by Barclay, a Democratic congressman from western Pennsylvania, who had voted for the admission of Kansas under the Topeka Constitution, was an added influence in this direction.

The Democrats had in their campaign the cordial assistance of the President. Shannon's administration of Kansas affairs had become a scandal. Unsteady in habits and purposes, he was execrated by the free-State men; his continuance in office gave additional force to every story of " bleeding Kansas." In August he was removed, and John W. Geary, of Pennsylvania, a man of good standing, was appointed in his place. The report went that Geary had said that peace must be restored or Buchanan could not carry Pennsylvania.1 The difficulty of his mission was emphasized when, on the way to Kansas, he met Shannon fleeing in abject fear, because at the last the pro-slavery leaders had taken offence as their former tool would not do their entire bidding.2 But the new governor set himself energetically
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1 Sara Robinson's Kansas, p. 339; The Kansas Conflict, Charles Robinson, p. 323.
2 Spring, p. 187; Geary and Kansas, Gihon, p. 104.

to work to bring back order. He took an impartial view of the situation; in his effort at pacification, he leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but pursued the course he had marked out with judgment, decision, and success. On the 30th of September he sent the Secretary of State a despatch which was a splendid Democratic argument in the impending contest. "Peace now reigns in Kansas," Geary wrote. "Confidence is gradually being restored. Citizens are returning to their claims. Men are resuming their ordinary pursuits, and a general gladness pervades the entire community. When I arrived here, everything was at the lowest point of depression. Opposing parties saw no hope of peace, save in mutual extermination, and they were taking the most effectual means to produce that terrible result."1

The Democratic organization in Pennsylvania was perfect. Unlike other Northern States, Buchanan was there upheld by the most influential newspapers, which were subsidized by "a system of general and liberal advertising."2 There were many wealthy Democrats in Philadelphia and eastern Pennsylvania, and money flowed in freely from other States. Douglas, while loyally striving to keep Illinois Democratic, was also able to contribute money liberally to aid in carrying the Keystone State.3 The governor of North Carolina, with other gentlemen, issued a "private and confidential" circular begging for money. "Pennsylvania must be saved at every hazard," they said. "We appeal to you, therefore, as a Democrat and a patriot, to contribute forthwith whatever amount of money you can, and raise what you can from others."4 The Republican journals charged—probably with truth—that the clerks in the departments at Washington, the officers in the New York
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1 Message and Documents, 1856-57, part i. p. 154.
2 Forney's Anecdotes of Public Men, vol. ii. pp. 239, 240; also article by Russel Errett, Western Magazine of History, July, 1889.
3 Life of Douglas, Sheahan, p. 443.
4 The circular was dated Raleigh, September 20th, was published in the Raleigh Register of October 22d, and copied in the New York Times, October 24th.

City Custom-house, and the laborers in the Brooklyn Navy-yard were assessed for the Pennsylvania campaign fund.1 It was credibly reported that one hundred and fifty thousand dollars was sent into Pennsylvania from the slave-holding States; that August Belmont contributed fifty thousand dollars; and that other Wall-street bankers and brokers, alarmed at Southern threats and fearing serious financial loss in the event of disunion, put into Forney's hands one hundred thousand dollars more.' The allegations of the defeated party regarding the outlay by the other must always be taken with a grain of allowance, yet a fair consideration of all the circumstances makes it reasonable to suppose that the Democrats had much the larger supply of the sinews of war.3

It certainly seemed to the Republicans that the Democrats were better provided with means. "We Fremonters of this town," wrote Greeley from New York to an intimate friend, "have not one dollar where the Fillmoreans and Buchaniers have ten each, and we have Pennsylvania and New Jersey both on our shoulders. Each State is utterly miserable, as far as money is concerned; we must supply them with documents, canvass them with our best speakers, and pay for their rooms to speak in and our bills to invite them."4
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1 See New York Tribune, October 2d; Evening Post, October 21st; Boston Atlas, October 18th.
2 New York Times, October 24th; Evening Post, October 21st; Boston Atlas, October 23d.
3 For charges of Republican expenditure, see Life of Stephens, Johnston and Browne, p. 316. Stephens writes August 31st: "I understand that the Republicans have spent $500,000 on Pennsylvania. These merchants of the North, who have grown rich out of us, are shelling out their money like corn now to oppress us." See also North Carolina circular before referred to. The report that Stephens heard was an exaggeration. The New York Times estimate of the expenditure by the Democrats for the State election was "very nearly $500,000," and I feel confident that the Democrats spent more than the Republicans.
4 Greeley to Pike, August 6th, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 346. The Republicans of Massachusetts sent money to Pennsylvania. Reminiscences of a Journalist, Congdon, p. 153,

The Democrats were successful in manufacturing enthusiasm for their candidate in his native State, and the abbreviation " Buck and Breck" readily lent itself to a resounding campaign cry. On the eve of election they had a serene confidence of probable success in October and certain victory in November.

Greeley advised his confidant that the fight was " hot and heavy in Pennsylvania. . . . There is everything to do there, with just the meanest set of politicians to do it that you ever heard of." 1 Dana was hopeful. Nine days before the election he wrote: " The election in Pennsylvania week after next will go by from thirty thousand to forty thousand majority against Buchanan, and so on. The tide is rising with a rush, as it does in the Bay of Fundy; and you will hear an awful squealing among the hogs and jackasses when they come to drown. ... I suppose there are about two hundred orators, great and small, now stumping Pennsylvania for Fremont." 2

Reeder, who had been a personal and political friend of Buchanan, came out for the Republican candidates, and this was thought good for over three thousand votes in his district. Dana wrote: "The Democrats are terrified and demoralized. . . . My impression now is that every free State will vote for Fremont." 3 Bryant wrote his brother from New York city: "We expect a favorable report from Pennsylvania. The Buchanan men here are desponding, and it seems to be thought that if the State election goes against them, then the presidential election will go against them also. I do not think that certain, however, though it is probable."4

The day which terminated this heated contest came, and the result of the voting was awaited with breathless anxiety. Passion had been so wrought up that the timid feared
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1 Greeley to Pike, September 21st.
2 Dana to Pike, October 5th.
3 Ibid.
4 Letter of October 14th, Life of Bryant, Godwin, vol. ii. p. 92.

lest the contest of words should be followed by blows. They thanked God that the weather in Philadelphia, which was raw, cold, drizzling, and uncomfortable, kept the turbulent spirits within doors. All felt relief when it passed without bloodshed. Perhaps the tension was increased by the report of the anticipated meeting of fifteen Southern governors at Raleigh to consider what steps should be taken in the event of the election of Fremont.1

The excitement in the evening was greatest in Philadelphia. The City of Brotherly Love was in an uproar. No one went to bed. The halls where returns were received were crowded; in the streets there was an anxious, excited throng.2 Several days elapsed before it was certain how the State had gone, but at last it became known that the Buchanan State ticket had been successful by a majority of less than 3000 in a vote of 423,000.

The Republicans charged that the Democrats had carried the State by fraud and bribery. Years afterwards Forney wrote: "We spent a great deal of money, but not one cent selfishly or corruptly."3 It is indeed difficult to believe that money was not used to purchase voters by some of Forney's henchmen, although he may not have been privy to the transactions, for the astute party manager does not always care to inquire closely into the means by which results are reached. But there is no need of the stale cry, invariably repeated by the defeated party, to account for the later success of the Democrats in the presidential election.4
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1 New York Times, October 14th. The meeting had been proposed by Governor Wise for October 13th. Only three governors actually met.
2 Ibid., October 14th and 15th.
3 Anecdotes of Public Men, vol. ii. p. 240. Governor Robinson, who was a member of the Republican National Committee, writes: "The October vote of Pennsylvania was offered to the Republican National Executive Committee for a consideration; but the money was not forthcoming, and the transfer was made to the other party."—The Kansas Conflict, p. 338.
4 I will transcribe two references to fraud which were honest expressions. Letcher, who was for Fillmore, wrote Crittenden, October 2d: "When in Philadelphia I saw the game fully, and told our friends that money and fraud would beat us in the State elections."—Life of Crittenden, Coleman, vol. ii. p. 133. The other refers more particularly to the November election, and was written by Silliman in his diary, November 19th: "There has been much fraudulent voting on the side of Buchanan. Many thousands Irish and not a few Germans have been at the command of the slave party. But a still more important cause of defeat has been that the late President Fillmore has been in the field by his own consent."—Life of Silliman, by Fisher, vol. ii. p. 251

If the State went Democratic, Buchanan's election was certain; if the Union ticket were successful, while a great impetus would be given to the Fremont movement, his election would not be assured. Yet fearing the influence, many conservative Fillmoreans, urged by the sentiments to which Choate had given expression, voted with the Democrats. It is not important whether this was brought about by collusion between the chairman of the American State committee and Forney; but it is certain that, by official direction or tacit consent, many Americans and Whigs bolted their own State ticket.

If the Fusionists had been successful by a small majority, would Fremont have carried Pennsylvania in November and been elected President? Probably not. There was no possibility of getting the bulk of Fillmore's supporters to vote the fusion Fremont-Fillmore electoral ticket which was proposed and actually adopted;1 and the minute the opposition to Buchanan was divided, he was certain to carry the State by a handsome plurality.2 Buchanan himself seemed to think that in any event he would receive the electoral vote of Pennsylvania,3 a confidence based on substantial reasons.4
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1 See New York Times, October 20th.

2 The vote in November was: Buchanan, 230,710; Fremont, 147,510; Fillmore, 82,175. Buchanan's majority over Fremont, 83,200; over both, 1025. Tho vote of Philadelphia may be of interest as illustrating some statements in the text: Buchanan, 38,222; Fillmore, 24,084; Fremont, 7993.

3 See letter, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 181.

4 See articles of Russel Errett, Magazine of Western History, July and August, 1889. Errett was a member of the Republican State Executive Committee. See the files of the New York Evening Post, the Times, Herald, and Tribune, from October 14th to the November election.

On the 14th of October, State elections were also held in Ohio and Indiana. Ohio went Republican, but Indiana went Democratic, thus making the assurance of Buchanan's election doubly sure.

The November election registered what the October elections had virtually decided. Buchanan carried Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and California, and all the slave States but Maryland, receiving 174 electoral votes. Fremont had 114 electors, and Fillmore the 8 votes of Maryland. 1 From the congressional elections it was apparent that the Democrats would also have a majority in the next House of Representatives.

After the disappointment at failing to elect their candidates was over, the Republicans felt that they had reason for self-congratulation. In spite of the complaints of the lack of organization and money in Pennsylvania, the Republicans of a later day could not have wished the campaign different. For it was conducted on the inspiration of a principle, and any manipulation of Pennsylvania voters would have been a blot upon this virgin purity. The immense Fremont vote could be traced along the lines of latitude, springing from New England influence where good and widely extended common school systems prevailed.2 The problem now was simply to educate and inspire the
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1 The popular vote was: Buchanan, 1,838,169; Fremont, 1,341,264; Fillmore, 874,534. Buchanan received in the free States, 1,226,290; in the slave States, 611,879. Fillmore received in the free States, 394,642; in the slave States, 479,892. The vote of South Carolina is not comprised in any of these totals. Those electors were chosen by the legislature. The only votes Fremont received in the slave States were: Delaware, 308; Maryland, 281; Virginia, 291; Kentucky, 314. These figures are based on those given in Stanwood's History of Presidential Elections.
2 See New York Independent, November 13th; Springfield Republican, cited in Life of Bowles, Merriam, vol. i. p. 160; Olmsted's Texas Journey, p. xx vi.

people of the Northern States that had voted for Buchanan. Whittier expressed the general feeling when he sang:

"If months have well-nigh won the field,
What may not four years do?"

Considering the weakness of Fremont's character, which later years brought to light, it was fortunate he was not elected President. One shudders to think how he would have met the question of secession, which assuredly would have confronted him at the beginning of his administration.

The cause being much stronger than the candidate, it is probable that Seward or Chase would have carried the same States and received substantially the same votes that went to Fremont. This is an interesting supposition, in view of Seward's ambition for the next presidential nomination; for had he made the run of 1856, he would undoubtedly have been the Republican candidate four years later. Before the smoke of the battle had cleared away, many journals, struck with the astonishing vote Fremont had received, nominated him for the standard-bearer of I860.1
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1 "Nobody knew better than Seward that if he had been the candidate for the presidency in 1856, he would have received the same vote that Fremont did, and that his nomination in 1860 would have inevitably followed, and he would have entered the White House instead of Lincoln. Seward more than hinted to confidential friends that Weed betrayed him for Fremont.
"Weed himself told the following story: He and Mr. Seward were riding up Broadway, and when passing the bronze statue of Lincoln, in Union Square, Seward said, 'Weed, if you had been faithful to me, I should have been there instead of Lincoln.' 'Seward,' replied Weed,' is it not better to be alive in a carriage with me than to be dead and set up in bronze?' "—Random Recollections by H. B. Stanton, p. 96.
The explanation of Weed's course given in his Life (vol. ii. p. 245) is more rational.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.2. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].