History of the United States, v.2, by James Ford Rhodes, 1910 [c1892].

Chapter 6: Diplomatic Costume through The Ostend Manifesto

HISTORY OF THE UNITED OF STATES

CHAPTER VI

Marcy might have pleaded the engrossing affairs of his department as a reason for not giving his attention to the domestic question which was agitating the country. In truth, he was actively employed during the year 1854; and few American Secretaries of State, in a time of peace, have had more real business to transact than fell to his lot.

Soon after assuming charge of the department, he showed that he wished to impress his plain democratic ideas upon those who represented this country abroad. Almost the first question which he took up was that of diplomatic costume. From the time of our mission to Ghent until President Jackson's day, the dress informally or officially recommended was: "A blue coat, lined with white silk; straight standing cape embroidered with gold; buttons plain, or, if they can be had, with the artillerist's eagle stamped upon them; cuffs embroidered in the manner of the cape. White cassimere breeches, gold knee-buckles; white silk stockings, and gold or gilt shoe-buckles. A three-cornered chapeau-bras; a black cockade to which an eagle has been attached. Sword, etc., corresponding." On gala-days, the uniforms should be more splendid with embroidery, and the hat decorated with a white ostrich feather.

Under the strictly democratic administration of Jackson, the President recommended some changes in the diplomatic dress in the line of cheapness and adaptation to the simplicity of our institutions. It was suggested that the blue coat be changed to black, the cape omitted, and a gold star affixed on each side of the collar of the coat; the breeches might be black or white. The chapeau-bras with the cockade and eagle and the sword were retained. Thus the matter remained until Marcy took it up. He issued a circular on June 1st, 1853, in which he recommended to our representatives abroad that, in order to show their devotion to republican institutions, they should, whenever practicable, appear in the simple dress of an American citizen. He stated that the example of Dr. Franklin was worthy of imitation, and regretted that there ever had been a departure from that simple and unostentatious course.

Our minister at Berne was glad to inform the Secretary that the "absurd and expensive uniform" necessary to be worn at a royal court was never required in the ancient republic of Switzerland.1 The ministers at Turin and Brussels reported that there probably would be no difficulty in carrying out the instructions of the department.2 Our representative at Berlin received an intimation from the president minister that the king would consider an appearance before him without costume as disrespectful. He therefore did not deem it discreet to insist upon this point, but in yielding to the wishes of the monarch he was careful to procure " a very plain and simple dress." 3 The King of Sweden was perfectly willing to transact business with the American minister in citizen's clothes, but on social occasions the court
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1 Fay to Marcy, June 30th, 1853.
2 Seibels to Marcy, September 30th, 1853; Daniel to Marcy, October 10th, 1853
3 Vroom to Marcy, October 31st, 1853.

dress was imperatively required. The minister explained to Marcy that the king was a rigid conservative in all the antique ceremonies and exactions of his court, that the Swedish society held fast to aristocratic symbols, and his appearance at court in plain clothes would be looked upon as an endeavor to propagate republican principles.1

August Belmont, who was at The Hague, received permission from the king to appear at the audience in citizen's dress. Although it had been hinted that it would be more satisfactory if he wore uniform, he had replied that he must follow the wishes and instructions of his government. He went therefore to the audience in plain black clothes. In his despatch he described his appearance as singular, for the king, his aides-de-camp, and the minister of foreign affairs, the only persons who assisted at the ceremony, were in full uniform and covered with stars and decorations. Belmont was more anxious about the presentation to the queen mother, for at her court ceremony was a weightier matter than at that of the king. His brother diplomats, who had wondered at his previous temerity, were concerned about the result, for they knew that she had often resented with rudeness any infringement of etiquette. The presentation, however, took place without incident;2 and after several months' residence in Holland, Belmont could report that he and his family had been treated by the royal family on every occasion with the utmost courtesy. Indeed, at a casino ball the queen paid him honor above any of the diplomats present by asking him to dance a quadrille; and at a court ball the king shook him most cordially by the hand and entered into an interesting and animated conversation with him of more than half an hour.3

Sanford, the secretary of legation, who was representing this country at Paris until the arrival of Mason, determined,
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1 Schroeder to Marcy, November 24th, 1853.
2 Belmont to Marcy, November 8th and 25th, 1853.
3 Ibid., February 28th, 1854.

after much consideration, to act in accordance with the spirit of the instructions of the State department. Fearing that his change of dress might be misconstrued, he made known his desire to the minister of foreign affairs, who promised to make the subject understood at court. Sanford accordingly appeared at the reception to the diplomatic corps, at a dinner of the foreign minister, and at a soiree at the Tuileries in citizen's dress.1 When Mason arrived at Paris, the first question upon which he brought his mind to bear was that of a proper costume. He had earnestly hoped that nothing would occur to cause him to deviate from the simple dress of an American citizen; but he soon perceived that it would not do to follow the example of Sanford. In the latter of two interviews with the minister of foreign affairs, the emperor's wishes were most politely conveyed to him. Nothing was specifically required, but suggestions were made to which, from a proper respect to the French government, he deemed it imperatively necessary to conform. He appeared before the emperor to present his credentials in a suit of plain black clothes, but at the first ball at the Tuileries which he attended, and on all subsequent court occasions, he wore, as he described it, "a simple uniform dress." Sanford was so disgusted with the action of his chief that he resigned the position of secretary of legation. He said that Mason adopted "a coat embroidered with gilt tinsel, a sword and cocked hat, the invention of a Dutch tailor in Paris, borrowed chiefly from the livery of a subordinate attaché of legation of one of the petty powers of the Continent. Mortified and indignant at this course," Sanford wrote, "I declined attending with him the ball at which he first figured in this toggery."2 A letter from the Secretary of State to Sanford approving his conduct was a salve to his wounded feelings;3 and his satisfaction was
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1 Sanford to Marcy, August 18th, 1853.
2 Letter of Mr. Sanford to Secretary of State Cass, January 19th, 1860. 3 Mr. Marcy to Mr. Sanford, February 18th, 1854.

complete when he read a private letter from Marcy to Mason, severely animadverting upon Mason's return to a monarchical dress, when the plain black clothes "had been almost universally commended by public opinion in the United States." 1

But nowhere did the circular of the State department create so much trouble as at the court of St. James. After considerable reflection, Buchanan had determined to wear neither gold lace nor embroidery at court, yet he desired to show a proper respect to the queen, for whom he had a most sincere regard. It had been suggested to him that he might assume the civil dress worn by General Washington. He therefore carefully examined Stuart's portrait, but came to the conclusion that fashions had so changed that such a costume would appear ridiculous. The question was still unsettled when Parliament opened in February, 1854. Two days before the meeting, he received a printed circular from the master of ceremonies, which stated, " No one can be admitted into the diplomatic tribune, or in the body of the House, but in full court dress." In consequence of this, he did not attend. Buchanan's absence from the House of Lords, at the opening of Parliament, "produced quite a sensation." "Indeed," he wrote," I have found difficulty in preventing this incident from becoming a subject of inquiry and remark in the House of Commons."2 When all England was excited by the prospect of war with Russia, it seems curious that this affair should have attracted so much attention; yet it was the occasion of official consideration, court gossip, and newspaper controversy. The Times, in describing the brilliant and imposing proceedings in the House of Lords, had stated that, amidst the blaze of stars, crosses, and ribands in the diplomatic box, the American minister, in evening dress, sate "unpleasantly conscious of
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1 Mr. Sanford to Mr. Cass, January 19th, 1860.
2 Buchanan to Marcy, London, February 7th, 1854.

his singularity."1 This account was speedily corrected, but the affair gave rise to a spirited discussion in the journals. One newspaper said that the exclusion of Buchanan from the ceremony would be considered in the United States "as a studied slight or determined insult."2 On the other hand, an influential journal said that the absurd quarrel was entirely due to "General Pierce's republican ill-manners" and to "American puppyism," to which nothing should be conceded. "There is not the least reason," continued this journal, "why her Majesty . . . should be troubled to receive the 'gentleman in the black coat' from Yankee-land. He can say his say at the Foreign Office, dine at a chophouse in King Street, sleep at the old Hummums, and be off as he came, per liner, when his business is done."3

Three weeks after the opening of Parliament, however, Buchanan had the pleasure of writing to Marcy: "The question of court costume has been finally settled to my entire satisfaction. I appeared at the queen's levee, on Wednesday last, in the very dress which you have often seen me wear at the President's levees, with the exception of a very plain black-handled and black-hilted dress sword, and my reception was all that I could have desired. ... I have never felt prouder, as a citizen of my country, than when I stood amidst the brilliant circle of foreign ministers and other court dignitaries in the simple dress of an American citizen." 4 He adopted the sword, he explained to his niece, "to gratify those who have yielded so much, and to distinguish me from the upper court servants." 5
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1 London Times, February 1st, 1854.
2 London Examiner, quoted in the London Times, February 6th, 1854. 3 London Chronicle, cited by New York Evening Post, April 8th, 1854.
4 Buchanan to Marcy, London, February 24th, 1854. The dress was black coat, white waistcoat and cravat, and black pantaloons and dress boots. Buchanan to Miss Harriet Lane, February 24th, Life of Buchanan, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 114. The despatches quoted may be found in vol. ix. Senate Documents, 1st Session 36th Congress.
5 Curtis, vol. ii. p. 114.

If Marcy had foreseen the number of serious questions that would come before him, he would not have taken upon himself the task of prescribing the cut of the garments for our diplomatic representatives. Buchanan expressed the opinion that Marcy had much to learn;1 but by 1854 the steady application and diligence of the Secretary of State began to bear fruit. In the last days of 1853 a treaty was negotiated with Mexico; amendments were made to it by the Senate, and in turn agreed to by the Mexican President. It was not, however, until June 30th, 1854, that proper legislation by Congress was had to carry the provisions of the treaty into effect; and only on that day were the ratifications exchanged. This agreement is known as the Gadsden treaty. It settled the question of a disputed boundary with Mexico, the line agreed upon between the two countries being that now existing.2 The United States gained the Mesilla valley, which was an oblong square of land containing about twenty million acres. It formed the southern part of what is now New Mexico and Arizona. The agreement also abrogated the eleventh article of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,3 which provided that the United States should protect Mexico from the incursions of Indians. This had been found to be an onerous duty, and one almost impossible of execution. For these considerations the United States paid ten millions of dollars. This district was now much better known than in 1848. No one pretended that fertile or valuable land had been acquired, but the friends of the administration urged that this valley was a very desirable and an almost necessary route for the projected Southern Pacific railroad.4
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1 In May, 1853, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 81.
2 In 1890.
3 The treaty of peace of 1848 which ended the Mexican War.
4 See Treaties and Conventions, Haswell; also debate in the House of Representatives on the appropriation necessary to carry out the treaty. The vote in the House was 103 to 62; in the Senate, on the appropriation, 34 to 6.

In June, a treaty settling the fishery question and providing for reciprocity between the United States and Canada was concluded between Marcy and Lord Elgin, Governor-General of Canada, who acted for Great Britain. It allowed United States fishermen to take sea-fish in the bays, harbors, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and of the several islands thereunto adjacent. This was a concession to our country, for by the treaty of 1818, which was then in force, United States fishermen were not allowed to take fish within three marine miles of these coasts. The advantage to Canada was in a provision that certain articles, the growth and produce of each country, should be admitted into the other free of duty.1 The treaty was to remain in force ten years, and thereafter until either country should give notice of the wish to terminate the agreement, but it should be binding for twelve months after such notice was given.2 This was a valuable treaty for Canada, and a desirable one for the United States; but the manner in which a majority of the Senate was obtained for its ratification, if the story told by Lord Elgin's secretary be exact, is neither creditable to Lord Elgin nor to the senators whose support he gained by wily
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1 Among the articles which were thus admitted were: Grain, flour, and breadstuffs of all kinds; fish of all kinds; poultry, eggs; hides, furs, skins or tails, undressed; butter, cheese, tallow; ores of metals of all kinds; coal, timber and lumber of all kinds; fish-oil, rice, broom-corn and bark ; flax, hemp and tow, unmanufactured; unmanufactured tobacco. A complete list may be found in Treaties and Conventions, Haswell, p. 451; also in Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress, vol. ii. p. 621, where the treaty is discussed. In mildly criticising this treaty, the New York Tribune, weekly of June 17th, nevertheless declared that it was in favor of absolute free trade between British America and the United States.
2 The ratifications were exchanged September 9th, 1854. The treaty was terminated March 17th, 1866, on notice given one year previously by the United States. See Treaties and Conventions, Haswell; Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress.
In July the treaty was ratified which had been made by Commodore Perry with Japan. The principal feature of the treaty was the opening of several important Japanese ports to American vessels. See Treaties and Conventions, p. 597.

social influences; it has been known as the treaty "floated through on champagne."1

In July, an affair occurred in Central America which created some excitement at the North. The port of San Juan had been occupied by about three hundred adventurers, mainly negroes from Jamaica, who had caused great annoyance to an American settlement on the other side of the river. This settlement had been established by the Nicaragua Transit Company, an association of citizens of the United States, whose purpose was to open a transit-way across the Isthmus of Central America. The San Juan (or Greytown)2 people had committed depredations on the property of the citizens of Punta Arenas, as the United States settlement was called. The trouble was still further complicated by the attempt of a body of men crossing over from Greytown to arrest the captain of one of the Transit Company's boats on a charge of murder. The American minister to Central America, Borland, happening to be there, effectually protected the captain, for he believed in the innocence of the accused, and, moreover, totally denied the jurisdiction of the intruding party. Afterwards, when Borland was in Greytown, he was subjected to insult by those presumably having authority. On receiving official accounts of these occurrences, the President sent the sloop-of-war Cyane to the harbor of San Juan to enforce the demands of this government. A claim for twenty-four thousand dollars for injury to property was made, an apology was demanded for the indignity offered to the United States minister, and assurances of better behavior in the future were required. No reply
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1 See Life of Laurence Oliphant, vol. i. p. 109 et seq.; Episodes in a Life of Adventure, Oliphant, p. 38 et seq. Oliphant's description of the Washington of 1854 is noteworthy: "Washington, 'the city of magnificent distances,' struck me as a howling wilderness of deserted streets running out into the country, and ending nowhere, its population consisting chiefly of politicians and negroes."
2 This population gave their town the name of Greytown.

being received, the commander of the Cyane, after giving due notice of twenty-four hours, opened bombardment on Greytown. He ceased firing twice, in order to give an opportunity of complying with the demands which had been made; but at length, as nothing was heard from the authorities, he continued the bombardment until the town was laid in ashes. No lives were lost, and the buildings destroyed were of little value. An English war-vessel was in the harbor, and its captain protested against the attack. "This transaction," the President stated in his message to Congress, "has been the subject of complaint on the part of some foreign powers, and has been characterized with more of harshness than of justice."1

But all foreign affairs were unimportant compared to the diplomatic intercourse with Spain, if this be estimated by the attention it received from the Secretary of State, the excitement it caused in this country, and the interest it occasioned abroad. The desire to obtain Cuba soon began to affect Marcy, and he indulged in the dream that through his agency the island might be peaceably and honorably acquired, though in the instructions to Soule he urged caution on his impetuous agent. At the beginning he went over the usual platitudes: it is difficult for Spain to retain Cuba, she cannot keep it long unaided, and the United States has a deep interest in its destiny after it shall cease to be a dependency of Spain. We should resist its transference to any European nation, and we should see with regret any power of Europe help Spain to keep her dominion over Cuba. Then coming to the actual matter, Soule could understand that we would be willing to purchase the island, but he was not authorized to make any offer for it, since there is now no hope that such a proposition will be favor
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1 For a full account of this affair, see the President's message of December 4th, 1854, and the original documents submitted to Congress in August, The subject is discussed in Wharton's International Law Digest, sec. 224.

ably entertained. Indeed, it is believed that Spain is under obligations to England and France not to transfer Cuba to the United States. It will be of great value if the minister can ascertain at Madrid what is the exact arrangement between the three powers, and especially whether Great Britain and France are urging Spain to take steps towards the emancipation of the slaves in Cuba. The opinion was expressed that if Cuba became a republic, and there was a voluntary separation from the mother country, it would probably relieve us from further anxiety, and the United States would be willing to contribute money towards the accomplishment of such a desirable object.1

Buchanan was also instructed to watch the conduct of Great Britain, and to ascertain whether she was urging Spain to emancipate the negroes in Cuba and to import more Africans as free men into the island.2 Soule had settled the question of his dress in literal accordance with the circular of his chief. He adopted the costume of Benjamin Franklin at the court of Louis XVI. The black-velvet clothes, richly embroidered, the black stockings, a black chapeau, and a black dress sword, set off his black eyes, black locks, and pale complexion, and gave him a striking appearance. He looked, indeed, not like the philosopher whose costume he imitated, but rather like the master of Ravenswood. 3 Contrary to general anticipation, he was received in Madrid by the queen " with marked attention and courtesy." 4 He had, however, good reason to believe that his rejection had been urged upon the Spanish cabinet by the French ambassador, by the Countess of Montijo, the mother of the Empress Eugenie of France and of the Duchess of Alba, and by the Austrian and Mexican ministers.
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1 Marcy to Soule, July 23d, 1853.
2 Marcy to Buchanan, July 2d, 1853.
3 Memories of Many Men, Field, p. 86.
4 Soule to Marcy, October 25th, 1853; see vol. i. pp. 394,395.

Soon after his presentation at court, an affair occurred which gave his family an unpleasant notoriety in every capital of Europe. A ball was given by the Marquis de Turgot, the ambassador of France, in honor of the Empress Eugenie's fete-day, and to this ball all the members of the diplomatic corps were invited. Madame Soule made a striking appearance. She had a beautiful head and expressive face, and her fine person was adorned by a rich and tasteful dress, cut low, designed by the artist of the mode at Paris. The Countess of Montijo, since her daughter had become empress, not only led society in Madrid, but mingled in state affairs with such apparent authority that she was often presumed to be the real representative of France. She needed only to make a remark to have it at once echoed. She criticised severely the toilet of Madame Soule, and the Marquis de Turgot joined in the criticism. The Duke of Alba, brother-in-law of Napoleon III., translated the trifling words into an insulting comparison, saying as Madame Soule was passing," Look at Marguerite de Bourgogne." The dissolute wife of Louis X. was then in every one's mind, owing to the reappearance of Mademoiselle Georges on the Paris stage in Dumas's "La Tour de Nesle,"who revived the memory of the sensation she once had made by her art and sensuous beauty in the impersonation of Marguerite. Nelville Soule chanced to hear the remark about his mother, and, approaching the duke in a menacing manner, applied to him the epithet of canaille. The next morning young Soule sent to the duke a demand for an apology. This was readily given, for the duke in his words had referred entirely to the physical likeness between Madame Soule and Mademoiselle Georges. The lady's character was above reproach, and there was not intended the most distant comparison to the beautiful and wanton Marguerite. But this did not end the matter. The duke was taunted by the proud Castilian grandees with having been forced to eat his words by a beardless boy. Certain reports of the affair which appeared in Galignan’s Messenger and the London journals gave the
duke an opportunity to demand of Nelville Soule that he should disavow those statements. This Soule declined to do, maintaining that the printed accounts were correct. The duke then sent a challenge. Both were experienced swordsmen. They fought for thirty minutes, and although neither was wounded, the seconds declared that honor did not require more; the duel ended with a shaking of hands.

But the hot blood of Pierre Soule boiled at this implied insult. He was of humble origin, and had been forced to leave France on account of advanced political opinions. Turgot, of an ancient noble family, could scarcely endure to meet on equal diplomatic footing a Frenchman of low extraction, as he considered the American minister, and, not content with secretly urging the rejection of Soule by the court, he manifested his contempt by shrugs of the shoulders and by petty slights. Soule now insisted on fighting Turgot, on the ground that the insult had taken place at his house, and no explanation availed to placate the fiery citizen of New Orleans. A duel was actually forced upon Turgot. Pistols were the weapons chosen. The American minister wanted the distance ten paces or under; Lord Howden, the British ambassador and second of Turgot, said that would be brutal murder, and determined that the distance should be forty paces. To this decision Soule was obliged to submit, although he maintained that in America such a duel would be ridiculed as a farce. The first fire was without result; at the second, the ball of Soule's pistol lodged in the thigh of his antagonist, four inches above the knee. The marquis was confined to his bed for a long time, and was lamed for life. A reconciliation between the two gentlemen never took place.1
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1 My authorities for this account are a letter of M. Gaillardet, dated Paris, December 22d, 1853, to the Courrier des Stata-Unis, cited by the New York Herald and New York Times of January 11th, 1854; letter from Madrid, December 26th, 1853, published in the New York Tribune of January 25th, 1854; Memories of Many Men, Field, p. 80.

This duel occurred December 17th, 1853. Six days thereafter Soule wrote an important despatch to his chief. Spain, he said, was almost in a condition of anarchy. The ministry had no longer the confidence of the Cortes and the Senate; the queen had suspended the sessions of the legislature; the ministers wanted to resign. The most astounding rumors were in circulation about the palace. The king had been advised, when the expected royal child should be born, to protest against its legitimacy and inaugurate a movement which should expel the queen from the throne.' She was extremely unpopular. The most shocking stories were current regarding the "innocent Isabella," as she had been called in her youth. The best people avoided her. The lower classes only spoke of her with sneers. Anecdotes most foul were told of her orgies, and everybody believed them. Her unbridled passion, it was said, led her to debauchery in which she seemed to emulate the disorderly adventures of Catherine II. of Russia.2

But to return to the despatch of Soule. He reported that in the midst of the confusion and disorder, it was difficult to transact any business. In foreign affairs, Spain did not move without consulting France or England. The influence of France was at present the more powerful of the two, and she was as much opposed to our acquisition of Cuba as was Great Britain; "and she will remain our enemy as long as she bends her neck under the yoke of the man who now holds the rod over her." Soule spoke of the duplicity of the French minister of foreign affairs; of his own delicate position in Madrid on account of the uneasiness which his presence in Europe seemed to give the French autocrat; of the exceedingly vain and overbearing Turgot, who had charge from the emperor to cut short Soule's course in Spain and
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1 Soule to Marcy, December 23d, 1853.
2 Madrid correspondence of London Times, April 18th; Memories of Many Men, Field, p. 94.

nullify what influence he might gain with the court or the government.1

After the receipt of this despatch, it is plain that the President and Secretary of State should have decided upon the transfer of Soule to some other diplomatic post, or, if there were none such available, that an honorable place should have been found for him at home. Soule was an accomplished and patriotic gentleman who deserved to be treated with consideration; but, on his own showing, he could no longer be of service to this government, unless it were desired to goad Spain into a war. The sequel proves that it was most unfortunate for the reputation of our government that he was permitted to remain at Madrid. He embroiled our relations with Spain to no purpose, trying to inaugurate a system of diplomacy which, had it been adopted, would justly have incurred for us the reproach of the civilized world.

Soule's very difficult position was made more difficult as Calderon, who held the portfolio of foreign affairs, was his personal enemy. The two had quarrelled at Washington when Calderon was the Spanish representative to this country.2 As Soule had apparently now no hope of accomplishing anything with the cabinet, he set to work to ingratiate himself with the queen and the queen dowager. In this he succeeded,3 but to the last he was cordially hated by the aristocracy and the press.

The despatches of Soule in January and February, 1854, show that he had no hope of being able to further the interests of his country by negotiation so long as Calderon should remain Secretary of State. But it was evident that a crisis in affairs was approaching, and he gloated on the difficulties which beset the cabinet. The government, not having the support of any political party, only maintained
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1 Soule to Marcy, December 23d, 1853.
2 New York Times, May 10th, 1854.
3 Memories of Many Men, Field, p. 79; Soule1 to Marcy, January 20th, 1854.

itself by a system of terror. Citizens who had run counter to the whims of the palace were sent to prison or exiled from the country. The press was closely fettered; the treasury was empty; the Bank of San Fernando peremptorily declined to make the government fresh loans, and even the usurers of Madrid were deaf to the entreaties of the court. The queen had already wasted the whole of her income for the current year. Everywhere was distress; food had doubled in price, and the poor of the capital were fed at the public charge. The queen and her secret counsellors were plotting for an absolute monarchy; the ministers, though not averse to the scheme, dared not move in it.

This condition of affairs was sure to redound to the profit of the United States, for it invited a rebellion in Cuba. It seemed unlikely that this event would be deferred later than spring, and in such a case the American minister at Madrid ought to be in a position to take an advantage of the lucky chance offered him. He begged, therefore, for specific powers and sufficient instructions.'

While Soule was fretting over his lack of authority and fuming at his uncomfortable predicament, the Cuban officials played into his hands by committing an outrage on the Black Warrior, an American merchant steamer. She plied between Mobile and New York, stopping at Havana for passengers and mail. She had made thirty-six such voyages, almost always having a cargo for the American port, and never being permitted to bring freight to Havana. The custom of her agent was to clear her "in ballast" the day before her arrival. This practice, while contrary to the regulations of Cuban ports, had always been winked at by the authorities. It was well understood that the Black Warrior generally had a cargo on board, but a detailed manifest of her load had never been required. She had always been permitted to sail unmolested until, when bound from Mobile to New York, she was stopped on the 28th of February, 1854,
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1 Soule to Marcy, January 20th and February 28d.

by order of the royal exchequer, for having violated the regulations of the port. The agent, finding that the cause of this proceeding was the failure to manifest the cargo in transit, offered to amend the manifest, which under the rules he had a right to do; but this the collector, on a flimsy pretext, refused to permit. The agent was at the same time informed that the cargo was confiscated and the captain fined, in pursuance of the custom-house regulations. The cargo was cotton, valued at one hundred thousand dollars; the captain was fined six thousand dollars. The United States consul applied to the captain-general for redress, but no satisfaction was obtained. A gang of men with lighters were sent to the ship, under the charge of the comandante, who ordered the captain of the Black Warrior to discharge her cargo. This he refused to do. The comandante then had the hatches opened, and his men began to take out the bales of cotton. The captain hauled down his flag and abandoned the vessel to the Spanish authorities.1

When the news of this affair reached Washington, it caused excitement there; but the North was too greatly troubled about the Kansas-Nebraska act to respond to the feeling in official circles. The President sent a message to the House of Representatives, stating that indemnity for the injury to our citizens had been demanded from Spain. He suggested that Congress should strengthen his hands by provisional legislation adapted to the emergency, promising that if the negotiations should fail, he would not hesitate to use the authority and means which Congress might grant, "to insure the observance of our just rights, to obtain redress for injuries received, and to vindicate the honor of our flag." 2

The day after the news was received, Marcy sent Soule documents which contained a history of the transaction.
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1 See the documents transmitted to the House of Representatives by the President, March 15th.
2 Message of the President, March 15th.

He expressed the opinion that the outrage would cause deep indignation throughout the country, as it was the most flagrant of many unredressed wrongs of Cuba to this country.1 Six days later the President and cabinet had considered the matter fully, and the Secretary of State was able to give authoritative instructions. Soule was directed to present the transaction as recounted in the documents accompanying the two despatches, and to demand three hundred thousand dollars as indemnity to the owners of the Black Warrior.2 The President, moreover, hoped that her Catholic Majesty would "visit with her displeasure the Cuban officials who have perpetrated the wrong." "Neither the views of this government nor the sentiments of the country," wrote the Secretary, "will brook any evasion or delay on the part of her Catholic Majesty in a case of such flagrant wrong." But lest Soule might urge his country's demands with too great persistence, he was directed simply to present the strong features of the case and refrain from the discussion of it. He should get "as early a reply as practicable" to his demand. With this despatch was sent a special messenger, who would wait a reasonable time for the answer of the Spanish government.3

The journey from Washington to Madrid in 1854 took a longer time than is now required to go from Washington to Yokohama. The messenger could travel almost all of the way by rail from Paris to Bayonne; but thence he must proceed by diligence or by the Spanish mail. The vehicles were rickety, the roads were rough, and the traveller was seventy-six hours on the road. In the winter or early spring he suffered intensely from the cold; he was almost certain to be upset, and he might consider himself fortunate if he were not attacked and robbed by highwaymen.4 It was the
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1 Marcy to Soule, March 11th.
2 They had abandoned the vessel; one hundred thousand dollars was for the cargo, two hundred thousand dollars for the vessel.
3 Marcy to Soule, March 17th.
4 See Field's description of his journey, p. 77.

7th of April when the messenger arrived at Madrid, and put the last despatch of the Secretary of State into Soule's hands. Three days previously had come Marcy's first communication in regard to the affair, and we may well imagine that Soule thanked his stars for what seemed to him a lucky event. Here was a chance to extricate himself from the unpleasant position into which he had fallen after his duel with Turgot. The average American deemed the seizure of the BlackWarrior a moderate wrong; to Soule it appeared a gross indignity. His eagerness to obtain Cuba colored every thought and prompted every action. He believed that the man who should be instrumental in acquiring the island would be the leader of the Democratic party, and while, being foreign-born, he could not aspire to the presidency, he relished the idea of being President-maker.1

Soule immediately asked Calderon for an interview; when they met on the 8th of April he gave a full history of the transaction, and left with the Spanish minister a letter which expressed the hope of the President that her Catholic Majesty would not only "make prompt reparation to the injured citizens of the United States, but also visit with her displeasure the Cuban officials."2 Thus far Soule confined himself to his instructions. Three days went by without a reply. The day after the interview was Sunday, which was kept with great solemnity in Spain, and Holy Week began on the Monday. Though the procrastination of Spanish officials was well known, the hot temper of the American minister would not take into account the holy season or the ingrained character of those he was dealing with. On April 11th, he sent a sharp letter to Calderon. The wrong, he said, was "of a highly grievous character," and "the United States cannot brook that the reparation due them for the insult offered to their flag and the injury done to the property of their citizens be in any way evaded or unnecessarily delayed.2 He demanded the sum of three hundred thousand dollars as
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1 See Field, p. 98.
2 Soule to Calderon, April 8th.

indemnity, and that all persons concerned in the perpetration of the wrong should be dismissed from her Majesty's service. He asserted that if these demands were not complied with in forty-eight hours, the government of the United States would consider that her Majesty's government had determined to uphold the conduct of its officers.1 The secretary of legation who carried this despatch to Calderon indicated to him, by pointing to the clock, that it was now exactly twelve, and that in precisely two days at the selfsame minute an answer would be due.

Calderon had already written a reply to Soule's first note, but did not send it until after he had received the letter of belligerent tone. It was in the usual Spanish manner, arguing for delay because authentic and complete information had not been received. The feeble Secretary of State would also have avoided a direct answer to the second note of the American minister, but his colleagues agreed on a reply, and forced him to sign it.2 They, in turn, were undoubtedly braced in their position by the ambassadors of England and France, trained diplomats, who shrewdly surmised that Soule had exceeded his instructions, and would not be sustained by his government. The reply sent on April 12th was couched in terms of haughty dignity that recalled the old days of Spain, when it was her custom to make imperious demands, not to hear them.

The despatch said that, considering all the circumstances of the case, the government had replied with promptness. The secretary promised that when full information was received, the affair should be carefully considered. But it was unreasonable to expect that a grave and definite determination would be arrived at when only one side of the case had been heard. The words of the American minister called
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1 Soule to Calderon, April 11th.
2 Madrid correspondence London Times, April 17th. This correspondent was thoroughly informed, and undoubtedly had his information from the British ambassador.

forth a reprimand. The peremptory manner of exacting satisfaction, he wrote, suggested "a suspicion that it is not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in the defence of pretended injuries as an incomprehensible pretext for exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel, between two friendly powers." But the Secretary hoped the United States government would not insist upon a decision until the expected information arrived, which would enable her Majesty's government to determine its course intelligently and justly. He added: "If, unfortunately, it should not be so, the opinion of the civilized world will decide on which side is the right." In conclusion, he wished to impress upon the mind of the American minister "that the government of her Majesty, jealous also of its decorum, is not accustomed to the harsh and imperious manner with which this matter has been expressed; which, furthermore, is not the most adequate for attaining to the amicable settlement which is wished for."1

The spirit of the proud Castilian spoke in this despatch. It cannot be denied that the imperious words of Soule justified this dignified reply and severe reprimand. It has a noble ring when we consider it the answer of a weak, degenerate nation to a strong, energetic people; for the senders of this message thought that they had thrown down the gauntlet to the United States, and they expected that the next communication from the American minister would be a demand for his passports.2 The ministry were certain of the sympathy of England and France, but, in the event of hostilities with the United States, material aid from these two countries was hardly to be hoped for, as they were now engaged in a fierce war with Russia. The Spaniards did not know that a more efficient force than England and France was working for them—public sentiment in the northern half of the Union.
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1 Calderon to Soule, April 12th.
2 Madrid correspondence London Times, April 20th.

In the official circles of Madrid, war with the United States was now considered as very probable, and the chances of it were seriously discussed. The most sensible men in Spain were convinced that Cuba must sooner or later belong to the United States, but no one would have dared to propose its sale.1 Such a project would have displaced any ministry and more than likely overturned the dynasty. In the event of hostilities with the United States, none but the proud Spaniards had a shadow of doubt as to what would be the fate of Cuba, but that conquest would be a very different affair from the conquest of Mexico. The Americans would find that to win the " Queen of the Antilles " was a difficult task. The forts and the city would be obstinately defended. Nor would the Spaniards confine themselves to a defensive warfare. By the time that Havana was taken the magnificent merchant marine of the United States would be swept from the seas by privateers issuing from the ports of Spain. Nor would the fall of the capital city end the contest. The slaves would be given their freedom on condition of fighting the invaders; and when the Americans had finally obtained possession of Cuba, they might find it, as to waste and ruin and social conditions, a very St. Domingo, instead of the fair, fruitful island they had set out to conquer.2

On the day that the American messenger left Madrid with despatches from Soule informing his government of the sudden check the negotiations had received, there was published the decree of the Spanish government announcing the intention of putting an effectual stop to the slave-trade and providing for a better regulation of the slaves in Cuba.3
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1 Madrid correspondence London Times, April 21st.
2 The chances of such a war are well discussed in the Madrid correspondence of the London Times, April 21st and May 10th. Clayton said in the Senate, May 22d, that he had heard the former Spanish minister threaten that the slaves would be emancipated in Cuba rather than permit the Americans to take it by violence.
3 Madrid correspondence London Times, April 17th. See discussion in the House of Commons.

This was a compliment to the influence of England, whose government had been urging Spain to this course, and was a bid for her support. Six thousand soldiers were ordered to the West Indies to reinforce the garrisons of Cuba.1

When the correspondence between Soule and Calderon reached Washington, the little flurry caused by the seizure of the BlackWarrior had subsided, except where an excitement was kept alive by the operations of filibusters. The ship and her cargo had been released. She was now plying as usual between New York and Mobile, touching at Havana, where she was treated with great consideration by the authorities.

A few days before the despatch from Madrid had arrived, Slidell, senator from Louisiana, introduced a resolution directing that the committee on foreign relations should inquire into the expediency of authorizing the President to suspend the neutrality laws. This was a move to make easy the operation of filibusters on Cuba; and if the execution of those laws were intermitted, a formidable expedition certainly would be fitted out in this country. The proposition fell flat in the Senate, aroused no interest in the border States, and when alluded to at all in the North was only mentioned with indignation. From several brief discussions in Congress, it was plainly to be seen that a proposition looking in the slightest degree to war with Spain on account of the Black Warrior affair would not for a moment be entertained. Not a resolution in response to the President's message had ever been introduced. Clingman and a representative from Louisiana had broached to the administration a project which should put ten million dollars at the disposal of the President, giving him authority to employ the army and navy and accept the services of fifty thousand volunteers; but Pierce, Marcy, and Davis
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1 Madrid correspondence London Times, May 10th; Soule to Marcy, May 34th.

were earnest in their opposition to any such proposition, and the matter went no further.1

However, after Soule's important despatches were received, the cabinet was reported as divided on the subject, Davis and Cushing urging that the minister should be fully sustained.2 Soule confidently expected that when the text of Spain's reply was read to the cabinet, he would be ordered at once to demand his passports and leave Spain, and that war would ensue.3 But the President was not at first disposed to any such conclusion. He came to no decision, except that nothing should be positively determined until after further advices from Madrid. A Spanish ambassador to Washington was now on the way, and it might be advisable to renew with him negotiations that had come to a standstill at Madrid. Soule was not recalled, nor was his course approved.4

Although the correspondence between Soule and Calderon was kept secret in this country, the essential points of it had been communicated by the Madrid correspondent of the London Times to his journal. The Spanish government was proverbially leaky. What the ministers did not disclose, the queen and her secret counsellors were sure to tell. The English minister, to whom the contents of the letters had been communicated, undoubtedly assisted the representative of the Times in furnishing information to the British public, and was of great service in enabling him to sift the rumors which were current in Madrid. At any rate, he got
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1 Speeches and Writings of Thos. L. Clingman, pp. 375, 376, quoted by Von Hoist.
2 Washington correspondence of New York Times, May 10th. The Washington National Intelligencer of May 13th said: "We have reason to believe that the New York Times correspondent in this city possesses facilities for becoming well-informed in our diplomatic State affairs." James W. Simonton was the correspondent.
3 Memories of Many Men, Field, p. 84.
4 Simonton in New York Times, Washington, May 10th. The subsequent diplomatic correspondence confirms this.

at the gist of the correspondence. His letters were extensively copied into the American journals, so that the public were almost as well informed of the essential facts as were the cabinet. They knew that Soule had made extraordinary demands; it was presumed he had exceeded his authority; and they knew that his demands had met with a peremptory refusal. The Northern and border States held no feeling of resentment towards Spain. Indeed, one may find expressions of amusement at the plight of Soule, but no sentiment whatever in favor of the government gratifying his self-love by giving him its support.

Far otherwise was the sentiment of the slavery propaganda. The acquisition of Cuba was certain to increase their power in the federal Union by the addition of two or more slave States; therefore, they wanted a pretext for a war with Spain. They were convinced she would not sell Cuba,1 and they pretended to believe that a movement was set on foot to Africanize the island. By this it was meant that the influence of Great Britain had been strong enough to induce Spain to take steps towards the emancipation of the slaves; that there was a "settled design to throw Cuba ultimately into the hands of its negro population, and to revive there . . . the scenes of San Domingo's revolution."2 In spite of the explicit denial of this report by the Captain General of Cuba; 3 in defiance of the assurance of the English Foreign Secretary of State that there was no foundation for the belief;4 and although Clayton challenged Benjamin
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1 See the speech in the Senate, May 22d, of Mallory, of Florida.
2Senator Mallory's resolution introduced into the Senate, May 17th. The resolutions of the legislature of Louisiana presented to the Senate by Benjamin, May 24th, were similar in purport.
3 Decree of the Captain-General of May 3d, published in New York Times of May 16th.
4 Buchanan, in a despatch to Marcy of November 1st, 1853, reported a conversation had with Lord Clarendon: "I said,1 Your lordship must be fully aware of the deep, the vital, interest which we feel in regard to the condition of the colored population of Cuba. This island is within sight of our shores; and should a black government like that of Hayti be established there, it would endanger the peace and domestic security of a large and important portion of our people. To come, then, to the point: it has been publicly stated and reiterated over and over again in the United States, that Spain, should she find it impossible to retain the island, will emancipate the slaves upon it; and that the British government is endeavoring to persuade her to pursue this course.' I here paused for a reply.
"He answered,' We certainly have no wish, very far from it, to see a black government established in Cuba. We have been pressing Spain incessantly to put down the African slave-trade with Cuba; and I regret to say, without yet having produced the effect which we so much desire. . . . With the exception of urging Spain to abolish the slave-trade and endeavoring to trace out the emancipados, and do them the justice which good faith requires of us—and in this last we have had very little success —we have never had any negotiations of any kind with Spain or attempted to exercise any influence over her respecting the condition of the slaves in Cuba. We have not the most remote idea in any event of ever attempting to acquire Cuba for ourselves. We have already too many colonies, far more than are profitable to us.'"—MSS. State Department Archives.
Buchanan wrote Marcy, November 12th, 1853: Lord Clarendon observed that "he was very much pained to learn there had been a violent and wholly unfounded article in the Washington Union charging them with an intrigue with Spain to 'Africanize' Cuba."—Ibid.
March 17th, 1854, Buchanan reported a conversation with Clarendon in which he asked: "Have Great Britain and France entered into any treaty or understanding of any kind whatever concerning Cuba, or in relation either to the present or prospective condition of that island?" He replied: "Great Britain and France have not entered into any treaty or understanding, direct or indirect, of any kind whatever concerning Cuba or in relation to the present or prospective condition of Cuba; we have never even thought of such a thing, nor have we the least intention to adopt any such course."—Ibid.
The position of England was well understood by the public. See Washington correspondence Philadelphia Ledger, May 28th, cited in New York Times; Washington correspondence New York Courier and Enquirer, cited in the Independent, June 8th.

to bring as proof of the assertion an expression of belief in the story from the present Secretary of State, or from any other man who had ever held that office,1 yet Southern senators
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1 In the Senate, May 24th.

persistently averred that unless we interfered, the scenes of St. Domingo would be repeated within a few hours' sail of our shores. It cannot be supposed that intelligent men like Benjamin and Slidell believed this story, but they knew the credulity of the Southern people where their darling institution was concerned, and, as a similar report had created a powerful opinion in support of the annexation of Texas the spread of this tale was sure to work up a sentiment in favor of a war with Spain, and it would arouse a feeling of sympathy with the designs of the filibusters who were now actively at work.

The leader of the filibusters was Quitman, a former governor of Mississippi and a personal and political friend of Jefferson Davis. He had visited Washington in July, 1853, and, frankly disclosing his object to many distinguished men at the capital, had been delighted to hear expressions of sympathy and receive the assurance that there would not be a pretext for federal interference with his plan.1 He had then devoted himself earnestly to the task, and in May of this year the project was almost ripe. "The great Cuban army," wrote a gentleman from Jackson, Mississippi, " will soon be ready to start, under command of our former governor, General Quitman. The men who are going from this section are of the right stripe and will never say die.' Mississippi rifles will tell the tale on Spanish soldiers. There is no secret
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1 Life and Correspondence of Gen. John A. Quitman, Claiborne, vol. ii. p. 195. Quitman is an example of a Northern man who became intensely Southern in his opinions. Born and educated in New York State, he was for a time professor at Mount Airy College, Germantown, Penn.; he studied law in Ohio, and was admitted to the bar; he went South when twenty-three years old, married a wealthy woman of Mississippi at twenty-six, and came into possession of a large estate. He served in the legislature of Mississippi, became chancellor of the State, was a brigadier general in the Mexican war. On return from the war was elected governor, and was sent to Congress in 1854 and 1856. Throughout life Quitman was an avowed advocate of the doctrine of States-rights and a leader of the extreme Southern party.

about this movement. Every one who has been to New Orleans says that the amount of money subscribed by the merchants there is very heavy. Every one favors the move, and although the New Orleans papers keep dark, yet the subject is bar-room talk. There is no man so well qualified as old Quitman. He has the confidence of the sharp-shooters of this State. . . . The plan meets with favor among the cotton-planters, but they have not come forward with the dimes to the amount that was anticipated."1 A letter from the same city a week later stated that General Quitman and his staff were in New Orleans; that a sufficient number of men had enlisted, but money was needed; three hundred thousand dollars more was necessary, and Quitman and another man had almost made up their minds to mortgage their estates to secure that amount. The state of Soule's negotiation was well understood; it was thought that the filibusters were in intimate connection with him, and that he had exceeded his instructions in the hope of bringing about trouble between the United States and Spain, thereby furthering the designs of those who were ready to attack Cuba.2

There is no question that powerful influences were now brought to bear upon the President with the design of having him assume a position in the Black Warrior affair that would force Congress, for the honor of the country and for the support of the executive, to authorize proceedings which could only result in a war with Spain. The ruling spirit of this cabal was Jefferson Davis, and as he apparently at this moment controlled the columns of the Washington Union, it was not an idle fear that he had the ascendency over the
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1 Private letter from Jackson, Mississippi, to a gentleman in New York City, dated May 27th, New York Tribune, June 10th.
2 Letter from Jackson, Mississippi, to the editor of the New York Times, dated June 4th, published June 14th, the journal vouching that it was from "an intelligent and reliable source; "see also extracts from a "Private and Confidential" circular, issued by the Cuban conspirators in New Orleans, published in the New York Tribune of June 15th.

President. "We are quite free to state," said the organ of the administration—"and in terms so emphatic and unequivocal as to admit of no misinterpretation—that if ample satisfaction is not allowed for the piratical seizure of the Black Warrior we shall advocate an immediate blockade of the island."1 A few days later the organ complacently stated, as if the matter had already been decided upon, that, "in the course of the thick-coming events Cuba is bound to be admitted" into the Union.2 The senators and representatives from the cotton States were convinced that now was a most favorable opportunity to strike for Cuba. On May 20th, news was received from Havana which seemed to indicate that the apple was ready for the plucking. Letters which reached Washington that day were full of an impending revolution in the island.3 It was reported that the Creole proprietors were determined to stand oppression no longer; that the registration of the slaves in accordance with the decree of the Captain-General had given rise to a rumor that emancipation of the negroes would soon follow, and that this was bringing matters to a crisis.4 The Captain-General had solemnly denounced as false and malicious the rumor that a compact had been made with Great Britain which would result in freeing the slaves. But the story continued to circulate. The authorities became alarmed, and with diligence made ready to repress an insurrection at home and repel an attack from the United States.

At the time that the important despatches from Soule reached Washington, the attention of the administration and of the country was absorbed in the struggle over the Kansas-Nebraska bill in the House of Representatives. When the importance of these several events was realized, as tending to one certain course of action, the bill had passed the
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1 Washington Union, May 11th, cited in New York Times.
2 Washington Union, cited by New York Times of May 15th.
3 Simonton to New York Times, Washington, May 20th.
4 Simonton from Washington, May 23d, New York Times.

House and its final enactment was a foregone conclusion. There were those who, in their enthusiasm over the parliamentary victory, not looking beyond the district of Columbia, thought that the dominant party could accomplish anything which they would undertake. Energetic and prompt action on the part of Congress or a word from the President was all that was needed to precipitate action. The cabinet were more disposed than at first to sustain Soule, since a precedent for his demand had been found.1 The warlike disposition of a large part of the cabinet was no secret. Five Democratic representatives from New York, who had opposed the Nebraska scheme, now issued an address to their constituents, in which they averred that there was a determination "to acquire Cuba utterly reckless of consequences." Little doubt can exist "that an effort will be made directly or indirectly at the conquest of Cuba and its incorporation into the Union as additional slave territory;" and it is a reasonable cause for fear that" we are about to be precipitated into a war" on account of the BlackWarrior affair.2 "We have reason to know," said the New York Times, in a carefully written article," that the impression is very strong among the best-informed men at Washington that the administration has purposely arranged matters so as to render a war with Spain almost inevitable. A very distinguished gentleman, not long since a cabinet officer and likely to be well informed on the subject, has expressed the belief that we should be at war with Spain within ninety days." 3

Yet the action was not taken by Congress, and the word was not spoken by the President. If Pierce was for a moment inclined to follow the lead of Davis in this matter, he shrank from it when confronted by the resistance of the
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1 Simonton, Washington, May 28th, New York Times.
2 This address was to justify their action on the Kansas-Nebraska bill; was published in the New York Times, May 29th.
3 June 2d.

Secretary of State and the almost certain opposition of Congress.1 Marcy and the members of the majority averse to war were backed by the almost unanimous sentiment of the North; and their arguments, pointed as they were by constant references to the mighty force of the actual public opinion, in the end prevailed.

On the 1st of June a proclamation was issued by the President warning the filibusters who were fitting out an expedition for the invasion of Cuba that the neutrality laws would be enforced, and that they would be prosecuted. Quitman was afterwards arrested at New Orleans and obliged to give bonds that he would for nine months observe the neutrality laws of the United States. A few days after this important step was taken by the President, it became apparent that the moderate element in the administration had won and that the danger of war was past.2

It is highly probable that but for the strong feeling aroused at the North by the Kansas-Nebraska measure, the Southern propaganda would at this time have forced the administration and Congress into war with Spain for the conquest of Cuba. The Black Warrior affair would have been a contemptible cause of war between two friendly countries, but lighter pretexts than that have sufficed to bring about hostilities when the wolf nation has desired to prey upon the lamb. The conditions were supremely favorable for the United States. The only powers from which Spain could expect help were engaged in the Crimean war. Although the government of England would dislike to see the country which was disputing with her the commercial supremacy of the seas get possession of Cuba, yet Cobden represented a powerful sentiment when he declared amid cheers in the House of Commons that, "Without saying
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1 See Life of Davis, Alfriend, p. 97.
2 See Simonton, Washington, June 9th and 15th, New York Times. I will add that the contemporaneous and subsequent events adequately confirm the reports of Simonton at the time.

one word about the expediency of giving Cuba to the United States or assisting that country to take possession of the island, he thought it would be greatly for the interests of humanity if the United States or any other power that would altogether discountenance the slave trade should possess it."1 And Clarendon, the English foreign Secretary of State had admitted to Buchanan that Cuba was wretchedly governed. He said that he had told the Spanish minister at London "that if Spain lost Cuba it would be altogether their own fault, and they would be indebted for it to the wretched manner in which they governed the island." He further informed Buchanan "that although Spain did not deserve it at the hands of the British government, they still felt a sympathy for her arising out of their ancient alliances."2 The Empress Eugenie would indeed have been glad to assist her native country, but France could hardly undertake another war merely for a sentiment. It was therefore unlikely that either France or England would interfere in a conflict between the United States and Spain, and this was well understood at our State department.

It is indeed true that if the difficulty could be accommodated by reasonable negotiation, a sense of justice and regard for the opinion of the civilized world should have prevented our government from pouncing upon Spain. But it was not thus that many of those in authority argued. They applied the remark of Burke to the present case. "If," the English statesman said, "my neighbor's house is in flames and the fire is likely to spread to my own, I am justified in interfering to avert a disaster which promises to be equally
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1 Hansard's Pari. Debates. Third Series, vol. cxxxii., April 4th, 1854; see New York Times, April 17th; also extract from Liverpool Times, quoted in the Senate by Mallory, May 22d. "In the present state of feeling in England, no great regret would be felt if the Americans were to get possession of Cuba in the scramble. In its present hands, that beautiful island is a source to us of more annoyance than any other place on the globe, Russia not excepted."
2 Buchanan to Marcy, November 1st, 1853. MSS. State Department Archives.

fatal to both." Cuba, asserted the organ of the administration, under her present rule threatens our prosperity and our honor, and there is but one single way by which the present situation can be remedied. We must take the island if needs be, in defiance of all Europe.1 It may be affirmed with confidence that Northern public opinion excited by the Kansas-Nebraska act alone prevented this unjust war.2 Without that power at his back, Marcy would have protested in vain. He would have been forced to resign as was Webster when he stood in the way of the annexation of Texas. And had not many Northern senators and representatives felt that they had already dared too much in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, they could have been induced to register the decrees of the slavery propaganda in regard to Cuba.

What a foolish piece of state-craft was that of the Southern leaders in 1854! They obtained a fighting chance in
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1 Washington Union, May 11th, cited by New York Times, May 13th. 2 The evidences of this statement are without number. I will cite three. Clayton said in the Senate, May 22d: "I see no reason at this time for this government's interference for the purpose of obtaining Cuba by war or violence of any kind or by the repeal of our laws of neutrality. I think it a dangerous period to make an effort of that description. There is great excitement at this time in the public mind throughout the United States in reference to the subject of slavery." The New York Courier and Enquirer said, June 1st: "Does the sane man live who believes that if Cuba was tendered us to-morrow with the full sanction of England and France that this people would consent to receive and annex her? . . . There was a time when the North would have consented to annex Cuba, but the Nebraska wrong has forever rendered annexation impossible." Said the New York Times, May 26th: "There is a growing and profound determination among the masses of the free States that slavery shall not extend itself; that the great majority for freedom must arouse and simply put the minority down—come what may."
None of these are radical authorities. Clayton was a Southern Whig. His position and former experience in the State department gave his utterances great weight. The New York Courier and Enquirer was conservative Whig. The New York Times, while the organ of Senator Seward, was not as radical as the Tribune and Evening Post.

Kansas, but they threw away the pearl of the Antilles, the island which would have been a rock and a fortress for their Southern confederacy.1

Although the President and Secretary of State had decided against a course that would surely lead to war, they had by no means relinquished the hope of the acquisition of Cuba. Marcy was undoubtedly as anxious to get the island as was Davis, but he could not be persuaded that the end would justify any means. He was, moreover, of the opinion that money would induce Spain to part with the possession she held so dear. Before he had received the account of the Black Warrior negotiations, he had written to Soule: "Should circumstances present a favorable opportunity, you are directed by the President to renew the attempt to purchase that island."2 The secretary was so impressed with the importance of this despatch that he sent Colonel Sumner as a special messenger to deliver it. But as Soule had practically demanded satisfaction at the point of the sword, he could not now treat for a peaceful purchase.3 The Spanish minister of foreign affairs now notified him that the Black Warrior affair had been settled with her owners. The property for which the indemnity of three hundred thousand dollars was asked had been returned; the fine remitted; the Black Warrior had been granted the same privileges at Havana as were allowed the steamers of the English Royal Mail company, and the company to which she belonged was thoroughly satisfied with the termination of the affair. The United States government had no longer cause for complaint; the facts showed that no insult had been offered to the American flag. The Spanish minister at the close of his letter did not forbear alluding to the "peremptory demands and acrid language" of Soule, and the "unfriendly haste" with
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1 See a significant article in the Richmond Enquirer, cited in New York Times, May 19th.
2 Marcy to Soule, April 3d.
3 Soule to Marcy, May 3d.

which the President of the United States had censured the action of the Captain-General of Cuba.1

The reply of Marcy to this communication was emphatic. "The wrong and insult to the nation," he wrote, have not been atoned; the treatment of the Black Warrior "was clearly an act of flagrant wrong;. . . the manner in which our demand for indemnity has been met by Spain is very unsatisfactory to the President and the attempted justification of the conduct of the Cuban authorities has rather aggravated than mitigated their offence." The offence was nothing less than an attempt to plunder American citizens. Soule was given the liberty to read this despatch to the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, but, fearing lest he might translate the emphatic words into a threat of aggressive action, his instruction was drawn up with great care. The President, wrote Marcy, "does not therefore expect you will at present take any further steps in relation to the outrage in the case of the Black Warrior. 2

The correspondence between Marcy and Soule shows the utter lack of sympathy between the two and the difference in their manner of envisaging a question. The Secretary of State had disapproved of Soule's appointment as minister to Spain.3 Soule was born too late; he seemed like a knight errant of a former century, the very opposite of a diplomat who uses language to conceal his thoughts. An insult to his nation was a grievous thing. To Soule the course was clear —Spain should apologize or fight. Marcy, on the other hand, was a hard-headed lawyer and a representative man of business of the nineteenth century. Menacing language he thought sometimes proper, and it might be used in a Pickwickian sense. He would, indeed, have repelled the charge that he himself said more than he meant, and the result certainly justifies the language of this despatch, for
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1 Calderon to Soule, May 7th.
2 Marcy to Soule, June 22d.
3 See New York Evening Post, March 7th, 1855.

in the end it was the means of bringing about a settlement of the difficulty.1

Had not Soule been working in a bad cause, we might admire his straightforwardness; we certainly should not fail to sympathize with him in his unpleasant position. Supposing that he would be sustained, he waited with all the patience at his command the six weeks that must necessarily elapse before he could hear from his chief. He feared that Congress would fail to take the resolve which the occasion required. In this case he would not for a moment retain a post from which he must behold the contemptuous insolence that his "discomfiture and that of the administration would be so sure to provoke." 2 Time went on, but not a word came from the Secretary of State. Soule suffered "torturing anxiety;" he saw frequent intimations in the American papers that there was a disagreement between him and the cabinet. If there be the least foundation for these reports, he wrote, "pray tender at once my resignation to the President."3 Nine days later he received a despatch from Marcy, but he was "concerned not to find in it the least intimation of the light in which is viewed by the cabinet the course" he had pursued under the guidance of the Secretary of State in the Black Warrior affair. His private letters gave him no encouragement, and his position was becoming "so painful and delicate" that he could not think of holding it much longer. He reported that the belief was prevalent at Madrid that he had exceeded his instructions and that everything which he had done would be disavowed. Congress had certainly hurt our reputation for character by not responding promptly to the President's message of March 15th.4 Soule was obviously disappointed at the
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1 Calderon did not see the despatch of June 22d. It was not shown to the minister of foreign affairs until December 8th, and at that time a new ministry was in power.
2 Soule to Marcy, May 24th.
3 Soule to Marcy, June 10th.
4 Soule to Marcy, June 19th.

President's proclamation against the filibusters. He saw his great desire receding from his grasp.1 At last, fifty days after he had expected to receive a warm approbation of his course, there came cold and measured words which seemed wrung from the Secretary of State. The President, he wrote, is "satisfied with the spirited manner in which you have performed the duties of your mission," but he thinks that " weight and perhaps efficiency" will be given to the negotiation " if he should associate with you two other of our most distinguished citizens."'2

Before this despatch and the one which Soule was instructed to read to Calderon reached him, a revolution had taken place in Spain which, starting with high anticipations of reform and hopes for liberty, really effected nothing but a change of ministry. Several engagements with the insurgents occurred. Queen Isabella ran the risk of capture by the rebels; the palace of the queen dowager was sacked and her life threatened. The chivalrous nature of Soule here showed itself. He alone of the diplomatic body offered the queen dowager the shelter of his house and the protection of his flag.3 The change of ministry greatly improved Soule's position, and he was able to renew the negotiations. The news of the Spanish revolution was of considerable interest to the administration. It strengthened the hopes of Marcy that a purchase of Cuba might be effected, and it revived the desire for provisional legislation which had in March been suggested by the President. As Congress was on the point of adjourning, the Washington Union begged that a few millions of money should be placed at the disposal of the executive during the recess to be used in the Spanish-Cuban business.4 The President in a special
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1 Soule to Marcy, June 24th.
2 Marcy to Soule, June 24th.
3 See Memories of Many Men, Field, p. 91.
4 Washington Union, July 30th, cited by New York Times.

messsage to the Senate hinted strongly in the same direction, but the Senate committee of foreign affairs reported that as the interval between adjournment and the next session of Congress would be short, they would not recommend any provisional measures.1

On the 16th of August Marcy wrote that the sending of an extraordinary commission to Spain had been abandoned, but it was suggested to Soule that much advantage might accrue from "a full and free interchange of views" between himself, Buchanan, and Mason in regard to the acquisition of Cuba.2 Soule "felt much relieved by the tender of so grateful an association," and set out as soon as possible for Paris.3 Marcy desired that the meeting should be quiet and partake of an informal character, but Soule was fond of theatrical display and was not unwilling that the conference should attract attention by its solemn and imposing character. Ostend was selected as the place of meeting. The ministers remained there three days, then retired to Aixla-Chapelle, where they recorded the result of their deliberations. The conference attracted attention in Europe, notwithstanding that all eyes were fixed on the siege of Sebastopol. It also gave rise to comment in the United States, although at the time the public mind was engaged by the fall elections. The paper which Buchanan, Mason, and Soule signed is known as the Ostend manifesto. It was not published until more than four months after its transmission to the Secretary of State, and was then brought to the light by a call from the House of Representatives.

It began by stating that there had "been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments," and that the committee had arrived at a cordial agreement. They were fully convinced that an earnest effort should be made
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1 This report was made August 3d.
3 See Soule to Marcy, October 15th.
2 Marcy to Soule, August 16th.

immediately for the purchase of Cuba, and advised offering for it one hundred and twenty million dollars.' An argument followed to show that Cuba was necessary to the United States and that it was likewise for the manifest advantage of Spain to part with it for the price we were willing to pay. Then the three diplomats proceeded: "But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what ought to be the course of the American government under such circumstances?" The answer is easy. Since "the Union can never enjoy repose nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries;" and as "self-preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as with individuals," we must apply this "great law" to the acquisition of Cuba. It is true this principle was abused in the partition of Poland, but the present is "not a parallel case;" and if we "preserve our own conscious rectitude and our own self-respect ... we can afford to disregard the censures of the world." Therefore: "After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be answered in the affirmative [it had already been so answered in the manifesto], then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home. . . . We should be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers,
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1 In the publication the price was left blank, but the argument in the subsequent part of the manifesto shows plainly enough that one hundred and twenty million dollars was the sum which the diplomats had in mind.

and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union. We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending towards such a catastrophe." To these sentiments were subscribed the names of James Buchanan, J. Y. Mason, and Pierre Soule.

It will be plainly apparent to the reader that this manifesto expressed the sincere opinion of Soule. That Mason, who belonged to a Virginian junto which was anxious for Cuba, should have signed it may not occasion surprise; but it remains something of a mystery why the cautious and experienced Buchanan should have agreed to a manifesto which contained notions abhorrent to justice and at war with the opinion of the civilized world. Field, who was in a position to learn the inside history of the transaction, understood that the manifesto was originally written by Soule and then revised by Buchanan. Yet the measures recommended were so ultra that neither Buchanan nor Mason would have signed it had not Soule cajoled them by his enthusiastic advocacy.1 Mason was afterwards conscious that he had been overborne, for he took occasion to warn Field against the fascinations of the minister to Spain, whom he described "as a perfect bird-charmer."2 We may presume that Soule drew the veil and showed Buchanan the vision of the White House and persuaded him that with the next Democratic convention Cuba would be a more powerful argument than Nebraska. When we take into account the characteristics of the three men we can hardly resist the conclusion that Soule, as he afterwards intimated, twisted his colleagues round his finger.3

Soule did not propose to have any misunderstanding about the matter. He sent with the manifesto an explanatory
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1 Memories of Many Men, p. 99.
2 Ibid., p. 76.
3 Ibid., p. 99.

despatch to Marcy in which he expressed his own idea without the least circumlocution. He affirmed that we must get Cuba; we must settle that matter now; never should we have a fairer opportunity. "Present indications," he wrote, "would seem to encourage the hope that we may come to that solution peaceably. But if it were otherwise," —if we must go to war for it—when could there be a better time for war than now, while the great powers of Europe " are engaged in that stupendous struggle. . . . Neither England nor France," he added, "would be likely to interfere with us."1

The reply of Marcy to the manifesto was chilling. He first affected to understand that the three ministers did not "recommend to the President to offer to Spain the alternative of cession or seizure" of Cuba;2 but he proceeded to reason earnestly against such a proposition, and took direct issue with the self-preservation argument. The instructions to the minister at Madrid were completely at variance with the policy laid down in the manifesto. If Spain were disposed to entertain an offer for Cuba, the offer might be made; but there should be no attempt "to push on a negotiation" if the men in power were averse to it.3 Field, who was acting secretary of legation at Paris, carried this despatch from Paris to Madrid and delivered it into the hands of Soule. Soule, elated at winning Buchanan and Mason to his views, had again indulged in glittering hopes, but these were now dashed by the measured words of the Secretary of State. After reading and pondering the despatch, he said: "My amazement is without limit. I am stunned. Of one thing only I am certain, and that is, that it is the
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1 Soule to Marcy, London, October 20th. The manifesto is dated Aix-la-Chapelle, October 18th.
2 It has been urged that Buchanan and Mason did not understand the conclusions of the manifesto as Soule and every one else did. See Life of Buchanan, Curtis, vol. ii. p. 136. Field, pp. 75, 100. Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, it does not seem as if the intent could have been made plainer.
3 Marcy to Soule, November 18th.

irresponsible work of Mr. Marcy. The President can neither have inspired nor sanctioned it."1

Reflection soon convinced Soule that personal dignity required him to throw up the Spanish mission. He and Marcy could not work together. After his resignation he gleefully reported a circumstance which demonstrated that Marcy's plan of peaceful purchase was impracticable. The minister of foreign affairs had declared in the Cortes that, in the opinion of the government," to part with Cuba would be to part with national honor." This statement was received with unanimous and entire approbation by the representatives, and in the galleries with "frantic applause."2 Yet Soule did not for a moment give up the idea of the acquisition of Cuba, but under the present Secretary of State he felt that he should linger at Madrid " in languid impotence."3 He might, however, be able to do something for the cause at Washington. The resignation of Soule ends this inglorious chapter of our diplomatic history.4

The reception of the Ostend manifesto is a mark of the difference between the notions of international justice which to-day prevail and those of the decade of 1850-60.5 Should
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1 Field, p. 79.
2 Soule to Marcy, December 23d.
3 Soule to Marcy, December 17th.
4 Soon after Soule's resignation, the differences between the two governments in regard to the Black Warrior affair were arranged in conformity to the ideas of the Secretary of State as declared in his despatch of June 22d. The pacific language of Perry, whom Soule left in charge of affairs, aided in effecting a settlement. See statement of the Spanish minister of foreign affairs in the Cortes, May 3d, 1855. Also letter of H. J. Perry to the President, dated Madrid, April 27th, 1855, published in National Intelligencer, May 22d, 1855.
5 In 1889 Secretary Blaine was supposed to be favorable to a Jingo policy. August 29th, 1890, he said in a public speech: "We are not seeking annexation of territory. Certainly we do not desire it unless it should come by the volition of a people who might ask the priceless boon of a place under the flag of the Union. I feel sure that for a long time to come the people of the United States will be wisely content with our present area, and not launch upon any scheme of annexation."

any three ministers issue a similar document now, public opinion would force their recall upon any administration. The anti-slavery sentiment, however, was then well up to our present ideas. One journal said the manifesto was "weak in its reasonings and atrocious in its recommendations ;"1 another called it the "manifesto of the brigands," whose declaration meant: "If Spain will not sell us Cuba, we must steal it in order to preserve our national existence." 2 Naturally enough, the relation which the scheme bore to the maintenance of slavery affected the people who had bitterly opposed the Kansas-Nebraska bill. It seemed to them a recommendation of an offer of one hundred and twenty million dollars to Spain to give up the emancipation of slaves in Cuba and to accomplish likewise the addition of two or three slave States to the Union.3 But if a peaceful purchase could not be effected, treasure must be wasted and lives sacrificed in order that slavery might extend its power.

European opinion of this manifesto, except that of the active revolutionists, was well expressed in a carefully written article in the London Times, which began: "The diplomacy of the United States is certainly a very singular profession." It was singular because the diplomats did not hatch their mischief in secret. A report of their plot was printed by order of Congress. In this Ostend manifesto a policy was avowed which, if declared by one of the great European powers, would set the whole continent in "a blaze;" or, if seriously entertained by the United States government, it would justify a declaration of war. The argument was exactly the same as that used by Russia in the last century to vindicate her interference in Poland.4
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1 New York Evening Post, March 6th, 1855. The document was published in the newspapers on that day.
2 New York Tribune, March 8th, 1855.
3 If Cuba had been acquired, no doubt can exist that it would have been admitted into the Union as one, two, or three slave States.
4 London Times, March 24th, 1855. This journal generally leaned to the Democratic party.

It is perhaps unjust to attach to the administration of Pierce the discredit of the Ostend manifesto, for the policy therein set forth was disavowed by the Secretary of State in the name of the President. Yet as the Democratic party indirectly approved it by the nomination for President of the man who was first to sign it, it settled down in the popular mind as one of the measures of the Pierce administration. Any good in the Democratic conduct of the government from 1853 to 1857 has been almost wholly obliterated by the Kansas Nebraska bill and the Ostend manifesto. The domestic policy was characterized by an utter disregard of plighted faith; the avowed foreign policy was marked by the lack of justice as understood by all civilized nations of the world.


Source: Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States; from the compromise of 1850 to the final restoration of home rule at the south in 1877, v.2. New York: Macmillan, 1910 [c1892].